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Abstract 
Abstract 
Modern companies have made a great contribution to the development of the 
economy. However, the company is not a perfect organization - modern companies, 
particularly listed companies, suffer from agency problems, in the form of conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders, majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders, and shareholders and other stakeholders. ' These agency problems form 
the core subject matter of the corporate governance debates that have attracted the 
attention of governments, international organizations, and scholars in the fields of 
economics, law, politics, management and other areas. 
The type of agency problem that arises is determined by the structure of share 
ownership. Where the structure of share ownership is concentrated, the agency 
problem takes the form of a conflict of interest between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders, whereas where the structure of share ownership is dispersed 
the agency problem takes the form of a conflict between management and 
shareholders. The appropriate model of corporate governance follows from this. The 
structure of share ownership is concentrated in some countries or regions of the world 
and dispersed in others, depending on the economic, political, legal, historical and 
cultural circumstances. There is no single perfect model of corporate governance, but 
different models appropriate to different countries or regions, in the light of the 
structure of share ownership. 
The case of Chinese listed companies will be examined to illustrate the argument, and 
in particular to contrast it with the "law matters" and the "politics matters" theories. 
The major problem of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies is the agency 
problem characteristic of concentrated ownership, of a conflict between the majority 
shareholder and minority shareholders. The problem in China is compounded by the 
fact that the majority shareholder is in most cases the state. Although the structure of 
ownership is affected by many factors, such as the economy, politics, law, culture and 
history, today the main determinant of the development of the economy will be the 
change of the structure of share ownership from concentrated share ownership by the 
state to relatively dispersed ownership. 
1 The thesis is building on the assumption that the company is run for the best interest of shareholders rather than 
stakeholders 
IV 
Contents 
Contents 
Acknowledgement 
.......................................................................................................................... 
II 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... IV 
Contents .......................................................................................................................................... V 
Abbreviations and Acronyms ...................................................................................................... 
IX 
List of Diagrams ........................................................................................................................... XI 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. XI 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 2 
Part 1 Theory: the structure of ownership determines a model of corporate governance........ 9 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 10 
Chapter!. The nature of company ........................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Evolution of the corporate form according to market pressures ........................................... 12 
1.2. Nexus of contracts model .................................................................................................... 15 
1.3. The main features of the company- limited liability and personality ................................ 
17 
1.4. Companies and property ...................................................................................................... 23 
1.5. The room for the improvement of companies ..................................................................... 
26 
1.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 
28 
Chapter 2. The Core Issue of Corporate Governance ............................................................... 30 
2.1. The agency problem ............................................................................................................ 
30 
2.1.1. The drawback of the company system ........................................................................... 30 
2.1.2. The reason for the agency problem: shareholding structure .......................................... 32 
2.2. Agency cost ......................................................................................................................... 
40 
2.2.1. Concept of agency cost .................................................................................................. 
40 
2.2.2. Methods of solving the agency cost problem ................................................................. 
44 
2.2.2.1. Contractual arrangements ...................................................................................... 
44 
2.2.2.2 Board of directors ................................................................................................... 
47 
2.2.2.3. Blockholders .......................................................................................................... 
50 
2.2.2.4. Creditors ................................................................................................................ 
52 
2.2.2.5. Market (takeover) .................................................................................................. 
54 
2.2.2.6. Proxy fights ............................................................................................................ 
55 
2.2.2.7. Executive compensation ........................................................................................ 
56 
2.2.2.8. Institutional investors ............................................................................................. 
58 
2.2.2.9. Trust ....................................................................................................................... 
60 
2.2.2.9.1. The conception and importance of trust .......................................................... 
60 
2.2.2.9.2. Trust and agent problem ................................................................................. 
63 
2.2.2.9.3. Disadvantages of trust ..................................................................................... 
69 
2.2.2.9.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 
70 
2.3. The concept of corporate governance ................................................................................... 
71 
2.4. The classification of corporate governance around the world ............................................. 78 
2.4. l. Outsider and insider systems .......................................................................................... 79 
2.4.2. Market-oriented and bank-oriented systems .............................................................. 80 
2.4.3. Dispersion and concentration systems ........................................................................... 82 
2.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 
85 
V 
Contents 
Chapter 3. Relationship between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
87 
3.1. The nature of the share ........................................................................................................ 
87 
3.2. The relationship between the structure of ownership and corporate governance ................ 
92 
3.3. The implication of model ..................................................................................................... 
97 
3.4. The share ownership structure determines the model of corporate governance .................. 
98 
3.4.1. In the United State: the structure of dispersed share ownership- shareholder & 
management model of corporate governance ....................................................................... 
104 
3.3.2. In Germany: the structure of bank-concentrated share ownership- majority 
shareholder(bank) & minority shareholders model of corporate governance ....................... 
111 
3.3.3. In South Korea: the structure of family-concentrated share ownership- majority 
shareholder (family) & minority shareholders model of corporate governance ................... 
119 
3.3.4. In China: the structure of state-concentrated share ownership- majority shareholder 
(state) & minority shareholders model of corporate governance .......................................... 
124 
3.5. Conclusion 
......................................................................................................................... 126 
Chapter 4.1s it true that "law matters" (La Porta et al. ) and "politics matters" ( Mark. J. 
Roe etc. )? ..................................................................................................................................... 129 
4.1. The "law matters"theory .................................................................................................... 129 
4.1.1. The brief content of "law matters" ............................................................................... 130 
4.1.2. Shortcomings of "law matters" .................................................................................... 134 
4.1.3. Conclusion 
................................................................................................................... 146 
4.2. The " politics matters" theory ............................................................................................ 147 
4.2.1. Summary of "politics matters" ..................................................................................... 147 
4.2.2 The drawback of "politics matters" .............................................................................. 151 
4.2.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 156 
4.3. Conclusion 
......................................................................................................................... 157 
Chapter 5. How does the structure of share ownership come into being? ............................. 159 
5.1. Law and politics have effect on the structure of share ownership ..................................... 160 
5.1.1. The United State .......................................................................................................... 
162 
5.1.2. Sweden ......................................................................................................................... 
164 
5.1.3. Italy .............................................................................................................................. 
166 
5.1.4. Japan ............................................................................................................................ 
167 
5.1.5. The United Kingdom ................................................................................................... 168 
5.2. Culture and the structure of share ownership .................................................................... 170 
5.2.1 Concept ......................................................................................................................... 
170 
5.2.2. The effect of culture on the structure of share ownership ............................................ 172 
5.3. History and structure of share ownership .......................................................................... 179 
5.4. Economy and structure of share ownership ....................................................................... 185 
5.4.1. In the United States ...................................................................................................... 185 
5.4.2. In Germany .................................................................................................................. 190 
5.4.3.1n South Korea .............................................................................................................. 194 
5.4.4. In China ....................................................................................................................... 197 
5.5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 199 
Conclusion of Part One .............................................................................................................. 202 
VI 
Contents 
Part Two Practice: the structure of state-concentrated share ownership determines majority 
shareholder (state) & minority shareholder (public) model of corporate governance in China 
...................................................................................................................................................... 205 
Introduction 
................................................................................................................................ 206 
Chapter 6. The history of the structure of concentrated ownership ...................................... 209 
6.1. Introduction 
....................................................................................................................... 209 
6.2. Ancient times ..................................................................................................................... 209 
6.3. Current times ..................................................................................................................... 210 
6.3.1. Introduction 
.................................................................................................................. 210 
6.3.2. Before the reform of economy ..................................................................................... 211 
6.3.3. Reform times ............................................................................................................... 214 
6.4. The history of listed companies ......................................................................................... 223 
6.5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 230 
Chapter 7. The Relationship between culture and ownership ................................................. 232 
7.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 232 
7.2. Ancient times ..................................................................................................................... 232 
7.3. In Mao's times ................................................................................................................... 240 
7.4. After 1978 
.......................................................................................................................... 243 
7.5. Conclusion 
......................................................................................................................... 246 
Chapter 8. The Influence of Politics on Ownership .................................................................. 248 
8.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 248 
8.2. How has politics influenced the corporate governance through the structure of ownership? 
.................................................................................................................................................. 249 
8.2.1. Management and appointment of officers in firms controlled completely by the Party 
before the reform .................................................................................................................. 250 
8.2.2. The influence of the Party on enterprises was changed after reform ........................... 
251 
8.2.3. The influence of by Party on firms is declining through changes in ownership structure 
.............................................................................................................................................. 256 
8.3. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 
260 
Chapter 9. Law, ownership and corporate governance ........................................................... 263 
9.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 
263 
9.2. The characteristics of Chinese law .................................................................................... 
263 
9.3. What is the relationship between law and ownership in China today? .............................. 
265 
9.4. Corporate governance ........................................................................................................ 268 
9.4.1. Background .................................................................................................................. 268 
9.4.2. The concept and character of corporate governance .................................................... 270 
9.4.3. The structure of corporate governance ......................................................................... 272 
9.4.3.1. Shareholders' general meeting ............................................................................. 272 
9.4.3.2. Board of directors ................................................................................................ 274 
9.4.3.3. Board of supervisors ............................................................................................ 276 
9.5. The future of corporate governance ................................................................................... 278 
9.6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 280 
Chapter 10. Disadvantages of the Structure of Concentrated Ownership ............................ 281 
10.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 281 
VII 
Contents 
10.2. Ownership, market and competition ................................................................................ 
284 
10.3. The structure of share ownership ..................................................................................... 
288 
10.3.1. General conception .................................................................................................... 
288 
10.3.2. The disadvantages of concentrated ownership ........................................................... 291 
10.4. Conclusion 
....................................................................................................................... 
305 
Chapterll. The reform of ownership is a precondition for the improvement of corporate 
governance ................................................................................................................................... 307 
11.1. Agency problem ............................................................................................................... 
307 
11.2. How to solve the agency problem? .................................................................................. 308 
11.2.1. Privatization 
............................................................................................................... 
309 
11.2.2. Institutional investors ................................................................................................. 315 
11.2.3. The role of commercial bank ..................................................................................... 318 
11.3. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 321 
Conclusion of Part Two .............................................................................................................. 324 
Part 3 Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................ 326 
Chapter 12. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 327 
12.1. Final Remarks .................................................................................................................. 
327 
12.2. The contribution of the research ...................................................................................... 
330 
12.3. Limitation of the research ................................................................................................ 
332 
12.4. Suggestions for further research ...................................................................................... 
333 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 334 
VIII 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AMC Asset Management Company 
BSAM Bureau of State Assets Management 
Ca1PERS California Public Employees' Retirement System 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CNAO China National Audit Office 
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
LLC Limited Liability Companies 
MRCS Management Responsibility Contract System 
NSOE Non State-Own Enterprise 
PBOC People's Bank of China 
PLC Publicly Listed Companies 
PRC People's Republic of China 
ROE Return on Equity 
ROS Return on Sale 
SCER State Commission of Economic Restructuring 
SCSC State Council Securities Commission 
IX 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission (United States) 
SETC State Economic and Trade Commission 
SOCB State-Owned Commercial Bank 
SOE State-Own Enterprise 
SPC State Planning Commission 
TVE Township and Village Enterprise 
WTO World Trade Organization 
X 
List of Diagrams 
Diagram 1 The Relationship between Structure of Ownership and Corporate 
Governance 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Types of Common Stock Issued in China 
Table 2 Selected Mean Performance Statistics of Listed SOEs 
Table 3 Examples of Chinese Companies Making Guarantees 
XI 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Corporate governance is one of the hottest topics in the fields of economics, 
jurisprudence, politics, management etc. all over the world. Scholars have put forward 
their arguments on corporate governance from various angles, although there is still 
no common agreement in relation to the definition of corporate governance. 
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means argued comprehensively that separation of 
ownership from control leads to conflict of interest mainly between shareholders and 
managers due to dispersed share ownership in large companies in America in their 
classic book "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" in 1932. Since then the 
literature by scholars on corporate governance constantly appears in favor of Berle 
and Means's argument on the principal-agent (shareholders and managers) 
relationship, for example Baumol (1959), Jensen and Mechling (1976), and 
Grossman and Hart (1980)etc.. 2 
However, from the 1970s onwards, the more and more results of empirical 
studies by scholars on corporate governance are at odds with the argument by Adolph 
Berle and Gardiner Means, for instance, Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz(1983), Shleifer 
and Vishny(1986), Edwards and Fischer (1994), Franks and Mayer(1994), Prowse 
2 E. g. see Baumol, William, 1959, Business Behavior, Value and Growth, MacMillan, New York, N. Y.; Marris, 
Robin, 1964, The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, Free Press, Glencoe, 111; Penrose, Edith, 1959, The 
Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, U. K.; Williamson, Oliver, 1964, The Economies of 
Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; 
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 1967, The New Industrial State, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, Mass.; Jensen, Michael, and 
William Mechling, 1976, `Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, agency Costs, and Ownership Structure', 
Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp 305-360.; Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1980, `Takeover Bids, the 
Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation', Bell Journal of Economics 11, pp 42-64. 
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(1992), La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens et al (2000)etc. 3 That is, in reality the 
concentration of ownership is universal and big shareholders control companies (e. g. 
in large companies, in particular publicly traded companies) all over the world except 
for the United States and the United Kingdom etc. 4 by share ownership in the hands 
of families, banks, or the state, and through the use of pyramid structures, deviations 
from one-share-one vote rules, cross-holdings, and the appointment of managers and 
directors who are related to the controlling shareholders. Conflict of interests in the 
concentration of ownership mainly occurs between the majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders besides the traditional conflict of interest between management 
and shareholders that could be controlled by majority shareholders. 
What is the relationship between share ownership and corporate governance? 
What determines the relationship or how do dispersed and concentrated ownership 
come into existence? What model of corporate governance should be learned across 
the countries? The thesis will answer the above questions in detail systematically for 
the first time (referring to the below diagram 1). 
The thesis argues that the company as a legal personality is the outcome of 
3 E. g. Eisenberg, Melvin, 1976, The Structure of the Corporation :A Legal Analysis, Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston, Mass.; Demsetz, Harold, 1983, `The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Law 
and Economics 26, pp 375-390.; Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986, `Large Shareholders and Corporate 
Control', Journal of Political Economy 94, pp 461-488.; Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan, 1988, `The 
Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis', Journal of Financial 
Economics 20, pp 317-346.; Edwards Jeremy, and Klaus Fisher, 1994, Banks, Finance and Investment in West 
Germany since 1970, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U. K.; Franks, Julian, and Colin Mayer, 1994, `The 
Ownership and Control of German Corporations', Unpublished manuscript, London Business School; Prowse, 
Stephen, 1992, `The Structure of Corporate ownership in Japan', Journal of Finance 47, pp 1121-1140; La Porta, 
Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 1998, `Law and Finance', Journal of 
Political Economy 106, pp 1113-1150; Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, `The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations', Journal of Financial Economics58, pp 81-112. 
4 Most scholars think that the U. S and the U. K. belong to the structure of dispersed share ownership in the world. 
But some scholars think the U. S., the U. K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand etc are the structure of dispersed 
share ownership in the world. e. g. See Neil 
Fligstein and Jennifer Choo, 2005, `Law and Corporate Governance', 
Working Paper; Peter Gourevitch, with Richard Carney, and Michael Hawes, 2003, `Testing Political Explanations 
of Corporate Governance Patterns', 
Working Paper, (February). 
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"survival of fittest" and has a lot of advantages compared to other enterprise forms in 
the long history but there are many weaknesses at the same time regarding the 
company per se as a legal personality. In particular, with the development of 
technology, progress of society and fierce competition in market, when companies 
become larger and larger, companies require much more funding beyond their ability 
in order to meet the expansion of marketing, production, and distributions etc. by debt 
or by equity. If the company selects external finance from debt, the structure of 
ownership remains the same as before, and generally speaking, the structure of 
ownership is concentrated under these circumstances. When companies, especially 
publicly traded companies get outside finance by equity, it means the change of the 
structure of ownership in companies will have to take place. It is the structure of 
ownership that leads to agency problems resulting in agency costs that is the core 
issue of corporate governance all over the world in place of separation of ownership 
from control by Berle and Means. That is, the structure of share ownership determines 
the model of corporate governance directly all over the world. 
When companies need much funding by equity, the change of the structure of 
ownership in companies will have to develop in the two directions: dispersion and 
concentration. Once the change of structure of ownership develops towards dispersion, 
the agency problem in corporate governance is mainly that conflict of interest happens 
between dispersed shareholders and management, which is consistent with the 
argument of separation of ownership from control by Berle and Means because of 
information asymmetry, free-rider problem, cost, skill etc for dispersed shareholders. 
4 
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Management will take advantage of its position to tunnel companies in the interest of 
managers instead of the company or dispersed shareholders. When the change of the 
structure of ownership grows towards concentration, the agency problem in corporate 
governance is mainly that conflict of interest rises between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders besides the traditional conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers because companies or management is controlled by majority 
shareholders. Majority shareholders will transfer assets to their or their relatives' other 
companies by related party transactions or other ways at the expense of the minority's 
interests. Hence the actual structure of ownership instead of the "law matters" by La 
Porta et al. and the "politics matters" by Mark J. Roe etc., determines the model of 
corporate governance which should be improved to a certain varying extent. 
Although political decision-making, or protection of investors by law will have a 
certain effect on structure of ownership or corporate governance, the function of 
politics or law is very limited and the influence by politics or law on corporate 
governance should not be emphasized excessively. The thesis argues that the structure 
of share ownership will be affected by many elements such as economy, politics, law, 
culture and history, but determined by economic factors ultimately. Thus it draws a 
conclusion: there is no best model of corporate governance in the world, only a model 
of corporate governance that adapts to a particular country or region. 
In order to support the argument that the structure of ownership determines the 
model of corporate governance in the world, the thesis takes the case of Chinese listed 
companies as example to explain and show the reason of the above. The thesis argues 
5 
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that the structure of concentrated ownership of listed companies in China has been 
influenced by history, culture, law, politics and economy etc. which leads to agency 
problems and conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, shareholders and managers; but the major conflict of interest between 
the state as controlling shareholder and the public as minority shareholders, because 
the state as controlling shareholder controls the listed companies and always pursues 
its goals in place of profit maximization at the cost of the interests of minority 
shareholders, which results in the poor quality of listed companies and the poor 
corporate governance in China. Thus the concentrated share ownership of listed 
companies controlled by the state through share ownership in China directly 
determines the quality of corporate governance of listed companies. 
The thesis suggests that only if the reform of the structure of concentrated 
ownership in China is successful, will the improvement of corporate governance of 
listed companies be possible. In order to improve corporate governance, the shares 
owned by the state must be privatized reasonably and properly in accordance with 
worldwide experience and given environments. Maybe the institutional investor is one 
of the ways to improve the quality of corporate governance, which has been proved a 
good experience in the improvement of corporate governance in some Western 
countries. 
In brief, based on the scholarly literature, mainly conducting library-based 
research in the UK and China, and analyzing by means of comparative study 
economically, culturally, historically, politically and legally, the thesis puts forward 
6 
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the following argument for the first time: the structure of ownership everywhere 
determines the model of corporate governance, which is the contribution made to 
academic understanding. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 describes the characters of 
companies, the result of survival of fittest, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
companies, in particular agency problems. Chapter 2 presents the core issue of 
corporate governance, and the conflicts of interest in the structure of dispersed share 
ownership and in the structure of concentrated share ownership. Chapter 3 discusses 
the relationship between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance. 
Chapter 4 challenges the "law matters" and the "politics matters". Chapter 5 outlines 
how the structure of share ownership comes into being. Chapter 6 explains how the 
structure of concentrated ownership is formed in history in China. Chapter 7 shows 
that the culture has great effect on ownership in China. Chapter 8 emphasizes the 
influence of politics on the structure of concentrated ownership in China. Chapter 9 
explores the relationship between the law, ownership and corporate governance in 
China. Chapter 10 expounds disadvantages of the structure of concentrated ownership 
in China. Chapter 11 suggests that the reform of ownership is a precondition for the 
improvement of corporate governance in China. Chapter 12 draws conclusions. 
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Part 1 
Theory: the structure of ownership determines a model of 
corporate governance 
Introduction 
Introduction 
In this part, I will elucidate briefly the advantages and disadvantages of companies in 
their long history. Compared with other forms of enterprises, companies could adapt 
easily themselves to changing environments owing to elaborate and efficient internal 
mechanisms while their shortcomings lead to the practical problems of corporate 
governance. 
As for corporate governance, scholars in varying disciplines have different 
comments on it of which "law matters" and "politics matters" are very famous. I 
argue that the issue of corporate governance derives from the structure of share 
ownership: the structure of share ownership determines the model of corporate 
governance in the world. In other words, the major problem of corporate governance 
in the structure of dispersed share ownership is conflict of interest between 
shareholders and management, while the major problem of corporate governance in 
the structure of concentrated share ownership is conflict of interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
The core issue of corporate governance is agency problems that originate from 
relationships between management and shareholders, majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders, and shareholders and stakeholders. As we know, there is no 
company without shareholders who can take part in the activities of the company by 
means of share ownership in accordance with its laws and charters; in other words, 
there is no company without shares which make up the structure of share ownership 
10 
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which is affected by many elements such as economy, law, politics, history, culture etc. 
but by economy ultimately. 
Although not all shareholders are interested in the operation of companies due to 
cost, skill, information asymmetry etc., we could say all shareholders are concerned 
with their assets or interests which have a close relationship with the operation of 
companies, which results in different agency problems in different structures of share 
ownership. Therefore I come to a conclusion that the structure of share ownership 
determines directly a model of corporate governance in the world for the first time. 
Here I emphasize that I am concerned with only the corporate form in general, 
not the detail of substantive law of any jurisdiction. Sometimes I will make particular 
reference to the company law of particular countries for illustrative purposes. 
Chapter 1. The nature of company 
Chapter 1. The nature of companys 
1.1 Evolution of the corporate form according to market 
pressures 
Modern companies in Western societies are creatures of a market economy. The sole 
tradership is the simplest and earliest form of business organization. 6 The Commenda 
and the Societas as the two earliest business organizations are similar to the modern 
partnership. 7 But with the development of society and technology, the existing 
business organizations of the day could not keep the pace with the requirement for the 
growth of economy and society, for example, the construction of railways needed 
huge amounts of money in the late 19th century, and neither sole tradership nor the 
partnership could satisfy the conditions. The company was created to adapt to the 
demands of the society. The emergence and development of the corporation is not 
only significant but also reasonable in practice, which is the result of evolution of the 
means of productivity. 
Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection in the natural sciences is well 
known, and there also exists competition among organizational forms for survival. We 
can say that firms that survive in competitive markets are supposed to have optimal 
5 The terms `company' and `corporation' are used interchangeably in the thesis, however `firm' in particular when 
citing articles in economics, `firm' is often used to represent any business 
including a partnership and a company. 
But `company' in the thesis means mainly `large companies' (including `public companies' or `listed companies') 
since chapter two onward. 
6 See John H Farrar and Brenda Hannigan, 1998, Farrar's Company Law, London: Butterworths, 4`h ed., p 15. 
See John H Farrar and Brenda Hannigan, 1998, Farrar's Company Law, London: Butterworths, 4th ed., p 16. 
(citing Holdsworth, op cit, at 195 f). 
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governance structures. Firms that could not adapt their governance structures to the 
changing business environment supposedly have to challenge extinction via 
bankruptcy, dissolution or takeover, resulting in a natural selection of efficient 
organizational forms. 8 In other words, only those firms that could adapt themselves to 
competition could survive in the market. That is, from the perspective of cost, the 
form of organization that survives in a transaction is the one whose cost is less than 
the profitability. 9 According to organization theory, adaptation is the central problem 
of economic organization. Friedrich Hayek stressed the adaptation of autonomous 
economic actors who adjust spontaneously to changes in the market, mainly as 
signaled by changes in relative prices. The marvel of the market is present in "how 
little the individual participants need to know to be able to take the right action". 1° By 
contrast, Chester Barnard emphasized coordinated adaptation among economic actors 
working through deep knowledge and the use of administration. In his view, the 
marvel of hierarchy is that coordinated adaptation is accomplished not spontaneously, 
but in a "conscious, deliberate, purposeful" way. ' 1 In fact the problem of economic 
organization is properly assumed not as market or hierarchies, but rather as the 
problem of combining market and hierarchies. 12 Only firms that should be active 
rather passive in the market could survive in the fierce competition. Therefore, Arrow 
8 See Stacey Kole and Kenneth Lehn, 1997, `Deregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure, 
and Survival', The Emerging New Economics of the Firm, Vol. 87, No. 2, p 421. 
9 See Eugene F. Fama, and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, 'Agency Problems and Residual Claims', Journal of Law & 
Economics, Vol. XXVI. 
10 See Chester Barnard, 1938, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
11 See Chester Barnard, 1938, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
12 See Oliver E. Williamson, 2002, `The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract', 
Journal of Economics Perspectives, Vol. 16, Number 3, p 175. 
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argued it would not be completely right to regard the firm as a black box13 that 
changes inputs into outputs according to the laws of technology. Instead, firms must 
be described in relation to other modes of governance, all of which have internal 
structure, which structure "must arise for some reason". 14 In other words, the 
structure emerges to reduce transaction costs by contract/ private ordering/ 
governance approach. 15 Thus Coase argued that firms rose because there were 
"transaction costs" involved in entering markets, negotiating for goods and services, 
and enforcing contracts. Coase continued that if the cost of carrying out a transaction 
in the firm was less than the cost of carrying out the same transaction within the 
market, firms would internalize the transaction in order to lower costs. 16 In this 
scenario, firms rise and develop precisely when the market is less efficient than 
firms. ' 7 As March and Simon pointed out, organizational structure was created by 
attempts to decrease the effects of these constraints, such as cognition and 
information. 18 In other words, enterprises must deal with transaction costs actively by 
their internal mechanism in intense competition in order to survive in the market. 
The corporation has been able to adapt itself to the society and market in its long 
history because it constantly and purposefully adjusts itself through its organization to 
adapt to changes in market and society. Companies are the result of institutional 
1; ` black box' put forward by the neoclassical theory which predicts how the firm's production plan varies with 
input and output prices, but says nothing about how this production plan comes about. See Oliver Hart, 
1995, ' Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications', The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 430, p 678. 
14 Kenneth Arrow, 1999, "'Forward" in Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics 
Perspective', G. Carroll and D. Teece, eds. New York University Press, p vii. 
15 Oliver E. Williamson, 2002, `The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract', 
Journal of Economies Perspectives, Vol. 16, Number 3, ,p 178. 
16 See Coase R, 1937, ` The Nature of Firm', Economica 4, pp 386-405. 
17 See Neil Fligstein and Robert Freeland, 1995, `Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Corporate 
Organization', Annu. Rev. Sociol,. 21, p 24. 
18 See Simon H, 1957, Administrative Behavior, New York: Macmilan; March J, Simon H, 1958, 
Organizations, New York: Wiley. 
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competition because they have efficient organizations. In other words, companies are 
not passive but active in the market. The company as an entity and an organization has 
a lot of advantages compared to other enterprise forms, for example, its ability to raise 
substantial amounts of capital from outside easily; limited liability (non-exclusive 
now) which attracts investors; a relatively perfected management system and 
elaborate structure; flexibility, namely the company form can be used to suit all kinds 
of firms, from the smallest, one-person business to the largest, multi-national 
undertaking; 19 freedom of establishment; etc. which are beneficial to the development 
and competition of companies in the market. But the above improve constantly in the 
process of development of companies in the market. In a word, the characteristics of 
companies and their structure and internal organization resulting from their historical 
development show the adaptability of companies to the changing environment. 
Therefore, the modem company, which adapts easily and naturally to the changing 
environments through its internal elaborate mechanism, is the result of "survival of 
fittest". 
1.2. Nexus of contracts model 
What is a company? Coase argues that the corporation is certainly a species of firm- 
a group of people organized to raise funds and operate a profitable business. 
20 In 
economics the current dominant model of the corporation, the nexus of contracts 
19 See Paul L. Davies, 2003, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 7`h ed., p 
3. 
20 See Ronald H. Coase, 1937, `The Nature of firm', 4 Economia, pp 386-405. 
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model that is based on an economic analysis of the firm, emphasizes this profit aspect 
of the firm. Bainbridge describes the corporation as follows: 
"The firm (is) not as a single entity, but is an aggregate of various inputs 
acting together with the common goal of producing goods or services. 
Employees provide labor. Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders 
provide equity capital, bear the risk of losses, and monitor the 
performance of management. Management monitors the performance of 
employees and coordinates the activities of all the firm's inputs. The firm 
is simply a legal fiction representing the complex set of contractual 
relationships between these inputs. In other words, the firm is not an 
individual thing, but rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit 
contracts establishing rights and obligations among the various inputs 
"2 making up firm. 1 
In light of the above concept, corporate law is only a provider of standard 
contract terms with which the contracting parties comply. 22 Sometimes the economic 
analysis of the nexus of contracts concerning corporation does not take into account 
all of law's separate objective such as fairness and justice. Or economic analysis of 
the nexus of contracts stresses an emphasis on the function of economy rather than 
social responsibility. The thesis will analyze the drawbacks of the nexus of contract 
next chapter. 
Law is concerned not only with economic efficiency, but with things we term 
retribution, personal responsibility, fairness, and a just society etc. Law should 
regulate not only individual human being's economic aim or demand but also the goal 
of society as a whole. Its structure is not and cannot be restricted to maximizing 
21 See Stephen Bainbridge, 1997, `Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law scholarship', 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, p 8. 
22 See Benedict Sheeshy, 2004, `The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and 
the Future of Corporate Law', Depaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 2: 463, p 465. 
16 
Chapter 1. The nature of company 
wealth transactions. 23 In particular, law should not only discuss how to organize and 
protect those rich persons but also care about social welfare. 24 Law should regulate 
not only rights and obligations but also the responsibility (result) which the company 
causes. As for corporate law, it performs two general functions at least: first, it sets up 
the structure of the corporate form as well as procedure requirements to strengthen 
this structure; and second, it attempts to solve conflicts of interest among corporate 
shareholders and stakeholders. 25 So it is not strange sometimes that the scholars in 
law and economics have a different understanding regarding companies and corporate 
governance etc. in the world. 
1.3. The main features of the company- limited liability and 
personality 
In Europe, the evolution of the corporation can be traced to the commercial societies 
of the Middle Ages with the characteristic of the state concession. 26 The early 
company regulations or laws regulated shareholders strictly and put emphasis on the 
protection of society and outsider against the company, for instance, by way of the 
creditor's right to petition for the liquidation of the firm if minimum capital 
requirements were not met. Until well into the nineteenth century, the allocation of 
23 See Benedict Sheeshy, 2004, `The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and 
the Future of Corporate Law', Depaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 2: 463, pp 482-483. 
24 See Robert Dworkin, 1980, `Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. of Legal Studies 191. 
25 See Reiner Karaakman et al, 2004, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p22. 
26 See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West, `The Evolution of Corporate 
Law, A Cross-Country Comparison', The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 
23, issue 4, pp 791-871. 
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control rights among the shareholders of the corporation was decided by state. At the 
early stage, companies as independent legal entities could not engaged in operation 
without state's permission in many aspects, such as selling their shares. 27 With the 
development of the company, the above legal provisions limit agency problems, but at 
the same time greatly restrict the ability of the company to respond to a quickly 
changing environment. For instance, in 1720, the parliament of the United Kingdom 
had to pass the Bubble Act which attempted to restrict, and to restore rigid legislative 
control, through the use of the corporate form, in response to the speculative bubble 
associated with the South Sea Company that did great harm to market and society 
then. But one of its negative effects was to dwindle the competition to which 
chartered corporations were exposed. 28 
Companies are the result of the development of society and are improved 
gradually, as stated above. Historically there have been many different types of 
companies, or companies could be categorized into variant forms. Modern companies 
regulated by company law have the five core structural characteristics as follows: "(1) 
legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4) centralized 
management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership by contributors of 
capital. "29 However, there are other different forms of business enterprises that adapt 
to different situations and that are short of one or more of these characteristics in the 
27 See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West, `The Evolution of Corporate 
Law, A Cross-Country Comparison', The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 
23, Issue 4, pp 791-871. 
`s See Michael J. Whincop, 2001, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law, Aldershot(UK): 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, p 1. 
29 Reinier Kraakmain, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hidekkanda and Edwardrock, 
2004 , 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 5. 
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history of the development of organizations. Even the company may lack one or two 
characteristics at early stage compared to modem corporations. For instance, the joint 
stock company with tradable shares as one of its characteristics was not legal for 
business activities in England until 1844 and limited liability was not stipulated in law 
until 1855.30 Of course, there ever existed only a handful of specially chartered 
companies that coalesced all five of these characteristics before the beginning of the 
nineteenth century in the history and that were outcomes of particular period and 
history. 
As an economic entity, a company will engage in activities stipulated by law and 
charter through a nexus of contracts, which requires the company to be recognized as 
an independent entity. The first and most important contribution of corporate law, as 
of other forms of organizational law, create a legal personality of a company that is 
distinct from the various individuals, such as investor, suppliers or customers of the 
firm. 31 The core element of legal personality is that company is able to own assets, 
participate in all kinds of activities independently and take responsibility for its 
consequence, which are distinct from its investors, such as the company's 
shareholders. The company can sue and be sued in its own name, and can make 
profits and losses that are its own. Thus the individual shareholders of the corporation 
cannot withdraw their share of company assets at will but can sell off their shares 
according to laws and the articles of association or shareholders' contract and the 
company is free not only to use and sell its assets but to pledge or lien its assets as 
30 Phillip Blumberg, 1988, The Law of Corporate Group: Substantive Law, Boston/Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 
pp. 9-20. 
31 ibid, p 7. 
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security to creditors whose claim on the company's assets is prior to the claims of the 
personal creditors of the company's shareholders. In a word, legal personality 
strengthens the stability and creditworthiness of the company in order that the 
company can take part in all kinds of activities stipulated by the law. 
Historically, limited liability has not always been associated with the birth and 
development of the corporate form. Unlimited shareholder liability as the governing 
rule for corporate debts was an important institution in some corporate jurisdictions 
for a long time. 32 For example, England was the first country to adopt free 
registration in 1844,33 but only after several court decisions, which recognized 
contractually granted limited liability. The Act for Limiting the Liability of Members 
of Certain Joint Stock Companies was passed on 14th August 1855, in which limited 
liability was firstly provided in England. French legislators firstly accepted limited 
liability in Code de Commerce in 1807.34 Limited liability was specified by law in 
Germany in 1861.35 Limited liability means the creditors of the corporation are 
limited to making claims against the assets of the company itself rather than the 
personal assets of the company's shareholders. The major advantages of limited 
liability are not only to encourage investment as the member's risk is minimized, but 
also to facilitate a public share market, since without limited liability shares would be 
32 See Paul L. Davies, 1997, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law (6t' ed., ) pp 40-46. 
33 See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West, `The Evolution of Corporate 
Law, A Cross-Country Comparison', The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 
23, Issue 4, pp 791-871. ( citing Joint Stock Companies Act land 8 Vict., ch. 110 and 111(1844) 
(Engl. )). 
;a See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West, `The Evolution of Corporate 
Law, A Cross-Country Comparison', The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law , Vol. 
23, Issue 4, pp 791-871. ( citing Art. 33 Code de Commerce(C. com. ), adopted 
by Law No. 2804, November 
1807, Bull. Des Lois No. 164 (1808), 161-299 (France)). 
35See Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Mark D. West, The Evolution of Corporate Law, 
A Cross-Country Comparison', The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 23, 
Issue 4, pp 791-871. ( citing Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch(ADHGB), od 
1861 reprint in 
BGBL. Norddtsch. Bd, Nr. 32.379, Append. C Part 3, at 445 (Germany)). 
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worth less to a wealthy shareholder due to the debt of companies. That is, the wealthy 
shareholder would be more likely to be sued in a liquidation than a poor one, so the 
value of shares would depend on the wealth of individual holder, 36 which is unfair to 
some of shareholders who are wealthier. The relation between legal personality and 
limited liability is that legal personality permits the business to possess assets, and 
thus acts as a kind of floating lien giving priority to business creditors over the 
individual creditors of investors and managers, and limited liability keeps the assets of 
shareholders' individuals exclusively for their personal creditors. 37 As a consequence, 
it strikes a balance between the creditor of company and the individual creditor of 
investors. 
One of basic characteristics of the business corporation that differentiates the 
corporation from the partnership and from various other standard-form legal entities is 
fully transferable shares. 38 Shares must be transferred in compliance with the law and 
articles of association. Transferability of shares benefits not only shareholders who 
can construct and maintain diversified investment portfolios but also the corporation 
itself because it can go on conducting business without interruption as the identity of 
its shareholders changes. In particular, the transferability of shares could promote the 
development of a stock market, and where a modern capital market developed it could 
accelerate the change of structure of ownership in companies. 
With the growth of the corporation and the change of the structure of share 
36 See John Lowry and Alan Dignam, 2003, Company Law (Second Edition), London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
Reed Elevier (UK) Ltd, p 48. 
37 See Reimer Kraakmain, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hidekkanda and 
Edwardrock, 2004, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 9. 
38 ibid, at 10. 
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ownership, the professional management developed gradually. Delegated management 
with a board structure is an attribute of nearly all large companies with numerous 
fractional shareholders, which result in the centralization of management in place of 
the centralization of shareholders. It was said that the potential problems of the 
separation of ownership and control were ascertained in the eighteenth century in An 
Inquiry into the Nation and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Smith. 39 Centralized 
management under a board structure result in separating management from ownership, 
as a consequence of a shift from ownership to control of firm40 and the emergence of 
professional managers and directors within the corporation has represented a new 
"managerial revolution" within the corporate governance system. 41 "Separation 
allows firm to combine managers with talent but without much capital (at least 
initially) with investors who have capital but neither the time nor the skills to 
manage. , 42 But management can in effect use the company as a device for enhancing 
their own utility. The manager's own self-interest may prevail and lead them to use 
the company's resources for other purposes such as increasing their remuneration and 
perquisites, or working with less diligence, or retaining profits within the company to 
finance growth and expansion designed to enhance their own prestige, which is called 
an adverse selection and a moral hazard problem in economics and leads to the 
agency problem in corporate governance that the thesis will discuss more below. 
39 See Jean Tirole, 2001, 'Corporate Governance', Econometria, Vo1.69, No. 1 at 1. ( citing Smith. A (1776), `An 
Inquiry into the Nation and Caused of the Wealth of Nations', New York: Modern Library, 1937). 
ao CS Beed I Journal of Economic Studies (1966) at 29. 
41 Cf: Burnham, 1962, The managerial Revolution, Indian University Press, and Nichols, 1969, Ownership, 
Control and Ideology, London: Allen & Unwin,. 
42 See Mark. J. Roe, 'The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate governance' Discussion Paper No. 493, 
09/2004. Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138. 
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Most people who managed the company at the early stage of company 
development were owners of the company before the twentieth century, which bears 
some resemblance to partners in partnership today. Shareholders were not only 
management but also owners of company. Investor ownership means investor has 
right to participate in control of corporation and receives the corporation's residual 
earnings or profits, which are typically proportional to the amount of capital 
contributed to the corporation. At that time, there was no agency problem in the 
company, or at least the conflict of interests was not extensive if there was. Thus 
earlier corporate statutes did not pay much attention to the governance structure of the 
firm. All laws initially stipulated that the company would be managed by directors or 
by trustees who were shareholders of the firm. From the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the law prescribes companies as entities or legal personalities that own its 
assets and are quite distinct from shareholders who own shares in companies but are 
not the owners of assets in the company. 
In a word, the emergence and development of the company are reasonable in the 
market around the world due to its adaptability to the changing environment, while 
the characteristics of companies show that companies are independent entities in the 
market and are at an advantage in comparison with other forms of enterprises. 
1.4. Companies and property 
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The concept of ownership is a very complex, powerful and controversial idea. 43 
Ownership has been conceptualized in a number of ways in economics. In the 
accepted economic theories the ground of ownership is commonly conceived to be 
"the productive labor of owner. , 44 Or ownership can be approached in terms of "who 
owns organizational resources, " 45 , who possesses organizational property, " 46 or 
"who owns the means of production. , 47 In law it emphasizes justice, and explains and 
gives moral force to a host of rights and duties as well as serving to legitimate the 
allocation of wealth and privilege. Thus to own something means owner enjoys a 
variable bundle of rights, liberties, powers, and liabilities against all others in relation 
to some tangible or intangible thing. The content of ownership mainly includes: (1) 
The right to possess; (2) the right to use; (3) the right to the capital; (4) the right to 
manage; and (5) the right to security; and (6) the right to the income. 48 The above 
rights, liberties, and powers associated with property could be separated from each 
other, combined together or someone else authorized for use by the owner for the 
purpose of obtaining optimal results in accordance with law. 49 Historically in 
43 See Harris, 1996, Property and Justice, Clarendon Oxford, p 3; Penner, 1997, The idea of Property in Law, 
Clarendon, Oxford, at 1; Honore, 1961, Ownership in Guest (ed. ), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, O. U. P., Oxford, 
p 107. 
44 See Thoristein Veblen, 1898, `The Beginnings of Ownership', The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 3, 
Nov., at 352. 
as See Lipsey, Peter O. Steiner, Douglas D. Purvis, and Paul N. Courant, 1990, Economics, New York: Harper & 
Row. 
46 See Barry Bozeman, 1987, All Organizations Are Public and Private Organizational Theories, San Francisco: 
Joseey-Bass. 
47 See Thomas Sowell, 1985, Marxism, New York: William Morrow and Company. 
48 See John Christman, 1994, ' Distributive Justice and the Complex Structure of Ownership', Philosphy and 
Public Affaire, Vol. 23, No. 3, p 227; A. M. A. Honore, 1961, `Ownership' in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, ed. A. 
Guest (Oxfor: Clarendon, ), pp 107-47; Lawrence Becker, 1977, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul); Andrew Reeve, 1986, Property (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, ); 
Jeremy Waldron, 1988, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press); and Stephen Munzer, 1990, A 
Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, ). 
49 See John Christman, 1994, `Distributive Justice and the Complex Structure of Ownership', Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, ), p 226. 
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company law, ownership as the foundation for the establishment of company was ever 
the principal explanation and justification for the central role of shareholders in 
corporate affairs. 50 As owner, shareholders had right to control and supervise the 
management of the company and to the exclusive result of the company's activities in 
the past. 51 However, in England it was Salomons case in 1896 and in America it was 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad in 1886 that established the 
company's identity as a legal personality in the common law, 52 that is, the company 
as an independent legal artificial personality having a its status is distinct from its 
shareholders in law and being owner of its assets instead of shareholders, who make a 
contribution to the company in return for shares in the company. Since then 
shareholders have rights and liabilities in proportion to their share in company but are 
not owners of asset in the company. By the beginning of the 20th century the idea that 
shareholders had no direct interest in the company's assets had become well 
established in the common law system. Thus the company itself as an entity is the 
owner of its asset and the shareholders of the company enjoy corresponding rights 
stipulated by law or articles and memorandum of association in civil law systems and 
in common law systems. As the owner of assets, a company can independently engage 
in all kinds of business activities by laws, regulations, memorandums and articles and 
take responsibility in society. The law no longer conceives of shareholder rights as a 
50See Dallas, 1995, `Working Toward a New Paradigm' in Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive Corporate Law, West View, 
Colorado, p 37; Hill, 1998, `Changes in the Role of the Shareholder' in Grantham and Rickett (eds. ), Corporate 
Personality in the 20the century, Hart, Oxford, Chapter 10. 
51 See Ross Grantham, 1998, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders', Cambridge Law 
Journal, 57(3), ( November) p 554. 
52 See Ross Grantham, 1998, `The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders', Cambridge Law 
Journal, 57(3), (November) p560 (footnote36, citing (1897) A. C. 22. ) 
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consequence of their status as owners of the company but as owners of a shareholding 
(share) in the company. Shareholders are owners of share in the company while the 
company is owner of its assets, which may be contributed by shareholders who are 
residual claimants, entitled to derive benefits from a company only after all other 
claims have been satisfied. That is why the thesis should use shareholding structure 
(or structure of share ownership) instead of ownership structure in strict law53 when 
owners of shares are referred to collectively concerning companies. As Fama and 
Jensen pointed out, "Our concern in this section is with the organizational forms 
characterized by separation of decision management from residual risk bearing- 
what the literature on open corporations calls, somewhat imprecisely, separation of 
ownership and control". 54 In sum, ownership structure in economics is in a sense 
different from ownership structure in law. But in this thesis, ownership, share 
ownership, and shareholding ownership have the same meaning regarding companies, 
unless stated otherwise. 
1.5. The room for the improvement of companies 
The corporate form is considered as another milestone for industrialization, which is 
53 Generally speaking, economists or scholars in economics in books, articles or other media like to use ownership 
structure related to company: e. g. Jensen, Michael, and William Mechling, 1976, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics 3, No, 4 (October). J. R. 
Davies. el. at, 2005, `Ownership Structure, Managerial behavior and corporate value', Journal of Corporate Finance 
11, pp 645-660; Jian Chen, 2001, ' Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from 
Chinese Listed Companies' , 
Economics of Planning 34: 53-72,; James S. Ang. et. al, 2000, ' Agency Cost and 
Ownership Structure', the Journal of Finance. Vol. LV, No. l, ( February) pp 81-106; Rafael La Porta. et. al, 1999 
`Corporate Ownership Around the World', the Journal of Finance. Vol. LV, No. 2, (April), pp 471-517. They should 
use the shareholding instead of ownership related to company in strict law. 
54 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, `Separation of ownership and control', Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. XXVI, (June), p9 
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the result of viable market economies, and ultimately economic prosperity. 55 The 
corporation as a wonderful flexible legal institution has existed for 200 years of 
industrialization and modernization largely due to its capacity to acclimatize 
constantly to changing conditions. 56 As stated above, companies as entities and 
organizations have many advantages that have improved (or evolved from other 
systems) constantly in the long history compared with other enterprise forms to adapt 
themselves easily to fierce competition in the market. Simply speaking in terms of 
economics, any enterprise that carries out the transaction or activity has to bear costs 
in the market on account of informational asymmetry, supervision etc., namely 
transaction costs. As for companies, as mentioned before, companies are active in the 
market due to the structure of orderly and elaborate internal organization which could 
reduce transaction costs greatly compared with other forms of enterprises. Therefore 
the company could take the advantage of competition in the market. 
However, there are many problems with companies which are identifies by 
scholars and practitioners, which are difficult to deal with, such as evading limited 
liability (e. g. stripping the assets of companies in order to pay a dividend to 
shareholders that leaves nothing to creditors), managerial discretion, related-party 
transactions by big shareholders, when the market is imperfect (in fact there is no 
perfect market in reality). In particular, there is agency problem or agent cost which is 
one of hottest topics in the disciplines of economics, law, management and others. In a 
ss See Ronald I. Mckinnon , 
1973 Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington D. C.: Brooking 
Institution. 
56 See Mary O'Sullivan, `The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance', 24 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 393(2000) on the Importance of Innovative Capacity of Companies. 
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word, the corporation system still needs to be improved in order to adapt to the 
environment of globalization of the economy due to its current drawbacks. 
1.6. Conclusion 
Economic activity in modern societies is dominated by firms that have internal 
organization, possess assets, conclude contracts, and assume liabilities as entities that 
are legally different from their owners and managers, completely taking place of 
individuals as dominant position in economy in the past. 57 The company as a legal 
personality owns its assets and can take part in all kinds of activities in society by 
laws, regulations, memorandum and article of association. Compared to other 
enterprises, the mechanism of company can adapt more easily to changing 
environment and it is the result of "survival of fittest. " If the invention of the steam 
engine started the industrial revolution, then the invention of companies, in particular 
the invention of the joint-stock company was definitely even more significant and 
symbolized a new and more important revolution: the system of the joint-stock 
company, especially raising funding from the public, not only stimulated the industrial 
revolution and innovation of knowledge and technology, but also lay the foundation 
for the development of the modern economy and the progress of civilization as we 
know it today. 58 Companies have both pros and cons. But theirs disadvantages that 
57 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraahman, and Richard Squire, `Law and the Rise of the Firm', Law Working 
Paper No. 57/2006, January 2006. www. ecgi. org/wp. 
58 See Dr. Cyril Lin, 2001, `Private Vices in Public Places: challenges in Corporate Governance Development in 
China', Working Paper, (April), OECD Development Centre. 
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are very difficult to tackle will give rise to the problem of corporate governance in the 
real world. 
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Chapter 2. The Core Issue of Corporate 
Governance 
2.1. The agency problem59 
2.1.1. The drawback of the company system 
The 1840s indicate the beginning of a great wave of organizational change that has 
developed into the modern corporation from traditional one. 60 With the development 
of the economy, the structure of share ownership has changed greatly in companies. In 
particular, the separation of ownership and control leads to a change in the 
organization of enterprise almost as important as that which happened in the industrial 
revolution. 61 The evolution of the modem corporation in the 20th century has 
undergone multidivisional organization, the conglomerate and the multinational 
corporation that have made a great contribution to economic integration and economic 
globalization. The standard for organizing commercial transactions is supposed to be 
59 Agency theory that is in relation to the dissertation will be stressed and described below. However, there are 
many theories regarding corporate governance development: (1) Transaction cost economics. It views the firm 
itself as a governance structure. The choice of an appropriate governance structure can help align the interests of 
directors and shareholders. (2) Stakeholder. The theory takes account of a wider group of constituents rather than 
focusing on shareholders. Where there is an emphasis on stakeholders (employee, creditor, supplier and 
consumer . etc. 
) then the governance structure of the company may provide for some direct representation of the 
stakeholder groups. (3) Stewardship. It thinks directors are regarded as the stewards of the company's assets and 
will be predisposed to act in the best interest of the shareholders. (4) Class hegemony. The theory supposes 
directors view themselves as an elite at the top of the company and will recruit / promote to new director 
appointments taking into account how well new appointments might fit into that elite. (5) Managerial hegemony. It 
thinks management of a company, with its knowledge of day-to day operation, may effectively dominate the 
directors and hence weaken the influence of the directors. See Christine A. Mallin, 2004, `Corporate Governance', 
Oxford University Press, Chapter 2, p 10. 
60 Chandler, A. D., 1977 , 
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press. 
61 Gardiner C. Means, 1931, `The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry', The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Dec. ), p 96. 
30 
Chapter 2. The Core Issue of Corporate Governance 
the strictly instrumental one of reduction of cost, namely lower transaction costs. In 
fact, however, the efficacy of internal organization relies on whether sound principles 
of internal organizational design function very well. In other words, the details of 
internal organization will have strong effect on the improvement of the operation, 62 as 
analyzed in Chapter one. The corporation is first and foremost an efficiency 
instrument that develops fastest and has become the most popular due to the efficient 
structure of internal organization as compared with the partnership, sole tradership or 
proprietorship, or other enterprises currently. However, as stated in chapter one, the 
organizational structure of the corporation as an entity instead of the shareholder as 
the owner of corporation in the past, is not perfect as expected and designed because 
corporations maybe seek to monopolize markets, management sometimes pursue their 
own goals to the detriment of system goals, and shareholder activities lead to the cost 
of a shareholder's shirking (e. g. big shareholder). As a result, presumably the poorer 
performance of the firm is shared by all shareholders in proportion to the number of 
shares of stock they own due to drawbacks of the company system itself. The greater 
is the quantity of shares, the greater the degree to which benefits and costs are 
assumed by the same shareholder. 63 Shareholders are not owners of the assets of 
company, however, the ultimate result will be borne by shareholders in proportion to 
their shares in companies. 
Traditionally in legal theory, shareholder democracy has been used as 
62 Oliver E. Williamson, 1981, `The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', Journal of Economic 
Literature, VOL. XIX, ( December), p 1547. 
63 See Harold Demsetz and Kenneth Lehn, 1985, `The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences', The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6, ( Dec. ), p1156. 
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mechanism to ensure that shareholders can monitor corporate management in the 
company. That is, shareholders are given the right to appoint and dismiss the directors 
and approve the basic issues of corporate affairs through voting attached to their 
shares. However, due to the structure of share ownership, in reality in the absence of 
incentive, skills and knowledge and on account of asymmetry of information, cost 
problems and free rider problems, individual shareholders are passive with respect to 
monitoring management performance. Particularly when shareholders become 
dispersed in publicly traded companies because of separation of ownership and 
control, management will have substantial discretion over how to allocate the 
company's assets necessary for day-to-day performance, which makes it possible for 
managers to divert company assets for their own interests. They may collect private 
benefits by means of an adverse selection and a moral hazard, such as building 
empires, enjoying perks. 64 This is the so-called agency problem. Or that is the agency 
relationship between a "principal" (investors, outsiders) and an "agent" (managers, 
insiders). 65 
2.1.2. The reason for the agency problem: shareholding structure 
The agency problem is actually a vital part of the so-called contractual view of the 
firm, developed by Coase, 66 Jensen and Meckling. 67 "The essence of the agency 
64 Jean Tirole, 2001, ` Corporate Governance', Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 1 (January), p 1-2. 
65 Jean Tirole ibid, p 1. 
66 See Coase, Ronald, 1937, The nature of the firm', Economica 4, pp386-405. 
67 See Jensen, Michael, and William Mechling, 1976, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics 3, No, 4, (October), pp 305-360. 
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problem is the separation of management and finance, - or in more standard 
terminology- of ownership and control, "68 which traces back at least to Berle and 
Means and was ascertained by Berle and Means in their creative work. 69 In their 1932 
classic, Berle and Means call attention to the fact that widely held corporations is 
prevalent in the United States, where ownership of capital is dispersed among small 
shareholders, managers have already controlled corporations. 70 Since then the issue 
of corporate governance has dealt with the agency problem between managers who 
exert control over corporation and shareholders that bear residual claims over the 
corporation assets. However, since the 1970s more and more studies on the agency 
problem have begun to question corporate governance that is only based on the 
assumption of the separation of ownership and control in modern public companies 
with diffuse ownership. For example, studies of other rich countries reveal more 
significant concentration of ownership, in Germany by Edwards and Fischer, 71 
Franks and Mayer, 72 and Gorton and Schmid, 73 in Japan by Prowse, 74 Berglof and 
Perotti, 75 in Italy by Barca, 76 and in seven OECD countries by European Corporate 
Governance Network. 77 In addition, ownership is also highly concentrated in 
68 Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishey, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
LII, No. 2, (June), p 740. 
69 See Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Chicago: 
Commerce Clearing House. 
70 See Rafael La Porta. et. al., 1999, `Corporate Ownership Around the World', The Journal of Finance. Vol. LV, 
No. 2, (April) ,p 
47 1. 
71 Edwards, Jeremy, and Klaus Fischer, 1994, Banks, Finance and Investment in West Germany since 1970, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U. K. 
72 Franks, Julian, and Colin Mayer, 1994, The Ownership and Control of German Corporations, Unpublished 
Manuscript, London Business School. 
73 Gorton, Gary, and Frank Schmid, 1996, Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firm, Working 
Paper 5453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. 
74 Prowse, Stephen, 1992, The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan', Journal of Finance 47, ppl 121-1140, 
75 Berglof, ERIC, AND Enrico Perotti, 1994, `The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial Keiretsu', 
Journal of Financial Economics 36 , pp259-284. 76 Barca, Fabrizio, 1995, On Corporate Governance in Italy: Issues, Facts, and Agency, Unpublished Manuscript, 
Bank of Italy, Rome. 
77 European Corporate Governance Network, 1997, The Separation of Ownership and Control: A Survey of 7 
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developing economies, '8 La Porta et al. point out, and the above research shows that 
these shareholders in large corporations are active in corporate governance and take 
responsibility for companies in many countries in contrast to the Berle and Means 
idea that managers are not accountable. 79 
As a result of the research above, they suggest the agency issue of corporate 
governance has arisen not only in the United States and the U. K. with the structure of 
diffuse shareholding of publicly quoted company, but also in other countries in the 
world with the structure of concentrated shareholding of publicly quoted companies 
where controlling shareholders suppress minority rights or exploit minority interests. 
Therefore the agency relationship (problem) includes not only the relationship 
between managers and shareholders but also the relationship between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders, and between shareholder and stakeholders etc. 
The Berle and Means corporation is not common over the countries; in reality there 
are many corporations controlled by majority shareholders (e. g. family, state, bank, 
pyramid) in other countries in the world except for the U. S. and the U. K etc. Thus the 
fundamental agency problem across the countries is the conflict between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders having nearly full control over the 
managers rather than between dispersed shareholders and managers put forward by 
Berle and Means in 1932.80 In fact, as Alfred Chandler points out, the largest British 
European Countries Preliminary Report of the European Commission, Volumes 1-4, European Corporate 
Governance Network, Brussels. 
78 La Porta Refael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrai Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, 
Journal of Political Economy 106, pp] 113-1155. 
79 Rafael La Porta. et. al , 
1999, `Corporate Ownership Around the World', The Journal of Finance, Vol. Liv. No. 2, 
472. 
° See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silances, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, 2000, `Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance', Journal of Financial Economics 58, p15. 
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firms were family-dominated and family influence and control lasted as late as the 
Second World War, the structure of concentrated ownership structure in British's large 
firm was closer to that of continental family firms than to American structure after the 
Second World War, with family owners controlling many, or most big firms. 81 Thus 
scholars point out, the Berle and Means picture of dispersed ownership being 
separated from a professional management could not depict an accurate picture of the 
U. K. The family in the U. K. kept controlling companies through board and exploited 
minority shareholders, which gave rise to conflict between controlling shareholder 
and minority shareholders. 82 This means the change of the structure of share 
ownership took place towards diffusion of ownership since as early as mid-twentieth 
century in the UK. However, concentrated ownership remained after the Second 
World War at least. 
The thesis argues, from the viewpoint of world as general patterns across the 
countries, the agency problem results from the substantial change of structure of share 
ownership instead of Berle-Means's argument (separation of ownership from control). 
Or in other words, the different structures of share ownership lead to different agency 
problems. Although Berle and Meams have found the significance of separation of 
ownership from control, in essence, it is the structure of share ownership that has 
caused the separation of ownership from control and leads to agency problems 
81 See Mark J. Roe, 2003, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact, 
Oxford University Press Inc. New York, pp 99-101. (citing Alfred D. Chandler, Jr, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics 
and Industrial Capitalism 240 (1990), See also Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Herman Daems, `Introduction', in 
Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprisel, 6 (ed, by 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr and Herman Daems, 1980) ( `Until World War II, the British economy was for the most part 
an example of family capitalism'). 
S2 See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2002, `The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and 
Control', Working Paper, 15 ( December ). ( note: with regard to the working paper, there are different versions, 
e. g. 2003) 
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between management and dispersed shareholders in America before the 1930s. Only 
the development of the economy and the change of the structure of share ownership 
towards the dispersion provided the possibility of the production of professional 
management and the separation of ownership from control in America. The 
production of professional management would not on its own result in the agency 
problem without the change of structure of share ownership toward the dispersion, 
and the consequence of the agency problem by professional management is not so 
serious that it attracts the attention of society, because shareholders or large 
shareholders can control the conduct of professional management completely. Today 
management as profession is very popular throughout the world and the separation of 
ownership from control arises across the countries to varying extents, but the 
phenomenon that conflict of interest happens between management and shareholders 
in other countries is not described so seriously as by Berle and Means. For example, 
the separation of ownership and management is very popular in most Central and East 
European firms. Shareholders, who cannot afford to depend on other institutions and 
arrangements devised to monitor and discipline managerial performance, have both 
the capacity and impetus to execute their rights. 83 The agency problem occurs 
between management and shareholders in most of countries, but except in the US and 
in the UK, it is not main conflict of interest in corporate governance. 
The thesis argues that it is not the separation of ownership from control but the 
structure of ownership that causes the agency problems in corporate governance as a 
83 See Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray, Marek Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1997, `Private Ownership and 
Corporate Performance: Some Lessons from Transition Economics', Working Paper, (June). 
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general pattern across countries. As a rule, the change in the structure of share 
ownership around the world develops in two directions: diffused ownership and 
concentrated ownership. The reason is that the growth of the firms needs funds of 
which the firms themselves are short, the firms must get external capital by equity or 
by debt in an intensely competitive market to expand their production, marketing and 
distribution etc. Otherwise the firms will fail and disappear by bankruptcy or takeover 
etc. in the market. Of course, whether the firm uses equity or debt depends on specific 
environments just like the internal capital and external capital that is more efficient 
and on which there are different viewpoints by scholars. The first argument by 
Williamson and Alchian etc. that the internal capital market is more efficient because 
funds are used appropriately by informed providers of capital. A second view, by 
Modgliani and Miller etc, holds that internal and external capital markets will result in 
the same resource allocation. A third view holds that internal capital markets are less 
efficient than external capital markets because the bureaucratic decision-making of 
corporate executives replaces the profit-based decision-making of investors. 84 
Generally speaking, when the firm selects debt rather than equity in capital market as 
its tool for expansion, the structure of share ownership will be affected little except for 
the structure of concentrated share ownership by banks that are both owners of equity 
and creditors in companies in some circumstances, and the structure of share 
ownership in companies by debt is always concentrated across countries, and the 
agency problem takes place between controlling shareholders and small shareholders, 
84 See Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein, 1998, `Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and 
Organizations', the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Autumn, ), p 106. 
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for example South Korea. If the company gets external finance by equity, the change 
of structure of share ownership will develop towards dispersion or relatively lower 
concentration and agency problems occur mainly between shareholders and 
management (structure of dispersed ownership), between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders (structure of concentrated ownership). Without question, the 
change of structure of share ownership under the circumstances will take the form of 
equity through the securities markets, and the result (dispersion or concentration) will 
depend on other elements in essence. However, it is determined by economy mainly 
and ultimately which will be discussed in chapter five. As regards the relationship 
between the structure of ownership and corporate governance, I will discuss it in the 
detail in chapter three. 
Whether the structure of share ownership in a company is of dispersion or 
concentration is directly and prima facie dependent on the following facts at least: (1) 
cost. If it is much cheaper for companies to get external finance from debt rather than 
equity, the company will try its best to do it, and the structure of share ownership in a 
company is usually concentrated under the circumstance. For example, state-owned 
companies can get debt more easily from banks with a lower interest rate instead of 
getting equity from outside finance. Otherwise companies will get equity from outside 
finance and the structure of share ownership will be dispersed. (2) Issue of dilution. If 
a large shareholder in a given company does not want its shareholding to be diluted 
and control to be reduced, (of course, it is also extra costly due to the discounts 
sometimes given to new outside shareholder), a company will have to get money from 
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creditors instead of going public. The structure of share ownership in the company is 
easily concentrated. (3) Constraint on condition by the law. Some countries restrict 
investment in companies by financial institutions by law or regulation. For example, 
in the U. S. and in China, the law prohibits banks from investing directly in the equity 
market. However, any law that restricts investment of any entity in companies must 
adapt itself to the development of economy in order to serve the economy. 
As for shareholders in companies, the transferability of share will affect the 
structure of share ownership, which will be stated in next chapter. However, in fact, 
the structure of share ownership in a given country is affected deeply by politics, 
culture, history, economy and other facts etc that will be discussed in chapter five. 
As I stated above, the structure of ownership is very important. However, why 
has the model of Berle-Means corporations affected countries around the world in 
such a far-reaching way since it was put forward? Because, on the one hand, some of 
the experience in the model of Berle-Means corporation may be worth learning; on 
the other hand, America has gradually become the biggest and the most powerful 
economic, military, and political country in the world since the First World War. Any 
theory that is suitable for American is likely to have a great influence on other 
countries in the world, even if it is not really suitable for them. Actually the model of 
the Berle-Means corporations only fitted America when it was put forward by Berle 
and Means. The theory did not fit the U. K until maybe the 1970s. Today the model of 
the Berle-Means corporations mainly applies to the U. S. and the U. K. but it has 
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affected other countries in the world indeed. In a word, the theory advanced by Berle 
and Means is limited now. As some scholars put as follow. 
"The Berle and Means (1932) perspective is to identify the firm with a 
single individual, the CEO, and a single productive asset. But firms are 
actually organizations with many different kinds of employees; with 
internal capital and labor markets; with formal management structures and 
decision-making procedures; and with a wide variety of rules governing 
the allocation of inputs, capital, and the hiring and promotion of 
employees. To develop a better understanding of the conflict between the 
firm's management and its investors, this perspective must be broadened 
to introduce the Coasian themes of internal organization and interaction 
among managers inside the firm. "85 
In a word, the theory by Berle and Means is significant indeed but needs 
developing. 
2.2. Agency cost 
2.2.1. Concept of agency cost 
As Oliver Hart pointed out, corporate governance issues arise in an organization 
whenever two conditions are met. First there is an agency problem, or conflict of 
interest, occurring between owners, managers, workers or consumers in the 
85 See Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein, 1998, `Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and 
Organizations', the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Autumn, ), p 101. 
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organization. Second, transaction costs are such that this agency problem can not be 
solved through a contract. 86 
Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as a contract under which 
agent provides some service for principals and agent is delegated some decision- 
making authority. If both parties to the relationship maximize themselves, there is 
enough reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. 87 Thus agency problem will arise, which will lead to agency costs that will 
be generated by the divergence between agent' interests and that of principal. Agency 
cost is the core of the agency problem in economics because the more efficient it is, 
the less cost it is if the agency problem could be solved. Or the aim pertaining to the 
agency problem is to minimize the agency cost in companies. What is agency cost? 
The cost of monitoring agent is called agency cost. According to the interpretation of 
Jensen and Meckling, agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and 
bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests, Agency cost also 
includes the value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts 
exceed the benefits. Thus agency cost includes: "(1) the monitoring expenditures by 
the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual loss. Of 
course, if there are enough 100 percent owner-managers available to own and run all 
the firm in an industry (competitive or not) the agency costs in that industry will be 
zero. "88 
36 See Oliver Hart, 1995, `Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications', The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 105, No. 430, ( May), p 678. 
87 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, 1976, `Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics 3, No, 4, (October), pp 
305-360. 
88 see Jensen, Michael, and William Mechling, 1976, 'Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
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In countries with the structure of dispersed ownership, managers with discretion 
can expropriate dispersed shareholders in different ways, such as the consumption of 
perquisites, entrenching themselves and staying on in the job even if they are no 
longer competent or qualified to run the firm, which are agency problems and lead to 
agency cost because dispersed shareholders are not likely to spend cost policing the 
performance of the management in a corporation. 89 In countries with the structure of 
concentrated ownership, although there exists a conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders, large shareholders have incentives to monitor 
management and take excessive risk in order to get returns on investment. However, 
there may be costs of large investors as well, for example, one cost is that large 
shareholders may bear excessive risk due to inadequate diversification. Some 
scholars90 support the argument that large shareholders better monitor management 
and thereby improve firm valuation while other studies have however contradicted 
this general finding. 91 This relationship, while subject to interpretation, suggests that 
on the one hand, big shareholders may monitor managers and reduce agency costs in 
companies with more concentrated ownership; on the other hand there big 
shareholders in the companies with concentrated ownership can do harm to market 
valuation. 92 That is, theoretically and logically large shareholders only represent their 
and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics 3, No, 4 , 
(October), pp 305-360. 
89 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, 'Large Shareholders and Corporate Control', the Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3, Part 1(Jun., ), p 46 1. 
90 Studies on the United States (e. g. Levy, 1983, Lease et al., 1984, DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986, McConnell and Servaes, 1990) find a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
corporate valuation. 
91 E. g. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn. 1985, `The Structure of Corporate Ownership: 
Causes and Consequences', 
Journal of Political Economy 93, pp 1155-77; Morck et al, 1988, `Management Ownership and 
Market Valuation: 
An Empirical Analysis', Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp 293-315. 
92 See Stijn Claessens et al., 2000, `Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence From East Asia', SSRN 
Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 202,390. 
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own interests and may expropriate other shareholders or other stakeholders, or large 
shareholders might try to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of other 
shareholders or other stakeholders, which are agency problems and lead to agency 
cost in concentrated ownership countries. Some scholars find that the largest 
shareholder in listed companies does obtain private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 93 In other words, expropriation or other wrong actions by big 
shareholder will be of major conflict of interest in the structure of concentrate 
ownership. The research has showed the disadvantages of expropriation by majority 
shareholders as follows at least: 
(1) "Expropriation by large investors can be detrimental to efficiency 
through adverse effects on the incentives of managers and employees, 
who might reduce their firm-specific human capital investments when 
they are closely monitored by financier without enough return or may be 
easily dismissed with the consequent loss of rents. (2) When the targets of 
expropriation by large investors are other investors, the adverse incentive 
effect of such expropriation is the decline of external finance". 94 
Thus based on the analysis above, agency cost is the core issue due to the agency 
problem in corporate governance both in the structure of dispersed share ownership 
and in the structure of concentrated share ownership. 
93 See e. g. Edwards, J., and Weichenrieder, 1999, `Ownership, Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence from 
Germany', Working Paper 193, CESifo, p 33; Bebchuk, L., 1999, `A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate 
Ownership and Control, ' Working Paper No. 260, Harvard University. In addition, evidence of such private benefits 
control obtained by large shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders 
has been provided for the USA by 
Barclay and Holderness (1989), for Sweden by Bergstrom and Rydgvist(1990), and 
for Italy by Zingales (1994). 
94 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, `A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. LII, No. 2, (June), p 760. 
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2.2.2. Methods of solving the agency cost 
How to solve the agency problem or make agency cost as little as possible owing to 
the structure of share ownership which leads to agency problems between dispersed 
shareholders and management as well as relationship between majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders in companies is worldwide issue which makes trouble for 
scholars, lawyers, government officials, businessmen etc. In theory, the reduction of 
agency costs will result in the improvement of firm performance, better corporate 
governance and overall economic growth. A great body of empirical evidence has 
supported the theoretical prediction. 95 The main methods to settle the agency problem 
and minimize agency cost suggested by scholars are as follows. 
2.2.2.1. Contractual arrangements96 
New economic theorists view the firm as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus of 
contracts among all participants of production, and primarily between shareholders 
and managers. They argue the best way to solve the agency problem is to structure the 
contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between the principal and 
agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices that will 
maximize the principal's welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring 
95 E. g, see Black B., H. Jang, and W. Kim, 2003, `Does Corporate Governance Affect Finn Value? ', Working 
Paper 327, Standford Law School; Klapper Leora. F. and Lnessa Lova, , 
2003 
, `Corporate 
Governance, Investor 
Protection, and Performance in Emerging Market', Journal of Corporate Finance 195, pp 1-26. 
96 On this topic, see, e. g. Hart, Oliver, 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial, Oxford University Press, London; 
Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmstrom, 1987, The Theory of Contract, in T. Bewley, Ed.: Advances in Economic 
Theory, University Press, Cambridge, U. K. pp 294-351; Tirole, Jean, 1994, 'Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We 
Stand? ' manuscript, IDEI, Toulouse, France. 
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exist. 
The contractual view could be dated back to as early as Coase's publication in 
19375 97 which was further developed and applied to public companies by Alchian and 
Demsetz in 197298 and Jensen and Meckling. 99 For example, Jensen and Meckling 
thought the level of agency costs counted, among other things, upon how statutory 
and common law and human innovation to design contracts between principal and 
agent. Both the law and the sophistication of contracts in relation to the modern 
corporation were the outcomes of an historical process in which there were strong 
motivations for individuals to reduce agency costs as much as possible. '°° In brief, 
they argue that agency costs can be tackled by the contracts between managers and 
shareholders because of the contractarian assumption that participants are "economic 
men", self-interested with the desire to maximize their investment welfare and to 
reduce transactional costs and tackle the agency problem by a set of contracts. 
Although some agency problems can be settled by contract and contract is in 
theory the result of agreement by parties at will, resting on the existence of private 
property and strong enforcement mechanisms, in practice contract could not express 
sufficiently the will of the principal due to the existence of shortcomings, such as 
information asymmetry about the operation in the company, bargaining status, fraud, 
97 See Coase R. H., 1937, `The Nature of the Firm', Economica 4. In the article, he points out that transactions in 
market are costly and argued that firms consisting of a nexus of contract exist to minimize these transactional 
costs. 
98 See Alchian A. A. and Demsetz H., 1972, `Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization', 
American Economic Rev. 62. 
99 See Jensen M. C. and W. H. Mechkling, 1976, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure', J. of Fina. Econ. 3. 
100 See ibid. 
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unforeseen circumstance, and ambiguous language. 101 This is the problem of 
incomplete contracts. The difficulty with incomplete contracts is that they make 
parties take advantage of ambiguities in the contract to their own advantage. In fact, 
parties to a contract are unable to foresee what will happen or not in the future. That is, 
it is impossible for parties to predict and plan for future contingencies, and 
correspondingly practically impossible for parties to conclude a contract which 
comprehensively provides for rights and obligations in the many varied situations 
which might happen. ' 02 Thus the contract that defines the parties' rights and 
entitlement in every future contingency is impossible to achieve. Meanwhile 
situations in which one party (the agent) has the ability to unilaterally affect the 
interest of the other party (the principal) are likely to be ubiquitous. In these situations, 
the former has power over the latter. In addition, the scope of the contract is limited, 
and the function of contract is restrictive in disciplining the action of agent, and in 
particular, contracts may be incomplete because of the inadequacy of legal system and 
processes- what the literature describes as problems of verifiability in the courts, for 
example, generally speaking, the role of courts in the United States is more extensive 
than anywhere else in the world, but the so-called business judgment rule always 
make the courts keep silent in the affairs of companies in America. ' 03 So some 
scholars argue that the corporation is a nexus of power relationships regulated only 
101 See Bradley M., C. A. Schipani, A. K. Sundaram, and J. P. Walsh, 1999, `The Purposes and Accountability of the 
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads' , 
62 law & Contempt. Prob. 9, pp 
38-40. 
102 See Paddy Ireland, 2003, `Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory', `Legal Study', p 476. 
(citing 0 Hart, Finns, Contracts and Financial Structure (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1995, pp 23-28). 
103 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, `A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. LII, No. 2, (June), p 741. 
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partially by the law rather than a nexus of contracts. '04 Sometimes courts are unable 
or unwilling to invest the resources necessary to ascertain the facts pertaining to 
complicated contacts because judges are maybe subject to political pressure or 
corruption in many cases. This shows the disadvantages of contracts and limitation of 
their enforcement. 
2.2.2.2 Board of directors 
Traditionally the conflict of interest always takes place between managers and 
shareholders, which is regarded as the agency problem. Control of agency problems in 
the decision process is crucial when the decision makers who initiate and implement 
important decisions are not the major shareholders and therefore do not assume a 
major result of the wealth effects of their decisions. '°5 General speaking, on the part 
of organizations (companies, enterprises etc), the decision process has four steps: 
"(1) initiation- generation of proposals for resource utilization and 
structuring of contract; (2) ratification- choice of the decision initiatives 
to be implemented; (3) implementation- execution of ratified decisions; 
and (4) monitoring- measurement of the performance of decision agents 
and implementation of rewards. " 106 
If decision management (the initiation and implementation of decisions typically 
are allocated to the same agents) is separated from decision control (including the 
ratification and monitoring of decisions) due to the separation of ownership and 
104 See Amir N. Licht, 2004, ` The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style', 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 29, p717. 
105 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, `Separation of ownership and control', Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. XXVI, (June), pp 2-5. 
106 See ibid, Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, p 4. 
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control, the agency problems will be controlled or agency cost will be reduced in a 
sense. 
Therefore, based on the above ideal, a lot of scholars think the board of director 
could take responsibility for the reduction of agency cost on behalf of company and 
for shareholders ultimately. Today in practice most corporate charters require that 
shareholders elect a board of directors, whose mission is to select the CEO, monitor 
management, and vote on important decisions. Thus board of directors would have a 
fiduciary duty to company to monitor the managers in order to reduce the agency cost. 
For example, a large number of CEOs of under-performing or marginal corporations 
have been dismissed in the United States in the 1990s. Companies involved include 
General Motors, Compaq Computer Corporation, General Electric, American express, 
Apple Computing Company and many others. 107 
But the CEOs actually have a considerable influence over the choice of 
directors and directors generally only have a very limited financial stake in the 
corporation. In other words, traditionally the board of director is limited to the 
reduction of agency cost because the board of directors, mainly dominated by 
executives, or insider director, does not have sufficient incentives or independence to 
perform the supervisory function over managers. Therefore most regulatory efforts 
have focused on the issue of independence of the board and the composition of boards 
should consist of a majority of independent directors with nominating, compensation 
and audit committees, at least the reason for independent directors is a majority of 
107 See Robert W. Harnilton , 1999, 
The Law of Corporations, Law Press House (China), p 343. 
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independent directors who have no material relationship with the listed company or 
have no relationship or circumstances that are likely to affect the director's 
judgment. 108 But independent director may have no special skill, knowledge or 
information about the companies. Theoretical work and laboratory experiments show 
that the boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdogs" may 
lessen conflicts of interest. '09 In addition, such boards are also likely to be not good at 
making strategic decisions on operation for short of industry or firm-specific 
knowledge. 110 It should be noted here that most companies in the U. S. have had a 
majority of nominally independent directors since the 1970s without any legal 
compulsion. However, there is no evidence that these directors have improved the 
performance of corporation. " Hence what the independent directors do to mitigate 
the agency problem is limited, although independent directors are very prevalent 
across the world. In a word, a few empirical studies carried out mainly in the US seem 
to indicate that the results are blended. Some evidences prove that there is positive 
relationship between presence of independent directors and overall performance of the 
finn12 while other studies found no such relationship at all. 113 
108 See § 302A(2) NYSE Listed Company Manual and § A. 3. I UK Combined Code. 
109 See Gillette, Ann B., Thomas H. Noe, and Michael J. Rebello, 2003, 'Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, 
and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence', 57 Journal of Finance, p 1997. 
110 See Gerard Hertig, 2005, 'On-Going Board Reforrns: One-Size-Fits-All and Regulatory Capture', Law Working 
Paper No. 25/2005, ( March), www. ecgi. org/wp. 
111 See Reiner Karaakman et al, 2004, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 
Oxford University Press, p 39. ( Citing Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, 'The Effects of Board 
Composition and Direct Incentives on Finn Perfon-nance', 20 Journal of Financial Management 10](1991); Sanjai 
Bhagat and Bernard Black, 'The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm. Perforinance', 54 
Business Lawyer 921 (1999)). 
112 See Gillette Ann B., Thomas H. Noe, and Michael J. Rebello, 2003, 'Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, 
and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence', Journal of Finance 58(5). 
113 See e. g. Bhagat SaRlai and Bernard S. Black, 1999, 'The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition 
and Finn Performance', The Business Lawyer 54. 
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2.2.2.3. Blockholders 114 
Logically if legal protection of small shareholder has not enough capacity to supervise 
the management, then perhaps shareholders can have to become large and strong in 
order to get more effective control rights against management. In practice small 
shareholders have little incentive to monitor management due to cost while owing to 
having large share in company, and blockholders will have motivations to monitor 
management and they have the impetus to collect information and have enough voting 
control to constrain management in some cases or perhaps even to force out the 
management through a proxy fight or takeover. 115 In other words, Blockholders who 
are characterized by majority or holding at least 5% of a firm's outstanding shares, are 
considered to have incentives to supervise a firm's operations, lessening agency costs 
and improving firm value. 116 But they are believed to have access to private, 
value-relative information via their roles as monitors of firms' operation and to have 
possibility of collusion with management to expropriate the minority. For example, 
the large shareholder might persuade management to divert profit to himself by 
selling or buying goods between company and the large shareholder, or the large 
shareholder would agree to leave management alone, in exchange for having his 
114 On this topic in detail, see, e. g. Franks, Julian, and Colin Mayer, 1994, 'The Ownership and Control of German 
Corporations', manuscript, London Business School; Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986(b) 'Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control', Journal of Politcal Economic 94, , pp 
461-488; Kang, Jun-Koo, and Anil 
Shivdasani, 1995, ' Firrn Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan', Journal of 
Financial Economics 38, pp 29-58. 
115 See Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986(b) 'Large Shareholders and Corporate Control', Journal of 
Political Economic 94, pp 461-488. 
116 See Frank Heflin and Kenneth W. Shaw, 2000, 'Blackholder Ownership and Market Liquidity', The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 4, ( Dec. ), p 632; Barclay, M., and C. Holderness, 1991, 
'Negotiated Block trades and Corporate Control', Journal of Finance, 46, ,p 
861-878; McConnell, J, J., and H. 
Servaes, 1990, ' Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value', Journal of Financial Economics, 
25, pp 595-613; Morck, R; A. Shleifer; and R. Vishny, 1988, 'Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis', Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp 293-315. 
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shares repurchased at a premium (this practice is known as greenmail in the United 
States). 
Most of the time large shareholders action is channeled through the board of 
directors. Large shareholders are in principle able to appoint board members 
representing their interests in accordance with the principle of one-share and 
one-voting, although in theory the board of directors acts on behalf of the company. 
When the large shareholders have majority control of the board, they can hire (or fire) 
management at the cost of the company. Large shareholders can also exercise power 
for the interests of themselves by blocking ratification of unfavorable decisions, or 
possibly by initiating decisions at expense of minority shareholders. 117 
It is generally accepted that large shareholders tend to use their control rights to 
both monitor management and to divert resources disproportionately to themselves. 
Thus large shareholders will likely make contribution positively in countries where 
"self-dealing" by large shareholders is tightly regulated, while in countries where it is 
not, large shareholders are often regarded as the source of the corporate governance 
problem rather than the solution to it. "8 In brief, there is a shortage of loyalty. 
Blockholders have to extract a return on their cost through self-dealing or insider 
trading at the expense of diversification and liquidity, 119 which will cause the conflict 
of interest between large shareholders and minority shareholder. As a consequence, a 
117 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas Röell, 2002, `Corporate Governance and Control', Working Paper. 
No. 02/2002(ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 (September), p78. 
118 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas Röell, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Control', Working Paper. 
No. 02/2002(ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 ( September) pp 110-111. 
119 See Willian W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, ' Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the 
Finn: The Case Against Global Cross Reference', Working Paper. 
007,2000. http: //papers. ssrn. com/paper. taf? abstract0_id=205455. 
51 
Chapter 2. The Core Issue of Corporate Governance 
new agency problem will occur and agency cost will increase in companies. 
2.2.2.4. Creditors 120 
Debt is regarded to decrease agency costs through lessening free cash flow and 
restricting managerial discretion. 121 The governance role of debt comes from the 
threat of bankruptcy and due diligence monitoring by creditors. Thus Jensen and 
Meckling argue that managers have to eschew leverage in order to mitigate the risk of 
corporate bankruptcy and the consequent transfer of control to bondholders. 122 
Significant creditors, such as banks, are also large and potentially active investors. 
Like the large shareholders, they have large investments in the firm, and want to have 
the returns on their investments greatly. The effectiveness of large creditors, like the 
effectiveness of large shareholders, reckons on the legal environment. In Germany 
and Japan, the powers of the banks vis-a-vis companies are very significant in 
corporate governance, such as playing a dominant role in lending and monitoring the 
operation of company. 123 Of course, not all of the creditors have an incentive to 
monitor the firm, if debt is diffusely held then no individual lender may have 
sufficient incentive to spend the private costs in monitoring. Only banks that can hold 
a substantial piece of a firm's debt have incentives to monitor firms by pooling the 
120 On this topic, see e. g. Smith, Clifford, and Jerold Warner, 1979 'On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of 
Bond Covenants', Journal of Financial, pp 117-1611; Diamond, Douglas, 1984, 'Financial Interneterdiation and 
delegated monitoring', Review of Economic Studies 51, pp 393-414; Gorton, Gary, and Frank Schmid, 1996, 
'Universal Bank and the Performance of German Finns' , Working Paper 
5453, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
121 See Jensen, M., 1986, 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers', American 
Economic Review, 76, pp 323-29. 
122 See Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, 'Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp 305-360. 
123 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 1-11, No. 2, ( June), p 757. 
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resources of many depositors and lending to many firms. In addition, the bank could 
get private information by loan, which enables the bank to supervise management and 
check the fulfillment of the correct investment choices. Banks also carries out a 
monitoring role by enforcing debt covenants periodically. ' 24 In summary, classical 
corporate finance theories argue that high leverage lessens managerial agency costs 
and improves the quality of corporate governance. 125 However, much debt not only 
enlarges the risk of bankruptcy but also causes conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders. ' 26 
If a company takes on debt, it will restrict how inefficient management can be, at 
least if management must repay its debt indeed. Hence debt can act as a bonding or 
commitment device to management. But compare an entirely debt-financed firm with 
an all-equity firms that are otherwise identical. While voting equity retains the control 
rights all the time, debt has control rights only on some occasions, namely creditors 
could take measures typically only when the borrower defaults on the scheduled 
repayment, 127 or debtors are on the verge of bankruptcy. So roe governing agency 
problem except for a few countries that the creditors play is very limited. 
124 See Kose John, and Simi Kedia, 2003, 'Design of Corporate Governance: Role of Ownership Structure, 
Takeovers, and Bank Debt', Working Paper, (April). 
125 See, e. g. Jensen, Michael C. and Willian H. Meckling, 1976, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics3 (4), pp 305-360; Harris, Milton and 
Artur Raviv, 199 1, 'The Theory of Capital Structure', Journal of Finance 46(l), pp 297-355. 
126 See Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc, Jim Wright, 2005, 'The International Evidence on Performance and Equity 
Ownership by Insiders, Blockholders, and Institutions', J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 15, pp 171-191. 
127 See Mike Burkart, Denis Grornb, and Fausto Panunzi, 1997, 'Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value 
of the Firn', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 3, Aug., at 715. 
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2.2.2.5. Market (takeover) 128 
The theory of the market for corporate control was initially established by Marine 129 
and developed by Easterbrook and Fischel. 130 The theory argued that the takeover, in 
particular hostile takeover served as a major constraining force on managerial 
discretion and inefficiency. They thought the market for corporate control ran in two 
ways. On the one hand, companies with inefficient management would attract and 
then be taken over by a bidder and accordingly efficient managements would take the 
place of inefficient ones. On the other hand, the main function claimed for the market 
for corporate control as an external disciplining device was effective because the 
target's management feared takeover so that they could try to improve their corporate 
performance instead of diverting company such as self-dealing, fraud and cheat. 131 
The theory is based on the assumption that the share market valuation of companies 
with inefficient management will be lower than that of well-managed counterparts and 
therefore attract predators. The effectiveness of the market for corporate control rests 
on the proposition of the efficient market hypothesis. That is, a hostile takeover is in 
principle a much more powerful mechanism for disciplining management since it 
allows someone who identifies an underperforming company to obtain a large reward. 
In reality, hostile bids may be less profitable than the above argument would indicate. 
First, there is a free-rider problem. Small shareholders who do not believe that their 
12S On this topic, see, e. g. Manne, Henry, 1965, 'Merges and the market for corporate control', Journal of Political 
Economy 75, p 110-126; Jensen, Michael, 'Takeovers: 1988, Their Causes and Consequences', Journal of 
Econornic Perspectives 2, pp 21-48; Easterbrook, Frank and Daniel Fishchel, 1991, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
12' See Manne H. Q 1965, 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', 73 J. Pol. Econ., p 113. 
130 See Easgterbrook F. H. and D. R. Fishel, 198 1, 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to A 
Tender Offer', 94 Har. L. Rev., pp 1169-117 1. 
131 See Marine H. (: ý 1965, 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', 73 J. Pol. Econ., pp 113-114. 
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decisions are to affect the success of the bid have no an incentive to tender to the 
raider. Second, the raider may face competition from others, including other bidders 
and minority shareholders as well as incumbent management. 132 
It seems the hostile takeover is one of the most radical and spectacular 
mechanisms for disciplining and replacing managers. This mechanism is highly 
disruptive and costly. Even in the U. S. and the U. K, it is relatively rarely used. 133 
2.2.2.6. Proxy fights 
A proxy fight is one of ways governing performance of management. It is where a 
dissident shareholder is not satisfied with the performance of management, and he 
puts up a slate of candidates to stand against management's slate, and attempts to ask 
other shareholders to support his candidates. Out of question, proxy fights can offer a 
degree of managerial disciplining and improve shareholders value. But the proxy fight 
is very rare and may not be very effective tool because first, and the most important, 
there is a significant free-rider problem. That is, the dissident has to assume the cost 
of launching the proxy fight- this may include everything from the cost of finding 
out the names and addresses of the shareholders and mailing out the ballots, to the 
cost of persuading other shareholders of the support and the advantages of the 
dissident slate. However, the benefits from improved management will be distributed 
to all shareholders in the form of a higher share price in proportion to shares. Thus 
132 See Oliver Hart, 1995, 'Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, ' The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 105, No. 430, (May), pp 684-685. 
133 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas R6ell, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Control, ' Working Paper 
No. 02/2002(ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 (September), p 24. 
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most of shareholders are not interested in launching a proxy fight that is socially 
valuable but uneconomical for them. Second, in practice most of shareholders have no 
incentive to a proxy fight launched by a strange shareholder. A reasonable rule of 
thumb for a small shareholder may be to vote for incumbent management on the 
grounds that "the devil you know is better that the devil you don't". Namely they 
would rather support incumbent management than a stranger. Finally, management 
could take an advantage of using company funds to promote management's slate of 
directors under company law and charter. This further would help the incumbent 
management against the dissident. 
134 
2.2.2.7. Executive compensation 
Another way of improving shareholders' protection and monitoring and controlling 
CEO actions is to devise the CEO's rewards so as to associate his interests with those 
of shareholders. This is what executive compensation is supposed to achieve. Most 
compensation packages in publicly traded firms are made up of a basic salary 
component, a bonus in relation to short run performance, and a stock participation 
plan. The package also includes various other benefits, such as pension rights and 
severance pay. In theory, for management to have an adequate shareholding in a 
company is beneficial to the improvement of corporate governance because they are 
shareholders of companies. In other words, management will get return on shares or 
future shares if companies earn profit. According to practice, institutional investors 
134 See Oliver Hart, 1995, `Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications', The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 105, No. 430, (May), pp 682-683. 
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prefer executive directors to be shareholders and option-holders in their companies. It 
is a depressing experience for institutional shareholders to see boards where virtually 
directors have no shares at all. 135 
Although stock options may improve CEOs' incentive to raise share value, CEOs 
could make use of them to enrich themselves and expropriate shareholders by 
manipulating stock prices due to their positions in the companies, for example, Enron, 
Global Crossing, WorldCom and others. 
136 
Executive stock options as major executive compensation have become an 
increasingly popular and controversial in the past decade. The options are inefficient 
and lead to more trouble if they are not based on some relative performance measure 
such as the excess stock performance relative to an industry or market index. If there 
are not any proper measures taken to regulate stock options and discipline 
management, they will create new incentive problems by inducing CEOs to 
manipulate earnings or "cook" the books in order to support stock prices. Furthermore, 
they will give rise to many problems when the CEO borrows from the firm to 
"purchase" his or her stock options, such as emphasis on the price of stock rather than 
rather the quality of company, short-term interest in place of long-term interest. 137 In 
a word, the serious problem with this approach is that it will create enormous 
opportunities for self-dealing on CEOs and it can not completely solve the agency 
problem, but still sometimes increase the seriousness of the agency problem. 
135 See D. D. Prentice and P. R. J. Holland, 1993, Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, Clarendon 
Press Oxford A] len & Overy, pI 10. 
136 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas R6ell, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Control', Working Paper 
No. 02/2002(ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 (September), pp 45-47. 
137 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas R6ell, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Control', Working Paper 
No. 02/2002(FCGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 (September), p 109. 
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2.2.2.8. Institutional investors 
Shareholders as the residual risk bearers have powers to supervise management 
through the general meeting in order to ensure that the management acts in the best 
interest of the company, and ultimately the shareholders, and the company is run for 
shareholder's purposes. However, shareholders, who usually lack the special ability, 
time, incentives, in addition, involving cost and skills, and free-rider problem, may 
exit by selling out their shares, rather than using voice through the shareholder general 
meeting, especially in the structure of dispersed share ownership. It thus has been 
widely perceived that shareholders are passive concerning the agency problem. 
But the change of situation has taken place greatly since the late 1980s onward. 
The recent growth of institutional shareholding in publicly traded companies has led 
to increasing debate on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. It 
has been argued that the widely dispersed structure of share ownership in the US and 
UK publicly traded companies has been replaced by a relatively concentrated 
structure of share ownership in the hands of institutional investor, and therefore the 
role of shareholders in corporate governance has accordingly switched from passivity 
to activism. The typical forms of activism are shareholder proposals by institutional 
investors. As Bernard Black pointed out, shareholder activism has been recognized as 
a helpful new way for solving the problems of dispersed holdings and a lack of major 
shareholders. 138 The experience shows in the UK and the US that it is helpful for 
138 See Bernard Black, 1992, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice', UCLA Law 
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institutional investors to reduce the agency problem in corporate governance. 
In corporate affairs, institutional investors could take measures of how to 
strengthen corporate governance structures and improve the effectiveness of corporate 
boards including the following in practice: disuniting the functions of chairman and 
chief executive officer and designating non-executive chairmen in all companies 
above a certain size; choosing independent external directors; taking advantage of 
cumulative voting for board election; opening the proxy process to allow greater 
communication among shareholders; making use of confidential voting at board 
meetings; enlarging the role of board committees that are independent of executive 
directors; uncovering the amount and rationale of managerial compensation; 
challenging anti-defense measures that are designed to protect incumbent managers at 
the cost of shareholders. 139 But there are problems and limitations of institutional 
investors' participation in corporate governance, such as short-termism, that is, 
institutional investors may put emphasis on short-term earning instead of long-time 
earning in order to satisfy their clients with high return on the investments, and will 
have no time or make no effort to improve the corporate governance. As we know, 
some institutional investors have a business relationship with firms in which they 
invest. For example, investment banks provide services for a firm, commercial banks 
provide loans to firm as clients, and insurance companies may provide firms with 
underwriting services. For these institutional investors, who are not only investors but 
also clients of firms in which they invest, part of their revenue counts on economic 
Review39, pp 811-892. 
139 See Dirnitri Vittas'- Institutional Investors and Securities Markets: Which Comes First? Development Research 
Group. The World Bank (Paper presented at the ABCD LAC Conference, June 28-30,1998) at 15. 
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exchanges with the firm. On the one hand, institutional investors as shareholders have 
to protect their investment by exercising certain rights; on the other hand, institutional 
investors as creditor or debtor will have to establish a close relationship with the firm. 
The dual nature of these activities may cause a conflict of interest between status such 
as both shareholders and cooperators (creditor or debtor). 140 In a word, these 
problems and limitations decrease the effectiveness of institutional investors in 
corporate governance. 
2.2.2.9. Trust 
2.2.2.9.1. The conception and importance of trust 
Trust is very important in our society because it helps us to make information easy, 
lessens the complexity of signals, and shields us from the ambiguity and uncertainties 
of many situations. Scholars put emphasis on the importance of trust to our society 
from the different perspective. For example, political scientists have considered social 
trust as essential for the work of democratic political institutions, 141 economists for 
the working of a market economy, 142 and sociologists have regarded trust as essential 
foundation for the implementation of agency in intricate societies. 143 Trust as social 
140 See Heard, J. E. and Shen-nan, H. D. 1987. Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting System. Washington DC: 
Investor Responsibility Research Center. 
141 See Almond, G, and Verba, S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 
Princeton University Press, Pnnceton. 
142 See Raiser, M., 'Trust in Transition', 1998, Paper Given at the Conference on Post Communist Transfon-nations 
and the Social Sciences: Cross Disciplinary Approaches. Berlin, October. 
143 See Seligman, A. R., The problem of Trust, 1997, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Simmel, Q. The 
Sociology of Georg Simrnel (translated and edited by K. H. Wolff), Free Pressj 950, New York; Sztompka, P., Trust: 
A Sociological Theory, 1999, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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capital 144 must be sufficiently widespread within a given society in order to present 
positive effect not only at relational level but also at the economic level because trust 
can improve the quality of interpersonal relationship and make the market mechanism 
more efficient. As we know that market will fail in the absence of trust in the 
economy145 because most transactions are in relations to an element of trust, such as 
contracts between merchants in our society 146 In other words, trust as social capital 
could produce socially and economically efficient outcomes and avoid inefficient 
non-cooperative traps such as that in the prisoner's dilemma. As Geraity Parry puts it, 
mutual trust benefits polyarchy and public contestation while extreme distrust lead to 
hegemony. The reasons are as follows: firstly people will trust one another in 
polyarchy by mutual communication. Secondly, people are to associate together in the 
achievement of those objectives by trust that they cannot gain by their own individual 
action. Thirdly, a feeling of trust stops political disputes from changing into severe 
animosity 147 In a word, trust can simplify the complexity of a situation and enhance 
the likelihood of cooperation 148 in order to achieve the goal socially and 
economically. 
However, many researchers recognize that the study of trust faces many 
144 Social capital in terrns of trust is often assumed to be accumulated via social participation activities, where 
'consumption' and 'investment' in relational goods tend to coincide. E. g. Paldarn and Svendsen 
identify social 
capital with 'the density of trust within a group' (See Paldarn M, and Svendsen GT, 'Missing 
Social Capital and 
The Transition in Eastern Europe', J Inst Innovation. Dev Transition 2002; 5, at 21-34); Putnam et al think that 
social capital refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and network than can 
improve the 
efficiency of society'. (See Putnam R. Bowling alone. New York: Simon and 
Schuster; 2000) 
145 See Angelo Antoci Marcello Galeotti, Paolo Russu and Luca Zarri, 2006, 'Gemeralized Trust and Sustainable 
Coexistence Between Socially Responsible Firms and Nonprofit Organizations', Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 29, 
nn793-802. iA See Arrow, K., 1972, Gifts and Exchanges, Philos. Public Aff 1, pp 343-362, 
147 See Geraint Parry, 1976, 'Trust, Distrust and Consensus', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 
2 
(Apr., ), at 129-142. 
148 See Mlsztal, B. A. 1996, Trust in Modem Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press,. 
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difficulties such as problems of definition, confusion of the levels of analysis, and 
ambiguity in conceptualizations of the factors responsible for trust production. 149 The 
ma . ority of researchers writing about trust pay their attention primarily to how one j 
may set about creating and fostering trust in the context of various recent changes, and 
they tend to emphasize the notions of vulnerability, uncertainty, and risk when their 
they define trust. 150 For example, trust is "the mutual confidence that no party to an 
exchange will exploit another's vulnerability"; 151 "to trust others is to accept the risks 
associated with the type and depth of the interdependence inherent in a given 
relationship. "152 
In our society, when we trust a person or organization, it means there is a rise in 
probability of our taking risks with thern. Trust has been defined as "confidence in a 
person or thing because of the qualities one perceives. " 153 In the literature, the 
definition has been taken a step further to include the person's behavioral intentions as 
"willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectations the other one will perform particular actions important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party. " 154 Thus, trust is 
distinct from confidence and reliance, which also have a close relationship with the 
estimated prediction of risk and outcomes, and rely more on the perceived intentions 
149 See Kramer, R., and T Tyler (eds. ) , 1996, Trust 
in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
150 See Barbara A. Misztal , 
2001, 'Non-nality and Trust in Goffi-nan's Theory of Interaction Order', Sociological 
Theory, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Nov., ), pp 312-324. 
151 See Sabel, C. F, 1993, 'Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy. ' Human 
Relations 46, pp 1133-70. 
152 See Shepard, B. H., and D. M. Shen-nan, 1998, 'The Grammars of Trust and General Implications', Academy of 
Management Review 23, pp 422-38. 
153 See New Webster's Dictionary, Lexicon Publications, Danbury, CT, 1993. 
154 See R. C. Mayer, J. H. Davis and F. D Schoorman, 1995, 'An Interview Model of Organizational Trust', Academy 
of Management Review 30(3), pp 709-734. 
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and motivations of the trusted party than on results and outcomes, which means 
"trust" with more risk and more unexpected results than reliance and confidence. 155 
Therefore trust is not necessary when you can calculate how others will act accurately 
or you can monitor and control the other's behavior. 156 
In a word, trust is a concept with many meanings, but most concepts of personal 
trust share three common elements. First, the theories suppose the relationship 
between trustor and trustee is interdependent. Second is the assumption that trust 
provides an approach to deal with risk or uncertainty in an exchange relationship. The 
third common assumption on trust is a belief or an expectation that no one should not 
take advantage of vulnerability which results from the acceptance of risk by the other 
party in the relationship. 157 
2.2.2.9.2. Trust and agent problem 
Zucker thought there were three ways to create trust: process-based, institution-based, 
and characteristic-based. Process-based trust is produced through social exchange 
between organizations and individuals. Institution-based trust is produced through a 
third party. Characteristic-based trust is produced through a sense of share 
commonality with the other party. This could derive from similar values, backgrounds, 
155 See R. Williarn Ide III and Douglas H. Yam, 2003, 'Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating 
Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust', Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol-56, p 
1113. (citing See Trudy Govier, Social Trust and Human Communities 6 (1997) (comparing trust in intimate 
relationships with trust in the context of social roles); Adam Seligman, The Problem of Trust 14-30 
(I 997)(distinguishing trust from confidence and understanding trust as role fulfillment); Lawrence C. Becker, Trust 
as Noncognitive Security About Motives, 107 EHHICS 43,54 (1996)(using the government as an example of trust 
depending on intentions and motivations). 
156 See Denise M. Rousseau et al., 1998, 'Not So Different After All: A Cross- Discipline View of Trust, 23 Acad. 
Mgnil. Rev., p 395. 
157 See Christel Lane and Reinhard Bachmann, 1998, Trust Within and Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues 
and Empirical Applications, Oxford University Press. 
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ethnicity and experiences. 158 Here I only take the characteristic-based trust as an 
example and look at characteristic-based trust and explore how to share values 
between the management and shareholders, or between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders. Trust is very important for organization 159 because trust could 
create socially efficient results and evade inefficient non-cooperative traps. 160 Trust 
without doubt could help managers obtain more effectively 16 1 because manager will 
make use of cooperation with shareholder to improve the performance instead of 
opportunistic behavior if managers could share the same or similar values with 
shareholders in a company. Each person or organization owns or projects a given set 
of values 162 by which entities could judge and choose among alternative modes of 
behavior. 163 With regard to value in trust, the same value (100%) between different 
entities is impossible in real life, in particular in a unit or organization. Value 
congruence is enough instead. Value congruence has been identified as value 
similarity and value compatibility that could support common causes or avoid clashes 
over issues important to the participant. Value congruence has a positive effective on 
trust while value conflict has a negative effective on trust. 164 In a company, in 
158 See L. GZucker, 1986, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure 1840-1920, Research 
in Organization Behavior 8, pp 53-111. 
159 See Donaldson, T, 2001, 'The Ethical Wealth of Nations', Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 31, pp 25-36; 
Lewicki, R., McAllister, D., & Bies, R, 1998, 'Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities', Academy of 
Management Review, 23(8), pp 438-458. 
160 See Putnam, R. 1993, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press; Fukuyama F., 1995, Trust; New York: Free Press,; Porta et al, 1997 'Trust in Large 
Organizations', American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87(2), , pp 
333-38. 
161 See Atwater, L. 1988, 'The Relative Importance of Situational and Individual Variables in Predicting Leader 
Behavior', Group and Organization Studies, 13, pp 290-310; Bazerman, M., 1994, Judgment in Managerial 
Decision Making, New York: Wiley. 
162 See Joseph A. Cazier, Benjamin B. M. Shao and Robert D. St. Louis, 2006, 'E-Business Differentiation Through 
Value-Based Trust', Information & Management 43, pp 718-727. 
163 See D. Elizur, A. Sagie, 1999, 'Facets of Personal Values: A Structural Analysis of Life and Work Values', 
, 6ýplies 
Psychology 48(l), pp 73-87. A 
16 See Joseph A. Cazier, Benjamin B. M. Shao and Robert D. St. Louis, 2006, 'E-Business Differentiation Through 
Value-Based Trust', Inforniation & Management 43, pp 718-727. 
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particular public companies, as describe above, if managers share the similar values 
with shareholders for the sake of the company, managers will perform the obligations 
that are sometimes beyond the regulation of laws and contracts, such as duty of care, 
loyalty and fiduciary. It is known that the common law recognizes specific 
relationships as inherently fiduciary, 165 such as relationships between attorney and 
client, principal and agent, and senior corporate managers and shareholder, 166 but 
laws on the regulation of these relationships are very ambiguous and contentious 
sometimes, which needs trust to regulate them. Therefore trust can reduce the agent 
problem and agent cost to a certain degree if management and shareholder, or 
majority shareholders and minority shareholder share similar values and put trust in 
each other. 
The thesis argues trust derives from the past experience, reputation, 
communication and co-operation. Generally speaking, if people have not interacted 
with each other and no other trust infonnation is available, there is no trust at all. That 
is, trust may not be spontaneous, instinctive or natural, but based on some information 
at least. Economists argue that trust should be more vital for ensuring co-operation 
between strangers or people who meet each other rarely than people who often 
encounter in a given place. It suggests that trust is most important to cooperate 
between people in large organizations, where members encounter each other only 
165 Some scholars think trust is equal to fiduciary duty, e. g. See Nathan Heyde, 2004-2005, ' 
Can You Keep A 
Secret? The -Sirnilar Relationship of Trust and Confidence" in Misappropriation Theory: U. S. V. Kim', Whittier 
Law Review, Vol. 26, pp 678(a similar relationship of trust and confidence must be the functional equivalent of 
fiduciary duty) , 
See Chestman, 947 F. 2d , at 
566 (fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence); 
See Chiarella, 445 U. S. p 228 (fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and confidence) 
166 See U. S. v. Chesti-nan, 947F. 2d 55 1,568(2d Cir. 199 1) 
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infrequently because they have a rare chance to co-operate in joint production. 167 For 
example, in public companies where management and shareholders interact 
infrequently, on the one hand, management who are in charge of operation are 
familiar with business; on the other hand, shareholders who have almost no chance to 
know what has happened to the company except through mandatory disclosure, 
annual or extraordinary meetings and whose interests are need protecting. Therefore 
there needs to be a bridge between management and shareholders, or majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders: trust through which lots of conflicts of 
interests between them will be reduced or solved. 
As we know, the regulatory function of the law is limited concerning its ability to 
create trust because the costs of enforcement are too great to monitor every interaction 
and too much regulation could not shape trustworthiness. 168 Trust among managers 
and shareholders or between majority shareholders and minority shareholders is 
necessary for corporate efficiency that has been mentioned. However, asymmetrical 
information provides ample opportunity for managers or majority shareholders to 
abuse trust. For example, most shareholders must place their trust in corporate 
management because they do not have the resources to determine whether or not the 
executives of a publicly held corporation are acting in a way to maximize shareholder 
value or reporting financial statement accurately. 
Conventional legal and economic analysis is based on assumption that the 
167 See Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shelifer; Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'Trust in Large 
Organization', The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, p 333. 
168 See R. Williarn Ide III and Douglas H. Yarn, 2003, 'Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating 
Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust', Vanderbilt Law Review, V61.56, p 1121. 
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corporation is best considered as a "nexus of contracts", a collection of explicit and 
implicit agreements voluntarily reached among the rationally entities who join in the 
corporate enterprise. However, this viewpoint disregards the value of trust to the 
corporation as well as incompleteness of most contracts. 169 That is, corporate 
participants often cooperate with each other because of internal ones instead of 
because of external constraints, such as trust in place of law and contract in 
cooperation. 170 As we know, in making contribution to the corporation, individuals 
who participate in the corporation often expose themselves to great risk of loss from 
other participants' failure or misbehavior, in particular management and majority 
shareholders. How to deal with the relationship between management and 
shareholders, or majority shareholders and minority shareholders? Will it be settled by 
law, or by contract or by other means? Of course, markets, law and contract work 
better when the situation is transparent and opportunistic behavior can be detected and 
punished, which can reduce agency costs but such efforts usually can't eliminate all 
opportunities for an agent to shirk or steal, especially making mistakes in operation or 
making use of position for the sake of himself, which goes beyond the regulation of 
laws and contracts. That is to say, maybe what the managers or majority shareholders 
do does not violate laws and contracts but does harm to the company and shareholders. 
Especially asymmetrical information between management and dispersed 
shareholders, or majority shareholders and minority shareholders occurs often. Trust 
can work better in such situation. Thus creating and maintaining trust in a corporation 
169 See Williamson , 
0., 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Pres. 
"' See Margaret M. Blair &Lynn A. Stout, 2000-2001, 'Trust, Trustworthiness, and The Behavioral Foundations 
of Corporation Law', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 149, p 1725. 
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is very important because the trust could reduce the inefficiencies and the need to 
expense resources on constant monitoring on management. Therefore, a scholar thInks 
"trust is the glue that holds organizations together. More powerful than contracts or 
authority, trust enables partner companies- or groups within a company- to achieve 
results that exceed the sum of the parts. " 
171 
With regard to law and contract, although I am not suggesting that legal rules, 
explicit contracts and market sanctions are unimportant in governing agency costs, 
there are shortcomings as follows. Firstly, no matter how carefully the legislature 
drafts laws and parties to a contract negotiate or reach agreement, it is impossible to 
predict what will happen exactly and control opportunities. That is to say, it is 
impossible for laws or contract to develop a plan of action that takes into account all 
possible contingencies. Second, it is too expensive to enforce the law or contract if 
management breaks it. Thirdly, as far as the development of trust to the importance of 
company is concerned, the use of binding law or contract can not help the creation of 
trust but actually harm the development of trust. 172 Therefore, some literature pointed 
out that certain measures imposed to increase trust may unintentionally harm trust. 
For example, in the organization literature, Sitkin and Bies suggested that legalistic 
remedies to enlarge trust could have a negative effect; 173 and Malhotra and 
Murnighan have shown that contracts can have a detrimental effect on interpersonal 
171 See Jordan D Lewis, 1999, Trusted Partners: How Companies Build Mutual Trust and Win Together; Trust 
Within and Between Organizations, Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann Eds., 1998. (www. Amazon. com) 
172 Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. 2002, 'The Effects of Formal and Informal Contract on Interpersonal Trust', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, pp 535--559. 
173 See Sitkin, S. B., & Bies, R. J. 1993, 'The Legalistic Organization: Definitions, Dimensions and Dilemmas', 
Organization Science, 4, pp 345-35 1. 
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trust. 174 That is, trust must come from trustor and trustee internally instead of 
externally. Here I by no means deny the importance of law and contracts. 
2.2.2.9.3. Disadvantages of trust 
As Putnam puts it, trust is a custom shaped during a centuries-long history of 
"horizontal networks of association" between people, including both commercial and 
civic activities. 175 It shows trust comes into being over a long period of time in a 
certain environment which is affected by comprehensive elements; secondly, trust in 
others is created more easily in horizontal relationships than in vertical relationships; 
thirdly, without sufficient inforination, there will be no trust at all. That is to say, due 
to asymmetrical information, the function of trust is very limited. With regard to the 
relationship between management and shareholders, it is very difficult for 
shareholders to trust in management in company due to asymmetrical information on 
some occasions. 
Although good social norms, conventions, institutions, law, morality, contract etc 
could help generate trust among people in our society, the production and the 
realization of trust are very complex process which stems from the inmost activity of 
soul and which is the outcome of trustworthiness for a long time by others. In other 
words, trust is very difficult to check and accompanies a great of risk that may lead to 
catastrophes to people in a certain circumstance. That is why the stories such as Enron, 
174 See Malhotra, D., & Mumighan, J-K, 2002, ' The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust', Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 47, pp 534-559. 
175 See Putnam, Robert, 1993, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, Pnnceton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
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Worldcorn happened in the USA where law, contract, institution, review mechanism, 
judicial review etc are very advanced in the world but trust is gone sometimes. That is 
the fatal shortcoming of trust that seems to have nothing to do with agent problem and 
agent cost in some situations. The above stories show the relationship between 
management and shareholders is in need of trust which could reduce agent problem 
and agent cost if they treat each other honestly on the one hand; however, on the other 
hand, trust is very breakable because management will not fulfill the obligation of 
trust at any time when law and contract do not prescribe it, although what 
management do will damage their reputation. 
2.2.2.9.4. Conclusion 
Trust based on conscience, vulnerability and risk-taking is the result of progress and 
civilization of society. Trust is functionally necessary for the continuance of 
han-nonious social relationships. Therefore trust is very significant in our society, 
including the relationship between the management and shareholders, or majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders in a company where trust can reduce the agent 
problem and agent cost which go beyond the regulation of laws and contracts 
sometimes. In a word, trust can play a great role in a company where laws, charters 
and contract are lacunary. However, the level of trust is quite varying between 
different persons, different groups, different regions, different countries and different 
societies, of which some people or organization will take advantage, for example 
managers will abuse the trust of shareholders in a company. In a sense, the function of 
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trust is limited in the regulation of relationship between management and shareholders, 
or between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 
To sum up, the above ways of solving the agency problem which mostly stem 
from the countries with the structure of dispersed share ownership but also popularly 
are used in the counties with the structure of concentrated share ownership in order to 
minimize the agency cost in corporate governance may be useful under some 
circumstances. Unfortunately, many of the mechanisms mentioned above to reduce 
the agency problem generate their own problems or the results are not as good as 
expected. For example, an increase in managerial ownership strengthens managerial 
alignment with those of shareholders while it simultaneously decreases the 
effectiveness of takeovers in monitoring and regulating management. ' 76 It seems that 
there is no better way of solving the agency problem so far. How to tackle the 
corporate governance problem is a worldwide problem. The thesis argues that the first 
step is to develop economy and solve the issue of the structure of share ownership 
according to the practical situation in a given country or region. The thesis will 
discuss it below. 
2.3. The concept of corporate governance 
Why has corporate governance become such a prominent topic in the past two 
176 See Kose John, and Sirni Kedia, 2003, 'Design of Corporate Governance: Role of Ownership Structure, 
Takeovers, and Bank Debt', Working Paper, (April). 
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decades or so and not before? The reasons are as follows: (1) the world-wide wave of 
privatization in the past two decades, (2) refonn of pension fund and growth of private 
savings, (3) the takeover wave in the 1980s, (4) deregulation and integration of capital 
markets, (5) the 1998 East Asia crisis, and (6) a series of recent U. S. scandals. 177 
Since modem companies are the main typical economic organization across countries, 
the common problem in companies will affect the development of economy and 
stability of society. Therefore it is not excessive however much the importance of 
corporate governance is emphasized. 
As a matter of fact, the corporate govemance issues are the same old as 
companies themselves since their birth. 178 The term "corporate governance" derives 
from "an analogy between the govenunent of cities, nations or states and governance 
of corporations". 179 Today there is no universal conception of corporate governance 
in the world. The concept of corporate governance has been lively debated by scholars 
in law, law and economics, management, sociology, and political economy from 
different angles respectively in the past two or more decades but there is no common 
agreement on it. It is not surprising that scholars, countries or regions, and 
organizations have different conceptions of corporate governance from varying 
disciplines according to their understanding on corporate governance, in addition to 
177 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas R6ell, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Control', Working Paper 
No. 02/2002(ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 (September), p 10. 
178 John Lowry and Alan Dignam, 2003, Company Law (Second Edition), London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
Reed Elevier (UK) Ltd., p345. 
179 See Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailas R6ell, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Control', Working Paper 
No. 02/2002(ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance), 30 (September), p 6. According to authors' footnote 5, the 
analogy between corporate and political voting was explicit in early corporate charters and writings 
dating back to 
the revolutionary origins of the American corporation and first railway corporations 
in Gen-nany (Dunlavy 
1998). The precise term "corporate governance" itself seems to have been used first by Richard 
Eell (1960, p. 108), 
to denote -the structure and functioning of the corporate polity". 
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different practices in countries or regions, and organizations. That is, there is variation 
in systems of corporate governance across societies and most of this difference 
reflects national political, social, and cultural trajectories etc. 
It is said that the earliest debate on "corporate governance" originated with the 
U. S. In America this debate on "corporate governance" started at least as early as 
1932 when Berl and Means published the classic book, The Modem Corporation and 
Private Property. 180 In 1971 Mace further put emphasis on the importance of this 
debate in his book, Directors: Myth and Reality 181 However, the discussion 
"corporate governance" really became heated in 1982 with the publication by The 
American Law Institute (ALI) of their Principles of Corporate Governance and 
Structure: Restatement and Recommendations. The result of the discussion led to a 
stream of publications on the topic of corporate governance in America, which 
gradually influenced the other countries or regions in the world. Since then, the 
publication and debate on corporate governance have been going without stop. In UK 
one of the most famous reports is the Cadbury Report that was published in 1992 and 
inspired the whole debate on corporate governance and affected the development of 
many corporate governance codes globally. ' 82 
As mentioned above, different scholars in different disciplines, even in the same 
field, have a different opinion on the concept of corporate governance. The following 
180 See Hopt, 1994, 'Preface' in Baums, Buxbaum &Hopt (eds), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, 
1, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 
"S 1 Mace, 1971, Directors: Myth and Reality, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
182 The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) keeps track of corporate governance codes around the 
\vorld. There are more than 100 countries, regions and international organizations promulgating codes of corporate 
governance. A comprehensive list of these documents and the text can be found at 
http: //www. ecgi. de/codes/a_codes-htin- 
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conceptions of corporate governance are typical and referable, for example, 
"Corporate governance is the framework that defines the division of 
power in the corporation. This division of power in turn determines the 
division of wealth created by the corporation. Oftentimes, the regulation 
of power in the corporation- either of managers or controlling 
shareholders- is subsumed under the rubric of 'accountability. " 183 
"Corporate governance can be defined as the set of mechanisms that 
translate signals from product markets and input markets into firm 
behavior. This definition focuses on two elements, the signals generated 
outside the firm and the control structures inside the firm to execute 
decisions based on these signals. " 184 
"Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
That is, because straight-out expropriation is a frequent manifestation of 
the agency problem that financiers need to address, the people who sink 
the capital need to be assured that they get back the return on this capital. 
The corporate governance mechanism provides this assurance. " 185 Or say, 
"corporate governance deals with the agency problem: the separation of 
management and finance. The fundamental question of corporate 
governance is how to assure financiers that they get a return on their 
financial investment. " 186 
Gillan and Starks define corporate governance as "the system of laws, 
rules, and factors that control operations in a company. "' 87 
The Cadbury Report defines corporate governance as "the system or 
process by which companies are directed and controlled. " 
188 
The OECD (2004) recognized corporate governance is one key element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor 
confidence. The OECD (2004) describes that "corporate governance 
183 See Amir N. Licht, 2004, ' The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style', 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 29, p 680. 
184 See Eriik Bergl6f and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1999, 'The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Tansition and Developing Countries', Working Paper, (June). 
185 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. Lll, No. 2, (June), pp 737-742. 
186 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. LII, No. 2, June, p773. 
187 See Gillan, S. L., Starks, L. T., 1998, 'A Survey of Shareholders Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence', 
Contemporary Finance Digest 2 (3), pp 10-34. 
See Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Report, Gee & Co., para. 
2.5., 1992, at 15. 
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involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in 
the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring. " 189 
These endlessly varying definitions that reflect different expectations on what 
corporate goverriance should be supposed to do, however, may be divided with 
respect to one fundamental criterion: the identity of the interests the corporation is 
supposed to serve: societal objectives such as equity, fairness, freedom, and citizen 
responsibilities, or narrowly economic efficiency. 190 
The thesis argues corporate governance refers to the mechanisms and processes 
by which corporations are governed with minimized agency costs. On the one hand, in 
the structure of dispersed ownership in countries, power over the enterprise is 
concentrated in the hands of senior managers, who have large discretion in enterprise 
decision-making. From a practical standpoint, the task of corporate governance 
mechanisms is to monitor whether managerial discretion is controlled within 
reasonable bounds. 191 On the other hand, big shareholders using their position exploit 
minority shareholders in the structure of concentrated ownership in other countries or 
regions, and how to discipline the action of majority shareholders is big problem. The 
institutional arrangements on corporate elections and the role and fiduciary duties of 
189 See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance', 
2004. 
190 See John W. Cilffi, 2000, 'State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State 
of the Art and Emerging Research', The Amencan Journal of Comparative Law, V61.48, pp 507-508. 
191 See David Charny, 1998, 'The Gen-nan Corporate Goverriance System', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 1: 145, No., p 
148. 
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the board have been the key themes in the corporate governance literature from its 
inception. Now the dilemma is how to balance the limits on managerial discretion for 
the protection of the interests of shareholders, and constraints on the exploitation by 
majority shareholders of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance. In 
a word, the corporate governance problem can be described as an "agency problem" 
in a sense. 
The different understanding of corporate governance by scholars may be the 
same as the story happened many years ago. That is, the debate on whether 
management should run the corporation solely in the interests of shareholders or 
whether it should take account of other constituencies is almost as old as the first 
writings on corporate governance between Berle (1931) and Dodd (1932). Berle held 
the view that "corporate powers are in trust for shareholders and nobody else. "192 But 
Dodd argued that "[business] is private property only in the qualified sense, and 
society may properly demand that it be carried on in such a way as to safeguard the 
interests of those who deal with it either as employees or consumers even if the 
proprietary rights of its owners are thereby curtailed. " 193 The above debate on 
corporate governance will continue forever too. 
The various views on corporate governance can be related to different cultural 
contexts, intellectual backgrounds and interests of scholars because scholars in 
different fields come from different academic disciplines and backgrounds. As Shann 
Turribull points out, these disciplines such as micro-economics, organizational 
192 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 193 1, 'Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust', 44 Han'. L. Rev., p 1049. 
193 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 1932, 'For Whorn Are Corporate Managers Trustees? ', 45 Harv. L. Rev., p 1162. 
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economics, organizational theory, infort-nation theory, law, accounting finance, 
management, psychology, sociology and politics, may consider corporate governance 
in a different approach, just like "the apocryphal group of blind people trying to 
identify an elephant through touch by each describing quite different parts of the 
animal. " 
194 
This thesis argues that the content of the modem corporate governance debate at 
least includes three aspects as follows: (1) the conflict between shareholders and 
managements, (2) the conflict between majority or controlling shareholders and 
minority or non-controlling shareholders, (3) the conflict between shareholders and 
stakeholders. 195 Based on the above relationships, there are substantial costs that 
derive from the clash of the interests between different agents. Corporate governance 
is the result of the relationships and interactions between these agents. An optimal 
corporate governance structure is the one that would minimize agent costs deriving 
fTom these agency problems. 
196 
No matter what definition of corporate governance it is and however the 
corporate govemance develops, because corporate governance varies widely across 
countries and across firms, but better corporate governance could help firms improve 
the possibility of perfon-nance and easily raise funding from the public on better 
terms, 197 the thesis argues the aim of corporate governance is to balance the interests 
194 See Shann Turnbull, 1997, 'Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concern and Theories', Corporate Governance, 
Vol. 5, No. 4, (October) p 180. 
195 The paper only discuss relationship between management and shareholders, and between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
196 See Stilpon Nestor and John K. Thompson, 'Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is 
Convergence Under Way? http: //www. oecd. orK/dat-aoecd/7/10ý/1931460. pd (visiting date: 3,20 2007) 
197 See Craig Dodge, G Andrew Karolyi and Ren6 M. Stulz, 2004 'Why Do Countries Matter So Much For 
Corporate Governancc"', Finance Working Paper N, (September), www. eczi. orjz/wp. 
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between parties concerned in companies in order to promote the development of 
companies, even the progress of society and growth of economy. So good corporate 
governance has far-reaching significance at least as follows: 
(1) "It helps to ensure that an adequate and appropriate system of controls 
within a company and hence assets may be safeguarded; 
(2) It also prevents any single individual having too powerful an 
influence; 
(3) It is concerned with the relationship between a company's 
management, the board of directors, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders; 
(4) It aims to ensure that the company is managed in the best interests of 
the shareholders and the other stakeholders; 
(5) It tries to encourage both transparency and accountability which 
investors are increasingly looking for in both corporate management 
and corporate performance. " 198 
In a word, corporate governance is an arrangement or mechanism that strikes the 
right balance of power and interests between managers, blockholders, dispersed 
investors and all the other stakeholders in order to solve the agency problem and 
mitigate the agency cost as much as possible. Therefore good corporate governance is 
separation of the functions with clearly-defined accountability, responsibilities and 
checks- and-b al ances among them. 
2.4. The classification of corporate governance around the 
world 
198 See Christine A. Mallin, 2004, Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 4. 
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2.4.1. Outsider and insider systems 
Corporate governance around the world can be classified into different categories, for 
example, the outsider and insider systems put forward by Franks and Mayer. 199 
Franks and Mayer argue that the United Kingdom and United States have "outsider 
systems" of corporate control with large share markets, dispersed ownership, and 
active markets in corporate control. The distinguishing characters of the outsider 
model are (1) the structure of dispersed equity ownership with institutional investors; 
(2) shareholders interests superior to stakeholders in the company law; (3) the 
protection of minority investors emphasized in securities law and regulation; and (4) 
relatively strong emphasis on requirements for disclosure. 200 In contrast, a majority of 
Continental European capital markets have "insider systems" with relatively small 
numbers of quoted companies, the structure of concentrated share ownership, and 
comparatively a small number of takeover activities, 201 and less protection of 
minority. Japan has an insider system too. 
The problem with these differences is that there are no "systems" that are 
different to such an extent as to explain the various factual phenomena. Although they 
are different, there are also some of the same characters between them. The 
differences are in reality in degree only. On the one hand, there are still much 
difference even if they are regarded the same system. The systems classified as insider, 
199 See Franks, J. and Mayer, C., 'Corporate Control: A Synthesis of the International Evidence'. IFA Working 
Paper 165-92,1992, London Business School. 
200 See Stilpon Nestor and John K. Thompson, 'Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is 
Convergence Under Way? ? http: //www. oecd. oriz/dataoecd/7/10ý/1931460. vd (visiting date: 3,20 2007) 
201 See Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, 2001, 'Ownership and Control of German Corporations', The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, (Winter), pp 943-944. 
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for example, are too divergent to be considered as one category. Each of the 
continental European systems has to a different extent some elements of as outsider 
system besides the features of "insider systems". From a legal point of view, some are 
very similar to the English system, but are at the same time quite distinctive in the 
growth of financial markets. On the other hand, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland, three countries are considered to be much 'closed' systems, namely a 
relatively large number of domestic listed companies and a relatively advanced stock 
market capitalization, although they are regarded as "insider systems". In a word, it 
seems unreasonable according to the categories above. For instance, comparing 
Germany and Japan, both regarded as a typical insider system is also rather 
problematic. Both might have some similar mechanisms of corporate control, such as 
bank playing an important role in corporate governance, but their dissimilarities are 
ever gTeater. 
202 
2.4.2. Market- oriented and bank- oriented systems 
Another classification is market-oriented and bank-oriented systems. 
203 The former 
are the UK and USA, and the latter are mainly Germany and Japan. The systems are 
categorized differently by following criteria: the size of banking systems and stock 
markets, the degree of external finance that results from bank and market sources and 
2"2 See Karel Lannoo, 1999, 'A European Perspective on Corporate Governance', Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2., (June), pp272-273. 
203 See Edwards, J., and Fischer, K., 1996, 'Bank, Finance and Investment in Germany', Cambridge, 
Cambridge 
University Press. 
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the amount of corporate equity owned by banks including the role in corporate 
governance played by banks. Bank-oriented systems are considered to have large 
banking systems, high levels of bank finance, concentrated shareholding and large 
equity holding by banks, while market-oriented systems are mainly thought to have 
high levels of takeover activities, a huge amount of information disclosure, dispersed 
shareholding and big equity market. Therefore there are certain differences between 
countries with "market-oriented and bank-oriented systems", or emphasis on the 
degree of division between investor and finn, "anns-length and close relationship 
systems". 204 
In fact, the distinction between bank-orient and market-oriented systems proved 
to be fragile. For example, Japan not only has a large banking system but also has a 
well -capitalized equity market. While bank lending to corporations has been high in 
Japan in comparison to the UK and USA, but such situation is different in Gen-nany. It 
seems Japan is the mixture by this criterion. Bank holdings of corporate equity are 
modest in most countries. While banks are thought to have been actively involved in 
corporate activity and, in particular, bank often taking part in reorganizations of 
companies in Japan, they have not in Germany, 205 which means Germany is different 
from Japan in some aspects although they are the same category by this criterion. 
204 See Colin Mayer, Oren Sussman, 2001, 'The Assessment: Finance, Law, and Growth', Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, (Winter), p 457. 
205 See Colin Mayer, Oren Sussman, 2001, 'The Assessment: Finance, Law, and Growth' , 
Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, (Winter) ,p 457. 
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2.4.3. Dispersion and concentration systems 
The thesis argues that the above classifications are not ideal because they could not 
represent the universal phenomena of corporate governance in the world but they are 
not persuasive. The research has shown that the United States and the United 
Kingdom has the structure of broadly dispersed ownership by diversified shareholders, 
but large shareholdings in some forms are the norm in the rest of the world, including 
most of Europe (e. g. Italy, Finland, and Sweden), as well as Latin America, East Asia, 
and Africa, corporations typically having controlling shareholders. In sum, the 
structure of heavily concentrated ownership and a predominance of controlling 
shareholders are very common around the world. 206 
As a matter of fact, the structure of concentrated share ownership is universal 
across the countries except for the US and the UK mainly For example, some 
scholars investigate the separation of ownership and control in 2,980 publicly traded 
companies in nine East Asian countries (including some regions, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand). They find that more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single 
shareholder. Combination of management and ownership control is frequent, and the 
top management of about 60% of firms that are highly concentrated is in relation to 
the family of the controlling shareholder. 207 In nine East Asian countries (or regions), 
206 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 1-11, No. 2, (June), pp754-755. 
207 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, 'The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian Corporations' Journal of Financial Economics 58, p 82. 
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the concentration of control rights in the hands of largest blockholders is very high. 
Thai and Indonesian companies have the highest concentration at 35.25% and 33.68%, 
respectively, followed by Malaysian and Hong Kong companies at 28.32% and 
28.08%, respectively. The least concentration of control rights is proved in Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan (10.33%, 17.78%, and 18.96%, respectively). 208 Companies in 
Philippines and Singapore are controlled apparently by the state. 209 
In Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Franc, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK), scholars 
analyze the ultimate ownership control of 5,232 corporations from1996 to the end of 
1999. They find that typically firms are widely held (36.93%) or family control 
(44.29%). That is, widely held firms comprise 63.08% of UK firms and 62.32% of 
Irish finns; in continental Europe the highest percentages of widely held finns are all 
in Scandinavia but are substantially lower (Sweden 39.18%, Norway 36.77%, Finland 
28.68%). The lowest percentages of widely held firms are in Gennany (10.37%), 
Austria (11.11 %), and Italy (12.98%). The picture for family control is reversed. The 
lowest percentages are in the UK (23.68%) and Ireland (24.63%); in continental 
Europe, the lowest percentages are in Norway (38.55%), Sweden (46.94%), 
Switzerland (48-13%) and Finland (48.84%). In every other Western European 
country, family controlled firms are concentrated .2 
10 Therefore, the structure of share 
ownership in most of western countries is concentrated. 
208 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, 'The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian Corporations' Journal of Financial Economics 58, p 99. 
209 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, 'The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian Corporations' Journal of Financial Economics 58 ,p 101. 
210 See Mara Faccio, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, 'The ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations', 
Journal of Financial Economics 65, p 378. 
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Based on investigation by scholars above, the thesis argues the shareholding 
structure composed of shares is the foundation for corporation, because incorporation, 
contribution and establishment of organization are dealt with by shareholders who 
constitute the general meeting. Since the agency problems derive from the change of 
the structure of share ownership and the agency problem is prevalent in corporate 
governance of publicly traded company around the world, the thesis allows for two 
types of corporate governance system of the publicly traded company around the 
world according to the degree of the structure of share ownership in companies: 
dispersed and concentrated systems. The former is characterized by dispersed 
shareholders and mainly conflict of interest between shareholders and management as 
agency problem. The latter is characterized by controlling shareholders and major 
conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders as agency problem. 
For example, the family firm has different corporate governance problems. Although 
there may be conflicts between big shareholders and hired managers in the family 
finn, these problems are probably of minor importance compared with conflict of 
interest between big shareholder and minority shareholders, as owners (big 
shareholders) are generally believed to have capacity to control the operations of their 
firm. 21 1 
The concentration is sub-grouped into: (1) family concentrated systems 
according to family concentrated shareholding structure, e. g. southeastern Asian 
countries and regions; (2) bank concentrated systems according to bank 
211 See Erlik BerglOf and Ernst-Ludwi- von Thadden, 1999, 'The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Tansition and Developing Countries', Working Paper, (June). 
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concentrated shareholding structure, e. g. Germany and Japan; (3) state concentrated 
systems according to state concentrated shareholding structure, e. g. China, Russia. 212 
The thesis argues that the classification of corporate governance based on the 
structure of share ownership is very significant and the pattern is very universal across 
the countries because whether in the structure of dispersed ownership or in the 
structure of concentrated ownership, the agency problem, the core issue of corporate 
governance emanates from the substantial change of structure of share ownership in 
the world. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The aim of corporate governance is to solve the agency problem and minimize the 
agency cost that is the core of corporate governance, while agency problems derive 
from the structure of share ownership that is consisted of shares I will discus in the 
next chapter. That is, the difference of the structure of share ownership leads to the 
different agency problem. The major agency problem in the structure of dispersed 
share ownership is the conflict of interest between management and dispersed 
shareholders while the major agency problem in the structure of concentrated share 
ownership is the conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. So the thesis argues study on the structure of share ownership is the first 
212 See Olga Kuznetsova, and Andrei Kuznetsov, 1999, 'The State as a Shareholder: Responsibilities and 
Objectives', Europe-Asian Studies, Vol. 51, Vol. 51, No. 3 (May), p 437. For example, in Russia the state retain a 
contriling stake of shares in 30% of all industrial firms, with total output accounting 
for 20-25% of GDP. In 
addition, in large firm and firms in key industries the state guaranteed itself the controlling power of a majority 
shareholder through the so-called golden share. 
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step in order to strike the balance on allocation of power and distribution of interest 
between parties related to companies and to improve corporate governance. 
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Chapter 3. Relationship between the 
structure of share ownership and 
corporate governance 
3.1. The nature of the share 
The share is a unit in the share capital of a company and represents the right and 
liability of shareholders to the company. The share itself as a special commodity is 
nominal and intangible in form while rights attached to a share are a matter of 
substance. In other words, the share in the fonn of paper or electronic certification is 
insignificant in a sense but the rights of its representative are significant. Therefore, 
here the nature of the share is shown by means of the rights (ownership rights of the 
share) attached to the share in the company measured by a sum of money that is 
contributed to the company. With regard to a share in the company, Farwell J in 
Borland in Borland's Trustees v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd Q1901] 1 Ch 279) defined a 
share as follow, "A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by 
a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the 
second. A share is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various 
rights. " Therefore, in practice ownership rights of shares will fall under four main 
heads: (1) attendance at meetings and voting, (2) dividends, (3) return of capital on a 
winding up, (4) others, e. g. bringing derivative suits on behalf of company. 
As we know, the company's assets consist initially of money, goods, or intellectual 
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property etc. supplied by shareholders in exchange for shares in the company issued 
to them. That is, the contribution which is made by shareholders to the company is 
independently of shareholders after contributing but belongs to the company's assets 
which, the shareholder can not get back originally, however, shareholders can get a 
share from the company in exchange for their contribution to the company. Although 
the shares will be transferred constantly from old shareholders to new ones in 
accordance with law and charters, particularly in publicly traded companies, 
shareholders owning shares can take part in all kinds of activities of the company and 
the profit is distributed to the shareholders by way of dividends or others on the shares 
from time to time declared by the company under laws and charters. A share in 
company is a forrn of property for shareholders and its position is at the heart of 
company law. There is no company without share in a sense. 
However, it seems corporate shareholders are ever more passive and functionless 
to some extent compared to partners in partnership in some countries or regions since 
the early 20th century. Thus different scholars have different opinions on the nature of 
a share. Some think the nature of a share is of a right of membership of a legal 
association, or of ownership. 213 Some scholars think shares come to suggest debt-like 
features because shareholders increasingly rely on regular dividends offered by 
corporate managers in proportion to shares as sources of steady income streams in 
place of as speculative financial instruments whose returns change greatly 
213 See Mei Shen Shi, 2001, System of Modem Corporate Governance, China Legal System Press House (China), 
pp 181-188. "Ownership" in this part (feature of share) is referred to property rights and 
is different ftom 
ownership rights of share" or "ownership structure" in the thesis. 
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dramatically with the ups and downs of a business. 214 Others emphasize the 
contractual qualities of the shares. For example, Pennington asserts that shares 
constitute simply arrays of contractual and statutory rights that the shareholder has 
against the company 215 Most of scholars share the view that shares have characters of 
both property and a proprietorial interest in the company. 216 In addition, despite the 
general acceptance of the "ownership" assumption, the legal nature of the share and 
shareholding appear to be uncertain, for instance, it seems very difficult to distinguish 
shareholders from debenture holders. As L. C. B. Gower says, the share does not readily 
fit into any "normal legal category". 217 As a result, shareholders found themselves 
being unfavorably regarded in some quarters as "absentee owners", owners of claims 
to "unearned or free income", and even compared to corporate bondholders. 218 
What is the nature of the share? First of all, let us briefly go back in the history of 
modem company law and the development of creditors. Modem company law 
originated from joint stock company law that was regarded as an appendage of 
partnership law. 
219 
Modem loan, as a relationship between credit and debt, has a strong relationship 
with usury, the loan of money for high interest in ancient times. Usury was always 
214 See Jonathan B. Baskin, 1988, 'The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United 
States, 1600 --- 1914: Overcoming Asymmetric Information', 62 Business History Review, pp 232-236. 215 See Robert Pennington, 1990, Company Law, London: Butterworths, 6 th ed, pp 56-144. 
216 See Paddy Ireland, 1999, 'Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership', The Modem Law Review, 
Vol. 62, p 46. 
217 See Paul Davies, 1997, Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6 th ed, pp 
299-321. 
218 See Paddy Ireland, 2003, 'Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory', 'Legal Study' p 481. 
( citing Thorstein Veblen, 'The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York: Scribner's, 1904) and 'Absentee 
Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times'(New York: Huebsch, 1923); See also FS Wood, "Me Status 
of Management Stockholders'(1 928) 38 Yale LJ 57; J Frank 'Book Review'(] 933) 43 Yale LJ 898. ) 
219 See Paddy Ireland, 1999, 'Cornpany Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership', The Modem Law Review, 
V61.62, p 38. 
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frowned upon in Greek and Roman times, when Roman law permitted usury as long 
as the interested charged was not excessive, and was completely prohibited in the 
Middle Ages. Over time, as trade expanded overseas, merchants were in need of a 
huge amount of money to enlarge the quantity of trade. Therefore the function of 
money gradually expanded to include "loan" as well as "investment" and the status of 
the provider of money correspondingly changed from "lender" into "partner" who 
would like to take the risk of 'investment' instead of accepting the fixed "interest ". 220 
That is, an investor of money whose return was neither guaranteed nor fixed in 
advance but depended on the result of the venture was deemed a risk-taking partner, 
while the money lender transferred ownership of his money to the borrower and took 
a fixed and guaranteed return. Thus, "lenders" who received interest were different 
from "partners" who received a share of profit. Both received the return on the capital, 
however, they have been quite distinctive in legal status since ancient times. 
In fact today, generally speaking shareholders as owners of shares are 
distinguished from creditorS221 of debt as follows. First, with regard to the forrn of 
investment, shareholders can contribute to the company by means of money, in kind, 
intellectual property while creditors only invest money in the company, relatively 
speaking. Second, concerning the return on investment, shareholders will depend on 
the success of the company while creditor will enjoy a fixed return that is agreed by 
company. Third, shareholders can take part in certain activities of the company such 
220 See Paddy Ireland, 1999, Tornpany Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership', The Modem Law Review, 
V61.62,1999, pp 34-35. 
22 1 Here creditors mean who invest money In companies excluding other kinds of creditors such suppi ies, 
consurner as creditors of companies. 
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as monitoring and voting according to its charters in proportion to the shareholding in 
principle while creditors should not (there is an exception in some states in the USA). 
Fourth, shareholders can claim the residual profit, but creditor can not. Fifth, creditors 
of the company can get a return on their investment before shareholders do. In a word, 
creditor's rights can be against the company, but the creditor has only limited control 
over the company' affairs. Generally speaking, such controls by creditor arise 
contractually from loan agreement until default, breach of contract or on the verge of 
bankruptcy of companies. While shareholders can take part in all kinds of activities of 
company from the beginning to the end in accordance with laws and articles, in 
particular by voting rights which are critical and lead to the objective of pursuit of 
parties who are in relation to the company in the course of operation, such as 
institutional investor, big shareholder, takeover bidder. 
What relationship is there between ownership (referring to the rights of assets) and 
the rights attached to a share? The right of ownership of the share is derived from the 
right of ownership but is distinctive from the latter. As analyzed above, once 
shareholders make a contribution to the company and the contribution is the 
company's asset, but shareholders get their share from the company in return. As 
stated in Chapter one, ownership is composed of many rights, such as "the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the 
right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and 
absence of the tenn, the duty to prevent harrn, liability to execution, and the incident 
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,, 222 of residuarity. They make eleven leading incidents. Compared with ownership, 
ownership rights of share are limited. So the rights attached to shares are different 
from ownership. 
In a word, shares with their own characters are the result of the development of a 
commercial society, shareholders are quite different from creditor of company and 
ownership rights of shares are independent rights that originate from ownership but 
determine the destiny of company. 
3.2. The relationship between the structure of ownership and 
corporate governance 
The company as an entity or mechanism consists of shares, organization structure and 
infon-nation etc, but shares belongs to one kind of property rights that forin the 
foundation for the operation of the company. That is, property rights are fundamental: 
investors will not invest if they expect to be unable to keep the fruits of their 
investment. In a sense, there is no company without shares. A share is a thing (or 
chose) in action. That is, a share that does not have a physical existence of its own is a 
fon-n of property, and the shareholders who are quite distinct from the creditors are 
granted certain rights, 223 which are analyzed above. As we know, property rights play 
no role at all in the world of Robinson Crusoe. Property rights are an instrument of a 
society and their significance records the status of man and enables man to realize 
222 See Alison Clarke and Paul Kohler, 2005, 'Property Law: Commentary and Materials', Cambridge University 
Press, p 194. 
221 See Ewan N/lacintyre, 2005, Business Law, Person Education limited, Second Edition, p 536. 
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expectation by their exchange value, which is recognized in the laws, customs, and 
mores of a society. 224 That is, property rights do not refer to relations between men 
and things but, rather, to relations between human beings that arise from the existence 
of things and pertain to their use. In other words, the property rights demonstrate the 
relationship between men and represent man's status in the society In fact Roman law, 
Common Law, Marx and Engels, and current legal and economic studies basically 
agree with argument that property rights controlled or scarce resources used by man in 
the community show his economic and social status. 225 In other words, property is 
associated with rights or social status that becomes focus by the mankind during the 
process of exchange, while the exercise of right has something to do with costs or at 
the expense of interest. Thus Coase suggested that transactions that are typically 
conducted within the firm are not governed by the price mechanism but by a power 
relationship. 
226 According to the views of Grossman and Hart227 and Hart and 
Moore, 228 authority or power is different from the price mechanism because it 
involves the exercise of rights that are not contractible, the so-called residual rights of 
control. The power derives from the ownership of physical assets and assets of other 
forms. There is no right or power without ownership or other assets in companies, 
although directors or management can make decisions and operate companies through 
224 See Harold Demsetz, 1967, 'Toward A Theory of Property Rights', The American Economic Review, Vol. 57, 
No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association 
(May, ), 
pp 347-359. 
225 See Eirik GFurubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, 1972, 'Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of 
Recent Literature', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Dec., ), pH 39. 
226 See Coase, Ronald, 1937, 'The Nature of the Finn', Economica, IV, pp 386-405. 
227 See Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1986, 'The Costs and the Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, XCIV, pp 691-719. 
228 Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, 1990, 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political 
Economy, XCVIII, pp 1119-1158. 
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the delegation of their powers. The decision rights refer to the use of assets, of 
resources, in fact they are property. 17 
1) Q 
It is known that the shareholders' general 
meeting is power organ but directors or management exercise day-to-day power or 
rights through the delegation. Therefore it should be noted that the attenuation of the 
stockholder's property rights in the firm and the "rule of management" result from the 
costs to the shareholders of detecting and policing managerial decisions and of 
enforcing wealth maximizing behavior rather than from legal restraints on private 
property rights. 230 In reality, if the attenuation of stockholders' rights comes from the 
fact that the costs of detecting, policing and enforcing appropriate managerial 
behavior exceeds the expected benefits, they will give it up. In other words, 
shareholders always think of the balance between cost and profit at least and it will be 
better for them that profit outweighs cost when monitoring companies. In a word, the 
share as the part of property rights institutions is the principal source of diversity 
among national corporate governance systems while the structure of ownership is 
made up of shares. 
Shares that shareholders own in companies are of interests that belong to 
shareholders themselves exclusively The structure of share ownership is made up of 
the share which shareholders own in companies. In theory, since shareholders have 
interest in companies owing to their shares, every shareholder should be concerned 
ý11 I about the development of companies or the situation of companies 
in detail. The 
229 See Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, 2002, The Economics of Contracts: -1-heories and Applications, 
Cambridge University Press, p 256. 
230 See Larenr, R, 1966, 'The 200 largest Non-Financed Corporations', Amer. Econ. Rev., (Sept. ) 56, pp 777-87; 
Samuelson, P. 1966, Economics. 7 th Edition. New York: McGraw Hill. 
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reason is very simple that every shareholder hopes he will get a certain expected 
return on the contribution by him to the company. Therefore, shareholders should take 
part in activities and play a positive role in companies by voting rights '23 
1 especially 
supervising the management or controlling shareholders to maximize the company's 
value for the sake of the shareholders themselves ultimately. 
However, in practice because the quantity of shares which every shareholder 
owns differs greatly in companies, the activity that every shareholder takes part in 
varies to the extent that some shareholders never care about companies due to the 
Wall Street Rule. As described above, the structure of share ownership is classified 
into dispersion and concentration across countries. In the structure of dispersed share 
ownership in countries, small and medium shareholders never mind what happens to 
companies because of cost, skill and free-rider problem etc. Especially when the costs 
of control exceed the benefit, shareholders tend not to take action. In contrast, big 
shareholders in particular care about the companies in a structure of concentrated 
share ownership in other countries. Hence, the conflict of interest shows differently in 
the structure of dispersed and concentrated share ownership due to the shareholder 
playing a different role in "governance". 
" "Governance" is issues of structure, control and process. "Structure" is 
about the forrns through which decisions are made and "control" as about 
the power to make those decisions via such structures, while "process" 
refers to the implementation of structure and control. 11,232 
23 1 There are exceptions frorn the one-share-one vote-principle in some countries, for example, in western 
Europeans countries, there are multiple-vote shares or no-vote share issued. 
232 See Nick von Tunzeli-nann, 2003, 'Historical Convolution of Governance and Technology in the Industrial 
Revolutions', Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 14, p 366. 
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Based on the concept of "governance", the thesis argues that how to deal with the 
relationship between "structure", "control" and "process" is very important because 
"structure" is selected by shareholders in theory. But "control" is manipulated by the 
management or majority shareholders in practice, while "process" is the logic result of 
44control". Once the change of structure of ownership develops towards dispersion, the 
company is controlled mainly by management and the agency problem in corporate 
governance is mainly that conflict of interests happens between dispersed 
shareholders and management, which is consistent with the argument that is 
separation of ownership from control by Berle and Means because of information 
asymmetry, free-rider problem, cost, skill etc for dispersed shareholders. Management 
will take advantage of his position to "tunnel" companies in interest of himself instead 
of companies or dispersed shareholders. While when the change of structure of 
ownership grows towards concentration, the company is controlled by majority 
shareholders and the agency problem in corporate governance is mainly that conflicts 
of interests arise between ma ority shareholders and minority shareholders because i 
inanagements are selected or controlled by majority shareholders. Majority 
shareholders will transfer assets to his or his relative's other companies by related 
party transactions or other ways at the expense of minority's interests. 
Today it is known that the aim of corporate governance is to balance the conflict 
of interest between entities related to companies. That is, conflicts of interest happen 
between shareholders and management, majority and minority shareholders, 
shareholders and stakeholders. In countries with a structure of dispersed share 
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ownership, the aim of corporate governance is mainly to solve the agency problem 
that is the conflict of interest between dispersed shareholders and management. While 
in countries with a structure of concentrated share ownership, the aim of corporate 
governance is mainly to solve agency problem that is the conflict of interest between 
the majority shareholders and minority shareholders. Although there is a conflict of 
interest between manager and shareholders in the structure of concentrated ownership, 
if the shareholding is concentrated, the shareholders, in particular big shareholders or 
majority shareholders, will receive reliable information about the company's 
performance. Big shareholders have broad powers to remove managers. Managers 
may then feel constrained to pursue strategies that are in the shareholders' best 
interests in the structure of concentrated share ownership. 
Therefore the thesis draws the following conclusion on the relationship between 
the structure of share ownership and corporate governance: whatever is the structure 
of share ownership across the countries in the world, there is the corresponding model 
of corporate governance in reality. Namely, the structure of share ownership 
determines the model of corporate governance in the world. 
3.3. The implication of model 
Models serving as an example to be imitated or compared have an important part to 
play in understanding, whether trying to understand oneself, organization, system 
itself Generally, models onel s community, our society, our planet or even the universe 
97 
Chapter 3. Relationship between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance 
are miniature or simplified representations of structures, systems, mechanism or 
processes. They will help people understand about how things may work and what 
they will take place probably, and offer a platform from which it is possible for people 
to gain deeper understanding and make better predictions, projections and suggestions 
n1l aDout how things may function in the future. Models compete each other like plants 
and animals on the earth, some models will be abandoned and a new model emerges 
and grows, which rely on whether models meet the need of nature or society. Where 
those competing models have a strong effect on our life, national policy and as a 
result, on society, and even on the planet as a whole, the role that the model plays will 
233 be beyond the academy, even to the most remote comers of the earth . So research 
on the model of corporate governance is very significant. 
Because there are differences in the economy, politics, law, culture, history etc. 
across different countries, there is not the same structure of share ownership and 
corporate governance in the world. But there will be some similarities in some aspects 
or some characteristics of the structure of share ownership or corporate governance, 
from which are worth learning or using for reference for other countries or regions, or 
from which we will find some similar problems to be dealt with for some countries or 
regions in the future. This is why I should carry out the classification of the structure 
of share ownership and study the model of corporate governance. 
3.4. The share ownership structure determines the model of 
233 See Benedict Sheeshy, 2004, 'The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and 
the Future of Corporate Law', Depaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 2: 463, pp 487-492. 
98 
Chapter 3. Relationship between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance 
corporate governance 
The study of corporate governance and the structure of ownership should be open to 
scholars from many disciplines; scholars in financial and economics research don't 
have a patent over it. It is said Karl Marx first studies comprehensively who controls 
the use of capital and how this control affects the creation and distribution of wealth 
in society. 234 Today there is a growing consensus among academics and practitioners 
that both the design and the ownership patterns of financial securities have a 
significant impact on the creation of value in large corporations. Economists and legal 
scholars have conducted research for the effect that large shareholders have on firin 
behavior. 235 As described above, agency problems occur due to substantial change of 
structure of share ownership in finn on account of the development of economy and 
society. Since the agency problem derived from the substantial change of structure of 
share ownership which resulted in issues of corporate governance in the modem 
corporation around the world, the crucial issue of corporate governance is to tackle 
the agency problem and minimize agency costs in order to balance the power and 
interest of the parties in relation to companies, and then the relationship between the 
structure of ownership and corporate governance should be worth studying deeply in 
detail for reference in the future. 
In terrns of shareholders of companies, as stated above, there are different kinds 
234 David L. Kang and Aage B. Sorensen, 1999, 'Ownership Organization and Finn Performance', Annu, Rew, 
Social, 25, p 122. 
235 h (1996), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi For example, Economist,,, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Sm t 
(1997) and 
Maug (1998); Legal scholar: Black (1992). 
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of conflict of interest among participants in companies: (1) majority and minority 
shareholders; (2) shareholders and management; (3) shareholders and stakeholders etc. 
The task of corporate governance as a mechanism is to balance the conflict of interest 
among participants in companies in order to make the operation and organization of 
companies orderly, proper and efficient and promote the competition of companies in 
market. 
Although company laws specify the power distribution among the general 
meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors or other departments either in 
common law system countries or in civil law system countries or in any other country 
in the world, different structures of share ownership in publicly traded companies 
have different decision-making styles in practice. Or say, the process of 
decision-making is controlled by different participants due to the structure of share 
ownership in companies that results in agency problems. That is, when the structure of 
share ownership is diffuse, theoretically, the shareholders have the power to select the 
members of the board and to vote upon certain key issues facing the company through 
the use of their voting rights, but in practice the fragmentation of ownership has 
proven to be a serious impediment to the actual exercise of such control and when 
shares in companies are owned by thousands of individuals who are not interested in 
decision-making or whose share is not big enough to have any effect on 
decision-making, the process of decision-making is controlled by management. The 
distinguishing feature of publicly traded companies in countries with a dispersed 
structure of share ownership is that it has a large number of small owners, which 
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creates two issues. First, the shareholdersý even though they typically have (ultimate) 
residual control rights in the form of votes, could not exercise this control on a 
day-to-day basis due to too small and numerous dispersed shareholders. The dispersed 
shareholders have to delegate day-to-day control to a board of directors who in turn 
delegates it to management. In the words of Berle and Means, there is a separation of 
ownership and control. The second, related issue is that dispersed shareholders have 
little or no incentive to monitor management because monitoring is a public good that 
easily results in the free-ride problem. That is, if one shareholder's monitoring leads 
to improved company performance, all shareholders will enjoy benefit in proportion 
to shares. Therefore every shareholder hopes other shareholders monitor management 
and wait for the good result. In addition, monitoring management require expensive 
cost. If all shareholders think in same way above and the unfortunate outcome is that 
236 
the monitoring will not happen at all . For example, 
dispersed shareholders have no 
incentive to monitor management in the U. S. A. and the U. K. 
Meanwhile when the structure of share ownership is concentrated, majority 
shares are owned by banks, families or by states, and the process of decision-making 
is controlled by the majority shareholders or sometimes a smaller proportional 
shareholding is sufficient for control by the biggest shareholder where holdings are 
more widely dispersed and therefore a different criterion should be used for each 
-4 
company, for instance, Germany, Italy and China respectively. 
Differences in the structure of share ownership account for differences in the 
236 See Olivcr Hart, 1995, 'Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications', The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 105, No. 430, (May), p 68 1. 
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agency problem, which are described above. For example, in countries with a 
dispersed structure of share ownership of publicly traded companies, the major 
agency relationship is between management and shareholders. Corporate managers 
tend to engage in earnings at the expense of the interests of dispersed shareholders. 
While in countries with a concentrated structure of share ownership of publicly traded 
companies in countries, the major agency relationship is between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders, majority or controlling shareholders tend to 
exploit the private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. As 
famous professor John C. Coffee pointed out, in particular, dispersed ownership 
systems of governance are prone to creating financial and accounting scandals in the 
United States, while the characteristic scandal in concentrated ownership economics is 
the appropriated action. 237 In recent years, corporate scandals have occurred in 
different structure of share ownership and their contents and types are quite different 
between a structure of dispersed share ownership and a structure of concentrated share 
ownership. For example, the United States General Accounting Office has declared 
that over 10% of all listed companies in the United States announce at least one 
financial statement restatement between 1997 and 2002.238 A more recent, fuller 
study in 2003 by Huron Consulting Group shows the following results: in 1990, there 
were 33 earnings restatements; 1995, there were fifty; then the rate truly accelerated 
to 216 in 1999; to 233 in 2000; to 270 in 2001; and the in 2002 , the number peak at 
237 See John C. Coffee, 2005, 'A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U. S. and Europe Differ', The Center for 
Law and Econornic Studies. 435 West 116 th St. New York, NY 10027-7201, working paper No. 274, (March). 
238 See U. S. General Accounting Office, 2002, 'Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, 
Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges', Pub-No. 03-138, (October) P 4. 
102 
Chapter 3. Relationship between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance. 
330 (ten times the 1990 level). On this basis, roughly one in eight listed companies 
restated over this period. The study by Huron Consulting shows that the number of 
restatements fell to 323 in 2003 and then rose again to 414 in 2004.239 Why did the 
fraud occur in the U. S. that had something to do with financial statement? It is well 
known that the mechanism of managerial incentives is relatively perfect, of which the 
scale of compensation is very big. In 2004, CEO compensation as a multiple of 
average employee compensation was estimated to be 531: 1 in the U. S., but only 16: 1 
in France, 11: 1 in Germany, 10: 1 in Japan, and 2 1: 1 in nearby Canada. Even Great 
Britain, with the most closely similar system of corporate governance to the U. S., had 
only a 25: 1 ratio. 240 Even though the scale of compensation for management is so 
large, the scandal always happens in the US. Because there is no incentive for 
shareholders to monitor management in the structure of dispersed share ownership 
and stock options are widely used as compensation for CEOs plus possessing 
asymmetric infon-nation, corporate managers use manipulative techniques to 
maximize stock price over the short-run in order to exercise their options and bail out 
at the expense of the interests of the company and shareholders. So it is not strange 
that cases such as Enron and WorldCom occurred in the U. S. By contrast, generally 
speaking, financial statement restatements are rare or less frequent in the concentrated 
structure of share ownership. Corporate managers in those countries have both less 
discretion to engage in opportunistic earnings management and less motivation to 
239 See John C. Coffee, 2005, 'A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U. S. and Europe Differ', The Center for 
Law and Economic Studies. 435 West 116 th St. New York, NY 10027-7201, working paper No. 274, (%larch). 
240 See Gretchen Morgenson, 2004, 'Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss Is Paid So Much', N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, § 3, 
P 1. 
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create an earnings spike. Controlling shareholders always get benefits through related 
party transactions. For example, controlling shareholders can compel the company to 
sell its output to, or buy its raw materials from, a corporation that they independently 
own for their interest only in China. 
As Coase pointed out, science and scientist must cope with their models by the 
evidence instead of the reverse. 241 Thus the thesis will further analyze the relationship 
between the structure of share ownership and the corporate governance based on the 
evidence in details as follows. 
3.4.1. In the United State: the structure of dispersed share 
ownership- shareholder & management model of corporate 
governance 
As described above, the structure of share ownership in the USA and the UK is 
dispersed. In this model, there are continuous external controls and threats to replace 
non-performing executives, and preventive and post-activities monitoring measures 
are perforined by different institutions. Here the thesis takes the USA as an example. 
In America, as for the phases of corporate governance evolution, they are as follows: 
"(1) until 1933: bank centered financial capitalism; (2) 1933-early 1950s: 
Berle crisis-period capitalism, brought about by anti-Wall Street populism 
developed during the first decades of the century and precipitated by the 
Great Crisis, with the Glass-Steagall Act (though banks played a lasting 
241 See Benedict Sheeshy, 2004, 'Tbe Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and 
the Future of Corporate Law', Depaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 2: 463, p 498. 
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role until the end of the period), the Securities Exchange Act and wide 
Federal intervention; (3) early 1950s-mid 1970s: strong manager 
capitalism, characterized by a growing lack of monitoring mechanisms; (4) 
mid 1970s-late 1980s: market and court capitalism, marked, since Miller v. 
Miller, by more intense court monitoring, new SEC disclosure rules and a 
growing number of takeovers; (5) late 1980s onward: active investor 
capitalism, brought about by negative perceptions of the effect ( on 
managers' incentive structures) of market and court monitoring and the 
softening that ensued in that monitoring. , 242 
As we know the corporate governance was ever affected by law and politics in 
America in the past. But the characteristic is that the structure of share ownership is 
still dispersed, and conflicts of interest remain mainly between management and 
shareholders in corporate governance. 
With the change of economy and development in society, the pursuit of value by 
companies is changeable. In North American from the 1930s until the 1970s, the 
model for the corporation was the communitarian model in which the corporation had 
to take some social responsibilities besides the emphasis on the importance of 
shareholders. This model derived from the outcome of the Berle and Means debate 
"Whom should the corporation serve? " which was one result of the economic collapse 
and Great Depression of the 1930s. But since the 1980s, the circumstance has changed 
greatly, that is, the model for the corporation moved from the communitarian to the 
contractarian model that was proposed by Neo-classical economists. The 
contractarian's concentration on only wealth generation has been most directly 
propounded by the Chicago School. This model stresses "shareholder primacy" and 
242 See Fabrizio Barca, 1998, 'Sorne views on U. S. Corporate Governance', Columbia Business Law Review, 
Vol., N. o I: I, pp 20-21. 
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243 places the interests of the shareholders above all stakeholders . 
Although many changes have taken place in America, the character of the 
dispersed structure of share ownership in publicly traded companies remains the same 
as in 1932. As we know, 
"Berle and Means conducted a survey between 1929 
and 1930 of the 200 largest non- financial corporations 
from various sectors of industry. They found that 44 per 
cent of these companies by number and 58 per cent by 
wealth, were subject to management control. Further, 21 
per cent by number and 22 per cent by wealth were 
found to be controlled by a legal device. This meant that 
the aggregate of non-ownership control of large 
companies was 65 per cent by number and 80 per cent 
by total wealth. Control was therefore located with the 
controllers of the company who were described as the 
6new princes' of industry, for this revolution had 
changed the company into one that was management 
controlled. , 244 
In the seminal book "The Modem Corporation and Private Property" by Berle 
and Means in 1932, they made three feature contributions to this preeminence: First, 
they proved that share ownership was typically widely dispersed with a large number 
of small shareholders in large American companies. Second, it was impossible for 
dispersed shareholders to control the corporation any more. Third, they argued that 
management controlled corporations and divert profit maximization for themselves. 
Many companies were completely controlled by management because the number of 
shareholders was so dispersed that management could make decision in disregard of 
243 See Benedict Sheeshy, 2004, 'The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and 
the Future of Corporate Law', Depaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 2: 463, pp 494-501. 
2'4 Saleen Sheikh & Willian Rees, 1995, Corporate Governance & Corporate Control, London: Cavendish, pp 
3940. 
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shareholders' interests. 
245 
More than seventy years have passed. What is the contemporary relationship 
between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance in American? 
Some scholars have given the answer as follows. Based on a sample of 4,639 firms 
that is broadly representative of approximately 5 million small, non-farm, 
non-financial businesses operating in the United States as of year-end 1992, which 
had been surveyed by the Federal Reserve Board's National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF), Ang et al utilized a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the 
FRB/NSSBF database above. They analyzed the equity agency costs for corporations 
under different ownership and management structure based on the zero agency-cost 
finn put forward by Jensen and Meckling's (1976). They argue shareholders incur 
agency costs resulting from management's shirking and perquisite consumption when 
management owns less than 100 percent of the firm's equity. They confirm the result 
as follows: (1) If the firm is owned solely by a single owner-manager, the agency cost 
is zero, as shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976); 246 (2) if finns are controlled by the 
primary owner, the agency cost is inversely related to the share ownership of the 
primary owner. Therefore, the profit of primary owner will increase with the rise of 
shareholding when firm makes profits because the primary owner has incentive to 
monitor firin as large blockholders at publicly traded corporations; (3) if a single 
215 Saleen Sheikh & Willian Rees, 1995, Corporate Governance & Corporate Control, London: Cavendish, p 40. 
24' Ang et. al argued because of limitations imposed by personal wealth constraints, exchange regulations on 
the 
rninimurn numbers of shareholders, and other considerations, no publicly traded 
firm is entirely owned by 
management. Thus, Jensen and Meckling's zero agency cost base case cannot 
be found among the usual sample of 
publicly traded firms for which information is readily available. 
The absence of infori-nation about sole 
owner-i-nanager firms explains why agency costs are often inferred 
but not directly measured in the empirical 
financial literature. See James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, and James Wuh Lin, 2000, 'Agency Costs and 
Ownership 
Structure', The Journal of Finance, Vol. LV, No. 1, (February), pp 81-82. 
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family controls more than 50 percent of the firm's equity, agency costs are lower. In a 
small, closely held corporation where a single family controls the firm, the controlling 
family also performs the monitoring role that large blockholders carry out in publicly 
traded corporations; (4) if firms hire a number of non-manager shareholders, agency 
costs should increase. As the number of shareholders increases, the free-rider problem 
reduces the incentives for limited-liability shareholders to monitor. With less 
monitonng, agency costs increase. 247 Although Ang et al use data on small businesses 
to examine how agency costs vary with a firrn's ownership structure, the results found 
by them will apply to publicly traded corporations or other type of corporations in the 
U. S. due to the separation of ownership and control. That is, when management owns 
less than 100 percent of the firm's equity because of the change in structure of share 
ownership and the free-rider problem, shareholders incur agency costs resulting from 
management's shirking and perquisite consumption in all kinds of corporations where 
agency costs vary to some extent in the structure of dispersed share ownership. 
In brief, the results of agency cost in corporate governance due to the different 
structure of share ownership are as follows: agency costs are higher when firm is 
managed by an outsider; agency costs was quite different inversely with the 
manager's ownership share; agency costs extend with the number of non-manager 
shareholders; and to a lesser extent, external monitoring by banks creates a positive 
externality and leads to the reduction of agency costs, 
248 because of the change in the 
247 See Jarnes S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, and James Wuh Lin, 2000, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. LV, No. 1, (February), pp 81-84. 
248 See Jarnes S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, and James Wuh Lin, 2000, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. LV, No. 1, ( February), p 104. 
'Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', The 
'Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', The 
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structure of share ownership toward dispersion which leads to free-rider problems and 
non-incentive to monitoring. 
As Peter Drucker pointed out, this "dispersed model" of the corporation faces 
significant challenges for the legal and financial system, let alone society as a whole. 
The "dispersed model" with its higher concentration of power and corollary lower 
level of participation exponentially multiplies the risks of managerial abuse of power 
from perspective of either financial malfeasance or the political arena. 249 In America, 
the board can at least initiate, or ratify all major corporate decisions under a central 
and well-settled principle of U. S. corporate law. Shareholders can change the course 
of the corporation only by substituting the board with new board rather than initiate 
any decisions. 250 The above principle and provision in law facilitate the managerial 
. `buse of power. For example, in Delaware, the most important corporate jurisdiction 
in American, according to the Delaware General Company Law § 141(a), "[t]he 
business and affair of every [corporation] shall be managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation. " But shareholders' substantive powers "are essentially 
limited to the election of directors and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, 
mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation's assets, and voluntary 
dissolution. , 25 1 Apart from the election of directors and the amendment of the bylaws, 
all these decisions need approval by the board. However, Delaware law provides that 
249 See Benedict Sheeshy, 2004, 'The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and 
the Future of Corporate Law', Depaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, Vol. 
2: 463, p 512. 
250 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 2003, 'Empowering Shareholders', Working Paper, ( March),. (citing Robert Charles 
Clark, Corporate Law (1986), Chl &, 3; and infra section II. A). 
2ij See Stephen M. Bainbridge, 2002, 'Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate', 16 Transnat'l 
Law 45, p 48. 
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outside the election at the end of directors' terms, shareholders can remove only for 
cause, 252 which is an absolute rule that directors could be removed only by cause at 
common law. 253 In other words, the lion's share of powers in the U. S. is in the hands 
of the board and management. Thus it is not surprising that management can take 
advantage of tunneling companies because directors who have been influenced by 
management are vested with primary control rights over key decisions in America. In 
theory, shareholders can remove the board of directors for cause, which is the 
fundamental power that corporate statutes provide for 254 and that courts strongly 
protect. 255 The power of shareholders to cause the replacement will have a forceful 
effect on management and generally induce it to follow shareholders' preferences. In 
practice, it is very difficult for shareholders to remove a member of the board of 
directors due to the structure of dispersed share ownership. Individual shareholders, 
even if collectively they form a majority, have no interest in doing it owing to cost, 
free-rider problem, and information asymmetry etc. It seems that it is natural for 
management to abuse its power without limitation in America. 
No matter it is at Berle and Mean's times or today, the structure of share 
ownership is still dispersed in the United Stats, which has often been identified as the 
cause of shareholders' weak power in the U. S. A. Although the number of institutional 
investors is increasing in America, the main contradiction remains the conflict of 
interest between the dispersed shareholders and management in corporate governance 
252 See Delware General Company Law § 14 1 (k). 
253 See Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 134A. 2d 852(Del. Ch. 1957). 
254 See, e. g. Delaware General Corporations Law, Sections 211-212. 
255 See. e. g. Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 564 A. 2D 651 (Del. 
Ch. 1988). 
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because the cases of Enron and WorldCom etc. show the above argument. In other 
words, in the US, many corporate boards are actually controlled by powerful 
management, and highly dispersed ownership leads to serious opportunistic behavior 
of managers. Therefore in the structure of dispersed share ownership in the world, 
how to settle the relationship between dispersed shareholders and management in 
corporate governance is the key question. 
3.3.2. In Germany: the structure of bank-concentrated share 
ownership- majority shareholder (bank) & minority shareholders 
model of corporate governance 
The extent to which the structure of share ownership in Japan and Gennany is 
bank-concentrated is remarkably Banks are thought to have a great effect on 
corporate governance in non-financial corporations. 256 In this model, there is more 
cross-holding and external monitoring by banks and other financial institutions; more 
bank-centered debt financing; and less reliance on external governance mechanisms. 
The major advantage is that strategic investors' interventions become close and direct 
control mechanisms in order to reduce the risk of incompetence and malfeasance by 
management; and the main disadvantages are that an internalized governance 
structure will be less responsive to external change, and the company will take on 
256 e. g. Kang, J. and Shivdaasani, A. 1995, 'Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive 
Turnover in Japan', Journal of Financial Economics 38, pp 29-58; Kaplan, S. N. and Minton, B. A. 1994, 
'Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for %lanagers', Journal of 
Financial Economics36, pp 225-58; Morck, R., and Nakamura, M. 1999, 'Banks and Corporate Control in Japan', 
Journal of Finance 54, p 319-39. 
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more risk if it borrows too much from banks. In addition, the bank and the company 
have to undertake market risk together due to the close ownership and borrowing 
relationship between the bank and the company, which is very likely to cause a 
financial crisis when many companies are in financial distress. 
In the structure of b ank- concentrated share ownership, banks play an important 
role in corporate governance, such as appointing their staff to the boards of firms and 
affecting corporate strategy. Banks as creditors and shareholders may have 
considerable voice in corporate governance without significantly associating their 
interests with those of other shareholders, and can do hann to share value for public 
shareholders. 257 Therefore, scholars have different views regarding banks in 
corporate governance. For example, Wenger and Kaserer argue that German banks 
pursue objectives that benefit themselves rather than provide adequate monitoring of 
German companies for outside shareholders. 
258 However, Gruntfest, 259 Gorton and 
Schmid 260 argue that German banks can positively influence the operations of 
Gen-nan companies. Some Japanese scholars 261 argue that banks as important 
monitors help to reduce agency costs. But Weinstein and Yafeh argue that client firrns 
of main banks do not perform better than other Japanese fin-ns in the improvement of 
257 See Randall Morck, Masao Nakamura, and Anil Shivdasni, 2000 'Bank, Ownership Structure, and Finn Value 
in Japan', The Journal of Business, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Oct., ), p 539. 
258 See WengerE., Kaserer, C., 1998, The German System of Corporate Governance --- A Model That Should not 
Be Inintiated, ln: Black, S. W., Moersh(Eds. ), Competition and Convergence in Financial Markets. Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, pp 41-78. 
259 See Grundfest, J., 1990, 'Subordination of American Capital', Journal of Financial Economics 27, pp 89-114. 
260 See Gorton, G., Schmid, F. A., 2000, 'Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms', Journal of 
Financial Economics 58, pp 29-80. 
26 1 E. g. Aoki, M., 1990, 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm. Journal of 
Economic Literature 28, pp 
27; Prowse, S., 1992, 'The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan', Journal of Fmance48, pp 1121-1140; 
Shear, P., 1989, 'The Main Bank System of Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan', Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 11, pp399-422. 
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corporate governance. 262 The following example of Germany shows the importance 
of the banks' role in corporate governance in the structure of bank-concentrated share 
ownership. 
In contrast to the U. S. system, German corporate governance is generally 
characterized by greater reliance on large inside investors and financial institutions in 
raising capital in the corporate sector in place of by reliance on capital markets and 
outside investors. That is, equity capital is less important than debt capital in Germany. 
Banks and insurance companies play an important role as shareholders in German 
listed companies with the structure of highly concentrated share ownership. 263 In 
Germany, higher control rights of the largest shareholder decrease the market value of 
a firm's equity, which implies that the largest shareholder in a listed company with 
highly concentrated ownership does acquire private benefits of control at the cost of 
minority shareholders. The evidence demonstrates that most types of large 
shareholders with these beneficial effects of increased ownership have a negative 
effect on minority shareholders. That is, minority shareholders investing in companies 
with high ownership concentration thereby expose themselves to the likelihood of 
exploitation by large shareholders. 
264 
According to a study of 171 large Gennan corporations, there is one shareholder 
possessing more than 25 percent of the company's equity in 85 percent of the largest 
2'2 See Weinstein, D., Yafeh, Y, 1998, 'On The Cost of a Bank-centered Financial System: Evidence From the 
Changing Mairn Bank Relations in Japan', Journal of Finance 53, pp 635-672. 
263 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for German Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., p 509. (citing Ekkehart Boehmer, 2001, 
'Country Reports: Gen-nany , 
in Corporate Governance and Economic Performance pp 96-103 (K. Gugler ed. j). 
264 See Jeremy S. S. Edwards and Alforis J. Weichenrieder, 1999, 'Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: 
Evidence Frorn Gen-nany' Working Paper No. 193 ( CESifo Working Paper Series), (July), 
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quoted companies, of which 57 percent have a single shareholder owning more than 
50 percent of the equity, 265 which means the structure of ownership in Germany is 
highly concentrated. These figures are for all listed firms during the period from 1985 
266 
to 1997 . In addition, large blockholders control 77 percent of the median firm's 
voting rights for officially traded shares, corresponding to 47 percent of gross market 
capitalization. These consequences have resulted in the conclusion that the Gennan 
stock market, in contrast to other developed economies, is controlled by relatively few 
large shareholders. 267 A large number of listed companies are part of enterprise 
groups (combined companies) with only a minority of their shares listed. 
Blockholders are mostly other business enterprises, wealthy families, or banks. 268 
Given the high concentration of share ownership in Germany, blockholders are often 
banks that are in a position as both shareholders and creditors to exert substantial 
influence on management. Banks, industrial firms, holding companies, and insurance 
companies account for over 30 percent of the market value of all firms listed in 
Germany's official markets. The top five banks and the top three insurance companies, 
which are closely related through direct ownership and voting control, jointly control 
265 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for German Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., pp509-5 10 (citing Julian Franks & Colin 
Mayer, 2001, ' ownership and Control of German Corporations', 14 The Rev. of Fin. Studies 943,947; Julian 
Franks & Colin Mayer, 1997, 'Corporate Ownership and Control in the U. K., Germany, and France', in Studies in 
International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems 281-296(D. H. Chew ED., ). 
266 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for Gen-nan Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., p 510 (citing Ekkehart Boehmer, 
2000 'Business Groups, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of Gen-nan Takeovers', 9 J. Fin. 
Inten-ned. 117). 
267 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for Gen-nan Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., p 510(citing Ekkehart Boehmer, 
2000 ' Who Controls Germany? An Exploratory Analysis (University of Georgia, Working Paper No. 20, ) 
268 See Harald Baurn, 2005, 'Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience', Law 
Working Paper No. 28/2005, March. \\ý\%ý\\-. cý,, ci. org/wl2. (citinýz R. H. Schmidt, 2004, 'Corporate Governance in 
Germany: An Economic Pcrspectivc in : Krahnen/Schmidt(ed), Me German Financial System(Oxford), p 394). 
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over 14 percent of all listed firms. 269 In a word, as stated above, 85% of the largest 
quoted companies have a single shareholder owning more than 25% of voting shares 
in Germany. Corporate ownership is characterized by the structure of strikingly highly 
concentrated ownership in the form of complex webs of holdings and pyramids of 
intercorporate holdings primarily in the hands of families and other companies. Bank 
influence and control are expansive where the structure of shareholdings is widely 
dispersed . 
270 That is, bank ownership is not important in the large proportion of 
highly concentrated firms, but is significant in the minority of widely held companies 
with no single shareholder having in excess of 25% by proxy votes, voting rights 
restrictions, and board representation. 271 In other words, banks may not be largest 
shareholders in the companies in Germany, however, banks as shareholders and 
creditors play a great role in corporate governance indeed. 
In Germany, banks exert influence on listed companies in the following ways: (1) 
Banks as shareholders can appoint representatives on the supervisory board. The 
supervisory board is a powerful organ of the company under German law. The 
function of the supervisory board representatives is to represent the shareholders' 
voice at annual general meetings, and protect shareholders' interest from violation by 
management. The number of board seats filled by bank representatives and the 
number of votes controlled by banks in proportion to the shares directly owned by the 
269 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for Gen-nan Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., p 510 (citing Ekkehart Boehmer, 2000, 
'Who Controls Gen-nany? An Exploratory Analysis (University of Georgia, Working Paper No. 20j 
270 See Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, 2001, 'Ownership and Control of German Corporations', the 
Review of 
Financial Studies, Winter, Vol. 14, No. 4, p 944. 
271 See Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, 2001, 'Ownership and Control of German Corporations', the 
Review of 
Financial Studies, (Winter), Vol. 14, No. 4, p 974. 
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banks show thus an important measure of bank influence on corporate governance in 
Germany. The German "bank-based" system of corporate finance is often regarded as 
having made an important contribution to the historically successful performance of 
the German economy. One of the contributions of bank-based corporate finance that 
arises from the role of banks is supervision over corporate management. In short, due 
to their unique position as equity holders, German companies are controlled 
substantially by banks and financial institutions. 272 (2) As creditors. Banks are able to 
have a profound effect on corporations as creditors by providing loans to companies 
and through their other businesses and financing relations with clients. As both 
creditors and shareholders, banks may enjoy information advantages compared to 
other shareholders as a result of their financing arrangement with the borrowing 
companies. In addition, banks may have an additional advantage in this regard over 
other financial intennediaries or other shareholders. That is, infonnation about a 
company's payments and receipts is generally not available to external suppliers of 
finance or other creditors and shareholders, but banks are able to control companies 
by observing strictly the deposits and withdrawals of finns that open accounts with 
273 orms to influence of banks on them . 
(3) By proxy votes. One of the other f 
corporate governance is the proxy vote by which small shareholders delegate banks to 
administer their stock portfolios and supervise management, even if the banks shares 
make up a small proportion of shares in the company. 274 The structure of the German 
272 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 0 
Implications for Gen-nan Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., pp 511-513. 
273 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for Gen-nan Corripanies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., pp513-517. 
274 See Tanja Santucci, . 
2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
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proxy voting system gives banks significant influence over the composition of 
company boards, and thus allows banks to exercise substantial control over the equity 
voting rights of the corporation. But today the proxy role is under change in Gennany, 
and corporations have recently acquired the power to designate third parties in place 
of banks to serve as shareholder representatives, which can reduce the proxy role of 
depository institutions. 275 Thus, maybe the role of banks in proxy voting will decline 
in the future. To summarize, as a result of the unique position banks play as both 
shareholders and creditors, banks (as shareholders and creditors) are able to gain 
infonnation unavailable to ordinary shareholders and are in a position to have a 
substantial effect on German companies, 276 while information asymmetries might 
exacerbate conflicts between bank and other shareholder interests or other 
stakeholders. As Mark J. Roe argued, 
"German firm could be analyzed by abstracting it into three parts: 
management, labor and capital. Managers who face the possibility that an 
independent board may scrutinize them might perform better than those 
who do not face an independent board, but for the board to be able to get 
good information about the firm from managers, which will occur conflict 
of interest between them. Capital might insist on this scrutiny, or 
managers might from time to time ask for it or firms with this scrutiny 
might tend to prosper and those without it to contract. Normally the board 
would be the vehicle for this scrutiny. - Internal rent-seeking between 
capital and labor could be in play; capital might want to keep labor in the 
dark so that labor is less effective in internal rent-seeking. , 277 
linplications for Gen-nan Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., p 518. (citing Ekkehart Boehmer, 2001, 
'Country Reports: Gen-nany , 
in Corporate Governance and Economic Performance at 109- 10 (K. Gugler ed. j). 
275 See Reinier Karrkrnan et. al. 2004, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 
Oxford University Press, p 43. (Henary Hansmann and Renier Kraakman 'T'he Basic Governance Structure) 
276 See Tanja Santucci, 2002, 'Extending Fare Disclosure to Foreign Issuers: Corporate Governance and Finance 
Implications for Gen-nan Companies', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 2: 499, Vol., p 518. 
277 See Mark J. Roe, 1998, 'German Codeten-nination and German Securities Markets', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 
1: 167, Vol., p 172-173. 
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Therefore conflicts of interest between management and shareholders may occur 
because the supervisory board relies on the managerial board for information, 
supervisory board meetings are infrequent, information flow to the supervisory board 
is poor and the function of a board composed of shareholders and employees is 
limited, although there exist conflicts between shareholders and employees. But banks 
as shareholders and creditors have a unique position as analyzed above, and banks can 
exert substantial control over German companies, and, together with poor legal 
protection of minority stockholders, 278 the agency problems of corporate governance 
in Gennany consist not only of conflict of interest between shareholders and 
management but also conflict of interest between majority shareholders (banks) and 
minority (common shareholders) in the structure of concentrated share ownership. In 
other words, most German corporations are controlled by a family, a controlling 
ma'ority shareholder (including banks), or at least a number of lar e shareholders. 
279 
19 
For this reason, German corporate law has concentrated more on the regulation of 
these relationships between controlling and minority shareholders than on the 
regulation of conflicts between shareholders and managers. Thus a specialized area of 
Gennan corporation law (Konzemrecht) regulates, inter alia, the conflicts of interest 
that may take place in connection with transactions between a corporation and its 
controlling shareholders. 
280 
278 See Rafael La Porta et al., 1997, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', 52 J. Fin. 1131 .. 279 See Theodor Baums and Kenneth E. Scott, 200, 'Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?: Corporate 
Governance in the United States and Germany', Working Paper No. 272, %k-ww. ecjzi. or/wv. (citin 
M. Beclit/E. Boehmer 'Ownership and Voting Power in Germany, ' in F. Barca & M. Becht (eds. ), The Control of 
Corporate Europe, 128-153). 
"'0 See Theodor Baums and Kenneth E. Scott, 'Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?: Corporate Governance 
in the United States and Gerniany', Working Paper No. 272, www. ecgi. or/wp. 
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Although reform on corporate governance has been fulfilled recently, much has 
changed which seems to be more or less closely connected to corporate governance in 
Germany. The investor protection has improved considerably. The big banks are 
partially withdrawing from their traditional role in the governance of other 
corporations. However, a transition towards a more modem capital market-based 
outsider system has not yet taken place. At least so far, no fundamental change has 
taken place. That is, the main characteristics of the traditional German system on 
corporate govemance as a whole are still as before. 281 
In a word, in the structure of bank concentrated share ownership across the 
countries, banks are both shareholders and creditors and they will take advantages of 
information or other convenient means to benefit themselves at the expense of other 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Thus there is no doubt that the main conflict of 
interest arises between banks as majority shareholders and minority shareholders in 
corporate govemance. 
3.3.3. In Korea: the structure of family-concentrated share 
ownership- majority shareholder (family) & minority shareholders 
model of corporate governance 
Family-based corporations are very common for the majority of Asian developing 
economies. In such corporations big shareholders are also the managers in most cases 
See Andreas Hackethal, Reinhard H. Schmidt and Marcel Tyrell, 2005, 'Banks and Gen-nan Corporate 
Govcmance: On The Wav To a Capital Market-Based SystemT, Corporate Governance, Vo. 13, No. 3, (May), pp 
397-409. 
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and family groups control the company completely (including the decision to hire and 
fire management and in many cases the selection of members of board of directors). 
Under such circumstances there is an asymmetry of information between minority 
shareholders and the controlling shareholders. This will usually result in both an 
adverse selection and a moral hazard problem. 282 With the emergence of these 
problems in family-based corporations, agency costs will rise as the share of outside 
shareholders increases and scatters. That is, the dominant conflict of interest occurs 
between the family-owner (majority shareholders) and minority shareholders in the 
structure of family concentrated share ownership. 
In South Korea, large conglomerate groups, known as chaebol groups, developed 
after the Second World War. The Korean government offered these groups low-cost 
loans and other incentives to establish corporations in order to compete globally. The 
founding family members of most chaebol groups have managed and controlled these 
large conglomerates. 283 By the 1980s, the top 10 chaebol accounted for more than 20 
percent of national income. 284 Research demonstrates that the largest 10 families in 
285 
South Korea control about one-third of the corporate sector. In 1997 family 
members possessed 8.5% of the total shares in the 30 largest chaebol, and group 
affiliates owned an additional 35% of the total shares within the group; within the five 
largest chaebol, family members' holdings in 1997 were 8.6% of the total shares 
282 See Haider A. Khan, 1999, 'Corporate Governance of Family-Based Businesses in Asia: Which Road to TakeT, 
Paper prepared for the 2th anniversary symposium of ADBI, Tokyo (Dec. 10),. 
283 See Terry L. Campbell, II and Phyllis YKeys, 2002, 'Corporate Governance in South Korean: The Chaebol 
Experience', Journal of Corporate Finance, V61.8, Issue 4, (October), pp 373-391. 
284 See Marcus Noland, 2005, 'South Korean's Experience with International Capital Flows', Working Paper, 
Number WP 05-4, ( June). 
285 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, 'The separation of Ownership and Control in 
East Asian Corporations', Journal of Financial Economics 58, pp 81-112. 
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within the group and affiliates owned an additional 37%. 286 In a word, family control 
of companies in South Korea is strong. 
The word chaebol, in fact, comes from the same two Chinese characters found in 
Zaibatsu, the word that depicts the pre-war Japanese business groups: Chae5 meaning 
wealth or finance, and bol meaning lineage, faction or clique, with a strong 
connotation of exclusivity 287 However a Korean chaebol is owned, controlled and 
managed by the family. 288 The term chaebol is commonly used to refer to 
conglomerates consisting of many related companies, including a number of 
companies listed on the stock exchange, which are engaged in a board range of 
industrial and service businesses. Most chaebol have highly centralized, autocratic 
management by the founder and his immediate family members. Since (until recently) 
the establishment of holding companies is prohibited, each chaebol group is 
controlled by the founder and his family through an intricate web of cross-company 
shareholdings and the relationship between companies is strengthened by intra-group 
loans and guarantees. 289 That is, the assets and management of a Korean 
conglomerate are controlled by family members and they heavily influence the 
operations and strategy of chaebol firms. 290 In South Korea, as mentioned above, one 
286 See Bernard S. Black, Coudert Brothers, and Shin & Kin, 2001, 'Corporate Governance in Korea at the 
Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness', 26 Journal of Corporation Law, pp 551-552. (citing 
Yoan-Doo Cho, 1999, 'Corporate Governance in Korean: Issues and Options, p 6. (report to the Asian 
Development Bank)). 
287 SeeEuysung Kim, 2005, 'The Impact of Family Ownership and Capital Structures on Productivity Performance 
of Korean Manufacturing Firms: Corporate Governance and the "Chaebol Problem", J. Japanese Int. Economics, 
(March), www. elsevier. com/locate/J*jie. 
288 See Ungki Lim, Chang-Soo Kim, 2005, 'Determinants of Ownership Structure: An Empirical Study of the 
Korean Conglomerates', Pacific-Basin Finance of Journal 13, p 2. 
289 See Bernard S. Black, Coudert Brothers, and Shin & Kin, 2001, 'Corporate Governance in Korea at the 
M illennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness', 26 Journal of Corporation Law, p 55 1. 
290 E. g. Hattori, H., 1989, *Japanese Zaibatsu and Korean Chaebols. In: Chung. K. H., Lee. H. C. (Eds. ), Korean 
Managerial Dynamics. Praeger, New York, pp 79-95; Kong, B., 1995, A Study on the Ownership Structure of 
Korean Chaebol, Econornic Studies42, pp 307-330; Lim, U., 2000, 'The Ownership Structure and Family Control 
in Korean Conglornerates', Inter-national Finance Review 1, pp 397-3 10. 
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of the most important hidden liabilities within chaebols is the cro ss- guarantees for 
bank loans between chaebol affiliates, which will constitute a chain of risk once one 
affiliate or more are in financial trouble. All decisions within the group are made by a 
small group of family-related individuals in an informal way, including publicly 
quoted companies. 
291 
With regard to a chaebol's ownership structure, the "chaebol problem" stemed 
from the fact that the interlocking-ownership structure between members led to the 
family control among chaebol subsidiaries, despite their low direct ownership stake, 
being virtually incontestable, and hence made it easy for chaebols to pass absolute 
corporate control within their own family from generation to generation, and small 
292 
shareholders are easily exploited . Because the characteristic structure of share 
ownership in companies in South Korea is family control, which results in 
management controlled or selected by the family, there is no doubt that conflicts of 
interest arise between the controlling shareholders (family owner) and smaller 
shareholders in corporate governance. Thus some scholars from South Korea make 
the point, " In order to avoid this type of market failure, it is quite crucial for Korea to 
take steps to correct opaque accounting as well as interest conflicts between 
minorities and controlling shareholders. " 293 In a word, the excess of family 
blockholder's control rights over cash flow rights in typical firms gives rise to large 
291 See Stilpon Nestor and John K. Thompson, 'Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is 
Convergence Under Way? Working paper, littl2: //w\v\k,. oecd. or. v/dataoecd/7/10/1931460. pd (visiting 
date: 3.20,2007) 
292 SeeEuysung Kirn, 2005, 'The Impact of Family Ownership and Capital Structures on Productivity Performance 
of Korean Manufacturing Firms: Corporate Governance and the "Chaebol Problem", J. Japanese Int. Economics, 
(March). www. elsevier. com/locate/Jýjie. 
293 See Ick Jin, TacHong Jin, and JeongHo Hahm, 2005, 'Path-dependency and Transition Strategy of Korean 
Financial Systern', The Journal of the Korean Economy, Vol. 6, No. I (Spring), p22. 
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agency costs, because the diversified business structure allows controlling chaebol 
families to expropriate other shareholders easily 294 
Because companies are under family control shareholders, the company is often 
characterized not only by concentration of ownership but also by the presence of a 
CEO, Board Chainnan or Vice Chainnan who is also a controlling shareholder of the 
company. That is, the production, distribution, personnel, operation and decision on 
strategy of companies are controlled by majority shareholders. In addition, ownership 
of these firms is also characterized by the separation of voting rights from cash flow 
rights where control rights (or voting rights) of the largest shareholders often exceed 
the corresponding cash flow rights, which is helpful for the largest shareholders to 
control companies. It is clear that high voting rights may incur serious agency 
problems, and are often associated with pyramid ownership structures, and 
crossholding. Such cases are associated with an over-reliance on debt in order to 
continue controlling the company, because large shareholders are unwilling to dilute 
their ownership. 
295 
In a word, in the structure of family concentrated share ownership, the selection 
or employment of management or other issues in companies is decided by family 
(controlling shareholders) under principle of one share on vote in company law, in 
particular under the circumstance of share without voting rights, companies only offer 
service for the family (controlling shareholders) in a sense. Conflicts of interest 
294 See Euysung Kim, 2005, 'The Impact of Family Ownership and Capital Structures on Productivity 
Performance of Korean Manufacturing Fin-ns: Corporate Governance and the "Chaebol Problem", 
J. Japanese Int. 
Econornies, ( March), \N, NN, \N,. elsevier. coili, locate/jjie. 
295 See Nigel Driffield, Vidya Mahambare, and San-nistha Pal, 2005, 'How Ownership Structure Affects Capital 
Structure and Firm Pcrformance" Recent Evidence From East Asia', Working 
Paper, ( May). 
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always take place between family (controlling shareholders) and minority 
shareholders in corporate governance. Minority shareholders will suffer from 
exploitation by controlling shareholders. 296 
3.3.4. In China: the structure of state-concentrated share 
ownership- majority shareholder (state) & minority shareholders 
model of corporate governance 
Ownership of listed companies in transition economies tends to be highly 
concentrated. In Central and Eastern Europe, blockholders control on average 
between 40 and 50 percent of voting stock. 297 In China, there are more than 60 
percent of non-tradable shares (today the refonn is under way since on 29 April 2005) 
that are owned by the state directly or indirectly in listed companies. 
Alternatively, there is a typical phenomenon of so-called insider control in 
corporate governance in transitional economies, where insiders, managers and /or 
employees, gain substantial control rights during the process of corporatization. 298 
Therefore, the main issue of corporate governance in the transitional economy is how 
to design a device to deal with insider control problems, or this centralization of 
ownership and decentralization of control rights gives rise to a peculiar conflict 
296 See Ok-Rial Song, 2002-2003, 'The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope of Corporate 
Governance Reforrn in Korean Chaebol', Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. Vol. 34, pp 202-203. 
297 See Bergl6f, Erik, and Anete Pajuste, 2003, 'Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets? ' in Peter Cornelius and 
Bruce Kogut, eds., Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
298 See Aoki Masahiko, 1995, 'Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition 
Econornies'in Aoki Masahiko and Hyung-Ki Kim(ed), 
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between the owners, or rather the state official who acts as owner, and managers and 
other state official as managers. 299 However, the situation is different from as 
described above in corporate governance in listed companies in China because more 
than 60% non-tradable shares are owned by the state. In practice, management is 
controlled by the state and managers of state-owned enterprises are typically 
responsible to political decision-makers instead of shareholders, and while the 
discretion of politicians is restricted by the limitations on political institutions as a 
monitoring system in a developing democracy, generally speaking managerial 
300 discretion is easy to control . In other words, with the 
development of the market, 
the procedures for selecting new managers are increasingly sensitive to firm 
performance. Managers can be fired when firrns are not performing well, and there is 
a significant turnover in managers within state-owned firms. The actual conflict of 
interest mainly takes place between the majority shareholder (the state) and minority 
shareholders (dispersed shareholders), which is a major agency problem in corporate 
governance in listed companies in China. How to tackle the agency problem in 
corporate governance has become a controversial topic in China. 
According to the law and finance theory, a powerful State with a responsive legal 
system will make use of advantages to divert the flow of society's resources toward its 
goal and this power will hinder the development of a free, competitive financial 
system. 301 In the structure of state concentrated share ownership across the countries, 
299 See J. Komai, 1990, The Road to A Free Economy --- Shifting ftorn a Socialist System: the Example of 
Hungary, 
New York, W. W. Norton & Company. 
. 100 See John Vickers and George Yarrow, 1991, 'Economic Perspective on Privatization', The 
Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2. (Springj, pp 111- 132. 
301 SeeBeck, Thorsten, Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, 2003, 'Law, Endowment, and Finance', Journal of 
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because the state accounts for most of the shares in companies, the state will take its 
advantages of serving its social aim at the expense of companies or other shareholders, 
especially national policy in place of law under some circumstances. That is, 
sometimes the state as the biggest shareholder in listed companies pursues its political 
goals at the cost of other shareholders rather than pursuing profit maximization or 
efficiency, which should be usually given priority in a market economy. So the main 
conflicts of interest that arises in corporate governance is between the state as 
controlling shareholder and the public as minority shareholders. (This will be 
discussed in Part two below) 
3.5. Conclusion 
We must remember that in fact as a rule every shareholder (or say, everyone in the 
world) cares about his or her own asset or interests (or property rights) rather than 
companies only in different way. Because the issue of property rights concerns mainly 
whether or not ownership rights are assigned to individuals and ownership rights 
implies that if a person makes an investment in the company, as the investor he will be 
able to reap the profit of the investment. So investors will not invest if they do not 
have ownership rights over the returns on their investment in the company. Investors 
will not make an investment or they will exit from the company even if they have a 
property right, if the profits are subject to seizure by others. Concretely speaking, in 
Financial Economics 70-2, , pp 
137-8 1. 
126 
Chapter 3. Relationship between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance 
dispersed ownership countries, dispersed shareholders may use the "Wall Street Rule" 
to secure his or her asset or interests in companies when they have no choice and they 
have no incentive to supervise the management because of cost, time and skill etc. 
While in concentrated ownership countries, controlling shareholders will select or 
control management for their interests at the cost of minority On the part of 
companies, cost is a determinant of whether they select debt or equity as external 
finance if they meet the requirements by law, which may lead to a change to a 
different structure of share ownership, namely dispersion and concentration. In ten-ns 
of countries, the development or status of the economy fundamentally determines the 
structure of share ownership that must adapt to the level of economy. 
Because these differences in costs, interests and economies can lead to different 
structures of share ownership, agency problems in corporate governance are varied. 
Where there is a structure of share ownership in the world, there will be a 
corresponding model of corporate governance across countries. That is the secret of 
the connection between the structure of share ownership and corporate governance. 
That is, corporate governance is detennined by the structure of share ownership, and 
therefore ultimately by the economy (either macro-economy or micro-economy). 
In sum, share ownership structure is an instrument to solve the trade-off between 
control and initiative because it determines the shareholders' incentives to monitor. 
Where there is a dispersed ownership structure, shareholders have no incentives to 
interfere in management because of free-rider problem, costs and skill etc., which Nvill 
result in management's discretion and the agency problem will arise between the 
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management and shareholders. While where there is a concentrated ownership 
structure, majority shareholders have incentives to control and monitor management 
in order to promote their own interests, but this may be at the expense of other 
shareholders (minority shareholders), and the agency problem will mainly occur 
between ma ority and minority shareholders. i 
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Chapter 4. Is it true that "law matters" 
( La Porta et al. ) and "politics matters" 
(Mark. I Roe etc. )? 
The scholarship has discussed corporate governance over time and debated about 
what deten-nines it. So far there are two influential points of view: one is the "law 
matters" theory by La Porta et al; other is the "politics matters" theory by Mark. J. Roe 
etc. This thesis argues that law and politics have a close relationship with the 
historical development of the company. They have had a great effect on the corporate 
governance in modem times but we should not emphasize excessively the importance 
of law and politics to corporate governance because they could not solve the major 
agency problems of corporate governance as a universal pattern across countries. 
Maybe law or politics plays a great role in corporate governance in a given country or 
region at particular time. 
4.1. The "law matters" theory 
Laws have a close relationship with corporate governance indeed. As we know, from 
the perspective of economics, in the process of the commercial activity by entities, 
conventions, practices and constrains of the market- "laws of game"- have such a 
profound impact on the belief, values, and normative understandings which influence 
the economic and social behavior of entities, or say, the "rules of the games" embody, 
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infuse, and propagate values which influence the behavior of individuals within 
institutions. 302 Since laws or rule of game will affect behavior of individuals, 
economy and society, let alone formal laws. As we know, law is very important for the 
economic and market development. In a sense the existence of a legal system that 
protects contract and property rights is a precondition for the economic development 
because, without the legal system, the legal interests of individuals would not be 
safeguarded and as a result there would be no transaction and no one would be 
interested in investment. Or, if they occurred, the cost of doing them would be too 
high. 303 Thus, in the absence of such a legal order, the development of markets will 
stop and economic growth will halt. 304 But we should not overstate the function of 
law in corporate governance. From the perspective of the development of long history, 
in particular for the current young market, it is legal change follows and serves the 
305 
economic development, rather than the other way around . 
4.1.1. The brief content of "law matters" 
It is very significant to improve the legal environment so as to reduce the conflict of 
interest between management and dispersed shareholders in the structure of dispersed 
share ownership, and between the controlling and minority shareholders and to make 
302 See John W. Cilffi, 2000, 'State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of 
the Art and Emerging Research', The American Journal of Comparative Law, V61.48, p517. 
303 See North, D. 1990, 'Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance', Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
304 See Zhiwu Chen, 2003, 'Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case', China Economic 
Revel w 14, p45 2. 
305 See Zhiwu Chen, 2003, 'Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case', Ch I na Economic 
Revei \\, 14, p45 2. 
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expropriation of a minority more difficult in the structure of concentrated share 
ownership. But some scholars argue that the law determines corporate governance. In 
fact the "law and development" movement that legal engineering intended to facilitate 
socio-economic development in countries occurred in the 1960s, which by 1975, had 
been declared a failure at all . 
306 The ideal that "law matters"- reinvigorated in large 
part by Rafael La Porta et al. (hereafter "LLSV" or "La Portal et al. ") advocated only 
legal reforms that were expected to offer adequate legal protection to investors in the 
1990s in order to improve corporate governance. 307 They argue that deep capital 
markets cannot be developed and corporate governance could not be improved unless 
shareholder- ffi endly fundamental legal reforms are adopted as a precondition. 
To understand better the importance of legal protection of investors in advanced 
countries or regions, in particular protection for minority shareholders, Rafael La 
Porta et al. use a sample that covers 49 countries from Europe, North and South 
America, Africa, Asia, and Australia. There are no countries or regions with a 
character of socialist or "transition" economies in the sample. A country is selected for 
inclusion if, on the basis of the WorldScope sample of 15,900 firms from 33 countries 
and the Moody's International sample of 15,100 non-U. S. firms from 92 countries, 
that country has at least five domestic non-financial publicly traded firms with no 
government ownership in 1993.308 The above countries are classified traditionally 
306 See Arnir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
International Review of Law and Economics 25, p 251. (citing Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, 2001, Legal 
Reforms and Development, 22 Third World Q. 21 ). 
307 See Arnir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
International Review of Law and Economics 25, p25 1. 
308 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Si lanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1998, 'Law and Finance', Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, No-6, p 1117. 
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into civil law and common law according to the following criteria. 
"(1) historical background and development of the legal 
system, (2) theories and hierarchies of sources of law, (3) 
the working methodology of jurists within the legal 
systems, (4) the characteristics of legal concepts 
employed by the system, (5) the legal institutions of the 
system, and (6) the divisions of law employed within a 
,, 309 system. 
Based on the above standard, civil law families are further classified into 
French-civil-law countries, Gennan-civil-law countries and S candinavian-civi I -law 
countries. The authors analyze laws pertaining to investor protection, and specifically 
in company and bankruptcy/ reorganization law. LLSV mainly analyze the importance 
of law to corporate governance by six indicators for minority shareholders protection. 
These six indicators are: proxy by mail allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, 
cumulative voting, oppressed minority, preemptive right to new issues, and percentage 
of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. There are four indicators 
for creditor protection. They are no automatic stay on secured assets, secured creditors 
first paid, restrictions for going into reorganization, management does not stay in 
reorganization. With regard to each indicator, if a country or region protects minority 
shareholders (or creditors) according to their measures, it gets a score of I and a score 
of 0 otherwise. These measures are supplemented by more or less generally accepted 
indices of "rule of law" and quality of accounting standards. After making 
309 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Si lanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1998, 'Law and Finance', Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, p 1118. (citing Glendon, Mary Ann; Gordon, Michael W.; and Osakwe, 
Christopher, 1994, ' Comparative Legal Traditions: Text, Materials and Cases on the Civil and Common Law 
Traditions, with Special References to French, Gen-nan and English', St. Paul, Minn.: West, p 4-5). 
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comparisons by their designed criteria, they conclude: Common-law countries 
generally have the strongest, and French- civil-law countries the weakest, legal 
protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries in the 
middle. 3 10 They conclude that common law systems do produce superior economic 
growth. They put emphasis on the importance of the laws that protect minority 
shareholders, that is, common law countries provide legal protection more extensively 
and enforce law more effectively. They argue that it is the reason that the content of 
legal rules of different countries demonstrated these corporate governance puzzles. 311 
In addition, they analyze law enforcement and ownership that have a close 
relationship with legal protection of investors in the paper. 
Before or after that, La Porta et al emphasize repeatedly the importance of law to 
corporate governance rather than other things in provocative series of papers. For 
example, Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny point out, "much of the difference in 
corporate governance systems around the world stems from the differences in the 
nature of legal obligations that managers have to the financers, as well as in the 
,, 312 differences in how courts interpret and enforce these obligations . They 
lay an 
emphasis on the importance of law to corporate governance and argue that legal 
protection of investor rights is one essential element of corporate governance. Thus 
they draw the conclusion: "corporate governance systems of the United States, 
Gen-nany, and Japan have more in common than is typically thought, namely a 
310 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Si lanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1998, 'Law and Finance', Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, p 1116. 
311 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de- Si lanes, and Andre, Shleifer, 1998, 'Law and Finance', Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp 1114-1115. 
312 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of 
Finance, 
Vol. Lll, No. 2, (June), p 750. 
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combination of large investors and a legal system that protects investor rights. 
Corporate govemance systems elsewhere are less effective because they lack the 
necessary legal protection. , 
313 
4.1.2. Shortcomings of "law matters" 
Although law is very important to corporate governance, especially after a market 
reaches certain mature stage, the argument by La Porta et al is doubtful. First of all, 
the design of the anti-director index regarding investor protection is not effective or 
reliable. For example, Belgium is the only country that received a score of zero in the 
1998 version of "Law and Finance" by La Porta et al. But Belgium should have a 
score of four rather than zero. 314 The first right in the anti-director index is whether 
shareholders can send their proxy by mail rather than show up in person or send an 
authorized representative to the general meeting. There is a score of one if 
shareholders can mail their proxy vote to the firm under the company law or 
commercial code, and zero otherwise. 3 15 LLSV grants Belgium a score of zero. In 
fact, the Companies Code in Belgium unequivocally specifies that a shareholder can 
vote in person or by proxy The Companies Code does not explicitly stipulate that 
shareholders can mail their proxy to firm, but there is no doubt that they can. 
Accordingly, as regards proxy by mail allowed, the score for Belgium should get a 
313 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. Lll, No. 2, (June), p770. 
314 See Sofie Cools, 2004, 'The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between The United States and Continental 
Europe: Distribution of Powers', Discussion Paper No. 490,09/2004. 
315 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Si lanes, and Andrei Shleifer, , 1998, 
'Law and Finance', Joumal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, pp 1122-1127. 
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score of one instead of zero. 316 With regard to cumulative voting or proportional 
representation, it is true that the Belgian Companies Code does not explicitly specify 
cumulative voting and proportional representation. As a matter of fact, case law and 
doctrine imply that the charters can validly specify cumulative voting and 
proportional representation. Such a provision may be in conformity with any 
provision of the Companies Code. Hence, Belgium should get score of one in place of 
zero in this aspect. 317 Apparently the indictors for statistical analysis by La Porta et al 
have a lot of shortcomings. As scholars point out, while the quantitative analysis of 
law has seemed superficially much attractive in legal issues and has created 
interesting results, such analysis has at least the following limitations. Firstly, the 
result of the indicator designed by La Porta et al is unfair. Coding legal provisions as 
binary variables while giving each indicator equal weight assume that counting the 
number of indicators indicates better legal protection. In fact, each indicator plays a 
different role, has different functions and weighs differently in the law. That is, that 
the above study by LLSV gives each indicator the same value in each country in their 
sample on an equal-weight basis is unreliable. Adding more indicators may distort the 
picture rather than help assess differences in the quality of law. Secondly, the criteria 
of indicators may be biased against some jurisdictions, because conventions, practices 
or implicit legal constraints may have the same effect as a large number of explicit 
rules. In other words, there are no explicit stipulations on "anti -director" provisions in 
116 See Sofie Cools, 2004, 'The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between The United States and Continental 
Europe: Distribution of Powers', Discussion Paper No. 490,09/2004. 
317 See Sofie Cools, 2004, 'The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between The United States and Continental 
Europe: Distribution of Powers', Discussion Paper No. 490,09/2004. 
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some countries, but in practice the court recognizes the legality of it and the outcome 
of enforcement is desirable, for instance, in the case of Belgium above. Thirdly, some 
of the indicators used by LLSV do not necessarily indicate greater the protection of 
minority shareholders. Some scholars point out that a closer analysis of the indicators 
that have been used in previous studies reveals that their function may be more 
ambiguous than has been assumed (e. g. preemptive rights, as one of the indicators in 
their anti-director index, may benefit existing block-holders in place of minority 
shareholders, because they force the company to return to existing financiers rather 
than reach out to new investors, as a consequence, giving rise to a more dispersed 
ownership structure over time). 318 Fourthly, could the six indicators for protection of 
minority shareholders, plus other four points for creditor protection, represent the law 
of the country as a whole? In other words, the ten indicators can not really be used to 
judge which country's law is much better than others regarding the protection of 
investors or corporate governance. Therefore the result by La Porta et al may not be 
true. That is, they draw the conclusion that the Common law systems are much better 
than the Civil law systems with regard to investor protection and corporate 
governance as deten-nined by law, which is not right. 
Second, the practical impact of formal law is difficult to measure from a reading 
of law in the books. Other facts, such as local practices, customs, culture, functional 
substitutes and business norms, may improve, create, lessen or even remove the actual 
318 see Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinhelisterkamp and Mark D. West , 'The 
Evolution of Corporate 
Law 
,A 
Cross-Country Comparison. The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law', Vol. 
23, Issue 4, pp 791-97 1. 
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impact of formal laws. 
319 
According to the logic of La Porta et al., if minority shareholders are given more 
legal protection, the economy or finance will develop efficiently and fast. That is, 
countries in Common law systems financially developed faster at the turn of the 20th 
century because investor protection was much better than that of any other place in 
the world, but the situation is contradictory. Some scholars point out: "More generally, 
by most indicators, the main countries of Continental Europe were more developed 
financially in 1913 than the United States. In fact, in contrast to the findings of La 
Porta et al. (1997) for the 1990s, we find that countries with Common Law Systems 
,, 320 were not more financially developed in 1913 . In Italy, the structure of ownership 
was more concentrated in the1980s than in the 1940s. Family controlled groups and 
pyramids were more common in the 1980s than in the 1930s. Does this mean that 
laws concerning the protection of investors were better in the past than they are now? 
These findings do not agree with the view of La Porta et al that the stock market 
development and ownership concentration are invariably related with investor 
protection. 
321 
Of course, sometimes the above analysis by LLSV is reasonable in a sense, 
namely legality may play a role in the actual working of corporate governance 
systems. Wel I -functioning legal systems not only protect outside investors and this 
in 
tum should enhance finns' ability to raise external funding easily and cheaply, but 
319 See Nei Fligstein and Jennifer Choo, 2005, 'Institute of Industrial Relations', Working Paper. 
320 See Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, 2003, 'The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development 
in the 20th Century', 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5. 
321 See Alexander Aganin, and Paolo Volpm, 2003, 'History of Corporate Ownership in Italy', Finance Working 
Paper, (March). http: // ssm. coiTi/abstract--391180. 
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also restricts expropriation by insiders that should result in less price protection for 
outsider investors. 322 For example, mass privatization that caused the securities 
market to crash happened overnight in the Czech Republic, at least in part due to the 
absence of investor protection. 
323 But the analysis is not universal, for example, four au 
Scandinavian nations protect minority stockholders well by law, but why are their 
corporate governances not as good as that of America? Many of the same nations by 
measurement have good corporate law as well as good contract law or other laws of 
high quality For example, all the Scandinavian nations, Germany, and several other 
continental European countries have the same enforcement of contract as the United 
States does. 324 But it seems that the quality of corporate governance is quite different 
in these nations, and the above theory can not explain the reason from the perspective 
of legal protection. In addition, shareholder rights are stronger in countries belonging 
to the English-speaking cultural region. However, the qualities of laws in these 
countries are not better than others in protecting creditors. This casts doubt on the 
claims of superiority of the law in common law countries for protecting investors 325 
because creditors are investors too. As Professor Coffee points out, the principal 
weakness of the "law matters" thesis is its narrow focus on the rights of minority 
322 See Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz, 2005, 'International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter? Working Paper, (December). (Forthcoming in Journal of Accounting 
Research June 2006) 
323 See John C. Coffee, 2001-2002, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111,2, p 23. 
324 See Mark J. Roe, 2003, Political Deten-ninants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact, 
Oxford University Press Inc. New York, p192 (citing Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie 
Kirkpatrick, 2001 Index of Economic Freedom 18 (2001) (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United States protect private property and contract strongly and have largely efficient legal systems) The index, a 
crude one, purports to measure both property rights and 'the ability of individuals and business to enforce 
contracts'. Id. at 57. Cf Ross Levine, 1999, 'Law, Finance, and Economic Growth', 8 J. Fin. Intermediation 
8, 
14-15,20). 
325 See Arnir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
International Review of La\ý, and Economics 25, p232. 
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shareholders and on enforceable legal rights in theory and on paper rather than in 
practice, just considering the distinction between common law and civil law. 326 In 
reality, within common-law systems, the differences between common-law systems 
are sometimes greater than those between civil-law systems and common-law systems 
in certain key respects. For example, corporate-insolvency law illustrates the point in 
England and the USA. Despite their common legal origin, corporate-insolvency law in 
the two countries is quite different. For instance in England the court emphasizes the 
terms of debt contracts, while in the USA the courts have to put emphasis on the 
contractual rights of lenders, particularly as regards liquidation rights of secured 
creditors. In the area of corporate governance, there are many different too. For 
example, levels of anti- shareholder devices in the USA are higher than in the UK, 
such as poison-pills, state legislation, and a variety of corporate board entrenchment 
devices being widely applied in the USA but not in the UK. With regard to hostile 
takeover, the UK and U. S. are greatly different in their respective reliance on 
standards and decision-making strategies for solving the management- shareholder 
agency problems. It seems more flexible and more protective of managers in the 
USA. 327 Therefore some scholars point out, it is unreasonable because financial 
systems are too changeable to be explained by fixed legal origins, for example the 
structure of financial systems at the beginning of the 20 th century was quite distinct 
326 See John C. Coffee, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and 
Control. ' Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, 435 Wesr 116 th St. New York, 
NY10027-7201, Working Paper No. 182/2001. 
327 See Reinier Karrkrnan et. al. 2004, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 
Oxford University Press, pp 163-173. 
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from that at the end of the 20th century. 328 
LLSV have emphasized the importance of the legal conditions (backdrop): 
dispersed ownership is possible in their view only when the legal system provides 
adequate protection for minority shareholders. Yet modem history seemingly supplies 
two counterexamples. 329 The US and U. K. law did not yet comprehensively adopt 
the standards of minority protection that LLSV contemplate as the precondition for 
dispersed ownership before the change of structure of share ownership had taken 
place in the direction of dispersion. For example, the structure of ownership began the 
development of dispersion from the 1890s in America. In other words, before the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were promulgated, 
the structure of dispersed share ownership had taken place in the U. S. Even in the 
U. K., the structure of ownership started dispersion from the 1940s to the 1970s when 
the protection of minority was weak. For instance, in the UK, there was a landmark 
case of unsuccessful litigation by an injured investor in 1843 that refused to offer 
minority investor protection in the Foss v. Harbottle case. Foss v. Harbottle (1843), 
seriously restricted minority shareholder rights for the next hundred years. The judge 
made two important rulings: the company as the proper plaintiff in an action of an 
alleged wrong to a company itself, instead of the minority shareholder, and, where a 
transaction can be made binding by a majority of the shareholders, then an individual 
shareholder can not bnng an action against the company. 
330 As Lord Justice Hoffman 
328 See Colin Mayer, Oren Sussman, 2001, 'The Assessment: Finance, Law, and Growth', Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, (Winter), p 457. 
329 See John C. Coffee, 2001-2002, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111,2, p 24. 
330 See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2002, 'The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and 
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has noted, this case had repercussions for minority investor protection for over a 
century: "A statutory remedy was provided for the first time in 1948 but this proved 
relatively ineffectual. It was not until 1980 that Parliament forged the sword which is 
now section 459 of the Company Act 1985 and which enables the unfairly treated 
minority shareholder to slay the dragon. , 331 According to the logic of La Porta et al., 
the U. K. should have had the structure of highly concentrated ownership like most 
European countries until investor protection was offered. But on the contrary, the 
dispersion of ownership began to develop rapidly in the first half of the 
twentieth-century through issuance of shares to local investors on provincial 
exchanges in the UK. 
332 
As we know most European countries have codification in law in contrast to 
precedent (case law) in Common Law Systems. But many lawyers have been critical 
of the classification of countries by legal origins. They find the distinction between 
common law and civil law particularly superficial. In fact there is some overlap in the 
sources of law or form of legislation between common law and civil law. For example, 
a considerable degree of codification has been enacted in common law countries (for 
instance, many of the rules protecting investors under US law are described in the 
Unifon-n Commercial Code and creditor protection is in part defined by the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978) and powerful bodies of case law are recognized practically 
Control', Working Paper, 15 (December). 
331 See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2002, 'The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and 
Control', Working Paper, 15 (December). (cited in the foreword to Robin Hollington's Minority Shareholders' 
Rights, 1999, Sweet and Maxwell, London). 
332 See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2002, 'The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and 
Control', Working Paper, 15 (December). 
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in civil law countries. 333 Since investor protection by law will improve corporate 
governance greatly, why have countries with a civil law system not transformed 
governmental policy into law because laws emanate more easily from the centre 
rather evolving through judicial decisions in those countries where the government 
systems is more centralized? The problem is not just simple. 
Law is very important to the development and improvement of corporate 
governance in the world, but law is very limited. Because law only resolves part of the 
agency problem, or say, law only reduces some of the agency cost and obvious 
examples are rules and procedures that enhance disclosure by the agent or facilitate 
enforcement actions brought by principals against dishonest or negligent agents, but 
many agency problems can not be resolved by the law. For example, in America 
managerial agency costs are sum of managers' thievery (unjustifiably high salaries, 
self-dealing transactions, insider trading, etc) and their mismanagement 
(over-investment; under-investment; negligent action, etc) in the structure of dispersed 
ownership, the business judgment rule in law only regulates the former in America but 
has nothing to do with latter. That is, unless the management has a conflict of interest 
or acts fraudulently, the business judgment rule does nothing in America because 
judges prevent directors and managers from legal inquiry. In the case of controlling 
shareholders in the structure of concentrated ownership, similar legal doctrines (the 
one share-one voting right, or one share without voting right) prevent the controlling 
shareholder from a lawsuit for a non-conflicted mistake. Because the controlling 
333 See Eriik BerglOf and Emst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1999, 'The Changing Corporate 
Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries', Working Paper, (June). 
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shareholder possesses a majority share in the company, it internalizes much of the cost 
of any mistake, as a result every shareholder will bear the cost in proportion to his 
share. Law may reduce stealing, but can not solve problems, such as non-conflicted 
dissipation and mismanagement. 334 In a word, law can not control all agency 
problems or reduce agency cost from poor decision in the world. 
Commentators came to share the view that it is not enough to simply write 
investor rights into the law. 335 In reality laws stipulate the protection of investors to 
the varying degrees in countries. For instance, when investors finance finns, they will 
get protection through the enforcement of regulations and laws. Some of these rights 
include disclosure, audit and accounting rules. Protected shareholder rights include 
receiving dividends on pro-rata terms, suing for directors or the ma ority shareholders i 
for suspected expropriation, etc. Protecting creditor rights include repossessing 
collateral, protecting their seniority in bankruptcy and reorganization procedure. 336 
However, only adequate protection rights in law will not definitely improve corporate 
governance. For instance, several countries formerly under communist regimes 
carried out legal reforms during the 1990s in order to enhance investor protection. 
With few exceptions, these reforms results varied from disappointing to ruinous. 337 it 
was thought that since law is a determinant of corporate governance, countries with a 
334 See Mark J. Roe, 2003, Political Deten-ninants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact, 
Oxford University Press Inc. New York, pp 171-173. 
3-15 See Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
International Review of Law and Economics 25, p 230. 
336 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silances, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, 2000, 'Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance', Journal of Financial Economics 58, p7. 
337 See Arnir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
International Review of Law and Economics 25, p 230. (citing Bernard Black, Reinier Kraahman, & Anna 
Tarassova, 2000, 'Russian Privatization and corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? ' 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1739; 
Ed\ýard Glaeser, Simon Johnson, & Andrei Shleifer, 2001, ' Coase versus the Coasians' 116Q. J. Econ. 853 ). 
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transitional economy should imitate the law of advanced economies, like the rules of 
common-law legal systems in order to develop their economies. But the outcome in 
transitional countries is contrary to the theory of La Porta et al. Some researchers have 
warned that attempts to "transplant" law in this fashion must not usually be successful 
if the legal rules so adopted are not consistent with local customs and traditions. 338 
The example shows the law is limited, only shareholder protection in law may not be 
adequate to facilitate the sustainable economic development, although law is very 
important, especially in transition economies. 339 
One must remember that shifts in the system of corporate governance and the 
structure of share ownership should precede and not follow shifts in legal rules. 340 
The development of the economy, strong markets, and a good model of corporate 
governance do create a demand for strong legal rules. In practice, the federal 
securities law passed in the 1930s in the U. S., the Company Act amendments adopted 
in the late 1940s in the U. K., the Stock Exchange Law of 1896 enacted in Gennany, 
the Company Law of 1993 passed in China were a response to this demand, not vice 
versa. But we can not say that law is a precondition to their development because 
many laws have been passed in both developing countries and transition countries, but 
corporate governance is the same as before: China is a good case. Today the law 
system in the book in China is relatively complete. Generally speaking, laws or 
338 See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, 2000, 'Economic Development, Legality, 
and The Transplant Effect', SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 183,269. 
339 See Erik Bergl6f & Ernst-Ludwig won Thadden, 1999, 'The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries' in Annual World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics 135. 
340 See John C. Coffee, 200 1, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control. ' Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, 435 Wesr 116 
h St. New York, 
NY] 0027-7201, Working Paper No. 182/2001 
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regulations enacted in developed countries can be found in China except for some in 
unusual fields, and apart from a lack of detail. However, corporate governance is not 
good as we would expect. In addition, according to the logic of "law matters" by La 
Porta et al., in countries with weak protection for minority shareholders, both the 
demand and supply of new share will be low. Individuals will be reluctant to purchase 
shares for fear of being exploited by the manager or controlling shareholders. 
However, in China, individuals or other entities are eager to purchase new shares at 
the stage of IPOs. Even in the second market, the turnover velocity for China's listed 
firms is 500%, much higher ever than that NASDAQ with the well-known trading 
patterns of technology stocks in recent years, 341 including purchasing shares in the 
first and second markets in 2007. At least the theory of "law matters" is not suitable 
for China indeed. 
In addition, in the paper "A Survey of Corporate Governance", the authors point 
out, "Corporate governance deals with the agency problem: the separation of 
management and finance. The fundamental question of corporate governance is how 
to assure financiers that they will get a return on their financial investment. )342 
"Financiers" above include not only shareholders but also creditors of investment in 
companies without doubt. On the one hand, they place emphasis on the importance of 
law (in particular company law) to corporate governance. On the other hand, they fall 
to take account of an important distinction in the law, because they treat shareholders 
141 See Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Maijun Qian , 2002, 'Law, 
Finance, and Economic Growth in China', 
Working Paper, The Wharton Financail Institutions Center, (December). 
342 See Anderl Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', the Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 1-11, No. 2, June, p 773. 
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and creditors of investment as financiers who are identical in the eyes of an economist 
(e. g. "the initial investors have no special ability to help the finn once they have 
parted with their money" 343 ). This implies that there is no difference between 
shareholders and creditors of investment in company and it seems company law 
should not exist any more, and investment law or enterprise law could replace it. As a 
matter of fact, shareholders and creditors are quite different in company laws in every 
country where shares and shareholders are one of the central topics in company laws 
while creditors are protected by other laws or contracts. 
4.1.3. Conclusion 
I accept that a good legal environment will benefit the development of the economy 
and promote the improvement of corporate governance. But I can not agree with the 
"law matters" theory by La Porta et al. based on the above analysis. As North pointed 
out, the adoption of the U. S. Constitution by South American countries did not result 
in democracy. 344 Following the collapse of socialist system in late 1980s, countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union reestablished their legal 
345 
systems drawing heavily on the European and the United States models . But what 
about corporate governance in these countries? At least the "law matters" theory by 
La Porta et al. is not universal across all countries. 
343 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', the Journal of Finance, 
Vol. LII, No. 2, (June), p 748. 
344 See North, Douglass C, 199 1, 'Institutions' J. Econ. Perspectives 5, (Winter), pp 97-112. 
345 See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, 2000, 'Economic Development, Legahtv, 
and The Transplant Effect', SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 183,269. 
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4.2. The "politics matters" theory"' 
Politics is taken to be a process by which a group of people with differing interests 
reach an accommodation. The view originates ultimately from Aristotle, who said 
politics are the processes by which order is maintained in a polis (for Aristotle, the 
Greek city-state) which is an aggregate of the people, and the concept will apply to 
organizations or unit, such as a department, a company or members of a sports club as 
to a city or a nation state. Finally, the accommodations which are created, changed or 
ended by politics will ultimately count on dispositions of power. 347 In a word, politics 
is a process by which a group of people or a state makes the policy or law for the 
people, which is the result of compromise between the different interest groups. 
4.2.1. Summary of "politics matters" 
Politics affect all aspects of life in our society indeed, including the structure of 
ownership and corporate governance. However, some scholars think most systems of 
governance arise out of struggles over the rights and roles of capitalists and workers 
in democratic and authoritarian societies, in other words, that the corporate 
346 The view that corporate governance is determined by politics is supported by some scholars, eg. Marco 
Pagano 
& Paolo F. Vovpin, 2000, 'The Political Economy of Corporate Governance', CSEF Working Paper No 29; 
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, 2003, 'The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development 
in the 
20th Century', 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5; Mark J. Roe, 2003, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political 
Context, Corporate Impact, Oxford University Press Inc. New York. 
347 See Peter Chechland and Jim Scholes, 1990, Soft Systems Methodology in Action, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, p 
50. 
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governance is detennined by politics. Recently the research has shown that, 
historically, political pressures are the same important as economic ones in the 
evolution of corporate governance systems, for example, Professor Roe argues that 
politics rather than economic efficiency created American corporate law, at the federal 
level. Professor Roe further provides a detailed account of how the American political 
system systematically discouraged large investors. That is, with politicians' effort in 
the history of American, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension 
funds were all prevented from becoming influential in corporate affairs, or at least the 
above institutions did not have big enough shareholding to interfere in the affairs of 
companies due to the role played by politicians in historyý The hostile political 
response to the 1980s takeovers can be considered as another good example of the 
influence of politics on companies. 
348 
Politics, without question, is very important to corporate governance. In a sense, 
politics can influence a firm in many ways, for example politics and its policy have a 
close relationship with the following cases: how finn raises capital, who has the 
capital to invest, how managers or employees treat themselves and one another, and 
how authority is allocated inside the finn etc. 349 Professor Roe analyzes the 
relationship between politics and corporate governance based on data by graphs and 
tables in detail in his famous book "Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: 
Political Context, Corporate Impact", and lays the emphasis on the effect of politics 
348 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of 
Finance, 
Vol. Lll, No. 2, (June), p 771 (citing Grundfest, Joseph, 1990, 'Subordination of American Capital', Journal of 
Financial Econornics 27, pp 89-114; Jensen, Michael, 1993, 'The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the 
Failure of internal Control Systems', Journal of Finance 48, pp 831-880. ). 
349 See Mark J. Roe, 2003, Political Detenninants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact, 
Oxford University Press Inc. New York, p 1. 
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on corporate governance in some developed countries, for example, lifetime 
employment to many employees in Japan, and particularly labor codetermination in 
boardroom in Germany, which have a great effect on the corporate governance of 
those countries. At present, for example, the German law of codetermination is 
contained in several different statutes. Under sections 76-117 of the Gennan Stock 
Corporation Act, Gennan public corporations have a two-tier board structure but 
limited liability companies usually have a single board. The managing board is 
responsible for day-to day operations. By contrast, the supervisory board is, inter alia, 
responsible for appointing and supervising the managing board. The corporation's 
shareholders generally elect at least half of the members of the supervisory board. 
According to the Coal and Steel Codetennination Act of 195 1, which was 
supplemented by the Supplementary Act to the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act in 
1956, and the Codetermination Act of 1976, companies that employ more than 2000 
workers have to form a supervisory board with half members selected by workers. 
Under the Industrial Constitution Act of 1952, the companies employ more than 500 
workers and have to form the supervisory board with one third of members selected 
by employees. 350 In sum, the codetermination influenced by politics in Germany is 
understood to contribute to the goals of protecting workers, such as standing against 
their employers' abuse of power, fostering working conditions, stopping the abuse of 
market power, and safeguarding the integrity of the political process. 
35 1 Thus some 
350 See Jens C. Darni-nann, 2003, 'The Future of Codeten-nmation After Centros: Will German Corporate Law 
Nlovc Closer to the U. S. ModelT, Fordharn I Corp. & Fin. L. Vol. VIII, pp 619-621. 
351 See Jens C. Darnmann, 2003, 'The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will German Corporate Law 
Nlove Closer to the U. S. ModelT, Fordharn J. Corp. & Fin. L. Vol. VIII, p 670. 
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scholars always take Germany as an example to show the influence of politics on 
corporate governance, because they always think that codetermination is the result of 
politics. 
After research for comparisons, Professor Roe remarks in his book: there is a 
powerful political pre-condition to ownership separating from control, to the rise of 
the structure of dispersed ownership, and to the eventual disappearance of block and 
family ownership in the United States, namely the absence in the U. S. of a strong 
social democracy. In other words, the structure of dispersed ownership in America is 
attributable in part to powerful politics. Professor Roe continues, where the social 
democracy is strong, there is concentrated ownership, otherwise dispersed 
352 
ownership. That is, whether ownership is concentrated or dispersed is the result of 
politics in broad sense. It means politics deten-nine corporate governance. 
To sum up the features of the politics thesis: First, the political process as being 
determined by coalitions between different interest groups. In the agency view of the 
firm, managers are employed to act in the interests of shareholders. But in order to 
defend their interest respective, workers and managers as a group have to stand 
together against shareholders to protect pnvate benefits and high wages from 
shareholders and others. For example, managers have private benefits of control that 
they wish to protect from shareholder intervention. They seek to limit shareholder 
rights and to avoid takeovers that could result in managerial dismissals and the loss of 
private benefits of control. However managers are always controlled or monitored by 
352 See Mark J. Roe, 2003, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact, 
Oxford University Press Inc. New York, pp 6-7. 
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shareholders. They therefore have to require the support of workers in minimizing 
investor protection and making troubles against takeovers, and in return they must 
offer workers higher wages and continue employment. It is private benefits of control 
that bring the interests of managers in line with those of workers, and the coalition 
between managers and workers is against the interest of shareholders. Second, laws 
and regulations are an outcome of the bargaining and coalition formation between 
different interest groups. 
353 
4.2.2 The drawback of "politics matters" 
Is the above viewpoint of politics true? The answer is "No", or the viewpoint is 
unreliable at least. As we know, although Germany and Japan in history were 
influenced deeply by politics, the trouble is, the argument that the political process 
serves the powerful interests in the economy rather than maximizing social welfare 
applies to Germany and Japan as well. Politics serve and are subject to economy. Both 
countries have created their systems of powerful banks at the end of I gth century, 
during a period of rapid economic growth, and with strong support from the state. 354 
In both countries, policies of the United States tried to ruin the powerful financial 
3 i. 1 Some scholars have similar viewpoint e. g. see Colin Mayer, Oren Sussman, 2001, 'The Assessment: Finance, 
Law, and Growth' , 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, (Winter), p457; also see Mark J. Roe, 2003, 
'Political Deten-ninants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact', Oxford University Press 
Inc. New York, pp29-46; also see Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin, 2005, 'Tbe Political Economy of Corporate 
Governance', Arnerican Economic Review, (September), Working Paper, No. 29). 
15' See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 1-11, No. 2, (June), p 771 (citing Gerschenkron, Alexander, 1962, 'Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective', Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA). 
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institutions during the occupation after World War 11 355 and in both countries it 
failed to set up new institutions as planned. 356 As Professor Coffee points out, "the 
U. S. and European experiences in the late I 9th century suggest that the first step is the 
separation of the market from politics. When, as in late I gth century France, the 
government administers the market, the market suffers. )5357 The means that politics 
indeed have a great effect on the market, the structure of ownership, and corporate 
governance etc. in a given country, but its function is as a limitation instead of a 
detenninant. However, even if the theory by Mark J. Roe is right for a particular 
country or region, as Professor Coffee points out, the Roe social-democrat thesis does 
not explain the origins of concentrated ownership in any other country, and certainly 
does not fit the situations in Asia or much of the Third World. 358 In addition, although 
employee participation in the supervisory organ is also mandated (with qualification) 
in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 359 it 
should be emphasized that employees as members of the supervisory board do not 
have formal decision-making power. 360 That is, the employee as members of the 
supervisory board can take part in the activities of supervision over management, but 
355 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. Lll, No. 2, (June), p 771( citing Adler, Hans, 1949, ' The Post-War Reorganization of The German Banking 
System', Quarterly Journal of Ecnomics 63, pp 322-341). 
356 See Anderi Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance', The Journal of Finance, 
Vol 
- LI I, No. 2, ( June), p 77 
1. 
357 See John C. Coffee, 2001, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control. ' Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, 435 Wesr 116th St. New York, 
NY 10027-720 1, Working Paper No. 182/200 1. 
. 158 See John C. Coffee, 2001-2002, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111,2, p74. 
359 See Luca Enriques, 2003, 'Silence Is Golden: The European Company Statute as a Catalyst for Company Law 
Arbitrage (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 07/2003) (citing Weil, 2002, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Comparative 
Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union And Its Member States, Final Report & 
Annexes I-I 11, AT 44 ). 
360 See Arnir N. Licht, 2003, 'The Maximands of Corporate Goverriance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style' 
Law Working Paper N. (November). www. ecgi. org/wp. 
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have no power to determine or influence directly the management of the company in 
those countries, so the function or influence of employees is limited. In other words, 
the coalition or alliance between managers and employees that is assumed in theory is 
impossible in practice. 
According to the theory of "politics matters", under appropriate political condition 
there is a foundation for an alliance between managers and employees that could stand 
against shareholders. It suggests that politics have a very close relationship with 
corporate governance because social democratic policies potentially could aggravate 
agency costs by promoting an identity of interest between managers and employees. 
In other words large public companies in social democracies are essentially forced to 
behave like growth-maximizing firms from which managers and employees can get 
much more benefit than shareholders, who will receive a small dividend . 
36 1 However, 
the empirical study by scholars is contrary to the theory of "politics matters". Some 
scholars have studied dividend pay-outs made by British public companies between 
1949 and 2002 so as to discover possible relationships between politics and corporate 
governance. Surprisingly, the results contradict the proposition that politics affects 
corporate governance. If politics "mattered" then dividend pay-out should have been 
higher when Britain had a right-wing govenunent and lower when the government 
was on the left-wing of the political spectrum. The study indicated that there was no 
meaningful statistical relationship between the politics and dividend distribution in 
361 See Dennis C. Mueller, 2005, 'The Economics and Politics of Corporate Governance in the European Union', 
Law Working Paper No. 37/2005, (May). www. ecgi. or, wp. 
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British public companies during that time. 362 Why dividends? Because dividend 
policy can act as a "bonding" mechanism for managers to attempt to maximize share 
value for the company, ultimately in the interest of shareholders. In accordance with 
Michael Jensen's free cash flow theory, in essence, managers take the opportunities to 
use cash from the operations of a company in the interest of themselves rather than 
shareholders. One way to prevent management from diverting corporate funds is to set 
a high, fixed pay out ratio. 363 This could be achieved through a high debt-equity ratio, 
or a mechanism like dividends. In addition, dividend policy in the company can be 
considered as an important "signaling" function to the outside. 364 When the dividend 
decreases in a company, this will be interpreted by the market as a powerful signal of 
bad news about the operation of company, and the failure to meet an anticipated 
dividend level can activate alternative corporate governance mechanisms that try to 
improve financial distress or solve corresponding problems. 365 In other words, poor 
performance or financial distress will attract the attention of shareholders and 
competitors in the market. According to the "signaling hypothesis" by Grinblatt, 
Masulis, and Titman, they argue as follows. 
"Accounting principles require that stock dividend distributions be 
accompanies by a reduction in retained earnings in the balance sheet. In 
the presence of information asymmetry, i. e., when managers (insiders) 
know more about the future prospects of the firm than investors (outsiders) 
362 See Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins and Marc Goergen, 2004, 'Dividends and Politics', Law Working Paper 
N. 24/2004, (December) www. ecgi. org/wp. 
363 See Michael Jensen, 1986, 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers', The 
American Economic Review, 76: 2, (May), pp 323-329. 
364 See Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961, 'Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares', 34 
J. Fin. 411. 
365 See Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins and Marc Goergen, 2004, 'Dividends and Politics', Law Working Paper 
N. 24/2004, (December). www. ecgi. org xN-p. 
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do, managers of high-quality firms can use stock dividend distribution to 
convey favorable information to the investors. These managers can afford 
to signal because they do not expect the reduction in the balance of 
retained earnings to constrain future cash dividend payments. On the other 
hand, managers who anticipate poor future earnings will find it costly to 
mimic the signal of a high-quality firm. An empirical implication is that 
stock prices, on average, react positively to stock dividend announcements, 
ceteris paribus. 066 
Therefore, if politics could determine corporate governance, the distribution of 
dividend in companies would be a good example of the influence of politics on 
corporate governance. However, the result is on the contrary. In other words, based on 
analysis above, "politics matters" does not fit other countries in the world except for 
Gen-nany. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, politics appears to have 
played only a little small role in the rise of dispersed ownership, and the structure of 
concentrated ownership had been established in Gennany and France by the late 
nineteenth century 367 before the earliest appearance of a social-democratic 
government in either country. But there is no proof that dispersed structure ownership 
and its corresponding corporate governance is deten-nined by politics. On the contrary, 
as Cambridge Professor Brian Cheffins has found that the structure of dispersed 
ownership in the United Kingdom actually had taken place during a period in which 
British Labor governments were pursuing social-democratic policies. 368 Under the 
Roe theory, such a political environment should have created the structure of 
366 See, Grinbatt, M., Masulis, R., & Timan, S., 1982, 'The Valuation Effect of Stock Splits and Stock Dividends', 
Journal of Financial Economics 13, pp 461-490. 
367 See John C. Coffee, 2001-2002, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111,2, p73. 
368 See John C. Coffee, 2001-2002, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111,2, pp 73-73. (citing Brian R. Cheffins, 2000, 
'Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergency of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom', SSRN 
Elec. Library, Working Paper No-218,655). 
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concentrated share ownership, but it did not. 369 
In addition, if politics could determine corporate governance, when Vodafone in 
the UK launched a hostile bid for Mannesman in Gennany in 1999, politics would 
have played a pivotal role but politics seemed to have no influence. In response to 
pressure from SPD party leaders, Chancellor Schr6der made his address "Hostile 
takeovers destroy an enterprise's culture. They harm the target, but also, in the 
medium-term, the predator itself " However, his comments ultimately played no role 
in the transaction. In the end Vodafone succeeded in its bid for Mannesman by the 
ultimate decision of the shareholders of Mannesman in place of politics. 370 As a 
matter of fact, from the perspective of history, the effect of politics on corporate 
governance always falls behind accidents, such as "Bubble Act" in the UK in 1720 
after the event of South Sea Company, Securities Act of 1932 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 after Great Depression in 1929, many laws and regulations 
enacted in Asian countries after Asia crisis in 1998 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
after the financial scandals in the USA, this shows the limitations of politics as a 
deten-ninant of corporate govemance. 
4.2.3. Conclusion 
Although the govenunent needs to create the essential ingredients of a system of 
369 See John C. Coffee, 2001-2002, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111,2, p 74. 
370 See Curitis J. Milhaupt , "Global 
Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and Governance in a New Era 
of Cross-Border Deals", (Jeffrey N. Gordon, 2003, 'Convergence on Shareholder Capital: An Internationalist 
Perspective), Columbia University Press, pp 241-242. 
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corporate governance through by political intervention, it will be failure if it is against 
the rule of the economic development, for example, in China and the former socialist 
countries. Therefore the thesis argues that politics is only an influence on corporate 
governance instead of detennining corporate governance. 
4.3. Conclusion 
If there is some set of political and legal institutions that produce corporate 
governance structures that might in the long run prove more efficient than other 
institutions in the world, then politicians and legislators should concurrently adopt this 
set of best institution on earth by legislation to improve their countries' economic 
growth. On the contrary, there exist no best political and legal institutions that produce 
corporate governance that can be followed by other countries. Although both politics 
and law can have a great effect on corporate governance, for example, the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, and the Sarbanes Act of 2002 demonstrate 
that law and politics have important influences on corporate governance, their effect 
on corporate governance is limited. There is no proof that dispersed share ownership 
in the U. S. A. and the U. K. or concentrated share ownership in Japan and Gen-nany or 
in other countries is historically determined by law or politics. To the contrary, today 
the fonner socialist countries' experience shows that corporate governance has not 
been improved a bit, although law and politics has been reformed greatly in 
accordance with some western models. At the same time, in East sia, corporate 
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governance remains as before although law or politics has been adjusted a lot after the 
financial crisis. Many countries in Europe are trying to develop towards a dispersed 
structure of ownership in their systems of corporate governance through the 
enactment of laws on the protection of minority shareholders, but corporate 
governance changes little despise the passage of many laws over the years. If there is 
multi-party political system in Western countries, there is a conflict of interest 
between them, which affects the improvement of corporate governance. However, in 
China there is only one party in power all the time and the corporate governance 
remains as before. Or say, the improvement of corporate governance is only a small. 
Why? How to explain the above phenomena? In fact, the reason is very simple. The 
structure of share ownership in companies in those countries remains as before. (Both 
in Russia and in the Czech Republic, mass-privatization through the sale or 
distribution of privatization vouchers to the citizenry inevitably created a highly 
dispersed ownership structure according to the style of the West, but only for a 
transitory period. Over time, concentrated ownership re-emerged 371 ). It is no 
surprising that corporate governance remained as before. 
371 See John C. Coffee, 1999, 'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market 
Failure', Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1, (Fall). 
158 
Chapter 5. How does the structure of share ownership come into being? 
Chapter 5. How does the structure of 
share ownership come into being? 
Why do societies fail to adopt the organization or system of more economically 
successful ones? The answer to the question seems to be very simple: because the 
organization or system in societies is affected by many elements and one organization 
or system which is suitable for one country or region may not be fit for any other 
country or region. As the endowment theory puts it, in the past differences in 
endowments created the initial fon-nation of property rights and the initial systems for 
the definition, defense and interpretation of property rights, and these have had 
long-lasting and different effect on property rights and private contracting today. 372 
So it is nonnal that there exist different structures of share ownership which detennine 
and lead to varying models of corporate governance analyzed above across countries. 
The structures of share ownership in publicly traded companies in different countries 
have been affected by the economy, politics, ideology, history, law and culture etc. 
But the economy lays the foundation for the structure of share ownership in publicly 
traded companies. That is, the economy plays a pivotal role in the change of the 
structure of share ownership in publicly traded companies. 
372 See Ross Levin, 2003, 'Law, Endowments, and Property Rights', Working Paper,. 
htW: //\\ý\\,, \k,. econ. bro\\, ii. cdu/fac/ Ross L-c\ i nc., Pub] ication/Forthcoming/Forth JEP RL La\%Po20Endo\ýments%20 
ProL)ertyO, -i, 2ORights. pdf (3.21.2007) 
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5.1. Law and politics have effect on the structure of share 
ownership 
Law and politics are very important to the formation of the structure of share 
ownership in a given country indeed. One scholar asserts that corporate ownership in 
a country therefore not only depends on the corporate law and on the legal regime but 
ultimately on the acceptance of entrenched private ownership politically. This scholar 
further thinks that the structure of corporate ownership and governance, as well as the 
development of the financial system, are regarded as very much integrated parts of a 
country's political history. 
373 
Most societal rules and laws are products of political processes that reflect the 
relative power of various organized social groups that directly or indirectly affect the 
structure of share ownership. Generally speaking, incumbent groups work to yield 
benefits for themselves and impose costs and restrictions on their challengers or 
opponents. Thus the legal systems that evolved prove the accommodation of these 
struggles and have had a profound influence on the national structures of corporate 
governance. 374 For example, politics played an important role in the construction of 
the common law system in Great Britain and the civil law system in France. In 
England the common law system stemmed from the victory of private landholders 
over the king and nobility The law attempted to stop arbitrary seizure of land by 
sovereign. In France, Napoleon established a civil law system exactly because he 
373 See Peter H6gfeldt, 2004 'The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden', Working Paper 
(ECGI), (July). 
374 See Neil Fligstein and Jennifer Choo, 2005, 'Law and Corporate Governance', Working Paper. 
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prevented judges from restoring feudal privileges at their discretion after the French 
Revolution. 375 Therefore, the structure of share ownership in the two countries Is 
quite different due to the influence of politics. Today the fon-ner is the dispersed share 
ownership and the later concentrated share ownership in most of public traded 
companies. 
Recent studies show that in highly ethnically diverse economies, the group that 
comes to power tends to carry out policies that (a) deprive the ethnic losers of as 
many resources as possible, (b) restrain the rights of other group, and (c) inhibit the 
growth of industries or sectors that menace the ruling group. 376 When this view is 
applied to the structure of share ownership, politicians will create a structure of share 
ownership that fits in with their interests by policy and by the passage of laws. For 
example in accordance with laws and the principle of one-share- one-vote, policies 
made in companies have a close relationship with the structure of share ownership and 
policy makers will be responsible for striking the best balance between the different 
groups in the company. 
In a word, the structure of share ownership is affected by politics through policy 
and law. For instance, if capital for investments can be supplied primarily through 
borrowing from banks or by the infusion of private capital at a lower interest rate or 
cheaper than obtaining capital through share issues, companies have no immediate 
need to go through the strictures of equity offers and place a larger fraction of shares 
375 See Mahoney PQ 'The Common Law and Economic Growth', J. Legal Study 30,503-25. 
376 See Beck, Thorsten, Ash Dernirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, 2003, 'Law, Endowment, and Finance', Journal of 
Financial Economics 70-2, pp 137-81. (citing Alesina, A., Baqir, R., Easterly, W., 1999, 'Public Goods and Ethic 
Divisions', Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, pp 1243-1284; Easterly, W. Levine, R., 1997, 'Africa's Growth 
Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions', Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, pp 1203-1250. ) 
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in a wider group of investors and dilute the private benefits of control in the process. 
Also larger shareholders can use dual-class shares to separate votes from capital 
contribution in order to maintain control after issues of equity in some European 
countries. Or a company with concentrated share ownership can get exemption from 
tax or tax preferential treatment by policy or law, for example, a chaebol can get loan 
at a lower rate of interest from banks, and preferential treatment of tax in accordance 
with policy and law in South Korea. These provisions of law and policy strengthen the 
structure of concentrated share ownership in South Korea. 377 
As mentioned above, in a sense, the law is the outcome of politics. Generally 
speaking, law has an effect on the structure of share ownership through the following 
ways at least: (1) prohibiting some institutions, companies or other entities from 
holding shares or restricting the number of shares they hold; (2) whether there is 
protection for minority investors or not; (3) whether there is one-share- one -voting 
or not. The following sections show that laws and politics in some countries have a 
close relationship with the structure of share ownership. 
5.1.1. The United States 
In the United States, one of the reasons why dispersed ownership became established 
historically is the combined function of law and policy at the turn of the 20th century. 
Today banks, mutual funds, and pension funds are either prevented entering from the 
377 See 'Korean, South The Origins and Development of Chaebol' Sources: The Library of Congress Country 
Studies, CIA World Factbook. 
http: //www. photius. cornJcountrics, korea_south/economy/korea_south_economy_the_origins_and_deve-204. html 
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securities business and from owning stock or are significantly restricted in their 
portfolios and cannot easily develop their portfolios to big blocks under the control of 
laws and by the influence of politicians. Moreover, some financial institutions, such as 
mutual funds and pension funds, face legal and structural problems that restrict them 
from appointing the member of board of directors. The general result under these 
legal restrictions is that the structure of dispersed ownership has been created and a 
shift of power from shareholders to managers has resulted. 378 If the banks and 
insurers had been large and capable of owning stock, the structure of ownership in 
America would not have been the same as it is today. In the wake of the Great 
Depression, the US Congress passed several pieces of legislation designed to facilitate 
the development of financial markets and promote the structure of dispersed share 
ownership further: the 1933 Glass-Steagal Act prevented commercial banks from 
underwriting, holding and dealing in corporate securities; the 1933 Securities Act 
mandated disclosure in the securities markets; and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
established and empowered the Security and Exchange Commission, which benefits 
the protection of minority shareholders and promotes the development of the structure 
of dispersed share ownership further. 
As a historical matter, government intervention in corporation traces back to the 
1890s with the case of Standard Oil and the prevention of "trusts" from holding and 
controlling shares in a number of different corporations by the imposition of 
regulations. For instance, not only Standard Oil, but also other corporations such as 
378 See Mark J. Roe, 1994, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate 
Governance, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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American Tobacco and DuPont, were prevented from merging with others to become 
giant businesses by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.379 Generally speaking, before 
the Great Depression and World War 11, the influence of the state and federal 
government on the modem corporation was primarily through taxes, tariffs, and 
regulatory legislation. 380 In brief, the politics and law have always played a certain 
role in the change of the structure of ownership in American history. 
5.1.2. Sweden 
The structure of heavily concentrated ownership has been profoundly affected by 
politics and law in Sweden. The largest listed firms are controlled by a few families 
and banks due to the persistent political influence of the Social Democratic Party 
since the Great Reversal in 1932. Finns have been dependent on the debt market in 
place of the primary equity markets, and in consequence the structure of concentrated 
ownership has been kept since then. The policies concentrated on the very largest 
firms but systematically disregarded the need to create new entrepreneurial firms. The 
consequence is that there are an unusually large proportion of very old and very large 
firms with well-defined owners in control in an ageing economy. For example, 31 of 
the 50 largest listed firrns in 2000 were founded before 1914, only 8 in the post-war 
period and none after 1970.381 
379 See Alexandre Padilla and Andrei Kreptul, 2004, 'Government Regulation, Unintended Consequences, and the 
Rise of Omnipotent Management', Working Paper. 
380 See Alfred D. Chandlcr, Jr., 1977, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, p 
494. 
381 See Peter H(5gfeldt, 2004, 'The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden', Working Paper 
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Influenced by politics, banks and large listed firms have kept a close good 
relationship which has had profound and lasting effects on corporate financing and 
ownership in Sweden over the last 100 years. The two pivotal refonns of bank 
ownership in 1911 and 1934 both had the strong support of the Social Democrats. 
Banks could directly own shares and operate as investment banks under The Banking 
Act of 1911. After the crisis in the early 20s last century, the banks owned a 
significant number of shares in the major listed firms and became the controlling 
owner. After the financial crisis in the 30s last century when banks owned very large 
portfolio of listed stocks and de facto controlled the largest, listed finns, and then the 
Swedish 1934(light) version of Glass-Steagall banned them from directly holding 
equity, but a few years later they were pennitted to transfer their assets to holding 
companies if the shares were distributed to the bank's shareholders. 382 One of the 
reasons why the structure of share ownership is concentrated are affected profoundly 
by politics: the use of dual-class shares and pyramiding with tax-exemption, which 
gets the support of politicians who help separation of internal funding from external 
funding that causes an enhanced (political) pecking order of corporate financing. As a 
result, the corporate control is strengthened and the structure of ownership is 
concentrated by the political support for the separation of control from ownership and 
for non-equity financing benefit established finns and in effect it associates the 
interests of the incumbent political power with incumbent capital (in particular the 
leading banks), while it was very difficult for new finns to develop by equity 
(ECGI), (July). 
IN2 See Peter H6gfeldt, 2004, 'The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden', Working Paper 
(ECGI), (July). 
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financing under the disfavored environment for egalitarian reasons. 383 In a word, 
policies by politics stimulate and support the development of firms with concentrated 
ownership. 
5.1.3. Italy 
The structure of share ownership is the result of the Joint effect by both politics and 
law in Italy in a sense. The important regulatory intervention was that the Bank Law 
of 1936 banned universal banks due to the Great Depression. Banks could not own 
equity stakes in non-financial firms. Commercial banks could only engage in short 
tenn lending. Since the Great Depression, the state had to intervene in the economy 
and took part in the economy as the owner of profit-oriented firms. As a consequence, 
the character of the structure of ownership is concentrated in Italy and groups of 
companies are controlled and managed by a family via a complex chain of holding 
companies. Over the century, there were important political strategy and decisions that 
influenced the stock market and regulatory environment. The stock market all the time 
has been controlled by family-controlled pyramidal groups and state-controlled 
conglomerates. 384 Therefore the structure of concentrated share ownership is affected 
deeply by politics in Italy. 
383 See Peter H6gfeldt, 2004, 'The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden', Working Paper 
(ECGI), (July). 
IS4 See Alexander Aganin, and Paolo Volpin, 2003, 'History of Corporate Ownership in Italy', Finance Working 
Paper N, (March), http: 11'ssm com /abstract--3 91180. 
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5.1.4. Japan 
In Japan, the history of the structure of share ownership shows that zaibasu and 
keiretsu are one of outcomes of political rent-seekers. Prior to World War 11, wealthy 
Japanese families exercised control of large corporations through pyramidal groups, 
called zaibatsu. After World War 11, the American occupation force tried to supplant 
zaibatsu with a widely held corporate sector similar to that of United States but this 
eventually failed by the end of the 1960s. A bout of takeovers and greenmail ensued. 
To defend their position, Japanese top executives placed numerous small blocks of 
stock with each other's firm, shaping dense networks of small inter-corporate blocks 
that summed to majority blocks in each firm. These networks, called keiretsu, that 
emerged during the 1950s and developed more fully in the 1960s, halted hostile 
takeovers completely and the current pattern of corporate ownership was essentially in 
place. Both zaibatsu and keiretsu were influenced by politics. Such influence was 
often instrumental in securing lasting advantages over the competition, as when the 
early zaibatsu families grew as giant firms by obtaining tax fanning concessions, 
mines and government contracts. In the postwar period, keiretsu banks and firms also 
benefited disproportionately from regulatory favoritism and overt subsidies from 
government. In addition, there were lots of laws relating to the structure of share 
ownership influenced by politics. For example, the Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947 was 
actually an anti-pyramid law, but subsequently this law was frequently amended in 
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response to corporate lobbying. 385 
5.1.5. The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom in 1945, when the Labor Party won the general election and 
came to power, it began to implement the policy of nationalization in the electoral 
document titled "Let us face the future". Nationalization was carried out in many 
areas where it accounted for 20 percent of the economy, such as public water, gas, 
electricity, transportation, coal mine, and Bank of England. As a result of this 
nationalization, ownership of many companies and enterprises was changed into state 
ownership, namely concentrated ownership by state. 386 In the traditional socialist 
view, nationalization is one of the methods- by no means the only one- by which 
the means of production and distribution are separated from private ownership and put 
under the control of the community as a whole. Nationalization will serve, according 
to the socialist program, to get rid of the private acquisition of the surplus value 
yielded in that particular enterprise or industry and the surplus should be controlled by 
and distributed to the entire community. 387 Nationalization is supposed to make a 
substantial contribution to the socialist objective of achieving a more egalitarian 
distribution of income, offer the advantages of large-scale production, better 
co-ordination, and integration. However, when Margaret Thatcher won the general 
385 See Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, 2003, 'Been there, Done That: The History of Corporate Ownership 
in Japan', Finance Working Paper N, (July), www. ecgi. orR/'Ai). 
386 See Mary E. Murphy, 1952, 'Nationalization of British Industry', The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May), pp 146-162. 
3X 7 See Adolf Sturmthal, 1953, 'Nationalization and Workers' Control in Britain and France', The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 6 1, No. (Feb., ), pp 43-79. 
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election in 1979, she carried out the privatization of nationalized enterprises in coal, 
iron and steel, gas, electricity, water supply, railways, trucking, airlines and 
telecommunications. That is, state ownership of companies or enterprises was 
changed into private ownership. 388 In fact the long-term economic problems of the 
British economy stem from a history of policy errors that go back at least to the 
1920s. 389 That is, the reform of the structure of ownership is a requirement for the 
development of the economy. However, the above reform of the economy was carried 
by the Labor Party or the Conservative Party, which changed the structure of share 
ownership greatly in some of companies, under the influence of politics in Britain. 
In a word, the structure of share ownership is indeed affected by politics and law, 
but it is not easily and directly modified by politics and law except in some special 
circumstances (e. g. wartime, revolution, nationalization, and privatization) because 
the right of share ownership is a vested right and a private property right which should 
be controlled by its owner in accordance with its requirement and the development of 
the economy in a given country or region and not by politicians and legislators who 
only give guidelines for the current structure of share ownership or may directly 
influence the future structure of share ownership. In fact, the effect of politics and law 
on the structure of share ownership ultimately has to be subject to and adapt to the 
change and growth of economy. 
388 See Sirnon Jenkins, 1996, Accountable to None: The Tory Nationalization of Britain, London, Penguin books 
Ltd,. p 23. 
389 See Thayer Watkins, "Privatization in the United Kingdom Under the Thatcher Governrnent", 2007,1 
http: //wwx%,. sjsu. edu/faculty/watkins/pr-ivUK. htm 
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5.2. Culture and the Structure of Share Ownership 
5.2.1 Concept 
"Culture" is very vague and ambiguous concept and is recognized as "one of the two 
or three most complicated words in the English language. , 390 Sociologists and 
anthropologists regard the organization of society to be an expression of its culture- 
an important integrated part of which is cultural beliefs. 391 Various social science 
disciplines define culture for their purposes. The preeminent anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz states that culture "denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meaning 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms 
by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about 
and attitudes toward life. , 
392 In the formal jargon of economists, culture can be 
translated as the social norm and the individual beliefs that maintain Nash 
equilibria 
393 
as focal points in repeated social mutual or reciprocal action. 
394 Some 
390 See Philip M. Nichols, 1997, 'The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted 
Foreign Investment Code', 18 U. Pa. J. Int'L Econ. L. 1235, ppl242-43. (citing Raymond Wililiams, 
1976, 'Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society' 76 ). 
391 See Greif, A., 1994, 'Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on 
collectivist and individualist societies', Journal of Political Economy 102, p 915. 
3'2 See Amir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 157. (citing Clifford Geertz, 1973, 'The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays', 89 ). 
393 See http: //en. wikipedia, orR/NN, iki/Nash equilibrium. In game theo[y, the Nash equilibrium (named after John 
Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a kind of solution concept of a game involving two or more players, where no 
player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a 
strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, 
then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium 
394 See e. g. Greif, A, 1994, 'Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies', Journal of Political Economy, n. 5, V61.102, (October); 
Myerson 11,13.1991, 'Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict', Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Schwartz, 
A. 
, 1981, 'The Econornic 
Theory of Social Institutions', Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, (January). 
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scholars define culture as follows: "Culture refers to the complex of meanings, 
symbols, and assumptions about what is good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate that 
underlines the prevailing practices and nonns in a SoCiety.,, 
395 In other words, culture 
is defined as a system of beliefs that shape and affect the action of individuals or other 
entities within a society. 
A radical view is that culture has a direct effect on individual behavior through 
values and preferences. 396 Action that culture operates to motivate and justify is 
compatible with its values which have a great impact on organizational policies and 
on the values of individual decision-makers. 397 When values are used to characterize 
cultures, what is sought are the socially shared values among a group of people or in a 
society These are abstract ideas that will be expressed about what is good, right, and 
desirable in society or other bounded cultural group. 398 Cultural values are the bases 
for the specific nonns that let people know what is right or reasonable in various 
situations. 399 Different groups of people or ethnics have varying cultural value 
(standard) in a country or region after a long history of evolution. After research, the 
scholar Schwartz grouped the nations of the world into clusters that share similar 
395 See Arnir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
International Review of Law and Economics 25, p233. (citing Pierre Bourdieu, 1972, Outline of a Theory of 
Practice ; Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, 1994, A Collative Fear of the Collective: Implications for Selves 
and Theories of Selves, 20 Personality & Social Psychol. Bull. 568). 
396 See e. g. Akerlof, G and R. Kranton, 2000, 'Economics and Identity', Quarterly Journal of Economics, August; 
Rabin M. 1993, 'Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics', American Economic Review, 83, pp 
1281-1302. 
397 See Arnir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschrnidt, Shalom H. Schwartz, 2005, 'Culture, Law and Corporate Governance', 
hiterriational Review of Law and Economics 25, p 233. (citing Robin M. Williams, 1970, American Society: A 
Sociological Interpretation (3 rd ed., )). 
398 See Arnir N. Licht, 200 1, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 157. (citing Shalom H. Schwartz & Maria 
Ros, 1995, ' Values in the West: A Theoretical and Empirical Challenge to the Individual i sm-Col lectivi sm Cultural 
Dirnension', World Psychol. 91,93). 
399 See Ainir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Goverriance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 168. 
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cultural traits: West European, Anglo, East European, Islamic, East Asian and Latin 
American. Countries belonging to the same cluster share conceptually similar cultural 
value or belief dimensions. 400 in other words, some countries may have similar 
cultural background, history, values and beliefs, while some countries (or societies) 
may have varying cultures which lead to divergences in many aspects, and may even 
result in conflicts between people. 
5.2.2. The effect of culture on the structure of share ownership 
Cultures develop, change and adapt in response to the change of economy, but they 
generally do so slowly. 401 Meanwhile the culture has a great effect on the economy, 
politics, and the law etc. Theorists, policy-makers, and practitioners share the intuition 
that corporate governance is the reflection of national culture. 402 In other words, 
culture influences the corporate governance. Cultural values thus rise as the "mother 
of all path dependencies" in corporate governance systems and national culture had 
shaped the initial conditions which influence company, its organization, structure of 
ownership and corporate governance etc. when companies and financial markets first 
403 
appeared . There are two major 
implications of path dependence. First, with 
400 See Arnir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 177, 
401 See Ren6 M. Stulz and Rohan Williamson, 2001, 'Culture, Openness, and Finance' Working Paper 8222, 
(April). 
402 See, eg. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Market J. Roe, 1990, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance 
and Ownership, 52 Stan. L Rev. 127,168; OECD Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance, Document SG/CG(99)53(1999); CalPERS, Global Corporate Governance 
Principles(I 999). 
403 See Amir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 200. 
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hindsight, cultural values fonn part of the heritage of certain interpersonal relations 
and institutions, which influence the selection of particular corporate structures and 
legal rules out of a large menu. Second, from a forward-looking viewpoint, cultural 
values are deeply ingrained in people's minds and in social institutions, which will 
have profound effect on corporate governance in the future. A corporate governance 
system that is consistent with social preferences in other areas (most importantly, legal 
areas) is more likely to run efficiently in a particular society. However, such 
compatibility may increase the persistence of certain features and impede reforms 404 
in the future. Therefore culture could affect companies through its values. That is, 
culture will affect not only the structure of share ownership but also corporate 
govemance. 
In east Asia (China, Japan and Korea), the Confucian ideal of social structure that 
is built on the "Five Relationships" is a prime example (Formulated by classical 
Chinese philosophers, this concept states that there should be affection between father 
and son, righteousness between ruler and minister, attention to their separate functions 
between husband and wife, proper order between old and young, and faithfulness 
between friends). Based on the above ideal of rigid hierarchy and harmony in the 
society, this is why the structure of concentrated share ownership, which is affected by 
culture, has developed in those countries, particularly in big companies, which are 
always based on blood kinship with an important element of Confucianism in China 
(mainly in Hong Kong and Taiwan today, but Mainland in the past which I will 
404 See Arnir N. Licht, '2001, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systerns', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, pp 186-187. 
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discuss in Chapter 8), Japan, and South Korea. For instance, the standard story of 
Japanese corporate governance tells of managers imbued with Confucian cultural 
values of hannony and consensus, which helps lessen self-interest and opportunism. 
The Japanese people allegedly prefer to endure rather than to resort to combative 
litigations and these cultural values also expedite the working of the keiretsu- the 
hallmark of Japanese corporate structure. 405 In Korea, Confucianism saturates all the 
aspects of Korean society 406 and the structure of ownership is often based on 
extended family (clan) kinship. Both the Japanese keiretsu and the Korean chaebol 
exhibit extensive cross-holdings among corporations that engage in a variety of 
industrial and financial activities to coordinate their relationships toward hannony in 
the society In China, the structure of share ownership is mainly concentrated in the 
hands of the state, which represents all the people in theory at least, in conformity 
with Confucian cultural values of han-nony and consensus and modem collective spirit. 
In contrast, "autonomy" is primarily emphasized in the thoughts and feelings of the 
individual in Western countries. 407 But cultural values in Western European countries 
attribute greater importance to egalitarianism and harmony, so in most of European 
countries, the concentrated structure of share ownership occurs in many companies, 
which represents most of people's interest and reflects the expectation of harmony. 
However, cultural value in English-speaking countries (especially American samples) 
is characterized by hierarchy and mastery, and the incidence of structure of dispersed 
405 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, 1996, 'A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and 
the Rule of Law', 37 Harv. Int'L LJ. 3, pp 6-7. 
406 See Craig Ehrlich and Dae-Seob Kang, 2000, 'U. S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea's Largest 
Companies', UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. Vol. 18: I, p 22 
407 See Amir N. Licht, 2004, 'The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A T'heory of Values and Cognitive Style', 
Delaware Jounial of Corporate Law, Vol. 29, p 677 
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- ýn I 
share ownership in these countries very high, which stresses the interest of individuals 
and the distinction between individuals. In other words, the cultural differences 
between the United States and Western Europe are consistent with the different 
positions of these countries in regard to the maximands of corporate governance. 
Cultural values in Western European countries emphasize the more social 
responsibility In contrast, the cultural values of the United States emphasize the 
autonomy of the individual person. For example, with regard to accountability, the 
Western European accountability will feature multiple constituencies as accountees, 
while the American accountability will seek to define power hierarchies among 
constituencies. 408 Most U. S. scholars agree that the maximization of shareholder 
wealth is by far most important goal of U. S. corporation law, 409 for example, Milton 
Friedman argues that "this norm (a managerial belief in shareholder-wealth 
maximization), widespread in American business circles, surely affects what 
managers think about their task, "410 while German corporate law continues to specify 
that the interests of other stakeholders are very important, 411 in particular, German 
corporate law is designed to "serve the interests of employees as well as those of 
shareholders', 412 because of different culture in the two countries. In Gennany, with 
408 See Amir N. Licht, 2004, ' The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style', 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 29, pp737-738. 
409 See, e. g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 1993, 'In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply 
to Professor Green', 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, pp1423-25; Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, 1996, 'A 
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law', 109 Harv. L. Rev. ppl9ll-1921; D. Gordon Smith, 1998, 'ne 
Shareholder Primacy Norm' 23 J. Corp. L. pp277-278. 
410 See Milton Friedman, 1970, 'The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profits', YN. Times Mag. 
13 (Sept. ), p 32. 
41t See, e. g., Michael Bradley et al., 1999, 'The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary 
Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads', 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9.52.; Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
1999, 'Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance', 84 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1133,1157. 
412 See Thomas Lee Hazen, 1987, ' Corporate Director's Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap', 
66N. C. L. Rev. 171,176n. 35. 
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respect to the principle of democracy, it is suggested that this principle should not be 
limited to the field of politics. Corporate power is also in need of democratic 
legitimacy. It is necessary for the providers of capital and labor to be offered equal 
treatment in order to protect the interests of workers against adverse decisions by their 
employers of corporation. 413 Therefore the structure of share ownership of listed 
companies in America is more dispersed, while the structure of share ownership of 
listed companies in most west European countries is more concentrated, which has a 
close relationship with culture or cultural values. 
Of course, as analyzed above, culture has an effect on corporate governance too. 
In the European Union (EU), it was cultural differences that resulted in the failure to 
adopt the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law. 414 In order to unify company law 
across the EU, the Draft Directive has experienced many revisions and changes in 
response to bitter conflicts of interest between member states due to the difference in 
culture. In May 1997, an expert panel came to the conclusion that significant 
differences between national cultures prevented the likelihood of consolidation as 
originally intended. Consequently, it said, there could be no single ideal system 
without further detail S. 415 The Fifth Directive case offers a vivid lesson for policy 
makers about the potential obstacles cultural differences give rise to in the attempt to 
413 See Jens C. Damrnann, 2003, 'The Future of Codeten-nination After Centros: Will German Corporate Law 
Move Closer to the U. S. Model? ', Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. Vol. VIII, p 655. ( citing Drucksache des 
Bundestages[BT-Drs. ] VI/334,18-20. ). 
414 See Amir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 157. (citing Amended Proposal for a Fifth 
Council Directive Based on Art. 54 of the EEC Treaty in an European Company and Financial Law[European 
Commounity Law: Text Collection](Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1994). 
415 See Amir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 157. (citing Corporate Governance Update, 5 
Corp. Governance: Int'L Rev, 256 (1997)). 
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converge corporate governance systems. In other words, the role played by culture in 
corporate governance should not be ignored. it especially suggests the requirement for 
a cross-cultural theory to inform corporate governance reforms. Even if this was the 
case in some countries, it is necessary to acquaint with the role of culture in corporate 
governance, perhaps even a fortiori. 
416 
Some scholars argue that differences in culture (mainly religion and language) can 
explain differences in investor protection through studying the data of 49 countries: 
"Shareholders rights are better protected in Protestant countries with common law 
legal origins than in such countries with civil law origins. Creditor rights are strongest 
in countries where the main religion is Protestant regardless of legal origin. Within 
civil law countries, the protection of creditor right is weaker in Catholic countries. 
,, 417 Spanish-speaking Catholic countries have weaker enforcement of rights . The 
above research shows the culture has a close relationship with corporate governance. 
As Landes makes the point, "Max Weber was right. If we learn anything from the 
history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost all of the 
difference. " 418 In a seminal paper on the role of culture as a determinant of 
institutions, Greif compares Maghribi traders of the eleventh century and Genoese 
traders of the twelfth century and concludes that "Differences in the societal 
organization of the two trading societies can be consistently accounted for as 
reflecting diverse cultural beliefs. " He states that his "findings suggest the theoretical 
416 See Arnir N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systerns', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, p 158. 
417 See Ren6 M. Stulz and Rohan Williamson, 2001, 'Culture, Openness, and Finance' Working Paper 8222, 
(April). 
418 See Landes, D., -Culture makes almost all the difference, in Culture Matters', L. E. Harrison and S. P. Huntington, 
eds., Basic Books, New York, NY 
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and historical importance of culture in determining societal organizations, in leading 
to path dependence of institutional frameworks, and in forestalling successful 
,, 419 intersociety adoption of institutions . The extant academic 
literature admits the 
importance of cultural differences in the development of corporate governance, 
company law and securities regulation regimes . 
420 The OECD, the IMF and the 
World Bank also think that cultural differences are very important to the development 
of corporate governance in some instruments. 421 Thus, cultural differences preclude 
the implementation of a single corporate governance model and warrant 
country- speci fi c adaptations. Therefore the varying cultures across countries lead to 
different kinds of corporate governance to a certain extent in our society. That is why 
the largest American pension fund CalPERS, in the wake of a strategic decision to 
increase its foreign portfolio investment, found it necessary to develop different 
policies on foreign corporate governance due to cultural differences. In other words, it 
recognizes that the legal, economic and cultural traditions that are unique to each 
market have an effect on the modem corporation and the corporate governance 
structures and principles that are appropriate for different markets. 422 
In a word, different cultural beliefs derive from divergent cultural heritages and 
political and social histories in different countries or regions in the world, and hence 
411 See Greif, A., 1994, 'Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on 
collectivist and individualist societies', Journal of Political Economy 102, p 914. 
420 For example, James A. Fanto, 1996, 'The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory 
Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance', 17NWJ. INT'L L. & BUS. 119; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. 
Roe, 1999, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127; Marcel 
Kahan & Michael Klausner, 1996, 'Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior 
and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347. 
'21 See. E. g. Principle of Corporate Governance (2004); Memorandum of Understanding between 
OECD and the 
World Band; the World Bank's Corporate Governance web-page. 
422 See Aniff N. Licht, 2001, 'The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems', Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 26, pp 150-154. 
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diverse cultural beliefs result in a distinct trajectory of organizational development. 
Namely divergent cultural values must affect deeply the origin and development of 
institutions. Meanwhile "the effect of organizations is a function of their impact on the 
rule of the game and the cultural beliefs of society within which this game is 
embedded. 9423 It demonstrates culture and institutions interact with each other. Thus, 
the structure of share ownership and corporate governance are affected greatly by the 
culture in a given country or region. 
5.3. History and structure of share ownership 
History always leaves us something that may be meaningful or not, which will affect 
us more or less. But sometimes the effect is great. Some scholars have argued that 
distant histories and traditions give rise to pronounced differences in civic, social and 
economic behavior between Northern and Southern Italy and that these different 
endowments of "social capital" in turn can explain the economic backwardness of 
Southern Ital Y. 424 Both law and endowment theories stress the importance of how 
initial conditions influence institutions today, but there are crucial differences. The 
law and finance theory focuses on the legal tradition brought by colonizers. Namely, 
the emphasis on the colonizer is the most important key to the institutions of the 
colony. By contrast, the endowment theory focuses on how the colony's own 
423 See Greif, A., 1994, 'Cultural beliefis and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on 
collectivist and individualist societies', Journal of Political Economy 102, p 944. 
424 See Guido Tabellini, 2005, 'Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of European', 
Working Paper 
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endowments shaped the building of long-lasting institutions. The emphasis on the 
initial historical conditions of the colony itself is most important key to the 
institutions of the colony. 425 Although the two theories stress different issues, both of 
them lay emphasis on the importance of history and its a great effect on institutions 
today 
As stated above, a widespread interpretation is that history has a strong effect 
on current economic performance by "institutions ". 426 The idea that history 
influences the current development and progress of society through institutions is 
beyond question. "Institutions not only are a fundamental determinant of the 
incentives of private individuals to innovate and invest but also remain in place for 
long periods of time, and thus they are a natural candidate to explain the legacy of 
history. A27 Social scientists have discussed whether the prevailing conditions, when 
the fortner European settlers arrived, resulted in the adoption of specific institutions 
that then had long-terrn effects on economic growth; or whether some institutions 
brought by colonizers had influenced society in new territories. For example, the 
historical accident that has had a profound effect on ownership structure and corporate 
governance is the transplantation of similar institutions in some countries or regions in 
the past. That is, many institutions, such as property rights, ownership structure, and 
legal system, are similar to or model on those of its colonizers. Because of 
'25 See Beck, Thorsten, Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, 2003, 'Law, Endowment, and Finance', Journal of 
Financial Economics 70-2, pp 137-81. 
426 "institution" is often used as a catch-all concept that means different things to different people. In a narrow 
interpretation, institutions can be thought of as the fori-nal rules of game that shape individual incentives and 
constrains. In a broader interpretation, institutions also include systems of beliefs or social norms that sustain 
specific equilibria. ( See Guido Tabellini, 2005, 'Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of 
European', Working Paper, ( June)). 
427 See Guido Tabellini, 2005, 'Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of European', 
Working Paper, (June). 
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colonialization, many societies were forced to take similar systems to those of their 
respective conquerors, and those systems or institutions have lasted for a long time 
even till today Some scholars argue that other early conditions such as settler 
mortality and the proportion of indigenous populations at the time of colonization (i. e., 
endowments) are powerful explanatory variables of financial development. For 
example, countries or regions that inherited the British Common law tradition got a 
legal tradition that attempts to stress private property rights and support financial 
development to a much greater degree than countries or regions that inherited the 
French Civil law tradition. 428 The idea is that exogenous conditions sometimes 
determined certain formal institutions, such as legal regimes or specific voting and 
property-rights systems that then had a long-time effect on the subsequent paths of 
institutional and economic development these countries followed, even including life 
style, belief and enforcement of the law. For instance, "the legitimacy of a legal 
system was affected by the conditions under which it was transplanted and this 
legitimacy had a big effect on the subsequent efficacy of the legal system. , 429 In fact, 
research based on current economic indicators has demonstrated that there is a strong 
relationship between certain initial institutions and today's development levels, 
suggesting that institutions might have a lasting effect over time. 430 The empirical 
results demonstrate that stock market development and private property rights 
protection in the colony are affected by both the legal system brought by the 
428 See Beck, Thorsten, Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, 2003, 'Law, Endowment, and Finance', Journal of 
Financial Economics 70-2, pp 137-81. 
429 See Berkowitz D, Pistor K, Richard J, 2003, 'Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect', 
European Econ. Rev. 47, pp 165-95. 
430 Aldo Musacchio, 'Law, Politics, and Finance: Creditor Rights, Contract Enforcement, and the Rise and Decline 
of Bond Markets in Brazil, 1850-2002', Working Paper. 
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colonizers and the initial endowment in the colonies. 431 in other words, history has a 
close relationship with institutions today. 
History has a persistent effect on the structure of share ownership. As some 
scholars put it, once structures were set up long ago, they can last for a long time even 
if they would not be built today. Keeping them may be efficient in a basic economic 
sense because the cost of destruction and reconstruction may much more than the 
value of the new improved model. 432 Development and reform in a given country in 
the world must build on current economy, politics, law and culture etc., but the 
imprint of history will be left impressively on them. Economy is the foundation, 
interest group always try their best to support their vested interests through political 
policy, law, culture etc as tools. For example, the legal rules in favor of the structure 
of concentrated or dispersed corporate ownership affect corporate shareholders and 
stakeholders, and these players might be influential interest groups like majority 
shareholders or powerful managers. The power of controlling shareholders and of 
professional managers count on their strength, right or power that derives from the 
existing pattern of ownership structures. 433 Once the legal rules at earlier times are 
chosen or maintained, they will be connected with the existing structure of share 
ownership. Thus it is no surprise that the imprint of the history of the economy, 
politics, law and culture at earlier time has a persisting effect on the existing structure 
of share ownership. 
431 See Beck, Thorsten, Ash Dernirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, 2003, 'Law, Endowment, and Finance', Journal of 
Financial Economics 70-2, pp 137-81. 
432 Jeffery N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe, 2004, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, Cambridge 
Univcrsity Press, pII- 
433 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, 1999-2000, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance', 52 Stan. L. Rev. p 158. 
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Historically parliamentary power was weaker in France and Germany, and the 
government intervened in economic activity greatly, for example, at the time of 
Napoleon and Bismarck. 434 Thus the state had a great effect on the structure of share 
ownership through intervention in theses two countries and the structures of share 
ownership has been concentrated since then. The difference is that in the fonner 
control is by the state itself and in the latter control is by family-owners and banks. 
A state develops based on its history, or say, the development of a state has a close 
relationship with its history. A country's pattern of ownership structures at any point 
in time depends partly on the pattern it had earlier. Consequently, "when countries had 
different ownership structures at earlier points in time- because of their 
circumstances at the time, or even because of historical accidents- these differences 
might persist at later points in time even if their economies have otherwise become 
quite similar. , 435 It shows the history of countries has great effect on the structure of 
ownership. 
No matter how the structure of share ownership changes in a given country, its 
economy, politics, law and culture at earlier times have an effect on the current 
structure of share ownership, more or less. For example, the state accounts for more 
than 60% of share ownership in listed companies in China now, because China was 
always centrally planned-economy system, and more than 90% of assets were 
controlled by state-owned enterprises in tenns of economy. On the part of politics, the 
434 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de- Si lances, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, 2000, 'Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance', Journal of Financial Economics 58, p 12. 
435 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, 1999-2000, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance', 52 Stan. L. Rev. p 129 
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Communist Party reinforces the stability of society and the reform of the structure of 
share ownership should be possible in China under both the stability of society and 
the maturity of the market. On the part of law, the Company Law of 1993 specifies 
that assets invested in companies by the state belong to the state, the state is still the 
owner of assets invested in companies, which contradicts the right of the owner of the 
company itself to its assets. In culture the collective spirit is very important to every 
worker, which is in confonnity with concentrated share ownership in China. The 
argument shows that "a more complete explanation for the distribution of 
shareholdings must incorporate politics, law and efficiency, together with the 
serendipity of each country's initial conditions. , 436 
The case of China shows history has a close relationship with the structure of 
state concentrated share ownership. The principle is applied to the East Asian 
countries and other countries in the world where the structure of share ownership is 
controlled by the state in listed companies. 
In a word, history leaves a legacy that is passed from generation to generation 
and evolves as a particular society evolves. Initial conditions are one of the 
expressions of history, detennined by historical accident or policy design, which could 
set an economy down a particular path in a given country or region at particular time. 
Following the path, the existing institution will develop and the new institution will 
emerge. In the process of reciprocity, the old institutions and the new ones have to 
interact deeply in particular circumstances. Especially, new institutions are always 
436 See Ronald J. Gilson, 2005, 'Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Coniparativc Taxonorny', Working Paper No. 49/2005. 
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being affected by old ones (history) to a certain extent. 437 Therefore, the structure of 
share ownership is affected greatly by history in a given country or region. 
5.4. Economy and structure of share ownership 
Each system must create, evolve and prosper under peculiar economic 
circumstances 438 despite the tendency towards as integrated world economy. Political 
integration or globalization of the economy has not changed the existing structure of 
share ownership towards an efficient one in a country. The economy lays foundations 
for the development of the structure of share ownership. Why does a country have a 
certain structure of share ownership? Or say, why does a country have such model of 
corporate governance different from that of any other country in the world? Although 
they are affected by many elements such as history, culture, law, politics, and 
economy, the economy is principal determinant of them. The thesis will show the 
importance of the economy to the formation of the structure of share ownership 
through the following examples. 
5.4.1. In the United States 
In the United States, the structure of dispersed share ownership came into being due to 
its economic requirements: the growth of the public securities markets in the United 
437 See Ick Jin, TacHong Jin, and JeongHo Hahm, 2005, 'Path-dependency and Transition Strategy of Korean 
Financial System', The Journal of the Korean Economy, Vol. 6, No. I (Spring), p 6. 
438 See David Charny, 1998, 'The Gen-nan Corporate Governance System', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. No. 1: 145, p 146. 
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States in the I 9th century was propelled by the enormous funding requirements of its 
railroads and by the similar funding needs of the steel, auto, and telephone industries 
in the early 20th century. 439 For example, the railroads were the first private business 
enterprises in the United States to need large amounts of capital from outside its 
territory, 440 and the enormous financing requirements of railroads in the United States 
(one billion dollars up to 1867 and 10 billion dollars up to 1890) resulted in the 
development of public markets for corporate debt and later for stock, with 40% of the 
capital coming from Europe. 441 The financing requirements of the railroads caused 
the establishment of the financial infrastructure of the United States, which provided 
good conditions for financing other industries that appeared later. 442 
In the United States, from the traditional business as a single-unit business 
enterprise to a modem, multiunit enterprise, it is the natural outcome of American 
economic development. As the I 9th century was drawing to a close, family control of 
industrial enterprises was very popular in the United States and it was only very 
common to find examples of companies with the structure of concentrated 
shareholdings, but there were few well-developed managerial hierarchies. 443 
Chandler has argued that the key reasons for the success of larger business enterprises 
439 See John C. Coffee, 200 1, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control. ' Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, 435 Wesr 116th St. New York, 
NY 10027-720 1, Working Paper No. 182/200 1. 
440 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., 1977, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, ,p 90. "' See Raghurarn GRajan and Luigi Zingales, 2003, 'The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development 
in the 20th Century', 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5,. (citing Eegelbourg and Bushkoff(I 996) and Chandler(I 990)). 
442 See Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, 2003. 'The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development 
in the 20th Century', 69 J. Fin. Econ-5,. 
443 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 475. (citing Navin & Sears, 
1955, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, " 29 Bus. Hist. Rev. 105,106-12; Werner, 1981, 
- Corporation Law in Search of its Future, " 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1611,1636-40). 
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during the early 20th century were the utilization of economies of scale and scope in 
production, the growth of suitable conditions for high-volume distribution, and the 
building of sophisticated managerial hierarchies. 444 In other words, it was the 
development of the economy that led to the change of structure of ownership and to 
the creation of professional managers in American history. As a result of fierce 
competition, a wave of mergers happened in America during 1897-1903. According to 
figures compiled by economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux, "more than 1,800 firms 
disappeared and well over half of the resulting consolidations absorbed over 40 per 
,, 445 cent of their respective industries . The merger movement that 
happened between 
1897 and 1903 has been regarded as a crucial event in the formative era of American 
managerial capitalism in history. 446 The result of these mergers was creation of the 
existing structure of ownership, which thereby accelerated or invigorated a shift 
towards contemporary managerial arrangements. 447 So Chandler points out: "The 
merger movement was the most important single episode in the evolution of the 
modem industrial enterprise in the United States from the 1880s to the 1940s 
)ý 
, 
448 
'4' See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 482. (citing Alfred D. 
Chandler, 1990, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, pp 212-23 ) 
445 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 477. (Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 
1985, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904, p2-4 ). 
44, See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: ne United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 478. (citing Hans B. Thorelli, 
1954, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition p 306; Willian G. Roe, 1997, Socializing 
Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America ,p 
254 ; Alfred D. Chandler, 1990, Scale and 
Scope: The Dynarnics of Industrial Capitalism 79 ). 
447 See Brian R, Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Gennany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 478. (citing 
Chandler, 1990, 
Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 79 ; Bittlingmayer, 1996, "Antitrust and 
Business 
Activity: The First Quarter Century, " 70 Bus. Hist. Rev. pp363,367-68; H. A. Marquand, 1931, The Dynamics of 
Industrial Combination, pp 40-45). 
See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 2 oth Century', The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 51, p 483 (citing Alfred D. 
Chandler, 1990, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industnal Capitalism 79 ) 
187 
Chapter 5. How does the structure of share ownership come into being? 
which is the requirement of economic development. 
The emergence of a market for industrial securities in the United States in 
theI890s, which was the result of economic development, facilitated the merger 
movement. The fact that the more important 1897-1903 consolidations were typically 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or another stock market meant that 
the merger wave made sure that corporate equity was a more fungible asset class than 
had been the case before. 449 Thus economic development and fierce competition led 
to the acquisition of firms and also stimulated the prosperity of the stock market from 
which firms could get a huge capital, while the development of stock market 
promoted the wave of mergers. Then the proprietors received a package of common 
and preferred stock in the newly merged company instead of traditional payments in 
cash. 450 The founders had to sell off their holdings in order to pool enough capital to 
consolidate other enterprises in the case of mergers, and as a result the structure of 
concentrated shareholding was changed into the structure of dispersed shareholding, 
451 
and ownership separated from control . In other words, since the 
1890s, the 
structure of share ownership gradually changed in the direction of the dispersed 
shareholding owning to mergers and the development of capital markets resulting 
from the requirement for development of the economy 
Although the common law principles and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
449 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 479. (citing Willian G Roe, 
1997, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America, p 248 ). 
450 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 479. 
451 See Mark. J. Roe, 2004, 'The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate governance' Discussion Paper 
No. 493,09/2004. Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138. p2 
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governing cartel in restraint of trade are very important to the merger wave of 
1897-1903, in a sense without the Shennan Act and these judicial interpretations, "the 
cartels of small family firms owning and operating single-function enterprises might 
well have continued into the twentieth century in the United States as they did in 
Europe. , 452 Of course, on the other hand, in fact the legal environment was not 
desirable at that time. 
453 Legal regulation of corporate disclosure was scant 
454 before 
the enactment of the cornerstones of federal securities law, namely the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Moreover, from the 1880s onwards, 
"competition between states seeking to supply law under which businesses would 
want to incorporate served to erode various legal constraints ostensibly designed to 
constrain irresponsible corporate behavior. , 455 In particular, corporate law did 
nothing to help investors be "comfortable" about owning shares in companies during 
the merger wave. 456 From the perspective of the "law matters" thesis, dispersed 
ownership should not have arisen in the U. S. But it did! Because legal developments 
have attempted to go after rather than anticipate economic change 457 and law refon-n 
has been primarily responsive to economic change rather than initiating or guarding 
it. 
458 
452 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., 1977, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, p375. 
453 See Cheffins, 2003, 'Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public 
Companies', 23 Oxf. J. Legal Study. 1, pp 8-10. 
454 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p489 (citing Bank, 2003, 'Is 
Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence From History', unpublished working papers, 
7-11). 
455 See Cheffins, 2003, 'Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public 
Companies', 23 Oxf. J. Legal Study. 1, p 9. 
456 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn ofthe 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 491. 
457 See Stuart Banner, 1997, 'What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence', 75 Wash. UL. Q 
pp 845- 850. 
458 See Katharina Pistor, 2000, 'Pattems of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition 
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In a word, the merger wave of 1897 to 1903 helped to prompt a transition to 
contemporary corporate ownership patterns under aid of law, or say, consolidation 
activity paved the way for further unwinding of the holdings of core shareholders and 
at last the structure of share ownership gradually became dispersed in the United 
States, which was a hallmark of the American version of capitalism. But the economic 
development and requirements played a pivotal role in this process. Of course, "the 
nature of separation and its degree got an extra push from American populist politics, 
which kept American financial institutions- banks and insurers at the turn of 20th 
century- small, weak, and generally unable to own stock. "459 But the function of 
politics is limited. As Chandler says, "The rise of modem business enterprise in 
American industry between 1880s and World War I was little affected by public policy, 
capital markets or entrepreneurial talents because it was part of a more fundamental 
economic development". 460 In short, since then, the structure of dispersed share 
ownership has remained till today in America mainly and ultimately due to the 
influence of the economy. 
5.4.2. In Germany 
In Gen-nany, the structure of concentrated share ownership results from the 
requirements of the economic development and its history. As the I gth century drew to 
Econornies', EBRD Working Paper No. 49/ 2000. 
'59 See Mark. J. Roe, 2004, 'The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate governance' Discussion Paper 
No. 493,09/2004. Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, p 2. 
460 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., 1977, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, ,p 
376 
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a close, manufacturers in both the U. S. and Germany were confronting competitive 
461 
pressures that would have lessened the private benefits . Railroad industries in 
Germany required enormous capital as in America, but the two principal German 
stock markets traded debt securities and commodities almost exclusively, namely the 
Frankfurt exchange which was founded in 1585 and the Berlin exchange which was 
established in 1685 462 before the founding of the New York stock exchange and the 
London stock exchange. These companies in Germany had to expand their market by 
borrowing money from banks. According to Alfred Chandler, it was the ability of its 
entrepreneurs and managers to adopted new technologies readily and build the 
organizational structures necessary to exploit the effectively opportunities created by 
changing market dynamics that ultimately led to make Germany's economic 
success. 463 The economic development created the opportunities for entrepreneurs 
and managers, while the success of the economy was contributed by entrepreneurs 
and managers in Germany. When the I 9th century was drawing to a close, German 
industrialists were confronting intense competitive pressures and were eager to 
maintain stability of conditions by limiting competition. 464 Although corporate 
acquisitions certainly did take place in Germany as they did in America during the late 
461 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 502. 
462 See John C. Coffee, 2001, 'The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control. ' Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, 435 Wesr 116 th St. New York, 
NYI0027-7201, Working Paper No. 182/2001. (citing German Capital Market Law (U. Siebel, M. Pnnz zu 
Lowenstain, and R. Finneyeds. ) (1995), p 3. ). 
463 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 492. (citing Alfred D. 
Chandler, 1990, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism at 428,595-96 ) 
464 See Brian R. Cheff ins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Gen-nany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 l, p493 (citing J. Riesser, 
191 1,71-he 
Great German Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with the Economic Development of Germany 
pp 168-69). 
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I gth century and early 2 Oth century, collusive activity was widespread and served to 
promote de facto the structure of concentrated shareholding within the industrial 
economy as the preferred strategy. Autonomous and independent firrns in the cartel 
would submit themselves to limitations regarding production, pricing and 
marketing. 465 Valid cartel arrangements and other alliances between competitors not 
only protected the vested interests of participating finns but also softened and 
stabilized the industrialization process. 466 As a result, control by founders and their 
offspring correspondingly stayed strong throughout the period up to World War 1,467 
and the structure of concentrated share ownership continues as the nonn till today Of 
course, the structure of concentrated share ownership in Germany has a connection 
with history, namely because "industrialists tended to have deeply-rooted historical 
ties to the firms providing their income and believed that having a family business 
provided the basis for their social status. " 468 In other words, the structure of 
concentrated ownership in Germany has a long history but it had become more 
465 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 493 (citing Robert Liefinann, 
1932, 'Cartels, Concerns and Trusts' pp 10- 11,60-62,278-79 ; Tilly, 1982, 'Mergers, External Growth, and Finance 
in the Development of Large Scale Enterprise in Germany, 1880-1913'42 J. Econ. Hist. 629,640-41 ). 
466 See Brian R. Cheffins, , 2003, 'Mergers and 
Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 I, p 494 ( citing Alfred D. Chandler, 
1977, 'The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, pp 316-17; McCraw, 
198l, 'Rethinking the Trust Question, ' in Thomas K. McCraw(ed), Regulation in Perspective 1,17-18 ; Jackson, 
2001, 'The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan, ' in Wolfgang Streek and Kozo 
Yamamura (eds. ), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison 121,134 ). 
467 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 494. (citing Alfred D. 
Chandler, 1977, 'The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, pp 495,500-1(); Jackson, 
2001, 'The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan, ' in Wolfgang Streek and Kozo 
Yamainura (eds. ), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Gen-nany and Japan in Comparison 132 ; Church, 1993 , 
'The Family Firrn in industrial Capitalism: International Perspectives on Hypotheses and History, 35(4) Bus. Hist. 
17,29). 
468 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Gen-nany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, at494. (citing Alfred D. Chandler, 
1977, 'The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business at 501; Chandler &Daems, 1979, 
'Administrativc Coordination, Allocation and Monitoring: Concepts and Comparisons, ' in Horn & Kocka(eds. ), 
La\ý, and the Forination of the Big Enterprises in the I 9th and Early 20'h Centuries at28,48; Martin J. Sklar, 1988, 
The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics 165). 
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concentrated by the end of the I 9th century through cartel arrangements due to the 
requirement of economic development. 
Banks played a great role in the process of the structure of concentrated share 
ownership. In the years before World War 1, Gennany's largest deposit-taking banks 
were powerful financiers that were in control of the country's corporate economy. 469 
Banks, it was said, were well-situated to sway matters in their favor in companies 
through their influential representation on the supervisory component of the two-tier 
boards which larger German companies used and through proxy votes at shareholder 
meetings. 470 The banks played a great role in promoting cartelization in German 
history. 471 
A striking feature of the legal milieu within which German companies operated 
at the turn of the 20th century was the degree of protection provided to shareholders. 
The investor protection reforms Germany enacted in 1884 (Corporate Law) and the 
Stock Exchange Law of 1896 were of the character that would be anticipated where 
regulators were seeking to strengthen securities markets by constraining misconduct 
by corporate insiders. However, the structure of concentrated ownership by family in 
companies preponderated in the German corporate economy throughout the period 
leading up to World War 1.472 In other words, the structure of dispersed share 
... See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 2 01h Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 497. 
470 See Brian R. Cheffins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 51, p 497 (citingW. F. Bruck, 1938, 
Social and Econornic History of Germany from William Il to Hitler 1888-1938: A Comparative Study pp 80-82; 
Chandler, 1984 'The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism, ' 58 Bus. Hist Rev. 473,499-500; Pohl, 1982 'On the 
History of Organization and Management in Large Gen-nan Enterprises Since the Nineteenth Century' in Wolfram 
Engels & Hans Pohl(eds. ), Gen-nan Yearbook on Business History 9 1,110-11 ). 
471 See Brian R. Cheff ins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 20th Century', The Arneri can Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, p 497. 
472 See Brian R. Cheff ins, 2003, 'Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at 
the Turn of the 2 oth Century', The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 1, pp499-500. 
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ownership never occurs in Germany, which is in contradiction with the "law matters" 
thesis, even if the legal environment in Germany was much better than that of 
America at that time. It shows that the law is very important but it can not displace the 
importance of the economy Today the gradual change in the law from bank-based to 
market-oriented finance and the necessity to implement EC regulation has taken place 
fundamentally since the 1990s. For example, the Stock Exchange Act of 1896 was 
completely revised as part of the so-called "Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act in 
2002; the enactment of the Securities Trading Act of 1994; Act on Improved Investor 
Protection of October 29,2004; The New Takeover Law of 2002 etc. 473 But corporate 
governance is still as before 474 because the structure of concentrated share ownership 
is still as before. The structure of concentrated share ownership changes little. 
5.4.3. In South Korean 
Today South Korea has been a member of the OECD since 1996, having been a poor, 
agricultural economy in the past. Indeed, it seems there is no more striking example of 
how government policies can affect the economic development than the contrast 
between South Korea and North Korea. Prior to the Korean War, the two countries 
were obviously parts of one, so it is difficult to think of them as having different 
histories. They have the same background, such as tradition, culture, history, language. 
4"3 See Harald Baum, 2005, 'Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience', Law 
Working Paper No. 28/2005, March 2005, www. ecgi. org/wp. 
474 See Andreas Hackethal, Reinhard H. Schmidt and Marcel Tyrell, 2005, 'Banks and German Corporate 
Governance: On The Way To a Capital Market-Based SystemT, Corporate Governance, Vo. 13, No. 3, (May), pp 
397-409. 
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They were exceptionally poor in 1950. They were separated from each other after the 
war. In 1980, South Korea grew rapidly, reaching per capita income level of US$1589 
475 
while North Korea only reached the level of income of US$768 . But the thesis 
argues the real distinction between South Korea and North Korea is to select different 
model of economic development. The former selected the market economy, the latter 
the planned economy. The choice of economic system is a matter of politics, but 
politics itself is not a panacea, why did crisis happen in South Korean in 1997-1998? 
Why did policy by politicians achieve nothing before the crisis? Why did the 
International Monetary Fund reach agreement with Korea on a$ 57 billion 
stabilization package that included conditions on financial, corporate, labor 
investment and other trade-related structural reformS476 instead of political reforms? 
In fact the crisis directly came from the chaebols, where controlling shareholders 
borrowed excessively from banks. Maybe there are other reasons for the crisis that are 
beyond my thesis. Neither politics nor law could solve the crisis, but they were 
helpful for South Korea to get rid of the crisis. For example, many reforms have been 
proposed and enacted into law in South Korea since the crisiS. 
477 However, these 
proposals are put forward and laws are passed to help the rehabilitation of the 
economy in a sense. 
As described above in Chapter 3, the chaebols are enormous and one of their 
most striking features is that most of their shares are dominated by the founder and his 
475 See Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de- Si lanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2004, 'Do 
Institutions Cause GrowthT, Working Paper, (June). 
476 See Craig Ehrlich and Dae-Seob Kang , 
2000, 'U. S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea's Largest 
Companies', UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. Vol 18: 1, p 28. 
4" See Craig Ehrlich and Dae-Seob Kang , 
2000, 'U. S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea's Largest 
Companies', UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. Vol 18: 1, p2 
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family. 478 Or say the ownership of Korean conglomerates is concentrated in the hands 
of family members and the operation of chaebol firms is influenced heavily by the 
founder and his family. 479 Although the structure of concentrated share ownership in 
South Korea has been influenced by many elements, for example, by Confucianism, 
by Japanese keistu and by politics, the real and key reason is the outcome of the 
economy itself Namely, South Korea is a small region politically and economically 
compared with many mainly developed countries after the Korea War, in addition to 
late development of the economy due to war, South Korea must organize companies 
like chaebol and win a global market facing intense competition in the world. The 
facts prove that some companies in South Korea are successful in the world. In the 
past twenty years, South Korea has made a dent in the international competition in a 
way that is intimately related to the indigenous patterns of social organization and 
corporate governance underpinning the rise of large, capital -intensive and diversified 
chaebol. Thus, the Koreans export mass-produced automobiles, consumer electronics, 
chemicals and steel. 480 In sum, the conglomerates with many subsidiaries in the hands 
of family could not have developed fast without requirements and growth of the 
economy in South Korea, although the conglomerates have received aid from the 
government in the course of their development, such as loans at a lower rate of 
interest from banks and preferential treatment of tax. 
As some scholars from South Korea point out, a series of economic factors have 
478 See Republic of Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy, Progress in Korea's Corporate Reforrn: 
Q& As 
(Sept. 1999) 
479 See Ungki Lirn and Chang-Soo Kim, 2005, 'Determinants of Ownership Structure: An Empirical Study of the 
Korean Conglomerates-, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 13, pp 1-28. 
480 See Mauro Guillen, 1999, 'Corporate Governance and Globalization: Arguments and Evidence Against 
Convergence', Working Paper, (September). 
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encouraged Korean conglomerates to establish a highly agency problematic 
ownership structure (conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders in the structure of family concentrated share ownership) - the choice of 
a certain type of ownership pattern by entrepreneurs could be regarded as the rational 
response to the surrounding business conditions. 481 Therefore the structure of 
family-concentrated share ownership in companies like chaebol in South Korea is 
both the requirement of the economic development and the outcome of a competitive 
market. 
5.4.4. In China 
The economic refon-n in China is greatly affected by politics indeed. However, the 
economic conditions meant that there was no choice but to carry out the reform which 
the economy per se also required internally, otherwise the economy system would 
collapse. In order to carry out the state-owned enterprises (hereinafter "SOEs") refonn 
due to capital shortage, the Shanghai Stock Exchange officially opened for business in 
December 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange officially began trading in 
February 1991 to raise funds through the stock market to maintain long-term 
sustainable growth in the economy. Maintaining economic growth is an essential task 
for the Chinese government. An important component of maintaining economic 
growth in China is to improve the performance of SOEs to make them adaptable to 
481 See Ungki Lim and Chang-Soo Kim, 2005, 'Deten-ninants of Ownership Structure: An Empirical Study of the 
Korean Conglomerates', Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 13, pp 24-25. 
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the market. 
Nearly all of the listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
remained majority-owned by the state at the early stage. Furthennore, the shares 
owned by the state cannot be traded on the market. "One shareholder dominates the 
board of directors"(yi gu du da) , in many of the Chinese listed firms, insider control 
takes the form of overlap between the management and board of the listed firm and 
the finn's largest shareholder. In these cases, the board is able to ignore the interests 
of small shareholders. 
In order to reduce the state shareholding in listed companies through market 
pricing, the "Provisional Measures on Management over the Reduction of State 
Shares to Raise the Social-Security Fund" was passed by the State Council on June 12, 
2001. But investors reacted negatively to the plan and stock price fall sharply; the plan 
to sell off state shares was in fact suspended in October 2001. In June 2002, the 
govenunent gave up and announced that the plan would be abandoned. The State 
Council had to formally cancel the provisional regulation requiring the sell-off of state 
shares. In this case, why did the policy fail? Neither politics nor law can explain this, 
only the economy per se. Because a high selling price for the state shares broke the 
rule of the market. The current market price for tradable shares was contingent on the 
fact that the large block of state shares was excluded from trading. 
The structure of ownership in listed companies in China is concentrated and the 
state-owned shares account for more than 60% of all listed companies. How was the 
concentrated state ownership shaped? Relatively speaking, weak legal protection, 
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historically upholding the public ownership situation, cultural influence and political 
goals may offer a partial explanation of concentrated ownership in China. However, 
the key reason is that the market is unperfected and the economic conditions are too 
weak to take the risk, which is completely different from western countries because 
the market economy in western countries has a long history of practical experience 
while the market economy is at infant stage in China. Thus the design of concentrated 
ownership in listed companies met both the requirement of the market at that time and 
stability of society 
5.5. Conclusion 
The above analyzes the effect of the economy, politics, law, culture and history on the 
structure of share ownership. The thesis argues that the formation of the structure of 
share ownership is a long process. Once it is stable, it is not easily changed forcefully 
by law or policy, through politicians who may affect the structure of share ownership 
instead of determining it. Because the right to a share is a vested right that is 
controlled by shareholders according to their requirements, the market and the state of 
development of the economy So the thesis draws the conclusion: the structure of 
share ownership is affected by many elements, such as the economy, law, politics, 
history, and culture, but it is ultimately and mainly determined by economy. 
What is the relationship between the economy, politics, law, culture and history? 
hi theory, simply speaking, this thesis argues whether the economy develops, prospers, 
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retreats or deteriorates etc. in a given country or region, there will always be a conflict 
of interest between different groups of people, to a certain varying extent, who 
represent different political sectors or cliques in a society at any time. How to deal 
with the problem depends on the strength, power, or effect of political sectors or 
cliques. Compromise will be reached between the different political sectors or cliques 
through struggle, negotiation or other means. Law which binds all the people in the 
country is one of the outcomes of compromise between the different political sectors 
or cliques. While culture and history always leave a deep imprint which accompanies 
economy, politics and law all the time in a country. That is, economy, politics and law 
have a close relationship with their culture and history in a country. In practice, the 
relationship between the economy, politics, law, culture and history is much more 
complex. Economy, politics, law, culture and history per se will be affected by many 
elements in a society, but the economic conditions lays the foundation for politics, law, 
culture etc. in a country, while politics, law and culture etc may have a strong effect 
on the economy for better or worse. For example, politics may push for or retard the 
development of the economy, but can not determine the development of the economy 
because the development of the economy has its own rules of the game. Change in the 
economy, politics and law will create a new culture and history that will affect the 
later economy, politics and law in a country. As some scholars make the point, "The 
results hold strategic messages for policymaker. While a country cannot change Its 
legal origin, it can- albeit with considerable effort- reform its judicial system by 
emphasizing the rights of outside investors, by making contract enforcement more 
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efficient and certain, and by creating a legal system that more effectively evolves to 
support changing economic conditions. " 482 It sheds light on the relationship between 
economy, politics, law, history and culture in a sense. That is, politicians can not 
change the existing history, tradition, culture and legal origin, but based on the 
existing position, politicians can reform the existing culture and create as effective 
law to serve economic development. 
In a word, the fonnation of the structure of share ownership in a given country or 
region is deeply affected by its economy, politics, law, culture, history etc. But it is 
determined by the economy ultimately. Once it is fon-ned, the structure of share 
ownership is not easy to change because the owner of share will detennine the fate of 
share in accordance with his requirement, market and economic development but 
politics, law, culture and history etc have an effect on it to the degree all the time. 
4S 2 See Thorstern Beck, Ash Dei-nirgUc-Kunt, and Ross Levine, 2001, 'Law, Politics, and Finance', Working Paper. 
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The results of the first part of this thesis present a different picture about corporate 
governance in the world. That is, the model of corporate governance is determined by 
the structure of share ownership in place of the suggestion of Berle and Means. 
Secondly, the thesis casts doubt on the "law matters" theory of La Porta et al. and the 
"politics matters" theory of Mark J. Roe and emphasizes the importance of the 
economy ultimately. Thirdly, the thesis infers there is no best corporate governance in 
the world from the above analysis based on the different economy, politics, law, 
history, and culture etc. It is impossible to have the one-size-fits all view of corporate 
governance in the multiple world but some of the advanced contents of corporate 
governance could be transplanted to some countries or regions in the world according 
to their adaptability. 
As we know, competition exists anywhere as the rule of nature. Competition is 
not just between animals, plants on our planet, between products, services, personnel 
etc, in the market in the world, but also between governance systems or other 
institutions across countries. But some scholars think the force of competition would 
lead national systems to adopt a single efficient form, namely the convergence of 
corporate governance. They further argued that the form on which systems would 
converge differed according to which national system appeared most successful at the 
time of the prediction. For example, before the bursting of the Japanese "bubble 
economy ý1, the main bank system was regarded as representing the model in the 
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future. 483 That is to say, Japanese and German corporate governance looked good as 
models in the world in the 1980s when Japan and Germany were growing faster than 
the U. S. However, a significant decline in activity spread across the economy in Japan 
and German for a long time, namely more than a decade of economic recession in 
Japan, a decade of costly po st-unifi cation economic adjustments in Germany, and 
since the 1990s an unprecedented economic and stock market boom in the U. S., the 
American corporate governance model has been considered as the model to follow in 
the world. But how to explain the phenomenon such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and 
Adelphia in the American corporate governance? "Had we been selecting at the end of 
the 1980s when the Japanese or German system was at its peak, then choice would 
have been very different from what we would have selected at the end of the 1990s, 
the winner (the Japanese or Germany system) at the end of the first decade of this 
century is likely to be different from what it appears to be today. , 484 The above cases 
show that there is no best model of corporate governance in the world. Because 
environment (economy, politics, law, and culture etc. ) differs between countries, 
between industries within countries, and between countries at different stages of 
economic development. But some advanced experience could be learned from in 
corporate governance if it adapts to a given country or region. 
As we know the institutions of all national systems are shaped not only by 
efficiency, but also by culture, history, tradition, politics etc. As Easterbrook pointed 
481 Ronald J. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function', Columbia Law 
School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 174, p 4. 
484 See Colin Mayer, Oren Sussman, 2001, 'The Assessment: Finance, Law, and Growth', Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 17, Iss. 4, Winter, pp 466. 
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out, no global standards of corporate governance are required in our world because 
differences in markets more than differences in law or in politics lead to international 
differences in corporate governance. 
485 
Ironically this part will end by the following words. As La Porta et al. point out, 
"This reasoning makes us skeptical about the imminence of convergence of corporate 
ownership patterns, and of governance systems more generally, to the Berle and 
Means model. , 
486 That is, there is no uniform model of corporate governance or 
structure of ownership in the world, though it is possible to learn from the experience 
of other systems. Lastly, the thesis argues that there is no best model of corporate 
governance in the world, there is only corporate governance which is adapted to the 
particular country or region because of particular structure of share ownership, 
whether diff-use or concentrated, that maximizes shareholders' expected returns that 
487 
originate from the interplay of market forces . In a word, markets will ultimately 
diminish the power of the state. The structure of ownership only changes towards its 
adaptability to the development of the economy, and so corporate governance will be 
improved in a market economy. Of course, the rationality of the structure of 
ownership and the improvement of corporate governance will have a strong 
relationship with politics, law, history and culture etc. 
485 See Frank H. Easterbrook, 1997, 'International Corporate Differences: Market or Law? Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance9, pp 23-29. 
486 Rafael La Porta. et. al, 1999, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World', the Journal of Finance. Vol. LV, No. 2, 
(April), p 513. 
487 See Harod Demsetz, and Bel6n Villalonga, 2001, 'Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance', Joumal of 
Corporate Finance 7, p, 212 
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Practice: the structure of state- concentrated share ownership 
determines the majority shareholder (state) & minority 
shareholder (public) model of corporate governance in China 
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The reform of the economy in China is actually the step by step process of 
privatization 488 with Chinese character, which is quite different from any other reform 
in the world because the history, culture, politics, law, economy etc. of China are 
different from those of any other country in the world. In particular, Chinese reforrn 
emphasized piecemeal incremental change. Today China is still simultaneously 
growing and transforming from a command to a market system. She is at the initial 
stage of a market economy. The process of reform in China began earlier than in 
Eastern Europe, but the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector has retained an insoluble 
problem for a long time, 489 in particular and mainly concerning large state-owned 
enterprises or companies: the result of the refon-n of large state-owned companies and 
490 
enterprises is not as good as expected due to the structure of ownership . In 
fact, in 
many ways it is difficult to compare the cases of SOE reform in China with those in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, not only because of the very different approach 
but also because of the very different historical, political, legal, economic and cultural 
488 In China, before the sell-off of small and medium state-owned enterprises, in fact the privatization of SOE had 
begun. In infon-nal privatization, property rights over public assets are conferred and regulated by social norms. As 
in squatter's rights, the community recognizes the property rights of individuals based upon customary use and de 
facto possession by managers. A common institutional means to privatize public assets through lease arrangernents 
that give long-term rights over econornic surplus to the lease-holder. Although the lease agreement does not entitle 
the lease-holder to fon-nal property rights, in effect this is viewed in the community as equivalent to private rights 
over property. The extensiveness of infon-nal privatization demonstrates the utility of the new institutionalist 
paradigm because infon-nal privatization results from the social appropriation of rights over communal assets. See 
Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthews, 1996, 'Market Transition and Social Transformation in Reforming State 
Socialism', Annual Review of Sociology, V61.22, p 416. 
4S9 As a matter of fact, si-riall and rnedium state-owned enterprises have been privatized in China, here it refers to 
large enterprises. 
490 In this part, 'ownership' rneans share ownership when it Is in relation to companies or SOEs, otherwise it 
rneans propcrty 
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What has accounted for the remarkable rate of economic growth sustained over 
the last 20 years in China, is the spontaneous entrepreneurial effort of the collectively 
owned Township and Village Enterprises, 492 which is the result of privatization. 
However, the success of further economic reform will rely on how to deal with the 
Chinese people's stake in the future of their country. 493 It means the key problem that 
the reform will challenge in the future is the large state-owned or controlling 
enterprises or companies owned by the state. 
As we know, unlike Russian and other East European countries that took a 
shock-therapy approach to economic transition, from 1978 onward China has adopted 
a gradual trial-and-error approach to the transition of its planned economy into a 
market-oriented one, starting with the agricultural sector under the household 
responsibility system, which represented the beginning of the process of privatization 
in China under the refonn and opening-up Policy. 
494 After its success with refonning 
the agricultural sector in the early 1980s, China began to restructure its state-owned 
industrial enterprises into joint-stock corporations, which is a way of privatization in 
part too. But the corporate governance of large state-owned enterprises or companies 
is not of high quality. What reasons are there to cause such poor quality of corporate 
governance in China? Most scholars think it is a political reason that results in such 
491 See Buck, T, Filatotchev, I., Nolan, P., & Wright, M. 2000, 'Different Paths to Economic Reform in Russia and 
China: Their Causes and Consequences for Industry', Working Paper University of Nottingham 
492 Today the collectively owned Township and Village Enterprises are shared by employees and local groups, or 
local government, which is quite different from before, that is, they have privatized. 
491 See Thomas Clarke and Du Yuxing, 1998, 'Corporate Governance in China: Explosive Growth and New 
Patterns of Ownership', Long Range Planning, Vol. 3 1, No. 2, pp 239-25 1. 
494 Although the ownership of land belongs to the state or the collective according to law, as a matter of fact 
almost everything in community was divided among peasants in the rural area in China, including usage right of 
land, tools etc 
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This thesis argues that the success of economic reform in China is actually in a 
sense the success of gradual privatization. However, the reform of large state-owned 
enterprises or companies is slow and inefficient due to the special history, culture, 
politics, law and economy etc which affect the structure of ownership of state-owned 
enterprises or companies. It is the structure of ownership that leads to undesirable 
corporate governance in China. In other words, the structure of state-owned 
concentrated ownership detennines the poor quality of corporate governance of listed 
companies in China. Therefore the development of the economy and the improvement 
of the ownership structure will enhance the quality of corporate governance of listed 
companies in China. Today the reform of the structure of share ownership in listed 
companies in China is under way and the corporate governance of listed companies 
will be improved soon, or at least it will be better than before if the reduction of the 
state share in large companies is successful. 
"5 There are many papers or articles in economics in relation to the reform of China arguing politics or politician 
determine the reforrn of SOEs. e. g. Lisin Colin Xu, Tian Zhu, Yi-mm Li, 200, 'Politician Control, Agency Problems, 
and Finn Perfon-nance: Evidence from a National Survey of Ownership Restructuring in China', Working Paper, 
(December); Qlao Liu, 2005, 'Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and 
Institutional Deten-ninants', ( May), Working Paper. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The origin and development of an institution in a certain country has a close 
relationship with its history which I discussed in Chapter five. History is a mirror for 
today and the future. Therefore, the structure of concentrated ownership of SOEs in 
China will not be changed in a day as Rome was not built in a day. The structure of 
concentrated ownership is the natural and necessary result of history in China. 
6.2. Ancient times 
From ancient China onward, the emperor was supreme authority over the people, and 
the emperor managed and controlled the country on behalf of God or Heaven, and the 
country belonged to the emperor. Thus it was accepted conventionally that the 
emperor was the owner of every-thing 496 and a centralized mechanism of control was 
non-nal in China. The historical tradition has had a great effect on the people in China. 
It is not surprising for Chinese people that the structure of concentrated ownership in 
companies appears nowadays, since this is similar to that in family-held business 
since ancient times in China. Workshops as a unit based on the family were 
496 See 'Shi Jing Xia Ya Bei Shan'compiled by Confucian. But Shi Jing Anthology was edited by Yu Guan Yin 
and published by People's Literature Publishing House in 1965. 
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widespread in the Ming and Qing Periods (from 16 century through 19 century) and 
were quite different from the factories or capitalist institutions of the West. The 
concept and structure of a company as an impersonal and distinct legal and corporate 
entity for locating ownership rights and responsibility did not exist in traditional 
China until the late Qing dynasty period. That is, company incorporation was 
introduced into China by the Company Law of 1904 until the 1949 or later. However, 
family-held businesses had existed before companies were introduced into China and 
concentrated ownership 497 was the characteristic of society in China since ancient 
times. First of all, ownership of almost everything belonged to the emperor in a slave 
society. With the development and progress of society in a feudal society, most 
property was under the control of the rich. With regard to family-held businesses, the 
father was the owner of the property on behalf of the family. In other words, the 
family was basic unit of production in the society in China and most property of the 
family was controlled by the father before 1904, and this tradition was passed down 
even until 1949. In a word, concentrated ownership was traditional and conventional 
in Chinese society before 1949. 
6.3. Current times 
6.3.1. Introduction 
497 Here 'ownership' in the paragraph ineans property, which is different from 'ownership' in the other places of 
the second part. 
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In a gradual process, since 1949 SOES were taken into absolute state ownership and 
became mainly a tool of economic and political development in a centrally planned 
economy. Eventually the SOEs become no more than a branch of government without 
independence. However, under the Chinese opening up and reform policy, the 
systematic ownership reform of SOEs has become the dominant theme, because 
economists and theorists have a belief that transformed-SOEs can be protected from 
government interference in their daily operation. By the refonn of SOEs, they can be 
independent entities in law, their property right can be clarified, they can be helped to 
raise new capital from the public, they can operate the business at their discretion and 
the management can take more responsibility for the consequences of its decisions. 498 
In fact, this thesis argues that economic reform in China is, in a sense, the reform of 
the structure of ownership of SOEs. That is, the process of refonn is gradually 
underway from the wholly state-owned structure to partly state-owned structure. 
6.3.2. Before the reform of economy 
When the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, business 
corporations and enterprises that were left by former government and businessmen 
were gradually reformed and became state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Historically, the 
government played a key role in governance. In the period of the planned economy, 
civil society was almost replaced by the political state, and SOEs and government 
498 See Daqing Qi, Woody Wu, Hua Zhang, 2000, 'Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance of Partially 
Privatized Finns: Evidence From Listed Chinese Companies" Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 8, p 588. 
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agencies were commingled to a great extent. Moreover, SOEs were generally 
regarded as govenunent branches and SOEs did not have their own legal 
independence. Chinese SOEs were established to serve two major objectives: as the 
principal microeconomic foundation and instrument of central planning, and as the 
concrete manifestation of the socialist principle of ownership of the means of 
production by the whole people. SOEs were not complete business enterprises. State 
ownership deprived them of legal independence, and the state planning apparatus 
deprived them of economic independence. In other words, SOEs were only a tool of 
government instead of being independent enterprises. Indeed, ternis like corporation, 
independent entity or legal person did not exist in China during the period of the 
planned economy. Most SOEs were referred to as factories, where there were small 
and independent societies with their schools, hospitals, kindergartens, shops and other 
service providers, but with regard to operation, they had no rights in purchasing, 
marketing, distribution, or strategic planning functions, and the factories were treated 
as government branches and were administered geographically. SOE managers were 
appointed, shifted and dismissed by government agencies and paid as government 
official S. 
499 
In China, SOEs are firms legally owned by the state and administered either by 
various industrial ministries of the central government or by local (provincial or 
municipal) governments. Before the enterprise was refon-ned in the early 1980s, all 
production and distribution decisions were centrally planned and SOEs were merely 
499 See, Nolan, P. 1996, 'Large Firms and Industrial Reforin in Former Planner Economies: The Case of China', 
Cambridge Journal of Economic, 20,1, pp 1-29. 
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operated as cost centers. In the absence of market competition, the operation of most 
SOEs was inefficient. Such poor perforinance by SOEs was frequently attributed to 
their ownership structure in which the state was only owner. In other words, the 
problems faced by SOEs often resulted from their history as "pure" state enterprises 
within a centrally planned economy. As a result, their social obligations to their 
workers and families imposed a heavy burden on many enterprises. The output of 
SOEs moved towards being production-driven rather than market-focused, and often 
lacked adequate product quality. Additionally, the soft budget constraints, too many 
employees, the inflexible wage and life employment system, the heavy burden of a 
firm-based social benefits system, the use of out-dated technology, and the lack of 
quality controls, no one taking responsibility for production, all contributed to the 
planning system rather than the requirement of market. 500 In a word, it seemed 
everything in the SOEs was decided by the goverment. 
The shortcomings of SOEs at that time were as follows: (1) there was no 
incentives for employees in an SOE under the principle of egalitarianism, let alone 
innovation; (2) it was very difficult for SOEs to operate purely as an economic unit 
seeking to maximize its economic efficiency objective because the cradle-to grave 
social services for workers were provided by the SOEs; (3) because SOEs had to 
answer to a multiplicity of superior authorities under the planning system, such as 
local government, banks, material supply bureaus, investment planners, it meant 
SOEs were "controlled by many and by none"; (4) as in the Soviet-type economies, 
500 See Martin Hovey, Larrv Li and Tony Naughton, 2003, 'The Relationship Between Valuation and Ownership 
of Listed Finns in China', Corporate Governance, Volume 11, Number2, (April), pp 112-113. 
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SOEs in China were instruments of political and social control, in other words, the 
system of enterprise governance in China was a duplicate of the system of political 
governance, in particular during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) when "politics was 
in command", and the objectives of SOEs were clearly subordinated to politics. 
6.3.3. Reform times 
China's SOE refonn began in the late 1970s, shortly after the Maoist leadership fell 
from power, which was an unprecedented event described by the senior leader Deng 
Xiaoping as "crossing a river by groping for stepping stones". The following is the 
evolution of reform objectives. 
"(1) Pre-1970. A planned economy under the law of exchange value. (2) 
1970 to October 1984. A planned economy supplemented by market 
regulations. (3) October 1984 to October 1987. A planned commodity 
economy. (4) October 1987 to June 1989. An economy where the state 
regulates the market and the market regulates the enterprises. (5) June 
1989 to 1991. An economy with organic integration of the planned 
economy and market regulations. (6) 1992 to present. A socialist market 
,, 501 economy with Chinese characteristics. 
Based on the above process of reform of SOEs in China, the SOEs governance 
models could be classified as follows. 
(1) Traditional model (1950s-1984). That is to say, first of all, the time from 1950 
to 1984, was mainly the traditional planned economy period, during which state 
ownership was the only legal forrn of ownership besides collective ownership. Under 
501 See Wing Thye Woo, 1999, 'The Real Reason for China Growth", The China Journal, No. 41 (Jan., ), p 123. 
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this model, the State had ownership of the property of the SOEs and enjoyed 
managerial power. The SOE's executives were required to fulfill the production plans 
of the government according to plans and arrangement rather than enhance profits for 
the benefit for investors. Thus SOEs were not real business enterprises acting as profit 
maximizers, but government affiliates responsible for producing goods and rendering 
services. The input and output of SOEs were determined by the State according to the 
central planning instead of the market. The State decided what to produce and how to 
appropriate financial resources, set prices, distribute profits, and assume losses as 
planned. 502 Accordingly, the governance structure of SOEs was an integral part of the 
general govenu-nental framework, SOE's executives were appointed and dismissed by 
government agencies and enjoyed the same political and economic treatment as 
govenunent officials. The people who worked in the SOEs gained an "iron rice 
bowel" which could be kept for life. In a word, SOEs under the model were not really 
independent economic and legal entities but government branches. The State 
exercised public ownership and enjoyed control rights over SOEs, and managers had 
little discretion or incentives as to how a firm could be operated. 
(2) Transitional Model (1984-1993). The aim of the model was to loosen the 
state's direct control and enlarge SOE's autonomy to an extent. That was, the reform 
was concentrated on "separation between state ownership and SOEs managerial 
rights". To accomplish the reform objectives, SOEs reform began with the 
Management Responsibility Contract System (MRCS), in which the government 
502 See Deboran Kay Johns, 1995, 'Reforming the State- Enterprise Property Relationship in the People's Republic 
of China: the Corporatization of State-owned Enterprises', 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 911, p 912. 
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transferred management authority to the enterprises and allowed them to keep some of 
their profit. And then, the State-owned industrial Enterprises Law of China was 
adopted in 1988. Pursuant to the law, "the property of an enterprise shall be owned by 
the whole people and shall be operated and managed by the enterprise with the 
authorization of the state in line with the principle of the separation of ownership and 
managerial authority. The enterprise shall enjoy the rights to possess, use, and dispose 
of, according to law, the property, which the state has authorized it to operate and 
manage. The enterprise may, in accordance with the decision of competent 
government agencies, adopt contract, leasing or other forms of systems of managerial 
responsibility" As a result of the series of enterprise autonomy expansion schemes 
and the "contract responsibility system", governmental intervention in the operation 
of SOEs was significantly diminished compared with previous reforms. Managers had 
a certain freedom to make their business decisions and the SOEs were allowed to keep 
part of their profit after completing the government's assignments. However, there 
were many drawbacks under the system, for example, the contractual relationship 
between managers and goven-iment was asymmetric and incomplete. 
As we know there was an agency problem between the managers and SOEs due to 
the lack of effective supervision and asymmetric information during that time. That is 
to say, managers abused their position and misused their rights to plunder state assets. 
At the same time, political costs still played important role in the country under the 
influence of the traditions of the socialist planned economy, such as the state still 
retained certain control rights over enterprises and the operation of managers were 
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controlled by the Party. 503 In other words, the state was the only owner of SOEs, and 
this determined the manner of operation. Thus the function of managers was very 
limited because they were appointed and dismissed by the Communist Party, although 
the managers were given some autonomy, for example, the use of incentive contracts 
to govern the relationship between the state and SOE managers was very popular 
during this period. 
As stated above, the reform of traditional SOEs in this period significantly 
lessened the role of governmental intervention in the management of SOEs, SOEs 
were given more autonomy and permitted to keep more of their profits, and the 
incentives of SOE workers were strengthened via bonus payments and differing work 
contracts, but there were many shortcomings including at least: the rights and 
responsibilities of SOE stakeholders and management were not well defined; there 
was no incentives for innovation and long-run investment; and there was opportunistic 
expropnation by managers. 504 In a word, owing to the structure of ownership being 
highly concentrated and the legacies of decades of central planning and traditions of 
administered allocations of resources, such as subsidized capital, skilled labour, and 
raw materials, some of these large- and medium-size, state-owned enterprises 
continued to hinder China's transition to an advance market economy 505 
(3) Modem Corporate Model (1993-Present). As described above, managers were 
503 See Qlan, Yingyi, 'The Process of China's Market Transition (1978-1998): The Evolutionary, History, and 
Comparative Perspectives', Working Paper, which is available at http: // 
\ý, \\, \ý, -econ. standford. edu/faculty/workp/swp99012. pdf, at 40. 504 See Varouj A. Aix-azian, Ying Ge, Jiaping Qiu, 2005, 'Can Corporatization Improve the Performance of 
State-Owned Enterprises Even Without Privatization', Journal of Corporate Finance. 
505 See Gary Jefferson, Albert GZ. Hu, Xiaoojing Guan, Xiaoyun YU, 2003, 'Ownership, Performance, and 
Innovation in China's Large- and Nledium-Size Industrial Enterprise Sector', China Economic Review 14, p 90. 
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given some autonomy after the refon-n. However, a critical defect was that profit 
retention by management had no downside, because the state, in fact, remained 
responsible for final losses, mainly through the state-owned banks, which were not 
contractual parties in the enterprise-commercialization process. Thus, as of 1994, over 
40% of SOEs were unprofitable, and while SOEs accounted for 34% of GDP, they 
absorbed three quarters of domestic credit. Their ever-increasing triangular debt 
(unpaid bills between state enterprises, state banks, and the government) had 
accumulated to over 4900 billion Renminbi Yuan (or 95% of GDP), and bad debt was 
estimated to be as much as 25% of state bank assets in 1996. Many troubled SOEs 
were unable to pay back these accrued loans, thus threatening the bankruptcy of 
China's banking system itself MRCS did not reach the aim of effectively reforming 
SOEs and was halted nationwide in 1994.506 
It demonstrated that the above refon-n of SOEs was not desirable. The process of 
partial privatization through the creation of joint-stock companies (corporatization) 
had to begin through the establishment of the Modem Enterprise System, or 
Cooperative Shareholding System. In order to address political costs and solve the 
agency problem, China decided to head for its socialist market economy reform by 
setting up the "modem enterprise system" in accordance with worldwide experience. 
Theoretically, the corporation as an independent legal person, and its rights, 
obligations, responsibility, ownership, and others are clarified by the law or private 
agreements, which will avoid govenu-nent intervention and strike a balance between 
506 See Dongwei Su, 2005, 'Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China', China Economic Review 
16, p 121 
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parties relating to the corporation. Accordingly corporatization is regarded as the best 
approach in theory to design modem enterprises. 'r- 
In fact, early in November 1984, some SOEs became shareholding enterprises 
through a process called "gufehua" or "shareholding transformation" as an initial step 
in China but on a small scale. The new and significant wave of economic refonn 
started with Deng Xiaoping's visit to south China in 1992, when he called for a 
continuation of the refon-n effort. From then the structure of ownership in SOEs has 
been changing greatly, or at least it provided a guiding theory for the refonn of the 
structure of ownership in SOEs. 
From the perspective of history, the market-oriented reform measures that China 
has taken have certainly fostered the economic efficiency of the state sector indeed. 
However, the optimal allocation of resources is unlikely to be achieved only by 
creating markets for products, workers, and managers without changing the 
concentrated ownership structure of SOEs. The state-owned highly concentrated 
structure must be reformed by privatization to a certain degree, such as diversifying 
state ownership by introducing other fonns of large shareholders, including 
institutional investors. There would be the possibility of a Pareto improvement if the 
shares that are held by govenu-nent in the stock companies could be decreased or sold 
off. 
507 
In order to carry the economic reform further, in November 1993, the 14 th Central 
Communist Party of China issued the Decision on Issues Concerning the 
507 See Xiaonian Xu, Yan Wang, 1999, 'Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance In Chinese Stock 
Companies', China Economic Review 10, p 94. 
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Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure, which formally introduced 
the modem corporate system to SOEs. The major reform objectives of the system 
included transforming the SOEs into corporations by the separation of ownership and 
control and the establishment of an efficient corporate governance structure. And then 
the Corporation Law of 1993 provided a solid legal foundation for the transformation 
of SOEs into different types of business corporations, including wholly State-owned 
corporations, closely held corporations ( limited liability companies), and publicly 
held corporations (joint stock limited companies) . In practice, the modem corporate 
model could not solve all problems that arose in China. (I will discuss this below in 
detail. ) For example, when an existing SOE was incorporated as a limited liability 
company (LLC), it became either a wholly state-owned LLC (if there was only one 
state-owned investment entity) or an ordinary state-owned LLC (if there were two or 
more state-owned investment entities). In both cases the state was the sole owner of 
the enterprise, though it may have invested in the enterprise through different entities, 
such as local governments, central government or their departments. As a 
consequence, corporatization of SOEs into LLCs thus only limited the state's liability 
toward the enterprises but did not change their ownership structures. In other words, 
the corporatization program was not intended to be a major breakthrough in terms of 
state ownership. Accordingly, most of the corporations have almost been the same as 
SOEs of the previous refonn. 508 The arbitrary goverranent control over and 
intervention in the operation of the LLCs, which are still solely state-owned, have 
508 See Shu YMa, 1998, 'The Chinese Route to Privatization: The Evolution of the Shareholding System Option', 
Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No-4 ( Apr., ), pp381-382. 
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remained as before. 509 In a word, the success of the SOE corporatization program in 
improving the effectiveness of the governance system of SOEs and their performance 
has been largely illusory, and some problems still persist after corporatization, such as 
that of soft budget constraints and of govenunent intervention. That is, the 
corporatization still leaves insoluble problems. 
The shortcomings of corporatization are as follows: Improved corporate 
performance will ensure that the state can benefit through its shareholding in these 
SOE-transformed companies. However, the performance of SOEs can't necessarily be 
improved by setting up shareholding companies alone without reducing the rate of 
ownership by the state. First, traditional agency problems remain because the 
separation of ownership and control, and state control over fin-ns continues to exist in 
these SOE-transformed companies if the state stays the controlling shareholder. As the 
state and its representative have inadequate resources and expertise in monitoring and 
disciplining the management, the conflict of interests between the state and the 
management persists. Second, the objective function of the state and its 
representatives is not to maximize shareholder value. For example, the state may want 
to keep redundant workers on the payroll of the SOEs and SOE-transfon-ned 
companies in order to preserve social stability, even though such a policy offers 
companies less profitable. Third, it is well known that minority shareholders in 
corporations have no adequate incentives to monitor management decisions closely 
50' See Shu YMa, 1998, 'The Chinese Route to Privatization: The Evolution of the Shareholding System Option', 
Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 4 ( Apr., ), p382. ( citing Chai and Docwra, "Reform", pp 173-175. More specifically, 68 
of the 100 SOEs selected for the corporatization experiment have chosen the wholly state-owned LLC as their 
legal organization frorn. See Jinrong shibao (Financial news) (Beijing) , 
November 23,1997). 
221 
Chapter 6. The history of the structure of concentrated ownership 
due to the free-ride problems .5 
10 Fourth, a more serious problem is the conflict of 
interest between the state as a majority shareholder and the public as minority 
shareholders which will be discussed below. 
As we know, China started the process of industrialization along the lines of the 
Soviet model much later than in Russia, and adopted a much modified structure due to 
prevailing conditions. But modeling after the Soviet model brought drawbacks, such 
as inflexibility and inefficiency, which needed to be reformed. China began to reform 
the economy much earlier than in Eastern Europe and Russia; and has experienced 
more rapid economic growth in recent years than the post-Soviet economies. 511 
However, there are many problems remaining after the process of the reform, in 
particular the structure of concentrated ownership, which must be solved properly and 
reasonably if the reform of economy in China is to be as successful as expected. 
In a word, the characteristics of reform in China include at least the following: (1) 
step by step. China has laid stress on gradual refon-n in order to keep the stability of 
society, which is in confonnity with the traditional Confucian culture discussed below. 
Thus, when gradual experimentation at the local and sectoral levels is successful, the 
central goverrunent will endorse it or other departments or sectors will imitate it. For 
example, the refon-n in China began in rural areas, in one of the poorest villages, and 
after success, the experience was spread to the countryside all over the country. (2) 
The dual-track approach. The dual-track approach is an extension of gradual reforrn 
510 See Daqing Qi, Woody Wu, Hua Zhang, 2000, 'Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance of Partially 
Privatized Finns: Evidence From Listed Chinese Companies" Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 8, pp 588-589. 
511 See World Bank, 1996, From Plan to Market, World Development Report, Oxford University Press,; J. Child, 
1994, Management in China During the Age of Reform, Cambridge University Press; P. Bowles and X. Dong, 
1994, Current Successes and Future Challenges in China's Economic Reforms, New Left Review 208 
November-Decernber, pp 49-77) 
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and is the most important aspect of Chinese reforms. The dual-track approach means 
partial refonns within sectors. In other word, when part of refonn is under the way, 
the traditional or old way still remains alive. For example, the first time this tactic was 
used was with two-tier pricing, which was introduced in rural areas in 1979 along 
with the household responsibility system. Later it was applied to other sectors, such as 
industry (through the contract management responsibility system), the national budget 
payments (through the fiscal contract responsibility system), external trade and 
payments (through the sharing of foreign exchange between central and local 
governments, trade contracting, and foreign exchange trading centers), and labour 
512 
markets (through the contract system for new hire in the state sector) . This thesis 
argues that, on one the hand, the dual-track approach is in line with gradual refonn in 
China, and, on the other hand, it strikes the right balance between the old one (the 
vested interest of the bureaucracy) and new one. (3) The structure of ownership is the 
key and sensitive problem, because the reform of the structure of ownership is 
complex and has something to do with the stability of the whole society of China. 
That is, the structure of ownership in SOEs will be reformed comprehensively if the 
two conditions are met: one is a mature market, and other is the stability of society. 
6.4. The history of listed companies 
SOEs had no choice but to go public after many years of reforrn due to the heavy 
512 See Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang with Loup Breform, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Reforni in China Building the Institutions of Modem Markets', World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporate, Washington, D. C, p 8. 
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losses incurred by SOEs. The first example since the founding of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949 was a department store in Beijing, which was given 
permission for issuing share in 1984. In 1992, firms were permitted to issue so-called 
"B-shares" to foreign investors in addition to the existing "A-shares" issued to 
domestic investors. In 1993, "H-shares" were issued for the first time in Hong Kong 
by finns incorporated in China but listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. In 1992, 
the government established the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). In April 1998, the SCSC and the 
CSRC were merged to form one ministry directly under the State Council as part of 
the goverrunent's plan for improving regulatory effectiveness. In November 1998, the 
authority responsible for supervising local securities regulatory departments was 
transferred from the People's Bank of China (PBC) to the CSRC. 
During the initial period of stock market development China relied primarily on 
an administrative govemment structure built around the quota system. 513 With regard 
to the quota system, the State Planning Commission (SPQ and CSRC together 
deten-nined how many shares in total should be issued each year. Then the total quota 
would be broken down and allocated among provinces and mega-cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. If an SOE wanted to be listed on the stock exchange, it 
had to get an approval from the local government, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC), the State Commission of Economic Restructuring (SCER) and 
the CSRC. In other words, under the quota system, firms must be granted the quota 
513 The quota system has been abandoned because it has many shortcomings. 
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before listing on the stock exchange in China. Although the quota system was 
beneficial to mitigate the asymmetric information problems investors and regulators 
faced, the adoption of a quota provided the local bureaucrats with 'rent-seeking' 
opportunities. 
Today's results of ownership and governance characteristics of listed companies in 
China are largely shaped by the past reform of SOEs based on the market and the 
stability of society Under the quota system, local government tended to give 
preference to state-owned companies in place of private sector companies. Such 
criteria would not necessarily lead to the selection of the most dynamic, successful, 
and high-growth companies. On the contrary, most of the companies under the control 
of local government were loss-making and urgently needed capital infusion, or were 
otherwise socially or economically important. In a word, the criteria of selection of 
companies for listing focused on not only the economy but also society. 
During the process of listing, the initial public offering process tended to select 
companies that had strong links with local govenunents and fuzzy boundaries with 
their parent groups, which would create strong incentives and preconditions for the 
controlling shareholders to interfere with the affairs of listed companies and exploit 
minorities through related-party transactions. For example, Qingqi Group was 
appointed by the provincial government to manage the State-owned shares in Qingqi 
Motorcycle, which took up 53.58% of the total issued share capital of the Company 
before the B Share issue and 40.90% immediately after the completion of B Share 
issue. The chain-nan of Qingqi Group was also designated as the shareholder 
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representative of the State-owned shares. 514 Such cases are very common in listed 
companies in China. That is to say, the interference of the state in the affair of listed 
companies or by related-party transactions will take place easily due to the structure 
of ownership. 
Because of the maturity of market and stability of society, equity ownership in a 
listed Chinese firm had to be divided into as many as five different classes: 
state-owned shares, legal-person shares, tradable A-shares, employee share, and 
B-shares only available to foreign investors. The phenomenon that is unique to the 
Chinese equity market maybe exists only in China. ( referring to table below) 
Table 1: Types of Common Stock Issued in China 515 
Tradable through exchange Definition 
No(private State-owned Shares that are controlled by the central government 
Block Shares(there during the process in which firms are reformed into a 
Transfer are limited liability incorporation, but before they are 
Possible)516 sub-categories listed. All these shares are managed and represented by 
under this the Bureau of National Assets Management. The 
definition) Bureau also appointed board members on firms'boards 
Entrepreneur's Shares reserved for firms' founders during the same 
share process 
5ý4 See Ray Ball, Joanna Shuang Wu, 2004, 'Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co., Ltd', J. of Acc. Ed. 22, p 333. 
5 See Franklin Allen Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian, 2002, 'Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China', The 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper, (December). 
516 It should point out that non-tradable doesn't necessarily non-transferable, in fact the state and 
legal person 
shares can be transferred among various institutions subject to the approval of the China Secunties 
Regulatory 
Commission (CSRS), but these shares still remain non-tradable and could not be directly traded as common 
tradable shares on the markct after the transfer. 
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Foreign Shares owned by foreign industrial investors during the 
owners same process 
Legal Entity Shares sold to legal identities(such as banks or other 
holders companies) during the same process 
Employee Shares Sold to Inner Employee during the same 
share process. 
Yes(New Share A Chinese Company listed in China (Shanghai or 
issued Shenzhen Exchanges), and shares are sold to Chinese 
shares investors 
Share B Chinese Company listed in China, but shares are sold 
to foreign investors 
Share H Chinese Company listed on Hong Kong, New York and 
London Stock Exchanges. (shares can only be traded on 
the above Exchanges but can be held by anyone). Since 
most of the shares are listed on Hong Kong, the H 
designation is used in this context. 
Although listed companies in China are incorporated in accordance with laws and 
regulations in form, the operation of listed companies is not as desired. As a result, the 
characteristics of the equity market in China are as follows: (1) the transfon-nation of 
SOEs into listed companies at the initial stage. As analyzed above, the result of the 
Management Responsibility Contract System was not desired and Central 
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Government had to terminate it in 1994. The aim of the reform concentrates on SOEs 
that only go listing due to their heavy loss. Therefore it is the reason why about 60% 
of shares are held by the state (so-called "non-tradable" shares), consisting of 
46state-owned" and "legal person" shares. State-owned shares refer to those held by the 
central and local governments, or departments designated by the State Council or 
governments. Legal person shares refer to those owned by SOEs or other economic 
entities- generally promoters of invested companies. (2) The state as the biggest 
shareholder controls most of the listed firms. Since most listed companies derive from 
the transfon-nation of SOEs and most of shares were kept in the control of the state, it 
is not surprising that the proportion of non-tradable shares is concentrated in the 
40-80% range in about 90% of listed firins that are controlled by the state in China. (3) 
The market requirement of one stock price, achieved through arbitrage instead of the 
market, does not prevail due to market segmentation, such as weakening the relation 
between the A- and B-share markets and between the domestic stock exchanges and 
Hong Kong stock exchange. The same company can issue both A-and B-shares (or 
both A- and H-shares), aimed at different types of investors. Domestic investors have 
been allowed to trade only A-shares, while foreign investors are restricted to trading 
B- and H-shares, even though the two shares are identical with respect to shareholder 
right. (But in March 2001, the government allowed individual domestic investor 
holding foreign currency accounts to purchase B-shareS) 517 
As stated above, most state-controlled listed companies have been transfonned 
517 See Sayuri Shirai, 2004, 'Testing the Three Roles of Equity Markets in Developing Countries: The Case of 
China', World Development Vol. 32, No. 9, p 1471. 
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from SOEs previously solely owned by the state. After the initial public offering, 
shareholder rights of the state are represented by either local offices of the Bureau of 
State Assets Management (BSAM) of the central government or finance bureaus of 
local government, depending on the pre-IPO ownership of the SOEs. However, the 
performance of listed companies is not as good as expected due to ownership by state 
because the monitoring and control system has inherited most of the agency problems 
that existed before the listing of SOEs. First, local BSAM and finance bureau officials 
don't have adequate incentives to closely monitor management performance and 
decision-making because their personal prospects have no connection to the 
performance of state-controlled listed firms. Second, most local BSAM office and 
finance bureaus are understaffed, and the existing staff has limited expertise in the 
field of modem finance and investment theories and practices. Third, while in theory 
local BSAM and finance bureau officials have the right to appoint board members and 
disapprove financing and investment proposals by management, in reality all major 
decisions have to be made jointly with local party organizations; consequently the top 
priority is political goal instead of corporate profitability 
Although the quota system has now been replaced by the sanction system under 
law, getting approval is still quite difficult and competitive. Because listing on 
Exchange Stock is scarce resource in China so far. 
Historically, actually the state shares were over-valued in the process of going 
public. Under a quota system controlled by all the level of governments and the focus 
of reforrn on SOEs, the govenu-nent or an SOE as sole or major initiator of a PLC was 
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inevitable to be the largest shareholder, and endowed with strong bargaining power in 
its assets valuation and discounted its assets into shares due to drawback of the 
accounting system. Thus it was not surprising that the state shares were deliberately 
enlarged and over-valued from the beginning. As a result, the IPO price of common 
A-shares was much higher than its intrinsic value, which meant the individual 
investors had contributed too much to the PLCs. That was why investors reacted 
negatively to market when the State Council announced to sell state shares to publics 
on 12 June 200I. The Shanghai Composite Stock Index dropped dramatically by 32%, 
from 2245 on 12 June 2001 to 1514 on 22 October. At last, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission had to suspend the reform in a hurry. 
Initially one of the aims of listed companies from the transformation of SOEs is to 
enhance efficiency and productivity However, on average, most of the listed 
companies in China after going public do not actually improve their performance as 
expected. They still face serious financial problems and still suffer from bad corporate 
governance due to the structure of concentrated ownership. That is, the dominant state 
shareholding justifies state intervention that results in the above outcome. 
6.5. Conclusion 
In China, concentrated ownership has been traditional since ancient times, which is 
ilon-nal and recognizable by Chinese people. At the early stage of the founding of the 
People's Republic of China, if the structure of ownership was influenced by politics 
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due to special environments, people were used to concentrated ownership, but after 
the refonn of the economy, it is the structure of ownership of SOEs that will play the 
key role in the process of reform when the market develops. That is, the gradual 
reforms hit squarely at the heart of the central institutions around which Communist 
China was organized. However, "vestiges of the old system stayed and these legacies 
would potentially play fundamental roles in creating the transition from one system to 
the other. " 518 In other words, the Communist Party has taken advantage of the 
structure of concentrated ownership of SOEs to control the economy, in particular, 
making listed companies the same as traditional SOEs. Namely, the state is the largest 
shareholder of most of listed companies, which results in the poor quality of corporate 
governance of listed companies. 
518 See Doug Guthrie, 2000, 'Understanding China's Transition to Capitalism: The Contributions of Victor Nee 
and Andrew Walder', Sociological Forum, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Dec., ), p 729. 
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culture and ownership 
7.1. Introduction 
Culture consists of the ideas, values, norms and meanings that are not only shared by 
members of a social entity, and transmitted through families, communities and 
organizations, but also have a profound effect on the behavior of members of a social 
entity Culture is embedded in institutions such as general and vocational education, 
training, systems of industrial relations, and social stratification. These institutions are 
in practice consciously shaped and changed by a group of powerful and influential 
sectors in accordance with their own self-interest and cultural orientations. 519 In the 
long history of China, the culture has affected ownership deeply, especially Confucian 
culture. 
7.2. Ancient times 
520 
A feature of traditional Chinese culture is a cosmic harmony (accommodation) 
including a culture of han-nony Therefore a collective spirit has been main the culture 
or cultural environment in China over a long period of time from ancient times until 
519 See Trevor Buck, Igor Filatotchev, Peter Nolan, and Mike Wright, 2000, 'Different Paths to Economic Reform 
in Russian and China: Causes and Consequences', Journal of World Business, 35(4), p 38 1, ( inciting Lane, 
C. 1989, 
Nianagement and Labor in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgarj. 
520 Zeng Xianyi, Ma Xiaohong, 2006, 'A Dialectic Study of the Structure and Basic Concepts of Traditional 
Chmcse Law and an Analysis of the Relationship Between 'li' (ceremony) and 'fa' (law)', 
Front. Law China, 
1: 34-52. 
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now. "Collectivist cultural beliefs led to a societal organization based on the group's 
111.1 ability to use economic, social, and, most likely, moral sanctions against deviants. 
Individualist cultural beliefs led to a societal organization based on legal, political, 
and (second-party) economic organizations for enforcement and coordination. , 521 In 
China, people's social values and institutions are mainly the set of beliefs first 
developed and formalized systematically by Confucius, who emphasized the 
cultivation of grace and amicability in order to achieve harmonious society. This 
means, on the one hand, honesty and sincerity in horizontal relationships, and on the 
other hand benevolence, faithfulness and hierarchy in vertical relationships as well as 
honesty and sincerity. This set of beliefs clearly regulates the behavior of individuals 
and defines family and social order. Confucianism has bred a highly hierarchical 
system of authority and control in which collective interests have assumed primacy 
over individual ones and individuals must obey authority. For example, Confucianism 
prescribes a strict hierarchical ordering among members of any organizational unit in 
order to maintain social order and harmony. Every member in society must absolutely 
be loyal to and submit to collectivism and authority to create a harmonized society. 
Thus, members of a collective or organization are expected to recognize, respect and 
obey a leading authority. Therefore, any member should recognize, respect and obey 
the directives of the organization, community, clan or village. In the past , it was 
customary and commonplace for conflicts within a unit such as the family, clan, 
community or village to be resolved not through the intervention of an external 
521 See Greif, A., 1994, 'Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on 
collectivist and individualist societies', Journal of Political Economy 102, p 
942. 
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agency, but instead internally and confidentially through arbitration or conciliation by 
the clan elder, or a respected or recognized local or officer of the organizational unit. 
Once a decision is made, parties to the case or the members of unit have to obey it and 
it can not challenge it, otherwise the parties, or members should be considered as 
disloyal and disruptive, even treacherous. Safeguarding the interests of the unit or 
organization is the responsibility of every any member and every member should 
know his place, and what he should not disclose and what he should no inquire into. 
In accordance with customs, every member of unit should maintain the confidentiality 
of the internal affairs of the unit- dirty linen is never washed in public, and 
disclosures are regarded as a betrayal of the unit's interests. 
According to Confucian principles, the life of each individual is only a link in that 
person's family lineage and each individual is a continuation of his or her ancestors. 
Therefore the ancestral hall has been especial significant in China in the past. From 
ancient times until the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, there was 
an ancestral hall that was used for public activities in every big village in rural areas, 
such as ceremonies for sacrifice and worshiping of ancestors, to commemorate 
ancestors and dead relatives and to express respect for their superiors, as well as for 
meetings for the discussion of key matters relating to public affairs. In tenns of 
property and shareholding, under the influence of Confucianism from ancient China, 
private ownership of productive assets (especially land) from the late Ming Dynasty 
period onwards in China was typically held in the form of ancestral trusts by 
households or clans. In other words, property rights of a family or clan were held in 
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the name of a dead ancestor or in the form of a dead ancestor, with rules of equity 
built into rules of lineage and ritual association with ancestor worship, from 
generation to generation. Thus, while the West went by the route of law, on the 
contrary, China went by the route of ritual in the rules and conventions governing 
property and control rights. As mentioned above, property of clan or family was in the 
name of ancestors. Control rights were exercised by members of the trust (clan) on 
behalf of the dead ancestor, with senior members of the family clan taking turns in 
management- by what has been described as "stripes" or lineage lines. Shareholding 
was organized and exercised through religious conventions based on the rules of 
ancestor worship, and generally speaking, the property (in particular land) in the form 
of ancestry in ancestral hall could not be sold but lent with proceeds going to all 
public activities. The relationship between people in the same clan or village was 
strengthened and harmonized by activities in the ancestral hall where the family tree 
or family system (pedigree) that held detailed information about every person (mainly 
male) or family of the same clans was kept, and national administration of the people 
was much assisted by ancestral hall, where officials from the administrative office 
could know who is who. With the help of activities in the ancestral hall, the principle 
of collective responsibility in the form of lineage served to mediate between the 
individual and the state in order to keep law and order in the society. Meanwhile 
institutions of lineage provided some means for the organization of business, such as 
who should take responsibility for the property in the name of ancestry, announcing 
the balance between incomes and expenditures publicly Of course lineage institutions 
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meant that an individual should be a member of the collective until one acquired 
seniority on behalf of the family or clan. An individual whose interest was violated 
and required remedies from the state, whether as a member of a family (clan) or of a 
family-held business, had to seek protection from the state through the lineage's 
private connections within the state bureaucracy 522 Without relationship in 
bureaucracy, it was very difficult for an ordinary people to find remedial way when 
their property or rights were violated, which was distinct from that in Western 
countries via law. 
In ancient China, the foundation of Chinese society was the family, based on filial 
piety, as advocated by Confucius, and the most important religion, as stated above, 
was ancestral worship for which the eldest male of the most senior line took the 
primary responsibility in each family in a form of ritual primogeniture in accordance 
with the patrilineal system, which was one of forms of filial piety. In fact, the whole 
of Chinese society was theoretically based on filial piety on which not only the 
well-being of the family but also the society in general was built. While rituals, 
ceremonies, laws, religions and even festivals or important occasions were simply 
different expressions of the filial piety in varying ways, which was the kernel or 
root-motive of all Chinese ethics. 523 The people could be united as one in the clan, 
village or community through the activity of filial piety, so that the society was much 
more hannonious. The above have held a long and deep-rooted history and are 
important aspect of Chinese culture, namely the reflection of collective culture. 
SI, See Dr. Cyril Lin, 2001, 'Private Vices in Public Places: challenges in Corporate Governance Development in 
China', Working Paper, (April), OECD Development Centre. 
523 See Edward H. Parker, 1906, 'The Principles of Chinese Law and Equity', 22 Law Q. Rev. 190 192 . 
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Therefore, it was not surprising that the modem business corporation never happened 
before the late I 9th century in Chinese history but family businesses representing 
collective harmony in the society until modem times. 524 Or quasi-commercial 
enterprises, relatively large quasi- commercial enterprises organized in the name of the 
family and worship of ancestors. Although the dynasties and their policy on 
quasi-commercial enterprises changed greatly from time to time, the baseline for any 
change followed the indigenous traditions, such as filial piety and worship of 
ancestors that consolidated the spirit of collective culture. And all intelligent policy 
analysis must begin with an informed appreciation of those traditions, including 
culture. As described above, in the Confucian view, the collective was morally 
superior to the individual. That is to say, as a member of society a person must control 
his selfish desires so that the interests of the community or public good could be 
respected. Otherwise the member was not loyal. His true personhood was thus 
achieved by disciplining or controlling his desires so that he should serve interests of 
society and not clash with the public good. 525 It is not surprising that the attitude of 
orthodox Confucianism was anti-mercantile and hostile to profit-seeking because 
orthodox Confucianism was infused with idea that the most socially acceptable road 
to success was winning a post by imperial exam in the imperial bureaucracy and that 
merchants ranked lowest in the traditional four-tier hierarchy of social groups (the 
gentry occupied the top tier, peasants the second tier, artisan ranked third, and 
524 See Max Weber, 1954, 'Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society 185-186, Max Rheinstein ed., Edward 
Shils & Max Rheinstein Trans., Harvard Uiniv. Press. 
525 See Teemu Ruskola, 1999-2000, 'Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
11 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective', 52 Stanford Law Review, p 1673, ( citing Wm. Theodore De Bary, 
1983, The Liberal Tradition in China 27 ). 
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merchants last). The merchant was always despised in the society in the past. 
In accordance with the spirits of Confucianism, when conflict of interest between 
the collective and the individual, the collective could seek profit at the expense of 
others because the collective reigned supreme in affairs familial and political, and 
then divided its profit unevenly among various classes of participants according to 
their status in society due to the "duty of submission to parental authority" etc. as 
influenced by Confucius. In other words, the Chinese household as a basic unit owned 
collective property that only was controlled by father in family and could engage in 
the pursuit of profit in place of the individual members of family, and kinship 
relationships were paradigmatically hierarchical, with the senior kin exercising 
authority over the junior kin. For example, the father-son relationship was governed 
by the master principle of filial piety. Thus, during the father's lifetime the son's 
personality was part of the father's, while after the latter's death his personality was 
extended into that of his son, not only rights but also liabilities, in particular before 
1949 it was nonnal for a son to take responsibility for his father's debts after his 
father's death. Women were in effect non-persons, mere appendages of male persons. 
In a word, the family's collective responsibility for debt was made in the name of 
father on behalf of the whole family and father can sell his wife and children if he was 
in arrears, and membership in the lineage descended in the male line only, while 
kinship group and the larger sociopolitical communities could be interpreted as 
extended families which were loyal and owed fiduciary obligations to their superiors 
and even to the emperor. Even before the foundation of the People's Republic of 
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China in 1949, it was very popular in China for Chinese clans to own property jointly 
to provide for clan welfare and ancestral worship through the institution of ancestral 
trust by which the collective property would be protected properly. Generally 
speaking, the property in the trust derived from contributions by families, donations 
by the rich, proceeds of the use of public or previous trust proceeds etc. The property 
in the trust was to remain intact over generations and was used mainly for ancestral 
halls for worship, or other public services etc. From the Confucian perspective, an 
ancestral trust was the symbol of perpetuating family solidarity, 526 which was the 
symbol of the collective spirit. It shows that the collective spirit deeply affect the life 
of people through the ancestral trust in China. It also shows why China's traditional 
business culture is characterized by "discretionary power, secrecy, a substantial 
,, 527 govenu-nent role in large scale production, and personal connections. 
Thus, Chinese society is characterized by "(1) high power-distance, indicating a 
tendency for the less powerful members of institutions to accept that power is 
distributed unequally, (2) low uncertainty avoidance, whereby citizens have low levels 
of anxiety in relation to risk and change, (3) low levels of individualism and (4) 
medium to high masculinity. , 528 This is why the society in some dynasties in China 
over a long history was so hannonious and orderly relatively speaking due to the 
influence of Confucian culture, although there were sometimes wars or peasant 
526 See Teeinu Ruskola, 1999-2000, ' Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective', 52 Stanford Law Review, p 1646, ( citing Chu His & Tsu-Ch' len, 
1967, 'Reflection on Things on Hand 202', Wing-tsit Chan Trans., pp 228-29; Chu His, 1991, 'Family Rituals: A 
Twelfth-Century Chinese Manual for The Perfon-nance of Cappings, Weddings, Funeral, and Ancestral Rites', 
Patricia Buckley Ebrey Trans.,. etc). 
527 See, Walter Hutchens, 2003, 'Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure about China's Legal 
Sý'stcni-, 24 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L, p 621. 
5 's See Hoon-Halbauer, S. K., 1994, Management of Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, Lund University Press, p 290. 
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uprisings. 
In a word, through the influence of Confucianism, the collective spirit became 
prevalent in ancient times in China, and it was traditional for individuals to succumb 
to collectivism and juniors to respect seniors. As a result, the property in the name of 
ancestry in a village or in the name of the father in a family was actually held in a 
concentrated fonn. Therefore concentrated ownership under the influence of culture 
was a very common phenomenon in Chinese society since ancient times. 
7.3. In Mao's times 
As described above, the deep influence of Confucianism, is endemic in Chinese 
culture, and the legacy of Confucian heritage is an ingrained tradition. China has been 
a highly centralized society since ancient time. It emphasizes the relationship of 
hierarchy, namely obedience of subordinates to the superior, and of the masses to 
officials. Under the centralized decision-making model the central government level 
has a strong influence on the belief and the behaviour of individuals at the lower 
organization level. The familial idiom as the symbol of a collective spirit has 
continued to influence Chinese economic organizations even though the traditional 
legal system was officially abolished after the foundation of the People's Republic of 
China. The collective spirit and interests are further reinforced by the post-1949 
adoption of Leninist- Stalinist principles and Chainnan Mao's thought. It is not 
surprising that a tradition of "rule by man" in place of the "rule of law" has been 
240 
Chapter 7. The Relationship between culture and ownership 
prevalent in China in the long history. Because individuals and all kinds of entities 
have been influenced by traditional culture, the Communists' collective entities still 
inherit the spirit of traditional family: communities with shared collective interests, 
rather than contractual arrangements among self-seeking individuals with radically 
divergent aims in the West. Moreover, traditional clan corporations (quasi - commercial 
enterprises) were considered an organic part of the larger community. Therefore 
"Chinese socialist enterprises are expected to serve, or at least pay lip-service to, 
several constituencies in a similarly collectivist spirit. " 529 Thus a fundamental 
identity in Confucian and Communist conceptions of virtues is "the utter 
subordination of individual interest" to that of the prince and the party respectively. In 
Mao's time, the collective spirit was advocated all over the country and collective 
interests were elevated over the individual interests. The theory of collective spirit 
thinks individual interests derive from the collective interests and there are no 
individual interests without collectivism. Thus individual interests must succumb to 
collective interests. 
At that time, in order to promote collectivism, no person could keep expensive 
goods. Otherwise, he or she would be regarded as a person who did not love the 
motherland, society and the people. Under the guardianship of the collective spirit, all 
most entities belonged to the people who "eat from the same great pot", children often 
succeeded to their parents'jobs, and the people were the owner of the entIties- Under 
socialist principles, the people were the ultimate owners of these enterprises. Thus, the 
529 See Teemu Ruskola, 1999-2000, 'Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and 
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective', 52 Stanford Law Review, p 1608. 
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people were the de facto bearers of residual risk, and, in principle, they entrusted the 
state in a stewardship role vis-6-vis the "state-owned" enterprises. In fact, the 
drawbacks of the collective spirit are apparent and everyone owned everything, but 
nobody took responsibility for everything; that is to say, no one owned explicit 
income rights, so that no one had any interest in operating these enterprises efficiently 
because the staff in factory still obtained the same result as specified, whatever 
state-owned enterprises make loss or profit. The factory directors and supervisors 
were not properly motivated to work hard because they were also paid a small and 
fixed wage. 
530 
In a word, owing to the influence of the collective spirit, no one had any incentive 
to enhance enterprise efficiency in China. The line between government officials and 
SOE managers is ambiguous, and there are specialized salaries for different ranks of 
government officials. It often happens that a SOE manager is paid according to her 
rank as government official instead of her real managerial effort. Besides, the 
ideological thought was that "there is no intrinsic difference between jobs except for 
their functions". As a matter of fact, all the entities were both state-owned enterprises 
and collective-owned enterprises. There were almost no private enterprises. It was 
normal that enterprises could not gain independence from the administrative 
bureaucracy, and the structure of ownership in SOEs was concentrated highly 
530 See Jon Cauley, Richard Comes, Todd Sandler, 1999, 'Stakeholder Incentives and Reforms in China's 
State-owned Enterprises: A Cornmon-Property Theory', China Economic Review 10, p 195. 
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7.4. After 1978 
The reform of the economy in China has been influenced strongly by culture. In fact, 
from the perspective of the development, the reform of the economy would not be 
successful without the adjustment of culture properly. The beginning of 
market-oriented reforms was accompanied by an important shift in ideology. The new 
growth imperative was expressed most forcefully by Deng's (1994) proclamation that 
"development is the hard truth". But the spirit of Mao's times still remained during the 
modem reform period. For example, some members of the board of supervisors 
consist of employees as masters of enterprise, as was advocated as a slogan in Mao's 
times. The Company Law of the People's Republic of China of 1993 (hereafter 
"Company Law of 1993") (e. g. Art. 52 and Art 124) still stipulates that corporate 
charters properly specify the proportion of employees' representatives on the board of 
supervisors (of course Company Law of 2006 also has similar provisions, e. g. Art. 52 
and Art 118). 
The corporatization of enterprises is the key to developing socialized mass 
production and the market economy. However, the biggest ideological opposition to 
the share system is rooted in socialist orthodoxy that joint-stock companies are 
supposed to be a prominent feature of the capitalist system, which runs contrary to the 
socialist precept of ownership by the "whole people". In other word, the role of stocks 
and shareholding was hampered by ideological questions conceming public and 
private ownership of business enterprises in the Chinese economy. With regard to 
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stock and shareholding, some argued that the emergence of private ownership of stock 
was in confon-nity with socialist ideology as long as the overall national economy was 
controlled by the state. 531 Others contended that the emergence of a shareholding 
system of investment in economic enterprises was fundamentally contrary to the 
concepts of socialist ownership. 532 Proponents of the shareholding system sought to 
reconcile it with socialism by re-examining the concept of "socialist public 
ownership". For example, Tong Dalin, a well-known economist, quoted Marx as 
saying that the share system was private property's self-negation and was a form of 
property by which capital became the property of the organized working people and 
could serve the interest of the society. In his view, Marx's statement could be 
considered as the seminal basis for the corporatization of enterprises in a socialist 
country. Any possible dilution of public ownership under the share system could be 
limited by restricting individual ownership. Jian Yiwai, a prominent economist, 
argued that the character of ownership of corporatized State-owned enterprises was 
co-ownership of labor by the people (represented by the state), the collective and the 
individual. This was consistent with socialist public ownership because the co-owners 
were all working people. 533 All analyses above were beneficial to the corporatization 
of state-owned enterprises but it did not seem to find the key to problems until Deng's 
statement on the difference between socialism and capitalism. This thesis argues the 
531 See, Li Su, Gong Xiaoyuan, Du Feijing and Pan Yuexin, 1987, 'Legal Discussion of the Transformation of a 
Part of State Enterprises Into Stock Enterprises', Chinese Legal System Gazette, (June 10), p 3. 
53 2Zheng Qing and Zhang Jie, 1987, 'Shareholding is not the correct direction for enlivening enterprises owned by 
flic whole people, ' in Wang Mengkui and Xing Junfang, eds., Questions about the Stock System, Beijing: Economy 
Publishing House, p 97. 
533 See Tan Lay Hong, 'The Legal & Regulatory Framework of the Secunties Markets in the People's Republic of 
China', 8 China Law Report, 1994-1999, p 109. 
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structure of concentrated ownership of SOEs is influenced by the collective spirit and 
also represents the symbol of the collective spirit (e. g. Art 4, Art 16, Art 17 of 
Company Law of 1993). The Company Law of 1993 is good evidence for this, as will 
be discussed below. 
As mentioned above, most scholars analyzed "socialist public ownership" on the 
basis of the classic statement of Marx, but in China, there still exits a conundrum in 
the theoretical bases of the post-Mao economic reforms, especially the difference 
between a "socialist market economy" and its progenitor "economic planning on the 
basis of socialist public ownership". The senior leader, Deng Xiaoping in his famous 
South China Tour gave the guidance for socialist market economy and broke the 
deadlock of theories on the structure of state-owned concentrated ownership. 
"If capitalism has something good, then socialism 
should bring it over and use it", he said, "a planned 
economy was not socialist- there was planning under 
capitalism too. The market economy was not 
capitalism- there were market regulations under 
socialism too. The plan and market were both means of 
controlling economic activities. Whether the emphasis 
was on the plan or on the market regulations was not the 
essential distinction between socialism and 
,, 534 capitalism. 
Since then the refon-n is carried out under the guardianship of the new idea and in 
practice the emphasis of reform is on the socialist market economy and it is clear that 
534 See Tan Lay Hong, 'The Legal & Regulatory Framework of the Securities Markets in the People's Republic of 
China', 8 China Law Report, 1994-1999, p 110. ( citing "Article Views Market Economy, Public Ownership" 
PBIS-CHI-93-159 19 August 1993 pp 20-26. Hence, the notorious anecdote of Deng's: "White Cat, Black Cat, 
Ný'hichevcr Catches mice is a Good Cat). 
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tremendous changes have taken place in the structure of state-owned enterprises in 
China compared with the past. In particular, the structure of state-owned concentrated 
share ownership has changed greatly since then. However, the refonn in China will 
continue to be hindered by its socialist ideology of "public ownership" such that the 
restrictions on the transfer of State and employee shares are impossibly to be removed 
at once. 535 In a word, the socialist culture, such as collective spirits and collective 
interests, has been a profound effect on the structure of concentrated ownership of the 
state-owned enterprises. It seems that only the structure of state-owned concentrated 
ownership symbolizes socialism. 
7.5. Conclusion 
Culture that evolves and develops gradually over a long period of time is traditional. 
Culture comes from the life of people but differs from the latter. In other words, 
culture deeply affects the behaviour, thought, and practices of people in a group or in 
a society. The people in China have been affected by Confucianism since ancient 
times, one of which is the mainly collective spirit. It is the collective spirit that 
influences the coming into being and existence of the structure of concentrated 
ownership. The structure of concentrated ownership of SOEs was the symbol of the 
collective spirit in the past. Today the traditional culture in China is in collision with 
the West or other world's culture after the refon-n and opening-up policy. The structure 
535 1 guess the structure of state-owned concentrated share ownership of listed companies in China will 
be changed 
greatly in a f6v years, especially since 2007 for the sake of the funds for pension or social security. Namely share 
owned by state will be sold off for infusion of pension funds. 
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of concentrated ownership is undergoing change but slowly. 
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Chapter 8. The Influence of Politics on 
Ownership 
8.1. Introduction 
Some scholars argue that it is the Communist party and the mechanism through which 
it controlled the economy and society. The Party ruled the country, and influenced 
individuals and other entities, through its control of the state, the imposition of its 
ideology, the implementation of its policy, and the penetration of party-led mass 
organizations deep in society in the command economy. 536 In China politics have 
greatly influenced the corporate governance of listed companies indeed because the 
state which is controlled by the Communist Party on its own accounts for most of 
shares of listed companies. This thesis argues that politics' influences of corporate 
governance of listed companies through the structure of ownership. 
The theoretical literature has always discussed the effects of the involvement of 
local party committees on the performance of China's firms. First of all, the grabbing 
hand theory proves that local party committee has an adverse effect on the firm's 
economic perfon-nance through using fin-ns to serve political and social objectives. 
Second, the helping hand theory argues that local party committees have a favorable 
effect on firrn perfonnance because scarce resources can be allocated to finns safely 
536 See Peck J. 1975, Revolution Versus Modernization and Revisionism. In China's Uninterrupted Revolution, ed 
V Nee, J Peck, pp 57-217. New York: Pantheon; Schurmann F. 1966, Ideology and Organization in Communist 
China. Berkeley: Univ. Calif Press; Vogel EF. 1969, Canton under Communist, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. 
Press; Walder AG 1986, Communist Neo-Traditional ism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, Berkeley: Univ. 
Calif Press; Whyte MK, 1974, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, Berkeley: Univ. Calif Press. 
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in the quasi-market economy and agency problems can be lessened in firms with poor 
corporate govemance with the help of local party committees. 537 Third, the 
ineffective hand theory considers that local party committees are only window 
dressing that influences finn perfonnance neither negatively nor positivel Y. 538 
The notion that politicians' control of firms' decision making that negatively 
influences finn perfonnance is widespread in the literature on corporate governance 
and public choice. Most theoretical arguments are based on the assumption that 
politicians use fin-ns in the pursuit of political and social objectives, e. g., to correct 
market failures, to reduce income and regional inequality, and to provide excessive 
employment, to stress the stability of society rather than efficiency of firms, and that 
these do harm to firms' economic performance. 539 
It seems scholars have reached the common view that state firms usually become 
worse and worse over time due primarily to political depredations and special -interest 
demands. Without such political pressures, however, state enterprises in some areas 
might hold their own and endure a certain amount of competition. 540 But how does 
the politics influence corporate governance in China? The thesis will discuss it in 
detail below. 
8.2. How has politics influenced the corporate governance 
Is of See, Qian, Yingyi, 1996, 'Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control', Economic 
Transition 4(2), pp 427-447. 538 See McGregor, Richard, 2001, 'The Little Red Book of Business in China', Financial Times 6, (July). 
539 See Eric C. Chang, Sonia M. L. Wong, 2004, 'Political Control and Performance In China's Listed Firms', 
Journal of Comparative Economics 32, p 620. ( Citing Boycko, Maxim, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W., 'A 
Theory of Privatization', Economic Journal 106(435), 1996, at 309-319; Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W., 1994, 
'Politicians and Finn', Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4), pp 995-1025; Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W., 
1998, 'The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures', Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA). 
540 See Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow, 1988, Privatization: an Economic Analysis, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
249 
Chapter 8. Tbe Influence of Politics on Ownership 
through the structure of ownership? 
8.2.1. Management and appointment of officers in firms controlled 
completely by the Party before the reform 
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Communist Party has been 
in power without opposition. 541 Before the enterprise reforins started in the early 
1980s, the SOEs as a pillar of China's national economy, had significant social and 
political implications for contemporary China. Chinese SOEs were controlled by 
politicians who exercised almost all the formal authority over operating and personnel 
decisions. Thus SOEs were only tools of implementation to policy by politicians. At 
that time, the economy was an appendage of the state, and economic agents were 
manipulated and controlled completely by politician under administrative power. 542 
In other words, the SOEs were completely controlled by the Communist Party before 
the refonn of economy. As a result, such an allocation of authority resulted in a lack 
of managerial discretion on the one hand, and business decisions influenced by 
politicians on the other. Politicians had incentives to control and / or subsidize SOEs 
to achieve objectives for political purposes in place of economic purposes. Leaders of 
factories were often appointed, shifted or dismissed for political or other reasons, 
rather than their managerial qualifications for the job. Thus the person who was 
51 ' There are other parties in China and parties are legal according to the Constitution Law, but influence and 
function of other parties is very limited. 
542 See Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthuews, 1996, 'Market Transition and Social Transformation in Reforming 
State Socialism', Annual Revicw of Sociology, Vol. 22, p 405. ZýI 
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appointed as a head of factory might not be the best person to manage the firm 
effectively. In particular, politicians might require an SOE to hire more staff than it 
needed or to maintain excess employment at the cost of firm efficiency. 543 Politicians 
did this in order to win political support, or to avoid the social instability that high 
unemployment caused. The political task was important than anything else at that time. 
Politicians might also ask an SOE to meet output growth targets, which they could 
show off as their own policy achievement, even if the enterprise could not sell all of 
its output at a profit. These political tasks had primacy over profit of SOEs, and this 
resulted in many problems among Chinese SOEs under the traditional command 
system. 544 In a word, the enterprises were controlled completely by the Party and as a 
tool only carried out the policy of the state at that time due to the state as only the 
owner of the state-owned enterprise. 
8.2.2. The influence of the Party on enterprises was changed after 
reform 
As mentioned above, Chinese SOEs before reform can be regarded as being 
controlled by politicians because politicians had not only almost all the fon-nal 
authority but also most of the real authority over business and personnel decisions. 
China engaged in reform commencing in the late 1970s because, in a sense there was 
543 See Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. 1994, 'Politicians and Fims', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), pp 
995-1025. 
. S44 See, Lixin Colin Xu, Tian Zhu and Yi-min Lin, 2005, 'Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership 
Reform: Evidence from China', Economics of Transition, Volume 13(l), p5. 
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no alternative. But by contrast to the wholesale and "overnight" refonns undertaken in 
many ex-Soviet-bloc countries, China's reform process has been step by step. The 
Chinese Communist government, wishing to avoid the political and economic turmoil 
that accompanied the mass privatization of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European governments, has chosen, as the cornerstone of its political survival, the 
commercialization and partial privatization of claims over assets and profits and of its 
state-owned enterprises. SOE reform began with the Management Responsibility 
Contract System (MRCS) in 1987, in which the government transferred some 
management authority to the enterprises and allowed them to keep some of their 
profits. But managers had few residual rights of control and were subject to strong 
political influence to accept SOE's social responsibilities as the most important 
assignment. 
The government is unwilling to implement deep institutional reform and is 
reluctant to relinquish its control over enterprises, in order to keep society stable, 
other-wise it will incur the cost of winning political support from worker satisfaction 
and a "quiet" population. Therefore, the privatization of SOEs has been carried out in 
part because it is the only viable means to survive the existing political order 
definitely, which, in the case of China, means the survival of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the fortification of its authority over the nation. The government, on the one 
hand, by refonning the agricultural industry, rebuilding SOEs via partial privatization, 
and stimulating the rapid development of Township and Village Enterprises, attempts 
to gain the benefits of a market economy for the mobilization of private savings, 
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economic development and an improved standard of living; on the other hand the 
Party keeps political control over the society. 545 Therefore the society seems to 
develop without becoming unstable. 
Prior to the adoption of the Company law of 1993, the main governance bodies 
in the traditional SOEs were the committee of the Communist Party, the trade union 
and the meeting of employees' representatives. It was thought that party organizations 
should perform duties according to the Party Constitution, for example, the 
appointment of managers by the standards of politics. More generally, it was believed 
that SOEs should forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political 
objectives, such as full employment, income redistribution and political stability. 
In China it is normal that managers under the communist system were selected 
for their political rather than their managerial skills as mentioned above. The party 
secretary was the ultimate decision-maker and managed the day-to-day operation in 
the enterprises. Since 1984 managers have been given greater autonomy in managing 
enterprise operation. In 1986 the central government issued the Regulations on the 
Work of Factory Directors in State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, in which directors 
had final operational authority However, SOEs' party committees still played an 
important role in personnel issues etc. 
When some enterprises were incorporated under the Company Law of 1993, 
companies would take into account responsibility not only to shareholders but also to 
others. According to Company Law of 1993, managers in the corporatized SOE are 
545 See Dongwei Su, 2005, 'Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China', China Economic Review 
16, p 120. 
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either elected or appointed by the board of directors. But actually managers are often 
appointed by the Communist Party's Organizational Department. For large SOEs or 
enterprise groups, the general manager is often also the secretary of the party 
committee. The party's standing committee usually consists of the general manager 
and senior managers, and is the ultimate decision-making body for important issues. 
The Communist Party Central Committee or provincial committees still control and 
determine the appointment, promotion, or dismissal of senior managers of large SOEs, 
listed companies or enterprise groups. In the case of Chinese listed companies, almost 
50% of the directors in listed companies are appointed by the state and another 30% 
are affiliated with various layers of governmental agencies. 546 A survey showed that 
the Party still controlled most of listed companies through personnel, such as selecting, 
appointing and dismissing head of the managerial operational departments, branches, 
and subsidiaries and CEOs. 
547 
Even today most corporate managers in the big SOEs still aspire to a civil service 
rank and hope they will be promoted to be a higher official in governments, and 
therefore they are concerned more about how their superior in the political and 
administrative hierarchy assesses their performance rather than others. The 
assessment may be quite arbitrary or subjective and be based on such indicators as 
profits, the number of employment, implementation of political policy, and the 
discharge of social responsibilities. For instance, in many cases the government still 
546 Qiao Liu, 2005, 'Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional 
Determinants', ( May), Working Paper. 
S47 See Wong Sonia M. L., Sonja Opper, and Rujin Hu, 2003, 'Shareholding Structure, Depoliticization, and Finn 
Perforinance: Lessons from China's Listed Finns', Working Paper 1066, Hong Kong Institute of Economies and 
Business Strategy, Hong Kong University. 
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evaluates the success of listed companies or the achievement of managers based on 
their total profits and taxes paid instead of companies' return on equity or earnings per 
share growth. As a result, in order to fulfill the profits and taxes as political 
expectations or tasks, companies want to issue new shares as often as possible to 
increase investment, which results in overstating the earnings at the expense of 
outsider investors. 
With the development of the economy and the depth of reform, the influence of 
the Party on finns has gradually changed. For instance, as stated above, the power to 
appoint or remove, reward and punish managers was explicitly transferred to the 
board of directors according to the Company Law of 1993. However, in Chinese 
history, the legal system has never been independent of the state or political leadership 
and has been uninterruptedly regarded without interruption as part of the executive 
branch. The law still gave sufficient legal grounds to back the Party's involvement in 
enterprise decision-making (e. g. Art. 17 and Art. 31 of Company Law of 1993). The 
Communist Party had to approve the senior level appointments. On average, 90% of 
the board members in Chinese joint-stock companies are government officials and 
delegates of other state enterprises. As a matter of fact, all top managers must be 
approved by the Organization Department of local or central government if the listed 
companies are controlled by the state through the structure of ownership. In other 
words, due to most stock companies controlled by the state, political consideration is 
still supenor to the economic perfon-nance in the selection of managers, as a result 
managerial incentives are adversely affected. Therefore, managers in listed companies 
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who want to be promoted quickly, in particular to be official in governments, no doubt, 
have to care more about carrying out the wishes of the Party and government, such as 
keeping more workers in employment and maintaining some level of worker social 
security, paying more tax, than about the concerns of shareholders. It is no surprising 
that management decisions always reflect the old political concerns (political CoSt). 
548 
But in more recent years, its role in appointing top managers and directors has 
diminished compared with the past owing to the change of ownership structure. 
8.2.3. The influence of the Party on firms is declining through 
changes in ownership structure 
Even today the Communist Party in China has a profoundly influence on the corporate 
governance in listed companies by way of policy and law, because of the state policy 
of maintaining a full or controlling ownership interest in enterprises. This is the cause 
of a fundamental dilemma for Chinese SOEs. The state wants the enterprises it owns 
to be run efficiently, but not solely for the purpose of wealth maximization, it is also 
concerned with the maintenance of urban employment level, direct control over 
sensitive industries, and politically motivated job placement. From the central 
government's perspective, any SOE reform program must be designed to ensure the 
continuing political power of the Chinese Communist Party. However, this thesis 
argues that the long-term sustainability of economic growth, the well-being of citizens 
548 See Dongwei Su, 2005, 'Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China', China Economic Review, 
Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp 118-148. 
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and stability of society are really the aim of SOE reform, although China's SOEs were 
created to function not just as production units, but also to carry out social and 
political functions. 
Some scholars consider that firms perform better when the managers have 
decision-making autonomy over business operations, particularly over labour 
deployment, and when the state's share of ownership is low, and that firms whose 
CEOs are appointed by the govenu-nent have significantly worse perfonnance. That is 
to say, the higher the ratio of state-owned shares, the worse the firm is performance. 549 
This shows that it is very necessary for SOEs to be reformed, by the reduction of 
state-owned share in listed companies. 
Due to the under-performance of SOEs, China committed itself to carrying out a 
significant refonn of state-owned enterprises in 1997. The fifteenth Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in September 1997, endorsed a major policy 
shift. It involved a commitment to an immense privatization program made under the 
slogan "zhuada fangxiao", - "protect the large, release the small ), 
550 or 44grasp the 
big, enlivening the small' 9.55 1 This meant, firstly, providing assistance to the 500 to 
1,000 large "pillar industry" SOEs in the government's effort to restructure the state 
sector and allowing many of them to be listed on the stock exchanges. Secondly, it 
meant allowing small enterprises, over which the state was willing to give up control, 
549 E. g. Xu, X. N.. Wang, Y 1999, 'Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies', 
Chinese Economic Review 10, pp 75-98; Lisin Colin Xu, Tian Zhu, Yi-min Li, 2001jolitician Control, Agency 
Problems, and Firrn Performance: Evidence from a National Survey of Ownership Restructuring 
in China', 
Working Paper, (Decei-nber). 
550 See Ho, S. P. S., P. Bowles, and X. Dong, 2003, 'Letting go of the Small: An Analysis of the Privatization of 
Rural Enterprises in Jiangsu and Shangdo', The Journal of Development Studies 39(4), p 1. 
551 SeeSmyth, R, 1998, 'Toward " the Modem Corporation": Recent Developments in the Institutional Reform of 
State-Owned Enterprises in Mainland China", Issue & Studies, 34(8), pp 102-13 1. 
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to deten-nine their own path. In late 1998 the central government ordered all party and 
government administrative organs to sever links with the enterprises they control. 
However, it is impossible for party and government administrative departments to 
sever links with enterprises if the state has big shares in them, especially owning big 
shares in listed companies. 
The SOEs reforms require enterprises to set up a "modem enterprise system" 
which is characterized by four attributes: clearly defined property rights, clearly 
defined rights and responsibilities, the separation of politics and government from 
business activities, and the use of scientific management. But actually it is impossible 
to do these in China due to the structure of ownership by the state and intervention by 
the Communist Party. In a sense, Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges and the 
initial listings of public companies were politically driven. In particular, the selection 
process for listing companies was historically political in nature. The central 
government gave priority for listing to SOEs, while the quota system and the 
provincial recommendation format encouraged bribery at the different local 
government level. As a result, rampant corruption, false documentation, a convoluted 
selection process and interference in operation resulted in the overall disappointing 
perfon-nance of the listed companies. Therefore, at the beginning of IPO, without the 
settlement of the structure of ownership of listed companies, politics' influence on the 
management of firms still remains and leads to many problems today. 
Politics has influenced all walks of life in China indeed. We must pay attention to 
this fact when the refon-n was under way. At the early stage of the reform, 
China's 
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economic institutional environment discriminates against non-state-owned enterprises 
(NSOEs). The legal status of SOEs is well protected, and SOEs enjoy preferential 
access to capital, scarce materials, and favorable govemment policies, while NSOEs 
suffer under insecure property rights and are at a disadvantage in China's immature 
markets in securing capital and raw materials. In other words, the conditions of SOEs 
are much better than those of NSOEs at that time. As a result, SOEs and NSOEs rely 
on the support of politicians and bureaucrats to different extents. 552 However, NSOEs 
develop fast under the same environments; in a sense, SOEs enjoy better treatment or 
preference (of course SOEs bear historical burdens such as redundant employees), but 
their performance deteriorates, and one of reasons is that NSOEs are not controlled by 
the Communist Party and the state has no share in them at all, although they are also 
influenced by politics through law, regulation, and policy. 
As we know the corporate governance of listed companies has been affected by 
politics based on the above analysis. The Communist Party is the governing party or 
ruler, and it is the structure of ownership controlled by the Communist Party through 
the state that leads to the control of listed companies. Supposedly if listed companies 
are privatized completely or only some of the shares are controlled by the Communist 
Party as ruler, for example only 10% instead of 30 % or more, the listed companies 
will not be controlled or interfered with by politicians, or at least, influence by 
Communist Party will be very limited. NSOEs are interfered with by politicians, but 
they are not controlled by Communist Party and their performance is very good in the 
552 See Sonia M. L. Wong, Sonja Opper and Ruyin HU, 2004, 'Shareholding Structure, Depot itici zat, on and Firm 
Perfon-nance: Lessons from China's Listed Firrn', Economics of Transition, Volume 12(l), p 36. 
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market economy. in other words, the poor quality of corporate governance of listed 
companies is determined by the structure of concentrated ownership which is 
controlled by the Communist Party. 
Today the situation in listed companies is changing with the development of the 
economy and the maturity of the market. In other words, the development of the 
economy has brought about a change in the structure of concentrated ownership that is 
controlled by the Communist Party. Once the structure of concentrated ownership 
adjusts properly in the market, the influence of the Party on corporate governance will 
decline soon. In particular the opportunity for appointment of board of directors and 
managers is declining as the amount of the share holding of the state is reduced in 
listed companies. In fact the influence of the Communist Party on corporate 
governance is declining now. 
8.3. Conclusion 
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Communist Party as the 
only ruling party could detennine the governance of state-owned and collective 
enterprises through the state that reflects the willingness of Communist Party 
sufficiently. Thus, politics indeed have a great effect on enterprises in China. 
Historically, the Communist Party completely controlled the governance of SOEs due 
to ownership by the state. However, with the gradual development of the privatization 
of enterprises in China, the influence of politics on governance of enterprises 
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decreases step by step. In particular, when enterprises are corporatized, politics only 
influence the governance by the structure of ownership because the state is still the 
largest shareholder in most listed companies in China. But the influence of the Party 
on company will fall when the market is mature and structure of ownership is 
changeable because the market reforms give rise to the adjustment of the structure of 
ownership that leads to altering relations of dependence on the govenunent hierarchy, 
greatly affecting the Party's ability to monitor, sanction, and reward its members, and 
that this will in turn reduce its capacity to govern the companies from the perspective 
of both its legitimacy and its monitoring and enforcement. 553 Then if the structure of 
ownership of listed companies in China changes from concentrated ownership to 
dispersed ownership to a certain degree and the model of corporate governance will 
change too. So it is the structure of ownership that detennines directly the governance 
of the corporation. 
In a word, in China the problems of corporate governance in listed companies are 
rooted in the structure of concentrated ownership. The structure of concentrated 
ownership by the state Provides potential justifications for political intervention. That 
is to say, the Communist Party as a ruler in China leads the country, and the state 
controls listed companies through its the shareholding. Therefore political 
intervention into the affairs of listed companies leads, as the logic result, to political 
costs. But with the maturity of the market economy in China, the ownership structure 
of listed companies will adjust reasonably and efficiently, and the influence of the 
553 See Nee V and Lan P, 1994, 'Sleeping with the Enemy: A Dynamic Model of Declining Political 
Commitment 
in State Socialism', Theory Soc. 23, pp 253-96; Walder AG; 1994, 'The Decline of Communist Power. Elements of 
a Theory of Institutional Changc', Theory Soc. 23, pp 297-323. 
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Communist Party on it will drop greatly. 
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Chapter 9. Law, ownership and 
corporate governance 
9.1. Introduction 
A good quality legal system will improve the corporate govemance of listed 
companies because complete and effective laws will provide all the shareholders with 
equal status, and in particular give the minority shareholders protection against 
tunneling, exploitation, and other illegal transactions by the controlling shareholders. 
However, the law only provides the platfonn for the protection of all shareholders. In 
reality, the share as a kind of property, and especially according to the principle of one 
share-one vote, big shareholders always control the company and its organization. 
Therefore laws have to be subject to the rule of the market in the economy. 
9.2. The characteristics of Chinese law 
The Chinese legal system is of great antiquity in the world since ancient times 
compared with the West. However, since the late Qing dynasty, China started to learn 
from the legal system of the West, except for in Mao's times. In fact even during 
Mao's times, China learned from the legal system of the former Soviet Union in the 
1950s at least. Therefore in contemporary times, China has constantly learned from 
the legal systems of other countries but retains its own character. 
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In ancient China, the legal system was a combination of 'li' (ceremony, or 
morality and virtues) and 'fa' (law, or punishment). The former is the spirit of 
Confucianism (soul), or at least, it is the value and spirit of traditional Chinese law 
that is enforced by morality or other local ways, and the latter is the body (system) 
that is enforced by officials at all levels of governments. The Confucian spirit ('Ii') 
and the Legalist system ('fa') constitute the primary content of traditional Chinese 
law. 554 With regard to 'fa' (law), a distinctive feature of China's legal tradition is that 
the legal system is not separated from, or independent of, the administrative system. 
At least since the Tang Dynasty (818-906 A. D. ) and until the end of Qing in 1911, the 
system of government in China consisted of a strong central government headed by 
the Emperor, who ruled through a bureaucracy and with absolute power. The lowest 
ranking officials at the county level represented the central govenunent and in effect 
exercised all of the power of the state, including tax collection, public works, and 
even deciding lawsuit cases. Thus, adjudication was simply one of many 
administrative duties. Since there was no doctrine of the separation of powers among 
government institutions as in the West, the country magistrate's power was virtually 
unchecked except that the subjects could technically and luckily appeal to a higher 
level official. Another distinctive feature is the emphasis on administrative and 
criminal sanctions, with a lack of formal development in civil liability and procedural 
law. 555 The traditional Chinese view, even as of today, is that the law is considered as 
554 Zeng Xianyi, Ma Xiaohong, 2006, 'A Dialectic Study of the Structure and Basic Concepts of Traditional 
Chinese Law and an Analysis of the Relationship Between 'li' (ceremony) and Ia' (law)', Front. Law 
China, 
1: 34-52. 
555 Some Jurists in China do not agree with the above opinion, they think law system in China is very complete in 
ancient times with its civil law and procedural law. 
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a tool used by the ruler to enforce its power and authoritative control over people and 
to maintain social order. For example, the central part of the Qing Dynasty's legal 
system, the Qing Code was a collection of rules that were predominantly concerned 
with official activities, in particular punishment imposed on wrongdoings or illegal 
actions, and the functions of bureaucrats within the government apparatus, not with 
disputes and relationships between and among private citizens. The imperial law 
involved private matters only so far, as the matters were considered to influence 
imperial policies. Thus, the code was primarily of an administrative nature, and it 
attempted to rely only on administrative and criminal penalties. In other words, the 
Qing Code seemed to be mixture of administrative law and criminal law instead of 
civil law that regulates equal civil relationship of rights and obligations between 
entities. This is distinct from the Roman law tradition, from which most Western laws 
are originated. As regards Roman law, civil law rather than administrative law is at the 
heart of law systems. Even today's law in China is still regarded a tool of the ruling 
class. 556 In brief, with regard to the Chinese legal system in the past, there is no 
distinction between substantive law and procedural law; inadequate differentiation 
between different fields of law; the emphasis on the importance of the administrative 
law and punishment; and'li' (ceremony, or morality and virtues) plays an important 
role in the regulation of people's behaviour in daily life. 
9.3. What is the relationship between law and ownership in 
556 See Zhiwu Chen, 2003, 'Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case', China Economic 
Re\, clw 14, pp453-454. 
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China today? 
It seems that there is the same status in protection between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders under the Company Law of 1993 and the Securities Law of 
1998. That is to say, all of shareholders of listed companies seem to be treated equally 
in terms of the rights attached to their shareholding. However, given that most 
legal-persons or corporations are state-owned or state-controlled, about two thirds of 
most corporations' shares are state- controlled directly or indirectly. In fact this 
ownership structure has been a major factor that restricts private securities litigations 
in court, because granting damage awards in private litigation would amount to the 
loss of state assets, which puts the court in a conflicted situation. It is logically normal 
that law protects the state-owned assets because the very justification for starting a 
stock market in China was to help the SOEs raise capital from the general public and 
solve the money-losing SOEs' financial problems instead of offering the general 
public a means to diversify investment portfolios and hedge future 
consumption/income risks. Therefore, it is very difficult for injured shareholders on 
behalf of the company to bring suit against the management of listed companies when 
management breaks some provision of the law, such as self-dealing, false 
representation, or manipulation. For example, Mr. Shao, a shareholder in a listed 
company called Sanjiu Yiyao, lodged a suit against the chairman of the listed 
company before Shenzhen Intermediate Court. The plaintiff claimed that the listed 
company engaged in illegal lending to its controlling shareholder, and the listed 
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company failed to disclose it publicly according to laws and regulations, and the 
chainnan of the controlling shareholder broke his fiduciary duty towards the listed 
company. However, the court refused the case. 557 Later, a lot of cases in relation to 
state assets or state- controlled assets in listed companies were rejected by the courts. 
Until on 15 January 2002, the Supreme People's Court issued officially the Circular 
on Accepting Civil Compensation Cases Arising from Securities Market False 
Representation. Under the Circular, an investor could bring an action for false 
representation only, but subject to the condition that administrative sanctions have 
been imposed on the alleged false representation only and reason is that litigation in 
relation to securities is specially complicated and needs to be investigated fully before 
courts accept them, which is in conformity with the nature of classic law in China. 
That is to say, law has been subject to administrative authority since ancient times. 
Thus in China the strategy, policy and operations used to be decided in an arbitrary 
manner, which seems to be the conventional way to settle problems rather than by 
outsider scrutiny, specially under the law. For instance, even claimants on the firm's 
resources who should have the right and power to ensure the finn's sound operation 
may have their claims be dismissed by companies or courts. In general, this hinders 
the efficiency of SOEs and creates moral hazard easily. 558 
As we know, it has been implausible to talk about transplanting legal norms and 
institutions from developed to developing countries without the caveat that the 
functioning of such imported legal rules and institutions will, of course, be affected by 
557 See Wang Lu, 2003, 'First Derivative Suit refused by Court' Shanghai Stock News, (22 Apnil). 
558 See World Bank, 1997, 'China's Management of Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder( Country Study), 
Washington DC: The World Bank. 
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the local political, historical, traditional, social, economic and cultural contexts. "The 
evolution of Chinese business, financial, and commercial law during China's 
transition from economic planning is a wonderful illustration of this complexity , 559 
In other words, law is subject to the special environments. In China, the law seems to 
protect more the interests of the state rather than any other interests in the certain 
environment. 
9.4. Corporate governance 
9.4.1. Background 
The corporatization program was launched by the Chinese government under the law 
in response to the unsatisfactory results of the incentive contract system that I 
discussed above. In theory, corporatization may enhance efficiency through better 
monitoring of managers, improvements in information-sharing channels, reduction of 
agent cost and a reduction in governmental political intervention, without changing 
state ownership, by structuring the internal governance system of SOEs according to 
that of a modem corporation. That is, the main strategy and aims, are to turn SOEs 
from sole state proprietorships controlled by industry-specific government agencies at 
various administrative levels to modern-form corporations with a Western-style 
corporate governance structure, without serious erosion of the dominant public, but 
559 See John K.. M. Ohnesorge, 2003, 'China's Economic Transition and the New Legal Origins Literature', China 
Economic Rcvicw 14, p 486. 
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not necessarily state, ownership. However, in practice the legislation in China is not 
consistent with this theory. For example, sometimes there is a conflict between laws: 
the shareholding system raises questions as to who should hold the property rights in 
state assets when state enterprises convert to the shareholding system. Article 2 of the 
State-owned Enterprise Law of 1988, one the one hand, provides that the state is the 
owner of the property of the state-owned enterprise, as well as exercising the rights of 
ownership over state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the state-owned enterprise 
has a legal person status but does not own the property it manages. Thus, it seems that 
there is no true conversion of state-owned enterprises into modem corporations as that 
in Western public corporations. 
Of course, corporatization has many purposes, but the chief one is the promotion 
of higher efficiency through better management. Corporatization is intended to 
address through structural reform three features of the traditional system of state 
ownership that are blamed for the inefficiency of that sector. First, commentators 
criticize the problem of efficiency of SOEs, because the state controls and interferes 
in the operation of SOEs through the structure of ownership, with the resultant 
imposition of non-profit-maximizing objectives on enterprise managers. Second, they 
point to the problem of conflicts of interest between agencies. The conflicting 
objectives from multiple state agencies with authority over the enterprise often 
occurred. Third, they point to the problem of monitoring. The state agencies consist of 
varying departments, who should monitor managers and who can policy the monitor 
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of the managers? 560 Corporatization can transform most SOEs into three types of 
shareholding companies: limited liability companies, joint stock limited companies, 
and employee-owned stock cooperatives. In other words, Corporatization of SOE 
stated in 1992 as a way of clarifying property rights of SOEs and improving their 
performance. There are provisions on joint stock limited companies and limited 
liability companies in The Company Law of the People's Republic of China of 1993. 
According to the Company Law of 1993, the corporatization of SOEs has provided a 
potentially superior institutional arrangement for corporate governance, with more 
rigorous requirements in terms of the duties of directors and required disclosure called 
for. But in fact Chinese companies are mainly controlled or fully owned by the state 
and characterized by insider control, priority of political aims, weak oversight 
mechanisms, inadequate safeguards for outsider and minority shareholders, excessive 
power of CEOs and the lack of transparency. In a word, corporatization is not as 
successful as people expect on account of the state as controlling shareholder, 
especially listed companies in China. 
9.4.2. The Concept and character of corporate governance 
The study of corporate governance in China started in the mid- I 990s. One of the most 
influential viewpoints, of the famous economist Wu Jianlian, is as follows: corporate 
governance as the organizational structure which consists of shareholders, the board 
560 See Donald C. Clarke, 2003, 'Corporate Governance in China: An Overview', China Economic Rev, ew 14, p 
497. 
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of directors and senior managers. Within the structure, shareholders entrusts their 
capital to the board of directors that has the power to appoint, reward and penalize 
managers. 561 He emphasizes the corporate governance is one kind of system or 
arrangement. 
According to the Company Law of 1993, Chinese listed companies adopt a 
two-tier board structure, a Board of Directors and a Supervisory Board. It seems that 
the corporate governance structure in China bear resemblance to the two-tier system 
of corporate governance in Gennany. There are a board of directors and a supervisory 
board in both countries. However, there are substantial differences in corporate 
governance structure between the two countries, for instance, in China, there is no 
hierarchical relationship between the board of directors and the board of supervisors, 
although the latter can supervise the fonner, and both directors and supervisors are 
appointed by, and may be dismissed by, shareholders at general meeting according to 
company law. In contrast, the German supervisory board can not only monitor the 
managerial board and but also appoint, dismiss, the members of the managerial 
562 board. 
Although many SOEs have been transformed into corporations according to the 
company law, their managements still attempt to evade the corporate governance 
requirements stipulated by law and regulations, and companies remain like the 
563 traditional SOE governance model . In some corporations, some 
directors who do 
561 See Wu Jianlian, 1994, 'The Focus of the Reform in 1995', Mimeograph, p 185. 
562 See Cindy A. Schipani and Junhai Liu, 2002, 'Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now', Columbia 
Business Law Review, Vol. 1: 1- 
563 See, wang Yanchun et al. 2000, 'Listed Corporations Walking on the Old Way in New Shoes', China 
Economic 
Times, (Jan. 20), p 1. 
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not take the board meeting rules seriously get used to the way of management and 
operation as before. 564 In addition, companies establish shareholders' general meeting, 
the board of directors, and board of supervisory according to laws and regulations, but 
they are more a matter of form than substance. The Board of Directors is controlled 
by the company's parent company. In some companies, directors are managers or 
executives, and the excessive overlap in these positions causes corruption. In a word, 
the corporate governance of listed companies is very poor because of the structure of 
concentrated ownership in China. 
9.4.3. The structure of corporate governance"' 
9.4.3.1. Shareholders' general meeting 
According to the Company Law of 1993, the shareholders' general meeting is the 
most powerful organ of a listed company, but this is not always the case in reality. For 
example, some scholars conducted a survey based on 248 listed companies accounting 
for about 25% of listed companies in China, and came to the conclusion that it was the 
board of directors that had the highest average level of decision-making power, 
second place was managers, followed by the shareholders' general meeting and 
supervisory board respectively. 566 The reason is that it is prevalent that controlling 
564 See Chen Qingtai, 2000, 'The Chair is Not the Number one Leader in the Corporation', People's Daily, (Jan. 
10), p 12. 
565 Compared with Company Law of 1993(effective as of 1994), Company Law of 2005 (effective as of 2006) 
has 
been revised a bit, in particular with respect to the protection of minority shareholders and requirement 
for the 
amount of legal capitalization. However, the structure of corporate governance is the same. 
566 See Opper Sonja, Sonia M. L. Wong, and Ruyin HU, 200 1, 'The Power Structure in China's Listed Companies: 
The Company Law and its Enforcernent', Working Paper No. 1039, Hong Kong Institute of Economic and Business 
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shareholders may enrich themselves at the cost of listed companies and other minority 
shareholders by manipulating the board of directors. In China, the corporate bodies of 
some SOEs subsidiaries are under the direct control of their parent corporations, 
which are owned by the state. The listed companies should be independent from their 
parent corporations and shareholders in terms of "independent personnel, independent 
assets and independent finance" in accordance with laws and regulations. However, 
the excessive connections between the listed companies and parent corporations have 
caused serious problems for some of the creditors and the minority shareholders of the 
listed companies. Because companies are always interfered with by government as the 
largest shareholder, some scholars argue that the incorporation of SOEs in China 
should be viewed as "nothing different but the logo" or "new bottles with the old 
wine". 567 That is, the corporate governance structure of listed companies is the same 
as that of the SOEs was before and the state as biggest shareholder can control most 
listed companies in China. 
Poor governance practices are rampant among Chinese listed companies because 
the state is the largest shareholder. For example, in 2001, the largest shareholder of 
Meierya, which had been a profitable company, colluded with other related parties 
and appropriated $ 44.6 million or 41% of the listed company's total equity. In the 
same year, the largest shareholder of Sanjiu Pharmacy embezzled $ 301.9 million or 
96% of this listed company's total equity. 568 This shows that a shareholders' general 
Strategy, University of Hong Kong. 
567 See Xianian Xu and Yan Wang, 1997, 'Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate 
Perfon-nance 
, the 
Case of Chinese Stock Companies', Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank Economic 
De\, elopi-nent Institute Office of the Director, ( June). 
568 See, Chong-En Bai, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank M. Song, Junxi Zhang, 2004, 'Corporate Governance and Market 
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meeting of a listed company controlled by the largest shareholder can not exercises its 
power properly, although its right is the most powerful according to law. Therefore 
improving corporate governance should be the crucial objective of China's further 
economic refon-n. 
9.4.3.2. Board of directors 
Although listed companies are set up in accordance with laws, under the current 
corporate governance structure of listed companies in China, the board of directors is 
dominated by the controlling shareholder. A survey of corporate governance for both 
Southern China and Eastern China showed the boards of directors and other 
departments of both Southern China and Eastern China were controlled by insiders at 
the time of listing. This situation has remained essentially unchanged after the 
listing. 569 This lack of change in leadership leads to bias against change of the model 
of operation and management, which can hinder performance improvement following 
privatization. 570 It is common in China that the Chairman of the board is also the 
CEO of the company. According to theory, this "duality" must give rise to benefits as 
well as costs. 571 Duality makes no distinction between shareholding and management 
functions, which brings unity of action but at the cost of board independence. 572 
Valuation in China', Journal of Comparative Econimics 32, p 600. 
569 See Pamela Mar, and Michael N. Young, 2001, 'Corporate Governance In Transition Economic: A Case Study 
of Two Chinese Airlines', Journal of World Business 36(3), pp 288-289. 
570 See Andrews, W. A., & Dowling, M. J. 1998, 'Explaining Performance Changes in Newly Privatization Firms, 
Journal of Management Studies, 35(5), p 601. 
571 See Boyd, B. K. 1995, 'CEO duality and firm perfon-nance: A Contingency Model', Strategic Management 
Journal, p 16. 
572 See Boyd, B. K. 1995, 'CEO duality and fin-n performance: A Contingency Model', Strategic Management 
Journal, 
,p 
16; Finkelstsin, S., & D' Aveni, R. 1994, 'CEO duality as a double-edged Sword: How Boards of 
Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command', Academy of Management Journal, 27(5), 
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International evidence suggests that corporate boards need directors who are not just 
independent of management, but take direct responsibility for the company and are 
indirectly accountable to shareholders, in particular to minority shareholders. China 
models itself after the West and introduces the independent director system to 
strengthen the independence of the board, limit abuse by controlling shareholders and 
protect the interests of minority shareholders. In 2001 the CSRC issued the Proposed 
Guidelines on Establishment of the Independent Directors System in Listed 
Companies. According to the Guidelines, all listed companies in China must amend 
their articles of association and employ independent directors including at least one 
professional accountant, there must be at least two independent directors on the board 
prior to 30 June 2002, and least one-third of the board must be independent directors 
prior to 30 June 2003. But the function of the independent directors system is limited 
and the independence of independent directors is sometimes in doubt because in 
practice independent directors are usually nominated by the board of director, and 
then elected by the shareholders' general meeting, which is influenced by controlling 
shareholders. 573 The empirical evidence showed that about 67% of independent 
directors admitted that major interference with their work came from the state as a 
controlling shareholder and then from management. 574 So it is impossible for the 
independent director system to play a positive role in improving the quality of listed 
companies without a fundamental change in the current ownership structure, which 
pp 1079-1108. 
573 See Jin Yorighong and Xi Yuqin, 2003, 'The Independent Directors System and Corporate Governance of 
Chinese Listed Companies', Lixin Accounting Press, pp 172-173; Kong Xiang, 2001 'A Study on the Independent 
Director System' Research Report of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
5'4 See Tong Lu, 2002, 'Development of System of Independent Directors and the Chinese Experience', Working 
Paper, Chinese Academy of Social Science. 
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results in insider control problems and the ineffectiveness of the board of directors. 575 
In addition, regarding wholly state-owned companies, the Company Law (both 
1993 and 2005) has special stipulations. The Corporate Law as originally enacted only 
required two corporate bodies in a wholly State-owned corporation: the board of 
directors and the CEO. Because there are no general meetings of shareholders in 
state-owned corporations, the board of directors and the CEO have more governing 
powers that their counterparts have in other types of corporations. Instead of the 
general meeting of shareholders, the boards of director, state-authorized investment 
institutions or government agencies under authorization have the power to make 
decisions on important corporate issues as the shareholders' meeting does in normal 
companies. 576 Therefore, such corporations are completely controlled by the state. 
9.4.3.3. Board of supervisors 
What about the board of supervisors of listed companies? In fact, the supervisory 
board has little influence on the company's activities. The effectiveness of the 
supervisory board's monitoring function has attracted much widespread criticism 
since its inception. 577 Because the supervisory board has limited power under the 
Company Law of 1993 and could not carry out the monitoring function. Pursuant to 
law, one of the functions of the supervisory board is to review the financial statements 
575 See Wan Cuiying, 2002, 'Skepticism on the Introduction of Independent Director System: Perfecting the 
Supervisory Board of listed Companies in China', Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Trade, Vol. 23 
No. 2, pp 56-58. 
576 company law (1993), article 66; company law (2005), article 67. 
S77 See Lin Cyril, 2001, 'Private Vices in Public Places: Challenges in Corporate Governance in Development in 
China', Working Paper, The OECD Development Centre Research Project on Corporate Governance in 
Development and Emerging Economics. 
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and the auditor's report. In addition, the composition of supervisors usually consists 
of officials chosen from government offices at various levels or from the parent 
company, although the company law also stipulates the representative of employee 
must be members of the supervisory board, such as accounting for not less than 1/3. 
How can the supervisors monitor the managers appointed by governments? In brief, 
the board of supervisors has assumed largely decorative functions. How to improve 
the Supervisory Board? To enhance the usefulness of the Supervisory Board, it must 
be independent, in particular, not subordinate to the Party Committee and the board of 
directors, and then it will be given more power. 
According to law, the supervisory board consists of at least three members in 
listed companies, who are either shareholder representatives or employee 
representatives. It means they are dominated by controlling shareholders, or the 
majority of the supervisors have less business experience and no management 
background at all. Some scholars drew the conclusion: in practice there are four types 
of supervisory board in listed companies as follows. 
"(1) an honored guest, this type is only a mere physical existence, and the 
supervisory board briefly meets twice a year. They are technically 
incompetent, or retiring with little motivation. (2) A friendly advisor, in 
this type of supervisory board, they are free to air their views, but they are 
strongly dependent on the board of director and CEO. Here, the 
supervisory board typically consists of representatives of the dominant 
shareholder or friendly outsiders. (3) A censored watchdog, the 
supervisory board in this category is particularly strong in terms of 
technical expertise and they attempt to undertake their legal duties 
diligently, but they are not allowed to disclose faithfully their findings. (4) 
An independent watchdog, very few supervisory boards fall into this 
group except that companies issue B-share, H-shares, or shares listed in 
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foreign exchange. " 
578 
Although many SOEs have been changed into business corporations according to 
the company law, these listed companies are still controlled by the state as the biggest 
shareholder, which leads to the operation of companies in the best interests of the state, 
meaning sometimes the maximization of social interests instead of economic 
efficiency. Meanwhile most members of the supervisory board in listed companies are 
designated by the state. As a result, it is impossible for the supervisory board to play 
its supervisory function. 
9.5. The future of corporate governance 
It is not difficult to draw the conclusion that the major impediment to corporate 
governance development is the continued excessive ownership by the state which 
undermines and distorts the market in China. It is the structure of concentrated 
ownership which is the main reason for poor corporate governance of listed 
companies in China. Thus, ownership diversification and the reduction of state 
ownership of listed companies are necessary for the reform of listed companies. 
What model of corporate governance will China follow in the future? Scholar Xu 
suggests that China should model itself after the Germany/japan bank model and set 
up corporate governance mechanisms with institutional or legal investors as its main 
578 See, Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari, Jason Zezong Xiao and Mei Yang, 2003, 'The Usefulness of the Supervisory 
Board Report in China', Corporate Governance, Volumel 1, Number 4, (October), pp 313-315. 
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bod Y. 579 But scholar Zhang argues that the main bank model cannot work effectively 
unless commercial banks in China are privatized as the first step. 580 Some people 
argue that China should adopt a mixed model of corporate governance. This hybrid 
model puts the emphasis on managers' self-realization of internal motivation and 
control, should be more effective than the UK/US external market mechanism. First 
of all, since financial institutions in China have incentives to supervise finns, China's 
current institutional environment seems to be more like that of Japan and Germany in 
the early days of their success than those of the United State or the United Kingdom. 
But when the long privatization process is successful and most shares are tradable, 
and when both the market is relatively mature and individual investors are more 
sophisticated, then the US/UK model should replaces the former one. Currently, it 
seems that the market regulatory framework in China tries to follow more the UK/US 
model, while the internal and external monitoring mechanism is more similar to the 
Germany/Japan model. However, with a view to long-term development, it is 
desirable for China to create its own model that matches its unique environments. 581 
Some scholars suggest that there are five conditions upon which China should base its 
choice of a generic corporate governance model: (1) the model must match China's 
economic development and maturity of its capital market (stock or securities market); 
(2) the model can make sure that firms promote long-term stable growth and 
579 See Xu. X. N, 1997, 'Establishing Corporate governance Mechanism and Capital Market with Legal Persons as 
Its Main Body', Journal of Reforrn No. 5( in Chinese),. 
580 See Zhang, Weiying, 1998, 'China's SOE Refon-n: A Corporate Governance Perspective', Working Paper, 
Institute of Business Research, Peking University. 
581 See Simon S. M. Ho, 2003, 'Corporate Governance in China: Key Problems and Prospects', Working Paper, 
Centre for Accounting Disclosure and Corporate Governance School of Accountancy, The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, 
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development; (3) the model can guarantee that investors monitor management 
effectively; (4) the model can make sure that management has the autonomy to 
operate the business independently; (5) the model can offer incentives and control 
mechanisms effectively to stimulate or regulate the behavior of investors, the 
management and employees. 582 This thesis argues that corporate governance must be 
adapted to the reality of China. But the precondition is that the structure of 
concentrated ownership by the state must be reformed and adjusted properly. 
9.6. Conclusion 
The new Company Law of the People's Republic of China, which came into force on 
I" January 2006, will provide more protection of investors, in particular minority 
shareholders compared with the old one. Meanwhile the reform of previous non-trade 
shares owned by the state and legal person was finished by the end of 2006 and those 
non-traded shares will be traded on stock exchanges three years later. Maybe the next 
step is to deten-nine how to sell off the shares owned by the state according to law and 
regulation and the rule of the market. What will the result be for the corporate 
governance of listed companies in China in the future? This will remain to be seen. 
582 See Simon S. M. Ho, 2003, 'Corporate Governance in China: Key Problems and Prospects', Working Paper, 
Centre for Accounting Disclosure and Corporate Governance School of Accountancy, The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. (citing He, S. W. and Xu, M. B. 2000, 'State-owned Enterprises Reforms and Strategic 
Re-organizations', China Financial and Economic Publisher. ). 
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Chapter 10. Disadvantages of the 
Structure of Concentrated Ownership 
10.1. Introduction 
China has started focusing on its economic development by adopting reform and an 
open policy since 1978. Before the reform, the input and output of SOEs were 
detennined by the state according to central planning. A study shows that "the share of 
the state-owned sector is approximately 71.4% to 99.7% in various socialist countries 
in the 1970s and the1980s, whereas it is the percentage of the private sector in 
,, 583 capitalist countries. Traditionally, the state had public ownership and enjoyed 
control rights over SOEs in China. SOEs, not only considered as working units and 
tools of policy but also serving as a platfonn to link the state and public, were the 
basic units for the state to organize society and offer social welfare responsibility, 
such as employment, housing, schools, kindergarten, shop and hospital for enterprises' 
employees and families, which were very heavy burden for SOEs. 584 In other words, 
SOEs were viewed as a tool of implementation of state polices in place of the 
maximization of profitability As a result, the socialist economy is no way to go under 
the central planning system. 
The success of China's economic reform in a sense is dependent on restructuring 
583 See Kornai, J., 1992, The Socialism System: The Political Economy of Communism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
72. 
4 See Schipani A. and Liu J. H. , 
2002, 'Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now', Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 
p 9. 
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state-owned enterprises. There are two competing approaches regarding China's 
economic reform suggested by economists: the market approach and the ownership 
approach. On the former approach, it is believed that if the markets for products, for 'r 
factors of production, and for corporate control are created and function well, 
efficiency improvements of SOEs can be achieved without dramatic changes in 
ownership that will be improved and adjusted correspondingly This market-oriented 
approach posits that if competitive markets are shaped for products or factors of 
production, SOEs can be successfully transformed from loss-making cost centers into 
profitable, return-oriented investment centers without radical changes in the 
ownership structure but the structure of ownership will adjust properly with 
development of market. In fact the market-orient approach seemed difficult to be 
implemented in the late 1999s without a change in the structure of ownership of SOEs. 
On the latter approach, it is argued that private ownership is a necessary condition for 
enterprise efficiency, and enterprise efficiency will not be fostered without a change 
of ownership of SOEs. China has implemented a reform strategy that, at the initial 
stage, gives priority to developing markets and facilitating institutional changes in 
place of a change of ownership, characterized as the "gradualism" strategy controlled 
by government. 585 However, the practice proves that the reform of SOEs seems no 
progress in the late 1990s without the change of ownership. 
Although the Company Law was enacted in 1993, state-dominated PLCs were 
popular. The 15 th Congress of the CCP in the fall of 1997 announced the policy of 
585 See Qu Qiang, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and State-owned Shares in China Listed Companies', Journal of 
Asian Economic 14, p 778. 
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ownership diversification in the state sector, and made it explicitly clear that 
"shareholding system" meant SOEs would be reformed completely. While many 
researchers considered it as turning on a green light to massive privatization, it also 
restated that public ownership should continue to keep dominant in the Chinese 
economy Similarly, a decision of the 4 th Plenum of the 15 th Party Congress 
(September 1999), and the State Planning and Development Commission (SPDC) 
January 2000 statement elaborating on this decision, reaffirmed that while state 
ownership would be lessened in a number of sectors, it would keep dominant in 
industries of strategic importance such as infrastructure, key producer goods, etc. Few 
specific practical measures for divestiture have in fact been formulated. The 16 th CpC 
Congress held in November, 2002 called for establishing a new state asset 
management system, "unifying the duty of managing assets, personnel and affairs"; 
and as late as 2003, in the news conference held by the newly established state-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) on 22 May 2003, the 
controlling role of state assets was once more emphasized . 
586 Today reforrn of the 
structure of ownership of listed companies has been under way since 2005; as 
mentioned above, all state-owned and legal persons' shares can be traded on a stock 
exchange soon. In a word, this thesis thinks optimal resource allocation is unlikely to 
be achieved simply by creating a market without changing the ownership structure of 
SOEs in China. 
586 See Qu Qiang, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and State-owned Shares in China Listed Companies', Journal of 
Asian Economic 14, p 780. 
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10.2. Ownership, market and competition 
In theory, the market is viewed as the most efficient mechanism to allocate resources 
based on the fundamental assumptions of perfect competition, no agency costs, low 
information costs, good price mechanism, and no public goods. In reality, there will 
be market failure, which can result from a number of causes including asymmetries of 
information, agency problems, incentives to shirk and cheat, motives for free-riding 
and other risks that will not be expected, 587 and which can lead to divergence 
between profit and welfare objectives in private firms. Thus the market may not 
function properly to effect in resource allocation as supposed, especially under 
non-competitive conditions, for example, where there is a centrally planned economy, 
and so governments may intervene to avoid the market failure by administrative 
orders or ways. 588 Effective markets would facilitate ownership reform and the 
enforcement of property rights while clarified ownership and property rights would 
improve the efficiency of markets and competition. However, an unreasonable 
structure of ownership will do harm to the market and competition, for example, a 
highly concentrated state-owned share in a sector will strangle competition and result 
in monopoly. Competition can greatly improve monitoring possibilities and incentives 
for productive efficiency. In general, the logic of competition suggests that a more 
complete specification of individual property rights decreases uncertainty and will 
587 See Alchain, Armen and Harold Demsetz, 1972, 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', 
American Economic Review 62, pp 777-95; Williamson, Oliver, 1975, Markets and Hierarchies; Analysis and 
Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press; North, Douglass C, 1981, Structure and Change in Economic 
History, New York: Norton. 
588 See Willian L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter, 2001, 'From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on 
Privatization', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 2. 
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expedite efficient allocation and use of resources in market. 589 In particular, among 
firms with private ownership, competition facilitates performance comparisons, which 
can generally strike a balance between incentives and risk when several agents 
(managers) confronting correlated uncertainties are being policed in a market 
economy. 590 Some scholars, in their international cross-section analysis of 
competitive industries, find that private enterprises are more profitable and more 
efficient than state-owned enterprises. 591 That is to say, in competitive industries 
private ownership is generally preferable on efficiency grounds. Therefore, ownership, 
competition and market are interrelated. A mature market can promote sufficient 
competition and facilitate the clarification of ownership rights; clarification of 
ownership rights will make the market reasonable and competition efficient, while 
sufficient and efficient competition will strengthen the development of a dynamic 
market and the structure of scientific ownership. 
China has been successful in economic reform in the past thirty years, and the 
small and medium SOEs have been sold off and this has made a great contribution to 
the progress of the economy, but it seems that there will be no final success of reforrn 
without a change of the ownership structure of big SOEs. Therefore this thesis argues 
that the structure of ownership of the big SOEs should be changed greatly once China 
has become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), otherwise the big 
589 See Eirik GFurubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, 1972, 'Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of 
Recent Literature', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Dec., ), p 114 1. 
590 See Hart, Oliver, 1983, 'The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme', Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn, 
14, pp 366-82, Holrnstro, Bengt, 1982(a), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of Economics, (Autumn), 13, pp 
324-40; Nalebuff, Barry, and Joseph Stiglitz, 1983, 'Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of 
Compensation and Competition', Bell Journal of Economics, ( Spring 14), pp 21-43. 
591 See Boardman, Anthony, and Aidan Vining, 1989, 'Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: 
A Comparison of the Perforinance of Private, Mixed and State-owned Enterprises', Journal of Law and 
Economics, 
(April 32), pp 1-33. 
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SOEs will be ineffective and uncompetitive compared with other forms of enterprises 
at home and aboard in the circumstances of globalization. It will not be enough simply 
to create markets for products, workers, managers and other factors of production 
because the structure of concentrated ownership by the state not only influences the 
market and competition negatively, but also makes the market and competition out of 
order which will result in regression in economy. 
In the past, most Chinese firms were controlled by the goverru-nent and had little 
flexibility in making decisions on hiring/firing or on business operations. There was 
no market and no competition at all because the SOEs and collective enterprises were 
under the central planning economy After the reform and opening up to the outside 
world, product-market competition was always highly uneven and segmented across 
sectors and regions due to the protection of the interests of sectors or regions without 
the unification of the market. With the development of the market, intense 
competition, and change of ownership, the need for autonomy to enable firms to make 
labour and business decisions to achieve their profit maximization objective is very 
important in the transition process from a centrally planned to a market economy. In 
China, the stock market is the symbol of the reform of economy The securities market 
can be viewed as a first step toward creating domestic capital markets. Of course, the 
securities market can be a tool through which the government can shift some of its 
SOE responsibilities to economic forces because most SOEs were performing poorly, 
and the securities market became an easy avenue for companies to raise funding from 
the public and shape some independence from political influence through the modem 
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corporate system. Generally speaking, good corporate governance must offer the 
appropriate market incentives. For a firm's corporate governance practice to have a 
positive effect on its market value, two conditions must be met. First, good 
governance must constantly increase the returns to the firm's shareholders and 
stakeholders; second, the share prices should efficiently represent the fundamental 
values of listed companies in the stock market. These conditions are more likely to be 
met in mature markets than in emerging markets. In fact, share prices on China's 
stock market are often considered to be driven by more purely speculative activities 
rather than the fundamental value of listed companies. '9' This shows that the stock 
market is not mature, and the structure of concentrated ownership by state is one of 
reasons why the market is immature in China. In other words, the immature market 
includes at least: share prices can not reflect the true value of listed companies; 
managers of a number of firms own a very small percentage of shares and they have 
virtually no incentive to increase the stock prices of their finns; institutional investors 
have little voice on some boards; bank debt does not provide monitoring of 
management, and the market for public debt is yet to be developed; and there is no 
active merger or takeover activity in the stock market to discipline managers. 
According to these the standards, the stock market is indeed not mature in China. 
Today the local party committees still succeed in maintaining their interference in 
the decision-making process, which affects competition in the market, even after two 
decades of economic transition. In particular, the decision-making power of local 
592 See Qu Qiang, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and State-owned Shares in China Listed Companies', Journal of 
Asian Econornic 14, p 780. 
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Party committees is dominant in China's listed companies, due to diverse lock-in 
effects between the Party and various areas of the institutional environment. However, 
some scholars have found that the decision-making power of the local party 
committees on the operations of listed companies is declining as the market improves 
and private power emerges in the process of economic reform. 593 It shows that the 
market is improving, the structure of ownership is changing and competition is being 
enhanced. 
In a word, once the refonn of the structure of concentrated ownership is successful, 
the market will be mature and competition will be effective. Accordingly the 
corporate governance of listed companies in China will be improved. 
10.3. The structure of share ownership 
10.3.1. General conception 
Most previous studies based on the theories and practice of developed economies 
regarding corporate govemance ascribe these shortcomings to factors such as the 
uncompetitiveness of markets, poor legal enforcement, and an inefficient debt and 
equity market. Maybe the analysis of the above by some scholars is reasonable. 
However, without the understanding of the fundamental underlying issue, namely the 
share structure, especially the role played by state-owned shares in the operate 
593 See Sonja Opper, Sonia M. L. Wong, and Ruyin Hu, 'Party Power, Markets and Private Power: CCP Persistence 
in China's Listed Companies', Working Paper, 
http: //www. no-big-bang. coi-nýkmg/pubiications/Opper-CCPý/ý20andý/ý2OCo. pdf 
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governance of Chinese publicly listed companies, it might be impossible to reach 
meaningful conclusions. I can say, without an understanding of the structure of 
ownership in China, one knows nothing about the socialist economic market because 
4cownership reform is a precondition of the creation of a fair competitive 
enviroriment. , 
594 
In China, SOEs have concentrated ownership by the people, but ownership by "all 
of the people really means in a sense ownership by none of the people. " SOEs 
represent the classic case of ambiguous property rights and principal-agent failure. 
That is to say, property rights in SOEs are owned by everyone and by no one in 
particular. It is known that the improvement of governance of SOEs in China has been 
limited to clarifying property rights through a process of corporatization without any 
significant change in ownership or privatization in the 1990s, but most divested 
jointed-stock companies remain under ma or state ownership and control. Therefore, i 
the poor performance of listed companies can be blamed on the ambiguity of property 
rights. That is to say, who actually owns the property rights in listed companies: the 
whole people, the govemment or others? 
According to the ownership view, private enterprises are inherently more efficient 
than state-owned finns. This view can be dated back to early work by Hayek and 
595 Friedman 
. Later, some scholars' studies 
have demonstrated that state ownership 
was in fact linked with poor SOE perforinance, further in support of a policy that state 
5 94 See Xu Dianqing, 2000, 'The Agent Vacuum' in Corporate Governance of Chinese Enterprises in Liang Neng 
(ed), Corporate Governance: the China's Practice and the American Experience, People University of China Prcss 
Ltd, p 163. 
595 See Yifan Hu, Frank Song and Junxi Zhang, 2004, 'Competition, Ownership, Corporate Governance and 
Enterprise Perfon-nance: Evidence from China', ( November). Working Paper, 
http: //www. hiebs. hku. hk/working_paper_updates/pdf/wp] III. pdf 
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ownership should be reduced in these firms. 596 These scholars' studies show that 
ownership structure appears to have a great influence on profit reinvestment. The 
correlation with the share of private ownership is not only a fundamental 
representative of the security of property rights but also active and significant in the 
creation of property. 
597 But other scholars have different views on ownership. 
598 This 
thesis argues that the experience shows that private firms are more efficient than 
state-owned enterprises from an historical world perspective, in particular in China. 
So far privatization seems to be the speedy way to solve the property rights problem. 
It aligns the control right and cash flow right immediately and is supposed to lead to 
restructuring the firm toward efficient production. Some Chinese scholars believe that 
privatization is the obvious solution to the SOEs' inefficiency. Privatization might be 
the right way toward restructuring. However, "Shock Therapy" is not best choice for 
China because of its different history, culture, politics, economy etc. Since theory and 
empirical evidence from international experience show that "examples of effective 
corporate governance and performance- except in cases of market failures, 
externalities or public goods- in state-owned corporations are few and far in between, 
and that pervasive state ownership undennines the effective functioning of 
596 See, Sun, Q., Tong, W. H., 2003, 'China Share Issue Privatization: The Extent of Its Success', Journal of 
Financial Economics 70, pp 183, -222; Wei, Z., Varela, 0., D'Souza, J., Hassen, M. K., 2003, 'The Financial and 
Operating Performance of China's Newly Privatized Finns', Financial Management, pp 126-197. 
597 See, Robert Cull, Lixin Colin Xu, 2005, 'Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The Determinants of Profit 
Reinvestment Among Chinese Firrns', Journal of Financial Economics 77, p 135. 
598 E. g. sorne scholars support the view that state-owned enterprises are inherently less efficient that private. For 
example, Boycko, Maxim, Andrew Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1996, ' A Tbeory of Privatization', Economic 
Journal 106(435), pp 309-19; Krueger, Anne 0,1990, 'Government Failures in Development', Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4(3), pp 9-23. But some scholars have different view, for example, Vickers, John and 
George Yarrow, 1991, ' Economic Perspectives on Privatization', Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(2) , pp 
111-132; Chang, Ha-joon and Ajit Singh, 1997, 'Policy Arena: Can Large Firrns Be Run Efficiently Without Being 
BureaucraticT, Journal of International Development 9(6), pp 865-875. 
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markets. , 599 Therefore reform of the structure of state-owned concentrated ownership 
must be carried out by means of privatization in China. 
10.3.2. The disadvantages of concentrated ownership 
Ownership reform among China's SOEs is a process in which state-owned capital, 
originally the exclusive preserve of state-owned industry, has migrated outside the 
traditional state sector into the new forms of enterprise ownership. As large numbers 
of ma or enterprises are state-owned and have the state as a majority shareholder in i 
listed companies, there is often an intertwined relationship between the state as 
participant and regulator. As a participant, the state owns ma ority of the shares so that i 
it offers the possibility of the state's dominant position in the general meeting. That is 
to say, the state has the power to appoint and dismiss the supervisory board and the 
board of directors, and to determine major business decisions. As a regulator, some 
business decisions in relation to state assets made by the board of directors and 
endorsed by the general meeting are required to be approved by government agencies, 
or government agencies abuse power to inspect and examine the operation of listed 
companies in order that the listed companies are controlled by the state. 
Why did the structure of public listed companies come to be concentrated in China? 
As I described in chapter six, the state-owned enterprises reforin started in China 
about two decades ago, the govem-ment was concemed about the stability of society 
and maturity of market. With regard to maturity of the market, the problem is the 
599 See Dr. Cyril Lin, 200, Tnivate Vices in Public Places: challenges in Corporate Governance Devclopment in 
China', Working Paper, (April), OECD Devc1opment Centre. 
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potential loss of state assets if all shares of a restructured SOE were to be freely traded 
when market is at the stage of infancy. As a concession, the ownership of each 
enterprise was mainly split into (1) state shares; (2) legal person shares and (3) 
common domestic A-shares. But only A-shares were tradable since then. This special 
institutional arrangement became deeply ingrained in Chinese political system and 
ideology, as well as in the economic refon'n strategy. 600 The designation of shares into 
state, legal entity, and individual is enshrined in China's company law. According to 
modem company law, legal entities are usually charged with making profits, whereas 
for state stockholders profit may not be the sole goal. Thus the current ownership 
structure of listed companies in China is mostly shaped by its unique listing process in 
a sense because most Chinese listed companies have a strong link with the state and 
their parent companies controlled by state. 
In China, generally speaking, the state controls about 60% of the share of listed 
companies. But some scholars have a different opinion, that the state's statistics fail to 
manifest the ultimate shareholders genuinely, for example, some think the state is 
ultimately in absolute control of 81.6% instead of 60% of all publicly listed 
companies via two control patterns: (1) government direct owns 9.0% of the listed 
companies, and (2) government indirect owns 72.6% of the listed companies via stock 
pyramids (the figures for state ultimate controls of listed companies is for the end of 
2001). However, the Chinese official shareholding classifications, which state shares, 
legal person shares, employee shares and the tradable A shares (issued for individual 
600 See Qu Qiang, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and State-owned Shares in China Listed Companies', Journal of 
Asian Economic 14, p 772. 
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investors) respectively accounted for 46 per cent, 18 per cent, 0.5 per cent and 25 per 
cent of the total shares outstanding in 2001, are not correct. For instance, Inner 
Mongolia Mengdian Huaneng, a thermal power corporation, was listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. The state asset bureau, as the third largest equity holder, 
directly possessed 7.9% of the voting rights in 2001, while the two largest 
shareholders are the Inner Mongolia Electricity Company (62.4% of shares 
outstanding) and the Huaneng Group Corporation (13.2% of total shares) respectively 
According to the official classification of state shares and legal person shares, the finn 
should be considered as under the control of the legal person- the Inner Mongolia 
Electricity Company, since it is the majority shareholder of the firm. A closer study, 
however, demonstrates that in fact the firm is controlled ultimately by the state, 
because its two largest legal person shareholders, the Inner Mongolia Electricity 
Company and the Huaneng Group Corporation are themselves respectively controlled 
solely by the Inner Mongolia local government and the central govemment (the State 
Council). Hence, the ultimate voting rights the state has in the thermal power 
corporation seem to amount to 83.5% (62.4%+13.2%+7.9%) instead of only the 7.9% 
shown in the official statistical record, and the company in question should be 
regarded as operating as a wholly state-owned company. 601 In fact, there are many 
case like the one above, that is, where the state has extended its ownership from direct 
control to indirect control via a pyramid shareholding scheme. This has become 
prevalent in Chinese publicly listed companies. In China listed company groups are 
601 See Guy S. Liu and Pei Sun, 2005, 'The Class of Shareholdings and its Impacts on Corporate Performance: a 
Case of State Shareholding Composition in Chinese Public Corporations", Corporate 
Governance, Volume 13, 
Nurnberl, (January), pp48-49. 
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usually headed by a holding company. These holding companies are usually 
controlled and majority-owned by a state-controlled company, such as a government 
asset management company, an investment company. The listed companies are 
usually majority-owned by the holding company directly, and thus are indirectly 
controlled by the local or central governments. For example, Kelon Electronics, a 
listed company, and one of the top refrigerator sellers in China, is majority-owned by 
Kelon (Yongshen) Holding company, and this holding company in turn is 100% 
owned by the town municipal government. Such a pyramiding structure is very 
prevalent among listed companies in China. The ultimate controller might have an 
interest different from that of the company and its small shareholders, and it would be 
very difficult to prohibit it from making decisions that fail to maximize corporate 
value. In other words, it is nonnal to have a conflict of interest between the 
government and other stakeholders because the state as the majority shareholder or 
the controlling minority shareholder of listed companies is prone to make decisions on 
the operation of the company which are in conflict with the interests of shareholders 
and corporate development. 
602 
Commonly, securities markets permit private entrepreneurs to access public equity 
and debt markets to raise capital. In China, however, listed companies are almost 
never private companies at the initial stage of the securities market. Rather, they are 
state-owned enterprises that have been transformed into joint stock companies under 
PRC Company Law of 1993 and regulations. And then listed companies remain 
"2 See Mariko Watanabe, 2002, 'Holding Company Risk in China: A Final Step of State-owned Enterprises 
Refon-n and an Emerging Problern of Corporate Governance', China Economic Review 13, pp 
373-381. 
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state-owned as they were before, through unlisted shares, an "overhang" of unlisted, 
illiquid shares which negatively influences China's securities markets. 603 Of course 
this phenomenon is changing now. 
Despite accounting for a declining share of national output, the state-owned 
enterprise sector still continues to control the national economy in terms of fixed 
assets and the allocation of financial capital. A major characteristic of China's 
enterprise reforms is the state's retention of a controlling stake in listed firms. On 
average, about 30% of the shares are held by the state (central govenu-nent), its 
ministries, and local and regional goven-iment. Another 30% of the shares are owned 
by legal entities and most of these entities are ultimately held by the state. In a word, 
this stake is owned directly or indirectly by central govenunent and its associated 
ministries, or by city, regional, and local government. In practice, the state and legal 
entity shareholders are typically blockholders and the largest blockholder often 
controls the firms as a dominant or blockholder's stockholdings far exceed the second 
largest stockholder. Blockholder among the "new" agency problems diverts resources 
to itself, manipulates stock prices, and expropriate minority stockholders compared 
with traditional agency problem, namely conflicts between managers (agent) and state 
(principal). 604 
According to China's Securities Regulatory Commission, the government owns 
more than 47% of the shares of all the public listed companies in 2003. In 35% of all 
603 See Walter Hutchens, 2003, 'Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China's Legal 
Systern", 24 U. N. J. Int'l Econ. L, pp 612-613. 
604 See Gongineng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao, Oliver M. Rui, 2005, 'Ownership Structure, Corporate 
Governance, and Fraud: Evidence from China', Journal of Corporate Finance, wwýy. elseyier, com/l oc ate/econ 
base. 
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public listed companies, the government shares owns more than 50% of all the shares, 
in 54% of them, it owns more than 30% of the shares. 605 This shows that state is 
absolutely the biggest shareholder in most listed companies in China. 
After many years of practice, it has proved impossible to improve SOE 
performance only through increased autonomy of companies by political push and by 
legal regulation. It was recognized that the crux of poor SOE perfonnance was the 
ambiguity in property rights inherent in the structure of share ownership in companies. 
That is to say, ownership by "the whole people is almost equivalent to free goods, 
since nobody possesses it". 606 Some scholars have done research on the listed SOEs 
from 1990 to 2000 and found that the financial performance of SOEs became worse 
and worse after being listed. Measured in tenns of return on sales and return on assets, 
the post-IPO perfonnance of listed SOEs trends worse than the results in the periods 
leading up the IPO. The table below shows that the average return on assets (ROA) 
drops steadily, from 19.6% in the year prior to IPO to 2.7% in the sixth year after IPO- 
The average return on sales (ROS) also decreases from 16.6% one year before listing 
to 0.2% in the sixth year after listing. 607 Why did listed companies deteriorate like 
that? One of the reasons is as follows: In accordance with requirements under laws 
and regulations, a company had to show three years of continued profits to qualify for 
listing on the exchange stock. Because listing is scarce, and there were quotas for 
companies at the time, provincial govenu-nent often bundled companies which had 
605 See www. csrc. org. cn 
606 See Nakagane, Katsuji, 2000, 'SOE Reform and Privatization in China: A Note on Several Theoretical and 
Enipircal Issues. Working Paper, University of Tokyo. 
607 See Wang, Xiaozu, Lixin Colin Xu and Tian Zhu, 2001, 'Is Public Listing a Way Out for State-Owned 
Enterprises? The Case of China'. 
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profits with poorly-managed companies that need money in order to make best use of 
the quotas and go public. No surprisingly, the performance of listed companies 
became poor after listing because of the structure of ownership by state. That is, the 
process of listing is controlled by governments, often in contradiction of the law and 
regulations on the one hand, on the other hand, the process of operation after listing is 
often controlled by state for its goal instead of profit. 
Table 2: Selected Mean Performance Statistics of Listed SOEs 
Year- I Year 0 Year I Year 2 Year 6 
ROA 19.6% 15.4% 9.7% 7.4% 2.7% 
ROS 16.6 16.2 13.7 7.8 0.2 
Capex/Assets 74.3 57.7 43.1 28.2 3.8 
Annual Sales 
Growth 
28.7 47.8 22.2 10.5 16.5 
Source: Wang, Xu and Zhu (2001), World Bank 
On account of highly concentrated share and non-tradable share, share splitting 
must result in serious consequence. Some shares for individuals can be traded on the 
stock exchange while others for state and legal entities cannot; some shares (A shares) 
can only be issued for domestic residence, while others (B shares) can only be issued 
for foreigners. Empirical evidence shows that the unique ownership structure of listed 
finns affects firrn value and share prices. Some scholars have found a significant price 
discount for Class B shares held by foreign investors as compared to Class A shares 
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held by domestic investors. (Mainland "persons" are able to trade B shares since 
2001 February if various eligibility requirement are met and now share owned by state 
can be traded). One possible explanation of the price difference is the illiquidity of the 
B-share market. However, B-shares move more closely with market fundamentals 
than A-shares, suggesting that there is a premium for A-shares (due to excess demand 
for these shares from domestic investors) rather than a B-shares discount. A related 
question is how government ownership affects finn value. To this end, Tian (2002) 
uses Tobin's Q 608 as proxy for fin-n value and finds that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between government ownership and firin value. For firms with low levels 
of state ownership, finn value is negatively related to state ownership. This might 
show higher government ownership is connected with a higher degree of interference 
with managers. 609 From the perspective of performance, scholars examined the 
cross-sectional relationship between ownership structure and corporate perfon-nance 
for a sample of 434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange, and 
then drew the conclusion that a high percentage of state shareholding, either in the 
fonn of direct state agency holding or in the fonn of holding by state solely controlled 
institutions, led to inefficient resource allocation. That is, shares held by the state play 
a negative role in corporate governance. 610 Some scholars studied the relationship 
108 Tobin's q, is the ratio of the market value of a firm's assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding 
stock and debt) to the replacement cost of the firm's assets (Tobin 1969). This measure of performance is not used 
as often as either rates of return or price-cost margins. If a firm is worth more than its value based on what 
it would 
cost to rebuild it, then excess profits are being earned. These profits are above and beyond the level that is 
necessary to keep the firm in the industry. 
http: //wps. aw. coi-n/aw carltonper modernio 4/0,9313,1424978-content, 00. htmI 609 See Franklin Allen Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian, 2002, 'Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China', The 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper, (December). 
610 See Jlan Chen, 2001, 'Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese 
Listed Cornpanies', Economics of Planning 34, p 68. 
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between state ownership and corporate performance on China's listed companies 
based on the panel dataset of China's listed companies during 1994-2000, and showed 
a significantly negative relationship between the state shareholding ratio and 
corporate performance, namely the higher state shareholding ratio, the worse 
performance. 
611 
The present structure of state ownership and control of enterprises accounts for 
some of their poor performance and bad corporate governance. This results from weak 
incentives for managers to maximize value for all investors and creditors, and from 
the protectionist practices of government agencies that shield firms from market 
discipline and laws. Today refonning China's state-owned enterprise sector is at the 
core of China's economic reform. The core of the problem lies in the difficult tasks of 
reforming the SOE ownership structure and improving corporate governance. This 
thesis argues that the privatization should be done in a way that is different from that 
in the former Soviet countries through the reform of the corporate system, because 
incorporation of private ownership interests through listing would provides the checks 
and balances on management to improve performance. 
Based on the analysis above, the drawbacks of the ownership structure in listed 
companies where the state is the controlling shareholder as in China are at least as 
follows. (1) Lack of incentive is a fundamental issue because managers have a small 
share in listed companies and it is the same for them whether listed companies is 
profitable or not. (2) The dominant state ownership tends to erode the credibility of 
611 See Laixiang Sun and Tao Li, 2005, 'State Ownership and Corporate Performance: A Quantile Analysis on 
China's Listed Companies', Discussion Paper 55, Centre for Financial and Management Studies, SOAS, 
University of London, (14 April). 
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the threat of market failure and the regulatory capacity of the state. Because the state 
is both the biggest shareholder in most listed companies and also the regulator, on the 
one hand, the state will realize its political goals through listed companies instead of 
pursuing profit maximization; on the other hand, how will the state inspect or regulate 
listed companies as a regulator, and who will monitor the state under the 
circumstances? (3) It is impossible in China for mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, 
and corporate takeovers to restructure really the allocation of resources and improve 
the management of enterprises because these transactions are largely dependent on 
alienability of ownership in the enterprise. However, in China, state shares and legal 
person shares, which comprise the preponderance of all outstanding stock, because of 
the characters mentioned above, are critical impediment to alienability. (4) The 
victims of fraudulent disclosure will not be compensated properly because listed 
companies are likely be substantially government-owned at all levels, especially 
provincially-owned. It is widely believed that false accounting and financial 
misreporting are pervasive among Chinese SOEs and companies. The China National 
Audit Office (CNAO) stated in December 1998 that "cooked books", embezzlement, 
fraud and "irregularities" in financial management were widespread among Chinese 
finns. After scrutiny of I 10 trust and investment companies, 88 securities companies 
and life and property business subsidiaries of the People's Insurance Company of 
China (PICC) in 1998, the conclusion was drawn that the financial and accounting 
management in many of these firms were "chaotic and inaccurate" and many 
securities companies misappropriated clients' money and conducted illegal fund 
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raising. 612 In China, a fundamental obstacle to the progress of the rule of law is that 
local courts are subject to the control of local governments. That is, local governments 
in China appoint judges to local courts and control the promotion of such judges, and 
local governments in China also control the budgets of local courts. Therefore, almost 
all judges who will adjudicate private securities litigation cases against 
government-owned corporations are subject to substantial influence from government 
cadres at the same level, which is very nonnal in China. (5) Intervention in operation. 
According to company law, the general meeting of shareholders is very powerful in 
China, but in fact the meeting is often simply a rubber stamp for the wishes of the 
majority of shareholders. There is little or no opportunity for minority shareholders to 
be heard. Thus minority shareholders and potential investors may be concerned about 
potential misuse of the controlling shareholder position by the state when the state 
owns a large portion of the shares of SOE-corporatized corporations, and it is very 
easy for the state to exercise dominant influence on the corporation. (6) Expropriation 
of assets. In most listed companies, the largest shareholder is the state. As a result, the 
controlling shareholder can dominate the firm's decisions and expropriate other 
investors. The fact that most listed firms in China are spin-offs from large SOEs with 
parent groups serving as their largest shareholders compounds expropriation problems 
between controlling shareholders and minority investors. Many controlling 
shareholders treat listed firrns as cash cows from which they can benefit themselves at 
the expense of other investors. Documented abused by controlling shareholders 
612 See Dr. Cyril Lin, 2001, 'Private Vices in Public Places: challenges in Corporate Governance Development in 
China', Working Paper, (April), OECD Development Centre. 
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include obtaining soft loans from listed firms, using listed firms as guarantors to 
borrow money from banks, and buying and selling goods, services, and assets at 
unfair prices. 613 For example, a listed SOE may be forced by the dominant 
shareholder to lend its own funds to the parent or affiliates of the group and lending 
usually carries a zero interest rate. Related-party transactions and loans from listed 
companies to their state-owned parents are very serious problems in listed companies. 
For example, New Fortune reported 159 new loans (guarantees) disclosed in 2001, 
which amounted to Rmb 23.1billion. The following table shows how serious the 
problem of loan guarantee is in China. 
Table 3: Examples of Chinese Companies Making Guarantees 
Company Guaranteed 
amount(Rmb m) 
Guaranteed 
amounts/Equity 
FounderTechnology(600601, SS) 465 82% 
Lujiazhui (600663. SS) 1962 46% 
Xinye Property (600603. SS) 878 232% 
China High Tech (600730. SS) 494 150% 
ChinaWestMedicine(600842. SS) 593 270% 
China Kejian(0035. SZ) 820 also received counter 
guarantees 
China Tech Venture(0058. SS) 415 249% 
613 See Tarn, On Kit, 2002, 'Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China', Journal of 
Business Ethics 37(3), pp 303-320; Tenev, Stoyan, Zhang Chunliln, 'Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform 
in China: Buiding the Institution of Modern Market', World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 
Washington, DC; World Bank, 1997, 'China's Management of Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder', World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
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Shanghai Ninth Department 567 84% 
Store 
Hero Corp(600844. SS) 472 82% 
Shenzen Petrochem(OO 13. SZ) 1673 307% 
Tongji Tech(600846. SS) 2240 67% 
Source: New Fortune, December 2001 ý UBS Warburg 
According to a survey conducted by CSRC in 2002, the sum of interest coverage 
and bad-loan provisions accounted for almost one-third of the net profit on average 
among the surveyed companies during the period of 1998-2002.614 In addition to the 
direct lending, the dominant shareholder tends to extract more funds from its listed 
SOE when the listed company performs well. Lianhua Gourmet Powder Company 
provides an instructive example. The parent of the company is a fully state-owned 
finn. By August 2003, the parent had held 65.73 per cent of total outstanding shares 
of the company and extracted RMB 858 million. Most of these fund extractions 
occurred during 1998-2000, a period when the company performed very well, and 
were in the form of direct lending to the parent and of guaranteeing bank loans to the 
parent. The default on these loans by parent put the company into a cash-flow crisis 
and the attention of CSRC and other monitoring agents was consequently drawn in. 
Once the source of its financial trouble was revealed, a rescuing and restructuring plan 
was drawn up and camed out by the provincial government. 
615 (7) Conflict of interest 
614 Shanghai Securities Daily, 2 April 2004. 
615 Shanghai Securities Daily, July 29,2004. 
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between governments. in theory, where different departments, agencies or 
governments are the representative owners of the state assets or are shareholders in 
the same listed company or different listed companies, they should serve together in 
the best interests of the state. However, in practice, conflicts of interest between them 
often happen and leads to the loss of state assets due to the divergence of interests. (8) 
Appointment of personnel. As analyzed above, the appointment of persons in listed 
companies is influenced by politics through the structure of ownership. In addition, 
from an operational perspective, there are the puzzles of distributing stock dividends 
and issuing uninsured rights in China. In the United States, stockholders respond 
positively to stock dividend announcements, which can be explained by the signaling 
theory. But in China, on the contrary, stockholders react negatively to stock dividend 
distributions. If a stock dividend does not signal good news, why do so many Chinese 
finns bother to distribute stock dividends? While fewer and fewer finns issue 
uninsured rights in the United States and elsewhere, Chinese firm predominantly use 
uninsured rights in seasoned equity offerings. With regard to the above puzzles, which 
are quite different from what has happened in advanced markets, a scholar thinks 
dividend policies and financing choices are influenced by ownership conflict (agency 
and political costs) and the ineffectiveness of monitoring. 616 That is to say, the 
puzzles of distributing stock dividends and issuing uninsured rights is the result of 
political interference. In fact it is affected by politicians through the structure of 
ownership. 
616 See Donwej Su, , 
2005, 'Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China', China Economic Review 
16, p 119. 
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This thesis argues that the puzzles of distributing stock dividends and issuing 
uninsured rights in China lie in the structure of share ownership. In other words, it is 
the structure of share ownership that leads to the difference between the market in 
China and other advanced markets. The structure of share ownership is concentrated 
in the form of ownership by all levels of governments, namely by the state in China. 
That government ministries and commissions and securities regulatory authorities 
enjoy substantial decision-making power is the logical result of ownership. Since the 
state accounts for the most of the share ownership in listed companies in China, it is 
normal for the state to control the listed company and select the members of the board 
of directors, who will decide how to distribute profit and how to exercise the rights of 
listed companies, which will be in interests of the largest shareholder in return. 
10.4. Conclusion 
The development of the economy is based on the adequate competitive market, and 
the progress of society is built on an excellent enviromnent, such as culture, politics 
and law. Across the world, history has proved that there are more effective methods of 
macroeconomic management, utilizing the market, than a planned economy Today 
economic reform in China is relatively successful, but there are many problems which 
will have to be overcome during the process of reform, and one of the biggest 
problems is SOEs, and in particular listed companies, because the state is the largest 
shareholder of most listed companies. If the structure of concentrated ownership of 
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listed companies controlled by the state is not ad usted properly in accordance with i 
the rules of the market, corporate governance will deteriorate further, the stock market 
will be suffocated greatly, and the development of the economy will be affected 
negatively beyong question because there are many disadvantages derived from the 
structure of concentrated ownership of listed companies which has been analyzed 
above in detail. Thus the structure of concentrated ownership must be reformed at 
once in order to improve corporate governance and the market economy. Now it has 
been under way since 29 April 2005. 
306 
Chapter 11. The reform of ownership is a precondition for the improvement of corporate governance 
Chapter 11. The reform of ownership is 
a precondition for the improvement of 
corporate governance 
11.1. Agency problem 
There are different agency problems in listed companies in China due to the structure 
of share ownership. As we know there are different ownership forms in listed 
companies which have created additional incentives and opportunities for managers to 
realize their benefits from their control over state assets. For instance, by using the 
appraisal and valuation process to sell state assets to their relatives or their affiliate 
enterprises at low prices and diverting them for private use. But the main agency 
problem is the conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. For example, parent companies as majority shareholders often borrow 
money as soft loans from listed companies on a long-term basis; or use listed 
companies as guarantors to borrow money from banks, or sell assets to listed 
companies at a higher price or buy assets from listed companies at a lower price 
without any appraisal by an independent evaluator. In other words, there are two kinds 
of agency problem in listed companies in China. One is the traditional one: the state 
as principal and managers as agents. Another involves the controlling shareholder as 
agent and minority shareholders as principal. The latter is more serious than the 
former one. 
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11.2. How to solve the agency problem? 
With regard to the agency problems in listed companies, some scholars suggest ways 
to solve the agency problem in China as follows: (1) The complete separation of listed 
companiesi managers from the civil service system. It will decrease the scope of 
political and government control over managerial appointments, prevent politicians 
from interfering in their operations and expedite the development of a managerial 
labour market. (2) Separation of government control rights from government cash 
flow rights. It will lessen political control over companies' behaviour and prevent 
government from intervening in management: for example, transfon-ning government 
equity claims into preferred nonvoting share. 617 This thesis argues that the above 
suggestions may be useful as transitional mechanisms in China because they could 
send a powerful signal that the government is committed not to interfere with market 
forces. But if most of the share ownership in listed companies is still controlled by 
governments, it will be impossible for governments not to interfere with the 
operational business of listed companies because interference is the natural logic 
according to the principle of one share-one vote, or the principle of property rights. 
Therefore the complete and perfect way of solving the agency problem is to change 
the structure of share ownership in listed companies. That is, governments should not 
be controlling shareholder except for special cases. In other words, neither the internal 
617 See Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang with Loup Breforin, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Reforin in China Building the Institutions of Modem Markets', World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporate Washington, D. C, pp 129-133. 
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nor the external monitoring mechanisms that are very common in western countries or 
in other advanced countries can solve the agency problem that derives from 
concentrated ownership without fundamentally changing state ownership in China. 
Perhaps the most appealing way of reducing the state share is to privatize through 
institutional investors etc, which will be discussed below in detail. 
11.2.1. Privatization 
More and more scholars' research shows that there is a great amount of empirical 
evidence that public firms perform worse than private firms in terms of productive 
efficiency both in the developed and the developing countries. 618 Because under 
public ownership the firm is run by a minister or government bureaucrat who 
maximizes an objective function that is a weighted average of social welfare and his 
or her personal agenda in place of firms or other shareholders. By contrast, under 
private ownership, the firm is run for the maximization of profit. Thus "the root 
problem of the inefficiencies of SOEs is the state ownership and its bureaucratic 
economy. , 619 However, privatization could reduce the transaction costs of 
6 18 E. g. See Dewenter Kathryn and Paul H. Malatesta, 1997, 'Public Offerings of State--- Owned and 
Privately --- Owned Enterprises: An International Comparison', Journal Finance, 
52, pp 1659-1679; Tian George 
Lihui, 2000, 'State Shareholding and Corporate Performance: A Study of a Unique Chinese Data Set', Working 
Paper, London Business School, London; Megginson, W. L., R. C. Nash and M. Van Randenborgh, 1994, 'The 
Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firrns: An International Empirical Analysis', Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 49, pp 403-52. However, some scholars argue that public ownership is not inherently less efficient 
than private ownership. For example, Caves, Douglas, and Laurits Christensen, 1980, 'The Relative 
Efficiency of 
Public and Private Firrns in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads', Journal of 
Political 
Economy, (October), pp 958-976; John Vickers and George Yarrow, 1991, 'Economic Perspectives on 
Privatization', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol-5, No. 2. (Spring), p 130(They argue that it would be 
simplistic to view privatization as a universally effective remedy for agency problems in the public sector. 
619 See Kornai Janos, 1992, Socialist Systems, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
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government intervention in enterprise decision-making. 620 That is, private firms could 
prevent government from directly interfering in the decision-making of the firm 
except by law or policy, because private property means that the right to make 
decisions willingly and independently regarding the uses of a resource under the 
principle of the maximization of profit, and the distinguishing characteristic of a 
private property system is that there is the strong positive relationship between the 
wealth of an individual and the consequences of his decisions on the value of 
resources. 621 In a word, the maximization of profit will promote the level of 
management and reduce the transaction costs as much as possible in private firms. 
The Chinese government carries out the privatization of State-owned Enterprises 
through a gradual way, which has made a great contribution to the achievements of 
the refonned econoMy. 622 Since 1978, the Chinese governance has been trying 
different strategies or ways to revitalize SOEs, but all the previous refonn 
concentrated mainly on the managerial aspects of enterprises, it is only the reform of 
the shareholding system that touches on the nature of ownership of SOEs but is, in a 
sense, only superficial to large SEOs in China. One of the most important 
market-oriented strategies of economic reform is the establishment of a shareholding 
system that is learned from West. The essence of the shareholding system reforrn is to 
convert SOEs into shareholding enterprises. Shares are issued to the state, enterprises, 
and individuals. This has made it possible for private individuals to acquire at least 
620 See Sappington, David, and Joseph Stiglitz, 1987, 'Privatization, Infon-nation and Incentives', Journal of 
Policy 
Analysis and Management, 6, pp 567-82. 
621 See Louis De Alessi, 1973, 'Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership in Large Corporations', The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 28, No. 4, (Sep., ), p 844. 
622 See Louis Putterman, 1995, 'The Role of Ownership and Property Rights in China's Economic Transition', 
The 
China Quarterly, No. 144, Special Issue: China's Transitional Economy, (Dec. j, p 1047. 
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partial ownership of formerly completely state-owned enterprises. In a sense, the 
shareholding system reform is a form of privatization in part, which offers a way by 
which state assets are transferred to private individuals and private firms. 623 Although 
the establishment of the first Chinese shareholding company was in 1984, it is 15 th 
Chinese Communist Party Congress that endorsed the shareholding system as the 
"mainstream reform program" for state-owned enterprises. 
Selling shares of stock on stock exchanges, which is considered to be a possible 
solution to some of the dilemmas faced by Chinese SOEs, is a form of privatization, 
which could force and speed Chinese fin-ns to converge toward global "best practice" 
standards. 624 The importance of privatization to the success of the post-communist 
reforms has been the subject of some controversy because some countries are not as 
successful as expected. But as analyzed above, with regard to SOEs, the bureaucrat's 
main concern is to achieve their political objectives, which do not necessarily agree 
with the profit maximization objective. Privatization means the state-owned 
ownership will be transferred to outsider investors, who place greater emphasis on the 
primacy of profits and efficiency. 625 Some scholars provide strong empirical evidence 
that private ownership dramatically enhances the most essential aspects of corporate 
performance in the countnes undergoing post-communist transition. 
626 But the 
empirical evidence on the privatization methods appears to be mixed. Megginson et al. 
623 See Shu YMa 1998, 'The Chinese Route to Privatization: The Evolution of the Shareholding System Option', 
Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Apr., ), pp 379-380. 
124 See Allen, J., 2000, 'Beyond Best Practice. Company Secretary: The Official Publication of the Hong Kong 
Institute of Public Secretaries', 10(l 1), pp 14-18. 
625 See Boycko, M., Shelifer, A., Vishny, R., 1996, 'A Theory of Privatization', The Economic Journal 106, pp 
11 
309-319,. 
'2' See Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray, Marek Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1997, 'Private Ownership and 
Corporate Perforniance: Sorne Lessons ftorn Transition Economics', Working Paper, ( June). 
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show that privatization through private sale is more likely to happen and more 
efficient when the investor is protected well, for example in common law countries. 627 
Bortolotti et al. argue that a higher frequency of direct sales takes place in civil law 
628 
countnes. Dyck and Zingals study the effects of private benefits of control on 
ownership structure of firms and choice of privatization means, and draw a conclusion 
that privatization through public offerings is impossible in countries that lack 
adequate legal protection. 
629 
Some scholars do not think of ownership as a key issue in the SOEs' inefficiency, 
they believe the stock market system will help China's SOEs get out of difficulty. 630 
However, the reforrn of SOEs by the stock market system has not been successful as 
expected so far due to the state-owned shareholding in listed companies. 
Over the past decade or so, China SOEs underwent significant reforin, about 80% 
of all small and medium-sized enterprises have been sold to employee and outside 
investors. During this time, the yearly growth rate of China GDP has been about 8%, 
and township and village enterprises and foreign invested enterprises have performed 
quite well. But Chinese public listed companies (PLCs) have performed so poorly For 
comparison, from year 1998 to 2000, ROE of collectively owned medium and small 
enterprises was 11.03,12.96 and 13.61%, and the ROE of foreign invested enterprises 
was 4.05,8.19 and 12.37%, and the ROE of PLCs was 7.36,8.06 and 7.52%, 
627 See Megginson, W., Nash, R., Eetter, J. N., Poulsen, A. B., 2002, "Me Choice of Private Versus Public Capital 
Markets: Evidence From Privatization. Working Paper, University of Oklahama, Wake Forest University and 
University of Georgia. 
62S See Bortolotti, B., Fantini, M., Siniscalco, D., Vitalini, S., 'Privatization and Institutions: A Cross-count", 
analysis', CESif Working Paper Seriers No. 375. 
629 See Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2002, 'Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison', Journal of 
Finance,. 
630 e. g. Qian, Y 1996, 'Enterprise Reforrn in China: Agency Problems and 
Political Control', Economics of 
Transition, 4(2), (October), pp 427-447. 
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respectively. 631 It is hard to attribute this to macroeconomic factors. Generally 
speaking and theoretically, only a clean and perhaps better perfonned group of SOEs 
could be selected to be listed according to law and regulation. How to explain the 
poor perfonnance of China PLCs? In addition to the reasons of analysis above, this 
thesis argues that they lie largely in themselves intrinsically. Namely the poor 
performance of China PLCs lies in their poor corporate governance, mainly due to 
their unique shareholding structure where the state is the controlling shareholder. The 
prominent feature of the ownership structure of China PLCs is that the state could be 
identified as the ultimate controlling shareholders that can control the fate of the 
company. In other words, the Chinese government not only controls the process of 
listing but also interferes with the operation of listed companies through the structure 
of concentrated ownership, which leads to the poor performance of listed companies. 
Some economists think the state-dominated PLCs share the traditional and main 
principal-agent problem of SOEs, in which there exists a long and multiple series of 
principal-agent problems among central government, line ministries, local 
governments and managers. But this thesis argues that actually the main 
principal-agent problems of the state-dominated PLCs are the state (including central 
government, line ministries, local government) as controlling shareholder and 
ordinary investors as minority shareholder because it is very prevalent for controlling 
shareholders in PLCs to abuse their rights including taking soft loans from listed 
companies on a long-term basis; using of listed companies as guarantors to borrow 
631 See Qu Qiang, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and State-owned Shares in China Listed Companies', Journal of 
Asian Economic 14, p 773. 
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money from banks; and the sale of assets to listed companies at unfair prices, usually 
without an appraisal by an independent evaluator; management appointment, etc. at 
the cost of minority shareholders ultimately. 
At beginning of 1997, there have been the estimated 308,000 state-owned 
632 
enterprises that were privatized . Vast numbers of small and medium sized SOEs 
have been merged, formed into joint ventured or sold under this plan. Today the 
private sector has been developing rapidly and thereby providing many new 
employment opportunities since China's economic reform began. The functions of the 
privatization of listed companies are as follows at least: there will be changes in the 
structure and quality of boards, and it will increase monitoring by shareholders and 
financial intermediary, and improve transparency and disclosure in line with global 
standards and practices which are beneficial. The logical result of privatization for 
Chinese SOEs will be to decrease the ownership of the state, but the privatization will 
be necessary for improving and upgrading the performance of firms or companies. 
Without doubt, the quality of corporate govemance will be fostered. 
When looking back to past decades, China's gradual economic reforms have 
fostered a variety of firm ownership types, including private firms (domestic or 
foreign). In fact, it shows the gradual result of privatization. The emergence of the 
non-state sector is in part due to the reorganization of SOEs, and in part to industrial 
deregulations and open-door policies that have permitted the entry of millions of new 
enterprises. Private-owned firms have played a great role in the deregulated 
domestic 
632 Morrison, W. M. 1999, 'China's Economic Condition, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 
for Congress: 
98014. 
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markets, and have grown rapidly for the past two decades. 633 This demonstrates that 
private firms are more efficient than state-owned enterprises in China. 
Of course, the main argument for the sale of state shares is to improve corporate 
governance of listed companies and to align their objective more with profit 
maximization, as a consequence the improvement of efficiency. On the other hand, the 
state-shares sale may cause a problem of social stability. 634 It seems it is not 
necessary to worry about the latter. 
This thesis believes that the privatization of state-owed shares should be carried 
out. A lot of small and medium state-owned enterprises have been privatized 
successfully, which will provide rich experience for the reform of listed companies 
controlled by the state. In addition, the reform and opening up to the outside and the 
development of the economy have laid down the foundations for the privatization of 
the state-owned shares in listed companies. 
11.2.2. Institutional investors 
Today shareholder activism can be viewed as a better mechanism by which investors 
have a strong effect on their company's behaviour without a fundamental change in 
control of the company, for the purpose of improving performance of companies. 
635 
633 See Qunyan Sun, Anming Zhang, Jle Li, 2005, 'A Study of Optimal State Shares In Mixed Oligopoly: 
Implications for SOE Reform and Foreign Competition', China Economic Review, 15, p 3. 
634 See Qunyan Sun, Ariming Zhang, Jie Li, 2005, 'A Study of Optimal State Shares In Mixed Oligopoly 
linplications for SOE Reforrn and Foreign Competition', China Economic Review, 15, p 2. 
635 See Gillan Stuart L. and Starks Laura T, 1998, 'A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and 
Empirical 
Evidence', Contemporary Finance Digest, Autumn 1998 2,3, pp 10-34; Bhagat S. and Back J., 1998, 'Shareholder 
Litigation: Share Price Movements, News Releases, and Settlement Amounts', Managerial & Decision Economics, 
Vol. 18, pp 293-340. 
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Generally speaking, once shareholders have substantial shares in which the potential 
gains outweigh the cost incurred, they will take part in the supervisory activities over 
management. Thus it is possible for institutional investors to monitor management 
because they own relatively large shareholdings and have advantages over smaller 
shareholders, such as time, information, skill and incentives. In the 1990s some 
examples suggest that American institutional investors with large stakes sometimes 
intervene in the affairs of public companies, e. g. the California public employees 
pension fund (CalPERS), Putnam Management (a mutual fund manager), J. P. Morgan 
(a bank holding company). These institutions lobbied for the removal of CEOs at 
several large, poorly perfonning finns, including Kodak, IBM, Westinghouse, Borden, 
American Express and GM. 636 The above experiences will provide use for reference 
for China. 
Institutional investors in China are primarily comprised of insurance companies, 
pension funds, securities investment funds, trust and investment companies, securities 
companies and qualified foreign institutional investors etc. 
In 2002, the CSRC and the Peoples' Bank of China issued jointly, the Interim 
Measures of Securities Investment Management of Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFII), which allows foreign institutional investors, including fund 
management companies, securities companies, and commercial banks to invest in the 
A share market. This thesis argues that the developing more institutional investors 
could improve the ownership structure in China so that different major shareholders 
636 See Charles Kahn and Andrew Winton, 1998, 'Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder 
Intervention', The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1, (February), pp 99-129. 
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could monitor each other and reduce the agency costs in order to play an important 
role in China's future corporate governance development. According to international 
practice, institutional investors pool together funds of many individual investors and 
this can become a powerful investment force and protect minority shareholders' 
interests. In addition, if there are more and more institutional investors in China, when 
they really become large enough, they will compete with each other and this will 
enhance the rationality and stability of the capital market. 
The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Scheme has opened up China's 
domestic securities markets for the first time to institutions oversees. That is to say, it 
will open up the largest sector of the tradable securities market: the A share market. If 
QFII results in major ownership changes in Chinese enterprises, the nature of 
corporate governance will be irrevocably altered. In other words, QFII is likely to 
accelerate the diversification of ownership in China's SOEs, and as a result, it will 
transforin corporate govemance. 
According to QFII, there are some restrictions on investment activities. For 
example, Article 20 stipulates equity ownership ceilings: first, it states that "shares 
held by each QFII in one listed company should not exceed 10 percent of total 
outstanding shares; " second, "total shares held by all QFIIS in one listed company 
should not exceed 20 percent of total outstanding shares. " However, the role of QFIIs 
in molding disclosure and governance standards will be great. The QFII scheme, and 
the concomitant increase in such demand, carries the potential to play a significant 
role in China's further evolution from state-run to market-driven economy and in 
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improvement of corporate governance. Much will rely on its probable influence on the 
three key determinants: "(1) demand for further financial disclosure reform; (2) 
manager's incentives to comply with disclosure requirements; (3) managers' 
incentives to voluntarily disclose additional infonnation. 55637 In a word, the QFII 
scheme will carry tremendous potential as a vehicle for raising corporate governance 
standards in China; in particular, maybe institutional investors will facilitate the speed 
of privatization of state-owned shares and be beneficial to the improvement of 
corporate governance. That is, if the shares of the state in listed companies in China 
are privatized, institutional investors will play great role in the improvement of 
corporate governance, although institutional investors may bring about negative effect 
too, such as short-tennism and the abuse of infonnation. 
11.2.3. The role of commercial bank 
Creditor banks can exert control over corporate governance in debtor enterprises in 
several ways in some countries. 638 Banks play an important role in corporate 
governance in Gennany and Japan, and banks as both shareholders and creditors can 
enjoy access to extensive infonnation and have representatives on the board. Banks as 
creditors can exercise influence over companies as borrowers based on laws and 
contracts, in particular banks can exercise influence over corporate governance in the 
637 See Michael J. Ferguson, Paul B. McGuinness, 2004. 'Chinese Secunties Reforrn: The Role of QFlls in the 
Corporate Governance Process. Bw4ness Horizons, Vol. 47, No. 2, Cvlarch-April), pl) 5-1-61. 
638 See Cheryl Gray, 1997, 'Creditors Crucial Role in Corporate Governance', Finance and Development 34, pp 
29-32. 
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case of default, for example, once a debtor defaults on repayment or on the verge of 
bankruptcy, the bank can trigger court actions, such as foreclosure on collateral, 
liquidation, or reorganization of the finn. The mere threat of such an action by the 
bank will make managers run the companies more efficiently rather than in interests 
of themselves so that corporate governance could be improved. With regard to the 
anbove methods of banks, legislation, the court system and the history of the countries 
or regions will determine their effectiveness to the extent. 639 However, banks in 
China have little influence on corporate governance or companies' strategic decisions, 
because until the mid-1990s the credit decisions of state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBS) were often not driven by the borrower's creditworthiness or the financial 
merits of their projects, but mainly by governments. In addition, the Commercial 
Bank Law prohibits commercial banks from having ownership of shares in 
non-financial institutions. Bank loans have traditionally been regarded as grants from 
the state designed to rescue failing firms. State-owned banks still remain a monopoly 
in the Chinese banking sector, and profit is not their paramount objective, but such 
cases are changing greatly after China became the member of WTO. The banking 
system can not have any real effect on the operation of companies because the share 
ownership of the four biggest banks is held by the state. 640 Of course, the market for 
private, non-bank debt has yet to be established, and there is no active merger or 
takeover activity in stock markets to discipline management. 
639 See Stoyan Tenev and Chunlin Zhang with Loup Breform, 2002, 'Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Refon-n in China Building the Institutions of Modem Markets', World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporate Washington, D. C p 56. 
640 Some of banks have been or will be listed on the Stock exchange, for example, the bank of China, 
bank of 
industry and commercial, bank of construction have been listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
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In China, the state used to have to subsidize losses, either in the fonn of grants or 
policy bank loans due to the poor perfon-nance of a SOE. Generally speaking, the state 
was responsible for SOEs' performance due to policy burdens, by providing financial 
support. However, no matter whether the bad performance was caused by policy 
burden, or by the management's incompetence or opportunistic behaviours due to 
information asymmetry, the state would provide financial support for the SOEs loss. 
Not surprisingly, SOEs accumulated enough non-repayable bank loans to qualify the 
major banks in China for bankruptcy, by any criteria. According to a survey by China 
central bank (the People's Bank of China), by the end of 2000,51.2% of the 62.656 
enterprises had failed to repay bank debts. The non-perfonning loan ratios in the 
state-owned banking system were up to between 25 and 30%. In other word, the poor 
financial performance of a large number of SOEs, including state-controlled listed 
companies, led to huge risk that was beyond the capacity of the banking system, and 
was also a potential menace to financial stability. 641 
In the context of China, why did state banks often make "soft loans"to SOEs to 
save them from possible bankrup tCY? 
642 This was because SOEs always made a great 
contribution in offering a wide range of social services to employees and their 
families and in maintaining social stability. 643 The loss-making enterprises always 
made a contribution to the stability of society. But "soft loan" is in contravention of 
the rules of a market economy 
641 See Qu Qiang, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and State-owned Shares in China Listed Companies', Journal of 
Asian Economic 14, at 78 1. 
642 See Lu, D., &, Tang, Z., 1997, *State Intervention and Business in China', Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
643 Bai, C., Li, D., Tai, Z., & Wang, Y 2000, 'A Multi-task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform', Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 28(4), pp 716-738. 
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So far in China banks do not play as prominent a monitoring role as they do in 
Japan and Germany. This is because who and how much should be loaned were often 
steered by politics or policies of the past and because of the "soft budget" constraint 
of SOEs. 644 Banks typically played a role in the restructuring of SOEs only at times 
of distress or near-insolvency. In other words, when SOEs were at the edge of 
bankruptcy or in financial trouble, banks were forced by governments to support 
them. 
Today China seems to be relaxing the strict separation between commercial and 
investment banking. The PBOC issued the Provisional Regulations on Intermediary 
Business of Commercial Banks, which states that following PBOC approval, 
commercial banks can engage in financial derivatives, securities, investment fund 
trusteeships, and infonnation and financial consulting. This will be an open new 
mechanism for bank involvement in corporate governance. Now some banks have 
been listed or will be listed on a stock exchange and this means that state-owned 
banks have been or will be privatized in part. Maybe banks will play a positive role in 
the corporate governance of listed companies in the future. 
11.3. Conclusion 
In order to improve the corporate governance of listed companies in China, the 
structure of concentrated ownership must be adjusted properly. Therefore two steps 
644 See Qian, Y, k Roland, G 1998, 'Federalism and the soft budget constraint', American Economic Review, 88 
(5), p 1143. 
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must be taken at least. First of all, all of the non-tradable shares must, bit by bit, be 
made tradable on a stock exchange (now these measures are under way by the 
Chinese Government and all shares owned by state will be tradable soon). Secondly, 
most of the state-owned shares in listed companies must be sold off. If the above is 
successful, the following results are possible: (1) The opportunity for direct 
interference by governments in the management of listed companies will be 
impossible or very limited, because governments have no share or only a small share 
in listed companies. Governments will be able to influence the listed companies only 
by means of policies and laws instead of by the way of share ownership. For example, 
governments will have no right to appoint, or dismiss the members of the board of 
directors, or managers. (2) Reducing illegal or immoral transactions by governments 
directly or indirectly. Because the state as the largest shareholder always engages in 
transactions which are harmful to other shareholders, for example, related-party 
transactions, parent company or holding company borrowing money from banks but 
using assets of listed companies as pledge, tunneling. (3) Listed companies will be 
managed in accordance with the rules of the market. Because listed companies are 
controlled by the way of shares owned by the state, governments always require listed 
companies to focus on more employment and stability of society rather than 
profitability. If the largest shareholder is not the state, listed companies will have the 
aim maximizing profits according to the rules of the market. 
In a word, if the problem of the structure of concentrated ownership of listed 
companies is settled, there will be a chance for the improvement of the corporate 
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governance of listed companies in China. The solution to the improvement of the 
corporate governance of listed companies in China is the reform of the structure of 
concentrated ownership. That is to say, privatization, growth of institutional investors, 
and the promotion of the role of commercial banks will be beneficial to the 
improvement of corporate governance in China. 
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In order to support the argument that the structure of share ownership determines the 
model of corporate governance in the world, this part has shown that the argument is 
correct and reasonable based on the analysis of listed companies in China. 
This thesis argues that the structure of ownership in China has been concentrated 
since ancient times, which has had a close relationship with history, culture, politics, 
law and economy etc. But the structure of concentrated ownership in China is 
detennined ultimately by economy. Whether in ancient times, in the central planning 
economy, or in the socialist market economy, only the structure of concentrated 
ownership could adapt to the particular requirements of the economic surroundings. 
But the structure of concentrated ownership must now be reformed to adapt to the 
development of the economy, although the structure of concentrated ownership has 
been influenced by other elements such as politics, law, history, culture. 
The quality of corporate governance of listed companies in China is so poor 
because the state is a majority shareholder in most listed companies, which are 
controlled by the state through shares. In other words, the state always interferes in 
the operation of listed companies for the sake of its goals instead of the maximization 
of profitability. The state as the biggest shareholder, governed by the Communist 
Party, has completely controlled most of the listed companies in the interests of 
political aims, and the major agency problem is the conflict of interest between the 
state as the majority shareholder and other shareholders as minority shareholders in 
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listed companies. Therefore it is not surprising that the corporate governance of listed 
companies is poor in China. The structure of share ownership directly determines 
corporate govemance. 
If the corporate governance of listed companies in China is to be improved, the 
structure of concentrated share ownership must be reformed properly as a 
precondition. The thesis argues that most shares owned by the state must be sold off in 
accordance with the rules of the market, as one kind of privatization. Only when the 
refonnation of the structure of concentrated share ownership is successful, is there a 
possibility of the improvement in corporate governance of listed companies in China. 
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Concluding remarks 
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12.1. Final Remarks 
Corporate governance is a very hot topic in the fields of economics, jurisprudence, 
management etc. How to improve corporate governance has been emphasized by all 
the countries and some international organizations in the world. This thesis argues that 
the structure of ownership determines the model of corporate governance all over the 
world 
In 1932, Berle and Means put forward the famous theory of "separation of 
ownership from control". According to the theory, the agency problem is the conflict 
of interest between shareholders and management. Berle and Means laid emphasis on 
the importance of supervision over management. Since then, management has become 
mainly the objective of the discipline of the articles, memorandum, law and policy. 
This conventional view is built on the proposition that the agency problem arises 
between shareholders and management in an efficient market through which 
managers will be disciplined or threatened to be replaced due to their poor 
perforinance by takeover and shareholders are able to exit freely by selling their 
shares. However, the theory of "separation of ownership from control" can only be 
applied to the structure of dispersed ownership in some countries, which are fewer 
compared to those where there is a structure of concentrated ownership. Thus the 
theory of "separation of ownership from control" has been doubted by many scholars 
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since the 1970s. In other words, there are more countries where the structures of 
ownership of firms is concentrated and the major agency problem is conflict of 
interest between the largest shareholders and minority ones, while there are countries 
where the agency problem arises between management and shareholders. 
Corporate governance is so important that almost all countries and some 
international organizations are studying it. However, what detennines corporate 
govemance? Is there a best fonn of corporate govemance which should be followed? 
Different scholars in varying disciplines have given distinct answers on these 
questions. With regard to the detenninants of corporate governance, there are two 
influential theories, namely "politics matters" by Mark. Roe, and "law matters" by La 
Porta et. al. with which this thesis does not agree. As a rule, the thesis argues that it is 
the structure of ownership that directly determines the model of corporate governance 
in place of the theory of "separation of ownership from control" by Berle and Means, 
politics by Mark. Roe, and law by La Porta et. al. 
Maybe the theory of "separation of ownership from control" by Berle and 
Means, politics by Mark. Roe, and law by La Porta et al. could be applied to particular 
countries or regions at particular times. But as a rule, it is the structure of ownership 
that deten-nines the model of corporate govemance. Because the structure of 
ownership is composed of shares that are derived from, but differ from, rights of 
ownership, they are property rights and are not changeable except under special 
conditions such as war and revolution. Thus, selling, buying, donating and giving up 
or other transactions in shares can only be carried out legally by owners in person or 
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by their agents. Although sometimes owners of shares may not be concerned about 
what happens to the firm due to costs and information asymmetry, they do care about 
the share itself and they vote with their feet when they have no choice but to sell it. In 
fact, the model of corporate governance is the result of the compromise between 
shareholders and stakeholders in a given firm. 
This thesis argues that politics and law only create a bad or good environment 
for corporate governance. This environment may be in good condition, leading to the 
improvement of corporate governance, or in a bad condition, leading to the 
deterioration of corporate governance. But it can not detennine corporate governance. 
If politics or law can detennine corporate governance, why are they not transplanted 
into countries where corporate governance is poor? It is impossible. In practice, 
fonner Soviet Union countries and Eastern European countries tried to follow the 
model of Western law and politics, but this corporate governance is not good as 
expected. In these countries the structure of ownership becomes concentrated again 
soon after the refonn, although the law and politics in the countries have changed to 
follow Western countries, because the structure of ownership is affected by many facts, 
such as politics, law, culture, history and the economy, but mainly by the economy. 
China, the biggest developing country, has been ruled by the Communist Party 
only since 1949, and according to the logic of politics by Mark Roe or law by La 
Porta et al., corporate governance should be better because the Communist Party as 
ruler could determine or make law and policy on corporate governance. In fact, the 
politics and laws of the Communist Party have profoundly influenced firms but have 
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not improved the corporate governance of listed companies. On the contrary, the state 
as a tool of the Communist Party, has a large shareholding in firms, and firms are 
controlled by way of this shareholding to realize the aims of employment and stability 
of society in place of the profit of enterprises. Why does the Communist Party only 
control listed companies and interfere in the management of listed companies and not 
other forms of enterprises? The answer is simple: through their shareholding. As a 
result, the corporate governance of listed companies is very poor, because the state is 
the biggest shareholder in most listed companies and the Communist Party controls 
these listed companies through the shares owned by the state. Therefore, the structure 
of concentrated ownership of listed companies must be reformed properly by 
diversification before the improvement of corporate governance of listed companies 
in China is possible. 
In a word, by analysis based on the experience of corporate governance across 
the world, this thesis draws a conclusion: the structure of ownership detennines the 
model of corporate governance. There is not a best form of corporate governance for 
companies all over the world, only a form of corporate governance suitable for a 
given country or region in the world. 
12.2. The contribution of this research 
To my knowledge, with regard to corporate governance and the structure of 
corporation, Berle and Means put forward the famous theory of separation of control 
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from ownership in 1932, which for the first time is recognized the cause of conflict of 
interest between shareholders and management. However, the theory only applies to 
countries which have the structure of dispersed ownership of the corporation. 
Although the theory is very significant, its function is very limited. With the 
development of economics, more and more scholars doubt the theory of Berle and 
Means. Influenced by Berle and Means and Coase's theory, and based on the theory of 
Alchian and Demsetz from the 1970s onward, agency theory argues that the 
relationship between shareholders and management is a relationship of principal and 
agent, which explains the cause of conflict of interest in detail and suggests the 
solution to the agency problem by various ways, such as market, contract, and 
compensation. The representatives of the agency theory are Jensen and Meckling. The 
agency theory is very popular even today. Since the 1980s more and more scholars 
have analyzed corporate governance from different perspectives across the world, but 
the most influential research of the 1990s was from the perspective of law and politics, 
the representatives of the former are La Porta et al. and the latter are Mark J. Roe etc. 
Of course, there are many other scholars who do research on corporate governance by 
means of other methods. 
The above theories do not explain perfectly the phenomenon or the puzzle of 
corporate govemance. I have tried to work hard at it from the perspective of the 
structure of share ownership. So this thesis has for the first time carried out 
comprehensive research on the relationship between corporate governance and 
ownership through the structure of share ownership, based on the achievements of 
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other scholars. The thesis argues that the structure of share ownership determines the 
model of corporate governance all over the world and the argument is supported by 
the case of Chinese listed companies. 
12.3. Limitation of the research 
Although there are many scholars from varying disciplines who are studying 
corporate governance, few are doing research on the relationship between ownership 
and corporate governance from the globe perspective. Most scholars study the 
relationship between ownership and performance in a few listed companies in a given 
country or countries by econometrics or economic analysis. Or some scholars only 
study corporate governance in a country or a few countries with dispersed share 
structure, or in a country or a few countries with concentrated share structure country. 
With regard to research on corporate governance in the jurisprudence, scholars in law 
focus on the study of whether a model of corporate governance will be divergent or 
convergent, or how to improve corporate governance in traditional ways such as the 
enforcement of disclosure, the strength of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and care of 
directors, the improvement of independent directors, the control of management, etc. 
Therefore materials which could be referred to by this thesis are limited in extent, 
particularly with respect to helpful materials from the viewpoint of law. 
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12.4. Suggestions for further research 
For the first time, I have come to the conclusion that the structure of share ownership 
determines a model of corporate governance and there is no best model of corporate 
governance. The model of corporate governance adapts to the economy in the country 
in question. 
Although the thesis comprehensively analyzes the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate governance, it seems it is true, namely ownership 
structure determines corporate governance. If a mathematical model can be designed 
in the future to demonstrate the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate governance, the scholars in all disciplines will be convinced of the fact that 
ownership structure determines the model of corporate governance, this will be my 
next research project. 
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